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ABSTRACT
THE CIVILIZING PROCESS FROM ABOVE: CULTURE AND STATE
IN TURKEY, 1923-1945
Yılmaz Çolak
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assc. Prof Dr. Ahmet İçduygu
July 2000
This dissertation deals with the formation of the official notion of culture during 
the early Republican era (1923-1945) from a historico-political perspective. This 
formation reflected the civilizing process from above, directed and determined by the 
state. The dissertation will analyze the legal and institutional bases of the discursive 
formation of culture by focusing on the cultural institutions of the Republic, especially 
the THS and the TLS. Here, the concept of culture will be examined as inherent to the 
state and its project, promoting the construction of an identity. The dissertation will 
discuss that culture in the state discourse, overlapping all expressed through civilization, 
denoted the modern state of mind and way of life as a high, developed category and so 
came to be the name of re-ordering and re-cultivating the society, taming the people and 
creating future-generations. Based on a hierarchical and assimilationist understanding, it 
was the sole means to determine the scope of the public sphere and membership to both 
political and cultural community. In this sense, it is inclusionary and, at the same time, 
exclusionary. The Kemalist notion of culture as construction has become more and more 
a politically contested issue, which has put its stamp on Turkish political life.




YUKARDAN AŞAĞIYA MEDENİLEŞTİRME SÜRECİ; TÜRKİYE’DE KÜLTÜR VE
DEVLET, 1923-1945
Yılmaz Çolak
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu
Temmuz 2000
Bu çalışma, erken Cumhuriyet döneminde (1923-1945) resmi kültür anlayışının 
oluşumunu tarihsel-siyasal bir çerçeve içinde ele almaktadır. Devletin sevk ve idare ettiği 
yukardan aşağıya medenileştirme süreci, bu oluşumun gösterdiği kültür-inşasının 
gidişatını belirlemektedir. Bu tez. Cumhuriyetin kültür kurumlarına değinerek kültürün 
söylemsel kurgulanmasının resmi ve kurumsal temellerini incelemektedir. Bu nokta, 
kültür kavramı devlet ve onun yürüttüğü siyasal proje ile bir bütün olarak 
çözümlenmektedir. Bu çalışmada, devlet söylemi içerisinde medeniyet kavramı ile 
örtüşen kültür kavramı gelişmiş ve modern bir mentaliteyi ve hayat tarzını belirtmekte 
olduğu ve toplumu şekillendirme, halkı ehlileştirme ve gelecek nesiller yaratma 
iradesinin ve faaliyetinin adı olarak belirdiği tartışılmaktadır. Bu kültürlendirme ve 
kimliklendirme anlayışıdır ki, hiyerarşik ve asimilasyonist bir mantığa dayanmaktadır. 
Bu bağlamda, kamusal alanın ve siyasal üyeliğin sınırları belirlenmektedir. Belirlenen 
sınırlar Kemalizmin kültür yaklaşımının hem kapsayıcı hem de dışlayıcı olduğunu 
göstermektedir. Sonuçta, siyasal bir süreçte inşa edilmişliğin getirdiği özellik, Türk 
siyasal yaşamını öteden beri etkilemekte olan resmi kültür tanımını tartışmalı bir konu 
haline getirmiştir.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this dissertation is to explore the process of the formation 
of the Kemalist discourse on culture during the early Republican period (1923-1945), 
and, in doing so, to show how a form of culture was effectively produced, re-produced 
and disseminated by the state. In order to achieve this aim, it focuses mainly on 
ideological, legal and institutional bases of the civilizing rulers’ notion of culture from a 
historical and political perspective, and history and language policies maintained as its 
foundation by the Turkish History Society, THS {Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK) and the 
Turkish Language Society, TLS {Türk DU Kurumu, TDK). In other words, the 
dissertation analyzes in a detailed account the efforts to construct and inculcate new 
myths, linguistic forms, rituals and habits by attempting to examine the activities of the 
cultural institutions of the Republic, but not popular resistance to the state policies and 
various formulations of culture among the intellectual circles of the period. In this sense, 
it argues that what these institutions worked for was a culture production, which was very 
influential in determining the scope of the public sphere and the boundaries of 
membership.
The rationale for such a study may be found in two main developments. The first 
is connected with a global search for establishing a new conceptual and symbolic
universe to every sphere of life undergoing a rapid transformation. That means that we 
live in the age of the “postmodern version of modernity” ' in which all concepts 
regulating social, political, economic and international relations have been questioned 
and re-defmed. It is coupled with the rising tide of globalization and particularization^ 
through which transnational forces from above and identity politics from below erode the 
rule and practicing of the traditional state system, and, at the same time, the idea of state 
based on a homogenized nation within a nation-state. Thus, the result is to question the 
certainties of the nation-state such as nation, citizenship and sovereignty. In this vein, 
nation-building, nationalism, culture and identity have come to the fore as the most 
stressed topics, especially in terms of their relations to the state and its homogenizing 
attempts.^ In the last two decades, more emphasis has been placed on difference rather
' This signifies the condition where a series of uncertainties deeply affect all aspects of 
human life. See Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and Its Discontent (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1997), 3, 21-25. In this age, the terms “civilization” and “culture”are among the 
most disputed aspects of modernity: here, it is “civilisation, generally used to refer to 
processes which have made human being more civilized, and less savage. This 
connotation has been criticised within the postmodern circles, regarding Western ideal of 
civilisation or its civilising mission that, through the meta narratives of reason, progress 
and freedom, have brought destruction and disappointment to human being.” John 
Rundell and Stephen Mennel, “Introduction: Civilization, Culture and the Human Self- 
Image”, in Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennell 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 2.
 ^ Both are closely interrelated, while seeming contradictory. See Ronald 
Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992).
 ^ It is obvious in the new literature on nationalism and nation-building. For the 
reviews of these studies on these topics see Benedict Anderson, “Introduction”, in 
Mapping the Nation, ed. G. Balakrishnan (New York: Verso, 1996), 1-16; Anthony D. 
Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of 
Nations.” Nations and Nationalism. 1/1 (1995); Michael Schudson, “Culture and the 
Integration of National Societies”, in The Sociology o f Culture, ed. Diana Crane (Oxford: 
Balckwell, 1994), 21-43; Special issue on Nationalism, Critical Review, 10/2 (Spring 
1996); David Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalism?” Nations and Nationalism. 
5/2 (1999), 281-302.
than sameness, heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, multiculturalism rather than 
monoculturalism, etc. Within this context, culture as an idea and discourse have become a 
more contested issue and means of the struggle, especially on the basis of determining 
state-society and state-individual relations.'* This is why the nation-states’ 
monoculturalism has been in every respect under assault both practically/politically and 
theoretically. Because of its peculiar position among non-Western societies, the Turkish 
case has been the subject of various recent studies in the West; and the Kemalist path of 
modernization has been criticized especially as being authoritarian and politically and 
socio-culturally failing.^ Under the light of new literature there emerges the need to 
reconsider and recover the early Republican period, in which a group of rulers strove to 
create a new society and nation. This is one of the goals of this dissertation, which 
particularly focuses on the concept of culture to understand the nature of the early 
Kemalist project of nation-building.
The second development, closely associated with the first, is about the politico- 
social, politico-cultural and socio-economic context of Turkey in the 1990s. Indeed,
See Jack David Eller, “Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism.” American Anthropologist. 
99/2 (1997), 251-253. In fact this is the struggle of “which groups and interest will hold 
power and shape the production and reproduction of society in such domains as 
education, government, institutions, and art.” Ibid., 251.
 ^ See Bobby Said, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricim and the Emergence o f  
Islamism (London: Zet Books, 1997); Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: 
Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst and Company, 1997); 
Kevin Robins, “Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe”, in Questions o f Cultural 
Identities, eds. S. Hall and P. du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 61-86; Andrew 
Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Ernest Gellner, “Kemalism”, in his Encounters with 
Nationalism (Oxford: Balckwell, 1995). Beside these, for an extensive study on critics of 
Kemalist modernization, see Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds.. Rethinking 
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1997).
throughout the 1990s, Turkish politics was overwhelmed by an intense war of images and 
symbols. In fact this condition accompanies the above-mentioned process of 
globalization bringing the questioning of the modern nation-states’ certainties. In Turkey, 
emphasizing particularistic affiliations, new social movements, namely Islamic, Kurdish, 
Women and Alawi movements, then gained more and more assertion to be represented in 
the public sphere and expanded claims to new rights. They have posed questions 
concerning the official definition of Turkish culture and the implications of this definition 
in determining membership at the political, social and cultural level. What was mainly 
contested was the scope of the public sphere coming with the idea of democratization and 
re-structuration of the state and administrative mechanisms. This occurred around 
problematizing those who are included in and who are excluded from the public sphere, 
which brought about the redefinition of state-subject relations. In this context, these 
movements were deemed by the holders of the old-age official ideology, the so-called 
Kemalists, as signs of reaction to modernity of which the official political authority has 
claimed to be the sole legitimate representative.^ Here modernity is reduced to a way of 
life. So, in fact, what occurred in the 1990s appear to be simple reflections of the struggle 
over the “essential” images, symbols and rituals belonging to the way of life Turks are 
attached to, which determines the boundaries of membership and the public sphere. The
The republicans strove to erode their visibility and reject their representation in 
the public realm. For example, Islamist opposition wanted to de-westernize culture (by 
defining an identity with rejection of the secular “other”), and Kurdish groups rejected a 
homogenized Turkish national culture. See Yılmaz Çolak and Ertan Aydın, 
“Encountering Identities: Kemalism versus Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s.” Paper 
presented at GSSA Conference on “Society at the Turn of the Century.” University of 
Toronto, Toronto, Canada, April 14-15, 1999; Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan
result was a war of culture waged by the Kemalists for re-monopolizing “the legitimate 
use of culture”. It was stimulated by nostalgia for the golden age of Kemalism^, the 
1930s, in response to the felt discontinuity in the Kemalist tradition of culture. The war 
ended with the process initiated by the 28 February decisions,^ which sought to redefine 
the “enemies” of the Republic and re-canonize the tradition. This re-canonization reached 
its peak point during the celebrations of the 75“’ Anniversary of the Republic (1998).^
Soyarik, “What is the Matter With Citizenship? A Turkish Debate. 
Sindies. 35 /4 (1999), 187-208.
Middle Eastern
’ In the literature on the Turkish politics, Kemalism is usually used to refer to the 
name of the official ideology. While employing it in its general sense as an ideology, this 
dissertation applies the term ideology in line with Raymond Williams. In its relation to 
cultural production he uses ideology to describe “the formal and conscious beliefs'’ of a 
specific group -  “as in the common usage of ‘ideological’ to indicate general principles 
or theoretical positions or ... dogmas.” See Raymond Williams, The Sociology o f Culture 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 26-29. But here, like culture, ideology 
is also subject to a set of processes by which it is itself produced. This occurs in power 
relations including tensions and struggles as well as harmony. This usage makes it 
possible to relate the production of ideology to specific classes or groups who conduct the 
route of culture production. In the early Republican case, it was a ruling circle composed 
of Mustafa Kemal and his close colleagues. After 1930 the efforts to form an official 
ideology, called Kemalism, was speeded up and resulted in some ‘ordered’ works in 
which the boundaries of new ideology were to some extent determined. See Mediha 
Muzaffer, Inkilabm Ruhu [The Spirit of the Revolution] (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 
1933); Tekin Alp, La Kamalism (Paris: Alcan, 1937); Peyami Safa, Türk İnkilabma 
Bakışlar [Perspectives on the Turkish Revolution] (İstanbul: Ötüken Yay., 1993) 
(original publication 1938); Mehmet Saffet Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri [The 
Principles of Kemalism’s Revolution], two vol. (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938); 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali [Atatürk Revolution], ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yay., 1995) (original publication 1940). Kemalism as a name of the official political 
doctrine took place in the RPP’s 1935 and 1939 programs as a form of Kamalizm in 1935 
program and Kemalizm in 1939 program. After the Atatürk era, Kemalism was made 
more systematized and reproduced again and again, but remained as the ideology of the 
state and as the formal and deliberate creed of the ruling group.
* This reflected a sort of quasi-military intervention in the politics, occurring in 
February 28, 1997.
Through the celebrations, like the ones held in the 1930s, some activities such as 
organizing “republican balls and dance parties” were revived and expanded countrywide.
Here, attempts were made to revitalize the “spirit” of the Republic manufactured during 
the early Republican period.
In this study it will be shown that many of the themes running through politics of 
culture in the 1990s were part and parcel of a discursive formation within which the 
Kemalist notion of culture made its first appearance during the formative years of the 
Kemalist regime. For that reason, any analysis of the formation seems to be necessary to 
understand the political causes behind the contemporary polarization in the socio-political 
life of Turkey due to a constant war over cultural symbols.
The stand may be justified with a reasoning that cultural revivalism in Turkey, or 
anywhere else, has inevitably taken shape within the frame of the nation-state’s 
nationalist projects, which have discursively produced their own imagined communities^” 
through defining a new belonging around essential modes of behavior, historical images, 
symbols, and so on. Like their counterparts, the new social movements in Turkey came 
within a modern context of power (shaped to a greater extent by Kemalist nationalism), 
providing “alternative” imagined communities by reconstructing the past and present for 
a sake of new identity.’* That is, they have constituted a process of “othering”. Therefore 
in some sense they have to be thought of as the heirs of the Kemalist project of
Participation in such activities was deemed to be symbols of being Kemalist and modern. 
The state agents, media, private sector, labor unions and civil organizations participated 
to the celebration of the Republic in such an unusual way that their foremost agenda was 
to preserve and perpetuate the values and norms of the Republic.
For imagined communities, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections o f the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).
” Thus, all revival groups can not be seen as “the awakening or the return of the 
repressed [as the post-Orientalist/post-Kemalists did], but a modernist reinvention of the 
past.” Yael Navaro-Yashin, “Travesty and Truth: Politics of Culture and Fantasies of The
modernity. In this process the definition of culture has become more and more a 
contested issue between the pioneers of the official ideology and revival identities. The 
formative decades of the Republic has been at the center of this debate and therefore 
regularly revisited for both critiques and revitalization.
Thus this study, stressing on continuity in history, aims at being one of the 
scholarly visits to this period as a political analysis of the process of culture production 
by focusing on its ideological and institutional bases. It tries to portray the process of how 
new standards including new myths, symbols and rituals were produced through the new 
disciplinary agents of the Republic. In doing so, it will be shown that the state, as an 
ultimate producer and initiator of the Kemalist project of modernity, had been an 
effective agent in defining, advancing and diffusing a form of cultural identity. This is 
based on the assumption that culture is discursively produced, reproduced and spread by 
means of the school system, quasi-professional cultural institutions, the military and the 
media. However, it is not the intention of this dissertation to claim that the state in Turkey 
was an absolute, omnipotent, all-seeing and all-controlling mechanism, but just to 
consider it as an active agent and sole authorized power in determining the boundaries of 
“legitimate” culture. In this regard the official discourse on culture is not simply 
evaluated as an intellectual production, but examined by situating into a politico- 
historical and politico-social context. So, this dissertation highlights the role of
State in Turkey.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, January 1998, 
41, and for a more details, see its introductoiy chapter.
The Turkish polity during the formative years of the Republic was based 
principally on a state-centered legitimization reducing any potential and alternative power 
centers. Davison calls this polity as ‘“state-dominant monoparty authoritarianism”, 
reflecting the new regime’s interest in exploiting the traditional relations of power.” 
Davison, Secularism, 141.
institutional and administrative transformations and the state agents to put into practice 
those manufactured cultural forms as part of everyday life in the process of culture 
production. At that point, it argues that the Republic’s new cultural institutions came to 
have a decisive role in the production, and that it was this discursive formation of culture 
that lies at the heart of the Kemalist nation-building process.
In recent times the subjects of nation building, nationalism, nationalist history, 
national identity and ethnicity in Turkey have become the topic of several studies. All 
these studies, tackling with the formative years of the Republic and later developments 
from various angles of nation-building, base their arguments on a model evolved around 
ethnic versus civic nationalism. This dichotomous model has recently attracted many 
criticisms that reject the idealization of the civic model as only a political entity free from 
any cultural bias. In fact, cultural artifacts are inherent to both conceptions, and so all that 
is collected under the name of “civic” is also bound up with a specific conception of
For examples, see Büşra Ersanli Behar, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de "Resmi 
Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu [Power and History: The Formation of “Official History” Thesis 
in Turkey], ed. (Istanbul: Afa, 1996); Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk 
Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları” [State Seeking its Own Nation; Paradoxes of Turkish 
Nationalism]. Türkiye Günlüğü. 33 (March-April 1995), 91-100; Ahmet İçduygu, 
“Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Kavramı Üzerine Tartışmaların Arkaplanı” [Background of the 
Discussions on Citizenship in Turkey]. Diyalog. 1/1 (1996), 134-147; Poulton, Top Hat, , 
Ahmet Yıldız, “Search for an Ethno-Secular Delimitation of National Identity in the 
Kemalist Era.” Unpublished Ph D. Dissertation, Bilkent University, May 1998.
It works through dual categories, civic / western / liberal / individualistic versus 
ethnic / eastern / cultural / collectivistic. This formulation dates back to Meinecke’s 
distinction between the staatsnation and the kulturnation. Later H. Kohn formulated it as 
Western and Eastern nationalism. A. Smith, with a minor modification, calls it as civic 
and ethnic nationalism. The first of the pairs are deemed as good, and the second, bad. 
See Brown, “Are There,” 284-286.
culture.’  ^Beyond this dichotomy, as Nieguth argues, new “organising principles” such as 
“ancestry”, “race,” “culture” and “territory” may be employed to define the “boundaries 
of civic and ethnic nations.”*^  In this sense, this dissertation uses the concept of culture to 
revisit the French and German models and highlights two dominant notions of culture. 
All discussions about the formation of the idea and discourse of culture throughout the 
thesis include to some extent a comparison with that of these two dominant conceptions.
This dissertation contemplates culture not simply as an entity reflecting given and 
distinctive set of values, as in its anthropological definition, but as “constructed” 
regarding its relation to the nation-state and nationalism. In other words, it is always 
subject to a process of constant production, as a significant tool of projecting a new social 
order. Due to being integral to power relations within the confinement of the modern 
nation-state, culture seems to be always “contested, contingent and historically 
grounded,” and so it is “a constituting element of political action and identity.” It is for
See Will Kymlicka, “Misunderstanding Nationalism.” Dissent. (Winter 1995), 
130-137; idem. States, Nations and Cultures (Assen; Van Gorcum, 1997), 22-27; Bernard 
Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation.” Critical Review. 10/2 (1996); Tim Nieguth, 
“Beyond Dichotomy; Concepts of the Nation and the Distribution of Membership.” 
Nations and Nationalism. 5/2 (1999).
16 Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 155-56.
I draw here from the recent dominant trend in the analysis of culture. In this 
trend, the classical anthropological concept of culture reflecting a set of “shared” values 
by all members of a specific society has been challenged through embedding it into 
power relations and specific contexts. “If we speak of culture as shared, we must now 
always ask “By whom?” and “In what ways?” and “Under what conditions?”.” See 
Nicholas B. Dirks, G. Eley and S. B. Ortner, “Introduction,” in Culture/Power/History, 
eds. Dirks, Eley and Ortner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3.
Kay B. Warren, “Introduction: Revealing Conflicts Across Cultures and 
Disciplines”, in The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Divided
this reason that culture plays a decisive role in the construction of nations and national 
identities. The basic goal of the architects of national cultures and identities is to provide 
a link between membership to the political community (state) and belonging to the 
cultural community (nation), which both constitute the status of citizenship. All these 
make culture and state more matched. This sense of culture may be related to Bourdieu’s 
concept of “habitus”, a structure of common ideas, concepts or perception patterns; in 
constructing this habitus, the state has an active role through all its agents and 
mechanisms.*^ It is in this respect that culture as a constituting part of the nation is 
regarded as a product of the political discourse of nationalism. It is a nationalist ideology 
of the nation-state which standardizes and subjugates all perceived qualities of living 
culture. Here, in the course of nation-building during the nineteenth century, culture 
became the primary interest of the state.^ ** The state during this time began to see culture 
as both its object and instrument in its project of transforming and shaping society.^* 
Briefly, by means of its policies and institutions the nation-state formulated its own
Nations, ed. Kay B. Warren (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 17. This stand is also very 
akin to Hall’s analysis of production; seeing “identity as a ‘production’ which is never 
complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside representation... 
Not an identity grounded in archeology, but in the re-telling of the past.” Stuart Hall, 
“Cultural Identity and Diaspora”, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A 
Reader, eds. P. Williams and L. Chrisman (New York: Harvester, 1993), 392-93.
Pierre Bourdiue, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the 
Bureaucratic Field.” Sociological Theory. 12/1 (1994), 7.
See Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
This was based on a modernist program of culture or civilization constituting 
“an active politics and policy of culture... to transform ways of life”. Tony Bennett, 
Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London: Sage Publication, 1998), 104.
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culture as part of its project for social engineering. This might be seen as the top-down 
formulation and production of culture.
Culture is in general used to designate “a developed state of mind” (as a cultured 
person), “the processes of this development” (“as in ‘cultural interests’, ‘cultural 
activities’”), “the means of these processes” (“as in culture as ‘the arts’ and ‘human 
intellectual works’”) . I n  this sense there exist two dominant views of culture, 
formulated by Williams as idealist and materialist positions. The first sees this way of 
life as unique, ahistoric, unchangeable, inherited from the long history. This organic and 
distinctive view is used in this study in connection with the Romantic conception of 
culture. The second, based on constructivist understanding, evaluates a “whole way of 
life” as something changed and controlled by the human will. Mainly as a product of 
Enlightenment philosophy and French revolution, it is based on human self-cultivation 
and cultivation of the ideal, covering and designating this life as a more developed and 
civilized category. This study employs this position as the French conception of culture.
This dissertation, stressing a relation between culture and the state - which lies at 
the center of the process of nation-building - through focusing on the above-mentioned 
two dominant notions of culture, examines the place of culture in the Kemalist project of 
modernization. Its basic assumption is that any analysis of culture production during the
Williams, The Sociology, 11. It is often associated with the anthropological and 
sociological use to denote “the ‘whole way of life’ of a distinct people or other social 
group.” Ibid.
Williams sees the former as the idealist position based on the informing spirit 
which is expressed in “the whole range of social activities but most evident in 
‘specifically cultural’ activities -  a language, styles of art, kinds of intellectual work.” 
The second, as the materialist position, sees culture “the signifying system through which
II
early Republican era makes it possible to understand to a greater extent the dynamics 
behind all disputes over the scope of the public sphere that has largely been under the 
control of the state mechanism. Furthermore, it argues that all official efforts towards 
nation-building in this era were accompanied by the crystallization of a hierarchical and 
assimilative notion o f culture.
The content and meaning of this culture was defined by a group of the ruling elite 
with a mission to civilize the “ignorant” and “unconscious” people. In fact, their stand 
reflected a sort of the “civilizing process” which is used by Norbert Elias to refer to the 
long process of the emergence of modern society later accompanying the state formation 
and nation building in Europe. '^^ In the hands of the Kemalists it turned into a “civilizing” 
pressure on the people through the disciplinary practices by means of schooling and adult 
education in the army and the People’s Houses and Rooms, and so the Kemalist model 
may be formulated as a civilizing process from above^^ Through this process, deliberate 
efforts were made to bring “civilization” and “culture” to the people believed to be
necessarily ... a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.” 
Ibid., 11-13.
The civilizing processes implies the development of social standards relating, 
for instance, to manners about eating, washing, spitting, blowing one’s nose, urinating 
and defecating, and undressing. In the process these standards were absorbed as habits in 
a mostly implicit ways. Later they gradually became the civilizing devices in the hands of 
modern state imposing on their citizens. See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The 
History o f Manners, vol. I, tans. Edmund Jebhcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
“ This modeling reflects the nature of the Kemalist project promoting, in the 
words of Göle, “state-centered modernization from above.” This understanding of 
modernization gave way “detraditionalizing the past” and the creation of “new” legal, 
cultural and social forms from above. See Nilüfer Göle, “The Freedom of Seduction for 
Muslim New Perspectives Quarterly. 3/15 (1998).
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“backward” and “savage”. T h u s  Kemalist nationalism came to be a reaction to 
“backwardness” (regarded resulting from the philosophy and system of the ancien 
régime, or the Ottoman/Islamic Empire), rather than “foreignness.
It was for this reason that the Kemalist project of modernity, promoting a 
civilizing process from above, maintained an assault against “backwardness” and 
“ignorance”. Thus it constituted in the first instance a “Cultural Revolution” intended “to 
deal a mortal blow to an entire culture and to set up a new culture, with new men.” *^ The 
goal was to transform all symbolic, spatial and substantial reminders of the 
Ottoman/Islamic past^  ^and to forge the “developed” and “civilized” way of life equipped 
with new standards. It was based on what one might call Jacobean utopianism, setting the 
political and cultural parameters for the future generations. By all regulations from dress
Charles Tilly relates this sort of the attitude of the ruler, who see the position of 
ordinary people to be “backward,” to nationalism initiated as top-down format. Charles 
Tilly, “The State of Nationalism.” Critical Review. 10/2 (1996), 304.
See Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity and Its discontents: Women and the Nation,” in 
Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, eds. Patrick Williams and 
Laura Chrisman (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). This characteristic makes the 
Turkish official nationalism different from other non-Western nationalism based on 
resentments against foreigners.
Nur Yalman, “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural 
Revolution in Turkey.” Deadalus. (1973), 154. Mardin calls it a “revolution of values.” 
Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Transformation.” International 
Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies. 2 (1971), 209. This was indeed the most emphasized 
theme in the writings of the Kemalists during the 1930s and 1940s. For two popular 
examples, see Mehmet Saffet (Engin), “Kültür İnkılabımız” [Our Culture Revolution]. 
Ülkü. 5 (June 1993), 352-354; Neşet Ömer (İrdelep), “Kültür İnkılabımız” [Our Culture 
Revolution]. Varlık. 17 (15 March 1934), 257-258.
Here the Ottoman/Islamic past was judged as the main “significant Other” of 
the new regime. See Tanil Bora, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik” [National 
Identity in the Early Republican Period], in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik [Republic, 
Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997), 58.
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to surname, and from the abolishment of the Caliphate to rewriting history it was aimed 
to pattern new symbolic representations held up only by those who internalized newly 
forged social and cultural values based on new categories of definition. For the ruling 
elite, new values, centered on new standards and categories, became the privileged names 
of civilization and culture. It was mainly the base line of the new Turks’ 
“identification”^’. In this respect, identification refers to the state commitment to define, 
defend, and preserve those values. Here, it means that the will and efforts of political 
authorities shape citizenry to identify with “produced” life forms, or culture.^^ Through 
the disciplinary and civilizing institutions of the Republic, these forms and values 
attempted to be turned into everyday practices of the people as new standards, which 
included prescriptions on how to dress, how to eat, how to look at others, how to dispose 
of spittle, how to walk, how to speak, and so forth. All gradually became the means of 
public representation.
In fact, at the center of this revolutionary zeal, there was a strong desire to form 
a new society with a new mental and emotional basis. What all these remind of us are the 
happenings after the French revolution. Here it is very akin to the Jacobean revolutionary 
tradition, reflecting the formation of a public sphere with a new symbolic universe and its 
expansion into private sphere. See Bernhard Giesen, “Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, 
and Romantics.” 127/3 (1999).
Identification, as Balibar argues, refers the processes of the construction of 
identity which is “a discourse of tradition”. This construction is “not an imaginary 
process but a processing o f the imaginary , a behaviour, a history or a singular strategy of 
the subject in his relation to the imaginary.” Etienne Balibar, “Culture and Identity 
(Working Notes)”, in The Identity in Question, ed. John Rajchman (London; Routledge, 
1995), 187.
” In fact this was realized on the basis of the connections between culture and 
policy through which, as Miller argues, citizens were formed. Here, in terms of discursive 
tactics of cultural policy, culture is charged with “the task of aiding the subject in finding 
out the truth of itself” Toby Miller, The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture, and 
the Postmodern Subject (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 39-49.
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In fact, the social structure the civilizing rulers aimed to transform was too far 
from being close to their “modernized” and “cultured” standards. Here, the clarification 
of the question of as to what kind of a social structure they applied sweeping reforms 
from above is important to understand the scope and parameters of their application. The 
society the Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire was first of all a more 
heterogeneous and traditional village society. Population structure underwent drastic 
changes from 1912 to 1923. During that time span, as a result of great military and 
political shifts,^^ the more heterogeneous structure of the Imperial society was 
transformed to some extent. This process was completed with the population exchange 
between Turkey and Greece through the mid-1920s.^'’ Although these migrations and 
population exchanges brought about a religiously homogenous societal base -a firmly 
Muslim population (approximately %99)- within the boundaries of new Turkey, there 
existed a still more heterogeneous structure regarding language and culture. The Kemalist 
nation-building project targeted the turning of this ethnically, linguistically and culturally 
heterogeneous society into a nation. This society was also a rural-based society. 
According to the 1927 census only 16.4 percent of the population lived in six cities, 
namely Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Bursa, and in fifty-two towns, with a population
”  These shifts resulted in the rise of the Muslim population in Anatolia through 
migrations from the Balkans and at the same time the decrease of the non-Muslim 
population through Armenian and Greek migrations.
It was about the mutual exchange of a Greek population in Eastern Thrace and 
Western Anatolia (more than one million) and a Turkish population in Northern Greece 
and Greek Macedonia (approximately 500,000). For the extensive study on the 
population exchange see Kemal San, Büyük Mübadele [Great Exchange] (Istanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1995); Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları 
[‘Capital Tax’ and ‘Turkification’ Policies] (İstanbul; İletişim, 2000), Chapter!
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of 10,000.^  ^The majority of the people lived in very difficult life conditions and suffered 
from infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, syphilis, etc.^  ^In addition, in 1927 
only 10 per cent of the population were literate. At the beginning of the 1920s, there was 
also insufficient transportation and communication network, and not any serious 
industrial production; there were only 341 mechanized factories, most of them small and 
ill-equipped.^^
This was a sociological profile of the Turkish society the Republican regime 
strove to make “modernized” or “civilized”. Thus, the “civilizing process from above” 
included some measures to improve the living conditions of the people through lowering 
the mortality rates and assaulting social and infectious diseases as well as through some 
structural and educational transformations to create a vigorous nation.
In this civilizing project the watchword came to be largely civilization from 1923 
to 1930 and culture from 1930 to 1945. In this way, the articulating role of the state in
For the 1927 census see Umumi Nüfus Tarihi, 1927 [General Population 
History, 1927] (Ankara: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1929); Richard D. Robinson, The 
First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), 59. The village population remained almost same in 
1935 (%16.9); it was %18 in 1940; and % 18.3, in 1945. Frederic C. Shorter, 
“Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Nüfus Yapısı ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Değişmeye Etkisi” [The 
population Structure and its Impact on Socio-Economic Changes in the First Years of the 
Republic], in Türkiye’de Sosyal Bilim Araştırmalarının Gelişimi, ed. Sevil Atauz 
(Ankara: Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 1986), 353.
Life expectancy thus was only 30 years, and also there were also great 
imbalances among different age and sex groups. Bahaeddin Yediyildiz, “Osmanlinm En 
Önemli Mirası: Türk Toplumu” [The Most Important Ottoman Inheritance: Turkish 
Society], in Osmanli [Ottoman], ed. Güler Eren, vol. V (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999), 
21 .
Robinson, The First Turkish, 103; Yediyildiz, “Osmanlmm”, 21. The lack of 
infrastructure was another feature of the society; for instance, in 1923, there existed less
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culture-production may be periodized in two broad stages, the early phases of the 
production based mainly on the concept of civilization (1923-1930), and the 
crystallization of the Republican notion of culture imagined as a “modern” state of mind 
and a “civilized” way of life (1930-1945). Within this second period, the İnönü era 
(1938-1945) came to the fore by the emphasis, in the definition of culture, on the Greek 
and Latin roots of “Western culture”, rather than historical mythicization centered on 
Central Asia mostly highlighted during the Atatürk era.
The main questions this study deal with are: what did the concept of culture mean 
for the Turkish “culture-builders”? What was the nature of the process of culture 
formation? To what extent was it formed around artificial or authentic values? What did 
the Republican civilizing elite understand from the concept of authenticity? How did they 
conceive and formulate the relationship between Turkish national culture and 
“universalized” Western civilization? To what extent did culture, which was formulated 
in the top-down process, determine the boundaries of political and cultural membership? 
To what extent did there emerge differentiation and deviation in the civilizing process 
from above?
The contributions of this dissertation may be twofold: firstly, conceptualizing the 
Kemalist notion of culture as hierarchical and radical assimilationist^^ Through setting a
than 1,000 kilometers of good roads and 8,300 kilometers of broken-surface roads. Ibid,
103.
“Radical assimilation” is used in line with Mason’s formulation. He makes a 
distinction between moderate and radical assimilationists. '^Radical assimilationists”, 
writes Mason, “aim to create a polity in which members of the nondominant cultural 
communities abandon all their distinctive customs and practices; that is, they aim to 
undermine those communities. Moderate assimilationists, in contrast, aim to create a 
polity in which members of the nondominant cultural communities abandon only those 
customs and practices which are either unjust or in conflict with some of the central
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strict hierarchy between “archaic,” “backward” life forms and that of a “modern,” 
“civilized” one^  ^ and applying coercive and noncoercive radical assimilation policies, the 
politics of culture in the early Republican regime manifest what might be called a dual- 
partite exclusion-inclusion process^"^ The Kemalist nation-building project promoted a 
process of assimilation for everybody defined as citizens, but at the same time determined 
a public good and identity only accessible for those who internalized the new value 
system, those who did not were excluded. This hierarchical and exclusionary inclusion 
concept of culture made the Kemalists isolate themselves from all traditional and 
particular positions assumed to belong to archaic times. These peculiarities imply the 
specificity of the Turkish case, which was denoted through non-colonial nationalism, a
public customs and practices of the dominant group.” Radicals can use both coercive 
measures (for example, including “laws against practicing particular religions, or against 
wearing certain kinds of dress, or using certain language in public places”) and 
noncoercive measures (for example, including “giving the customs and symbols of the 
dominant culture public status and respect). Andrew Mason, “Political Community, 
Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation.” Ethics. 109 (January 1999), 267 
and 286.
This is based on logic of transforming cultural differences into a homogenous 
whole, through hierarchicizing ways of life, favor of a “high” or “developed” form of 
life. See Bennett, Culture, 104. This is closely tied with the efforts of totalizing all forms 
in the society under the rubric of an imagined cultural community.
This determination draws back from Balibar’s formulation according to which 
culture may include “exclusive inclusion, or interior exclusion” to express the internal 
exclusion in cultures. See. Balibar, “Culture and Identity.” 190-2. Exclusion has two 
main meanings; first, as Nieguth states, “it can mean to bar individuals and collectivities 
and thus the cultures they carry from physical entry into a given society -  that is, its 
territory.” Secondly, exclusion on the contrary “can also mean the marginalisation of 
individuals and their cultures and collectivities which already and despite the sanctions 
regarding physical entry exist within this society -  for example, by restricting their 
access to public goods and institutions, by relegating them to lower ranks in the 
socioeconomic order, or by establishing segregated institutions. In effect, this amounts to 
an exclusion from full and equal societal membership” (my emphasis). Nieguth, “Beyond 
Dichotomy,” 166.
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specific nation-building process initiated by the strong, centralized state in a non-Western 
context, and the politically defined and determined concept of culture not as a unique 
category primarily distinguishing simply the Turks from Europeans.
Secondly, this particularity of the official discourse of culture differentiates 
Kemalism from its European and non-Western counterparts in the process and nature of 
culture production. Although the concepts the dissertation depends on have to be treated 
in its historical and social context, it may become more understandable only within the 
Western historical frame of references. Thus the clarification of this specific model as 
one of the explanatory categories in related literature might help us to better understand a 
complex relationship between culture and state, and between culture and nationalism. In 
other words, this study aims at contributing to a theoretical and practical repertoire of 
codes for the construction of culture. This is the main theoretical interest of this 
dissertation.
In this sense, one of the main contributions of this dissertation is to analyze the 
Turkish case with new literature of political/social science, that is, to examine the old 
case through new theoretical perspectives. Therefore, the process of culture production 
during the formative decades of the Republic is studied especially on the basis of history 
and language within the confines of new conceptual frameworks such as “imagined 
community”, “the modern project of culture”, “identity construction”, “constructed nature 
of culture”, “critiques of civic-ethnic model of nationalism”, and so on. In fact this is part 
of the general tendency in social sciences according to which the past is always re-written 
from the present perspective.
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The present dissertation employs Elias’s “process model” as an explanatory 
category in examining the structure of processes behind culture production in the early 
Republican period/*' Drawing from Elias’ analysis, the development of culture as a base 
for a public identity is here referred to any processes rather than a static entity. This 
perspective makes it possible to historicize and analyze “culture” by situating it in power 
relations compassed within a nationalist project. What was produced in such a process 
was a discourse. Thus this analysis is based on “the discourse-historical approach” 
revealing the analysis of all-possible original documents and texts shedding light on the 
historical process.'*  ^ The analysis provides some clarifications about how the official 
discourse on culture was produced through the Republic’s pseudo-scientific and 
disciplinary institutions and how it contributed to the process of culture production.
Within the frame of these perspectives, to examine processes of 
institutionalization of studies in the fields of culture, history, language and mass 
education, the following groups of sources were utilized in this study. The first group of 
resources used in this analysis was the published views and memoirs of the state and
Elias applies this model in analyzing “individual” and “society”, which are 
“changing, evolving entities” and referring to “processes.” This is based on the idea that 
everything from self to state structure is in a constant process of change. Various causal 
factors are interwoven for the production of a process in a period of time. For him this 
methodology is necessary for an “understanding of the civilizing process.” Elias, The 
Civilizing Process, 211-263. On conceptualizing that model as “process model” see 
Stephen Mennell, Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image (Oxford; 
Blackwell, 1989), 177 ff
Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive 
Construction of National Identities.” Discourse and Society. 10/2 (1999), 156. Here 
discourse is seen as a form of practice which “constitutes social practice and is at the 
same time constituted by it.” Ibid., 157. For “’discourse’ as a form of social practice”, see 
N. Fairclough and R. Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, in Discourse as a Social 
Interaction, Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, ed. T. van Dijk, vol. 2 
(London: Sage, 1997), 258-284.
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intellectual elite who had a decisive role in determining the official policies/*^ The second 
group includes the texts of related legal regulations and minutes of the Assembly 
Sessions (published in Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi or Zabıt Ceridesi). This 
study gives special importance to discussions in the Parliament, which reveals different 
perspectives and all intentions and projections behind legal regulations. It also includes 
some publications on the implemented policies. Some collections of articles of the 
prominent leaders and intellectuals, which give us a general intellectual picture of the 
period, constitute third group of resources.T he fourth group employed is composed of 
books and texts documenting and reporting the activities of the THS, the TLS and the 
People’s Houses, such as the minutes of the THS and TLS congresses, some of their 
publications as booklets or books (e. g. the history textbooks), and their prominent 
journals {Ülkü of the Houses, Belleten of the THS). Two newspapers. Ulus (semi-official 
daily) and Cumhuriyet (Istanbul daily) were used in a selective way during some cases or 
topics happening in a definite time span investigated. In addition, this study has 
employed books and articles related to literature about culture, state and nationalism, 
Ottoman history and its modernization, and the politics and history of the formative years 
of the Republic. This research was conducted in the Milli Kütüphane (National Library), 
and the libraries of TTK, TDK and TBMM, Bilkent University and METU Libraries in the 
period from 1997 to 1999. After this methodological clarification, the focuses of the 
chapters are as follows.
For example, these include Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçler, M. Esat Bozkurt’s 
Atatürk İhtilali, S. Maksudi Arsal’s Türk Dili İçin, F. Rıfkı Atay’s Çankaya, ete.
Such Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı (Two Volumes), Atatürk Ve Türk Dili (Two
Volumes), The Turkish Press (Two Volumes), Alfabe Tartışmaları.
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The second chapter deals with a theoretical explanation of the philosophical, 
historical and political roots of the idea of culture. This is done through focusing on 
culture’s relations with modernity, the nation-state and nationalism. The analysis is 
deepened with the examination of the development of two historical models of culture, 
namely the Enligtenist-Jacobin and Romantic-German, which were about two processes 
of culture production. Providing a theoretical background, such an analysis becomes 
helpful to trace the line of the early Republican experience in Turkey.
The third chapter analyses Ottoman modernization, some main projects of 
modernity in the last decades of the Empire, and the transition from the empire to a 
nation-state system. The reason behind this exploration is to shed light on to what extent 
there was continuity or discontinuity between the Ottoman reform movements and the 
Kemalist Revolution. In this sense, it explores the emergence of the idea of society­
making and its relation to civilization and culture in the Empire, which provided the 
ideological background and roots for the new regime’s notion of culture.
In the fourth chapter, firstly the nature of the Kemalist Revolution and nation­
building is portrayed. Then in the three main periods (1923-1930, 1930-1938 and 1938- 
1945) the development of the concept of culture in state discourse is analyzed, tracing the 
stock of the civilizing reforms. In the first period the concept of civilization, constituting 
the basis of the state discourse on culture, came to be the sole legitimizing element for the 
reforms. Culture during the second period was defined in its broadest meaning as 
comprising all that were expressed through the term civilization, and national. In the third 
period, while almost akin to the previous conceptualization, there was quite an emphasis 
on the Greek and Latin roots of the West in the definition of culture. This chapter argues
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that culture as a high category was associated with “the modern way of life”, revolving 
around the idea of “society-making” and “order-making”.
The subject matter of chapter five is the invention of a new past through the 
works of the THS. It was the formation of the Turkish History Thesis, the aim of which 
was to provide continuity between the past and present, that is, the justification for the 
construction of a new way of life. Here the process of the formation of the thesis, 
including controversy over its validity, was one of the constitutive elements of the 
production of culture.
The sixth chapter investigates the language policy of the new regime, which 
included two main steps; firstly, the change of alphabet and secondly, the revolution in 
language. As the cornerstone of a new vision for a new future, the first one in fact 
reflected a radical break with the past. Following this, the creation of a new language was 
another revolutionary step in the new cultural formation. However, the debate on the 
revolution resulted in the radical and moderate phases (1930-1935 and 1940-1945 were 
radical in nature, and 1935-1940, relatively moderate). The last chapter forms conclusion.
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CHAPTER II
CULTURE, STATE AND THE “CIVILIZING PROCESS”
C u l tu r e  is  th e  d is t in c t iv e  e le m e n t  th a t  a l lo w s  u s  to  a v o id  c o n f la t in g  th e  n a t io n  w i th  th e  s ta te ,  e v e n  a s , in  
p r a c t ic e ,  in d iv id u a ls  “ e n c o u n te r ” th e  n a t io n  th r o u g h  th e  s ta te  . . .  t h a t  “ r e p r e s e n t s ” it, t h r o u g h  th e  s t a te ’s 
in s t i tu t io n s .  C u l tu r e  is  th u s  th e  n a m e  to  b e  g iv e n  to  th e  “ e s s e n t ia l  n a t io n ” ; i t  d e s ig n a te s  th e  p u r e  d i f f e re n c e  
b e tw e e n  th e  n a t io n  a s  n a t io n a l  s ta te  a n d  th e  o th e r  “ n a t io n ” t h a t  is  to  b e  d i s t in g u i s h e d  f r o m  a n y  s ta te ,  j u s t  
a s  a n  “ in te r n a l ” o r  in t r in s ic  “ c o m m u n i ty ” is  to  b e  r e p re s e n te d  f ro m  a n  a r t i f i c ia l  c o m m u n i ty . . .  I n  th is  
c a p a c i ty  it  c a n  e i th e r  a n t ic ip a te  th e  s ta te , r e s i s t  i t  o r  f ig u r e  th e  “u l t im a te ” g o a l  o f  i ts  c o n s t r u c t io n .  B u t,  
b e in g  in d e b te d  to  c u ltu r e  f o r  th e  n a t io n a l  id e n t i ty  t h a t  fo u n d s  i t ,  th e  f i r s t  d u ty  o f  th e  s ta te  i s  to  “ g iv e ” to  
th e  n a t io n  i ts  c u l tu r a l  id e n t i ty  a n d  a b o v e  a l l  to  w o rk  to  “ d e v e lo p ” it. *
During the last two centuries in Western and non-Western societies, culture as an 
idea and process has been at the center of all modernist projects for constructing an 
“ordered” society and “cultivated” individuals. In the West, the term culture became 
visible as a part of the comprised process of modernization through which politics, social 
structure and subjects took new shapes and visions. In this manner, from the beginning, 
culture has had a close link with the organized, centralized and integrative polity, namely 
the nation-state. That is, it is subject to the processes of constant production led by the 
state agencies and so it is a vision of the nation-state to “describe”, “manage” and 
“monitor” the society. Therefore, in this chapter, basic emphasis is especially placed on the 
role of the state and its agencies in describing the boundaries and contents of culture and
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forging an identity, that is, in culture production. From the early nineteenth century,
coupled with the idea of nationalism, culture became the effective instrument of nation-
;
building and identification processes through which a (national) identity - necessary for 
membership to the polity - was constructed. This meant that the concepts of culture and 
nation usually overlapped. Thus it is also a key for the formation of modern public sphere 
and citizenship. Thus, above all, it seems necessary to examine the concept of culture by 
situating it in philosophical/theoretical and politico-historical processes.
The main purpose of the present chapter is to clarify and shed some light on 
culture’s relations to modernity, state and nationalism by examining the philosophical and 
politico-historical background of the concept of culture. This is done through focusing on 
two dominant understandings of culture, namely Enlightenment-Jacobin and Romantic 
conceptions of culture. The first conception was closely tied with the idea of civilization, 
developed in France under the effect of the Enlightenment and through later Jacobin 
policies; and the second, stimulated and flourished by the Romantic tradition as a reaction 
to universalizing and atomizing tendency of the Enlightenment and French concept of 
civilization. This analysis is based on French and German cases. These two cases have 
been employed in all inquiries about both state- and nation-building and nationalism in the 
literature, and almost all studies on Turkish nationalism. In fact they are still indispensable 
and very significant for these studies, but they should be re-considered in terms of 
changing contexts. Thus, this dissertation tries to re-examine them critically with reference 
to culture.
' Etienne Balibar, “Culture and Identity (Working Notes),” in The Identity in 
Question, ed. John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 178.
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2.1. Culture as a Modern Artifact
Before explaining the development of the idea of culture in the two cases, it seems 
necessary to clarify culture’s relation with modernity and rnodernization. As Bauman 
argues, “culture” is a modern invention. It came onto the scene in the eighteenth century; 
before that time there had not been any understanding comprising the “complex world­
view that the word ‘culture’ attempts to capture.”  ^ Its “discovery” occurred as a part of 
the process initiated by emerging modern conditions. However, it is usually mentioned 
together with the development of the Romantic philosophy which criticized the “universal” 
principles of the Enlightenment, like Reason, science, freedom, the autonomous individual 
and so on. In light of such a conception, it is seen as an authentic, unique and organic 
whole, and so it is, unlike the claims of the philosophers and intellectuals of the 
Enlightenment, not simply composed of autonomous and free individuals. Being the 
internal part of culture each individual subject gains its true identity. In fact, until now, this 
conception has been the basis of most nationalist, ethnic and culturalist movements under 
which it is seen as a useful and usable tool for a project of forming society and, often, 
building their own independent states. However, this is not only one notion of culture.
2 1.1. Culture and Modernity
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The other conception that provided convenient ground for the organic notion of 
culture to flourish, resulted from the early modern conditions brought about by the 
process of epistemic, socio-economic, political and cultural transformations taking place in 
Western Europe. According to such a conception, culture is first of all perceived as part of 
the ideal of the creation of “civilized man” and “civilized society.” It seems that it has 
developed as one aspect of the “civilizing process.”  ^ To understand culture’s intimate 
relations to politics and the state,'* such a conception, for the purpose of this dissertation, 
appears to be important as well as the Romantic conception of culture.
The appearance of the concept of culture went parallel to the “civilizing process” 
that, including “changes in the way men conceived the cosmological reference-world” ,^ 
completely exterminated the existing understandings of social and political order, and self 
Such cultural and political rupture, for the first time, began in England and later in 
Western Europe. It reflected the emergence of the modem conditions and process called 
modernization. From the Renaissance and Reformation movement to the French 
Revolution, in the context of loss of the ground on which certainties and symbols in the
 ^Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1987), 81.
 ^For the civilizing process, see Norbert Elias, History o f Manners, The Civilizing 
Process, vol. I, trans. Edmund Jephcott, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
'* For inescapable ties between culture and state, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Ithaca NY; Cornell University Press, 1983); Will Kymlicka, States, Nations 
and Cultures (Assen; Van Gorcum, 1997), 22-25.
 ^ Michael Walzer, ‘On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought’, in The Self 
and the Political Order, ed. Tracy B. Strong (New York: NY University Press, 1992), 68.
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human life dwelled, the search for a new symbolic infrastructure and reference points by 
the philosophers and intellectuals gained impetus.^ For Descartes, whose scientific outlook 
was not simply epistemological but also moral, traditional moral standards could be 
modified or even abandoned in the light of philosophy and science. This determining 
scientific knowledge can be seen in almost all the works of scholars interested in finding 
out a new “political and moral system.”’ All these efforts strove to unify the previously 
dispersed universe to reproduce a new sense of wholeness through establishing “new” 
standards and certainties. This is the modern view of the world based on universality of 
human beings and ordered unity of thought and socio-political structure.
Modern thought around which new standards and certainties were produced, went 
hand in hand by challenging and rejecting the absolute “Truth” closely tied to the view of 
the God-given and -ordered world. This rejection and secularizing efforts may find their 
true expression especially in the Enlightenment’s attack on traditional, religious and 
particular attachments, and, instead, preaching “universal” standards.* A uniform law of 
Nature and Reason directed these mores which were not tradition- and context-bound.
 ^This became the earlier attempt for the cultural formation of modernity. Thus, for 
Giddens, the basic feature of modernity has been the organization of “time and space” in a 
cultural sense, reflecting time and space compression. Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequerices o f Modernity Polity Press, 1991), 14.
’ All scientists in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries “tried in practice to 
reinvent the moral world around them on scientific grounds” (my emphasis). Samuel 
Fleischacter, The Ethics o f Culture (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press, 1994), 24; On 
this see Charles Taylor, Sources o f The Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially Part II.
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They universally implied the code of right and wrong. It was assumed that “secularized” 
moral ideals are common to all human beings. There emerged, therefore, the belief in the 
human capacity to plan and set models for new moral, social and political structures. The 
human being that is intrinsically valuable, self-satisfied and reasonable has the capability to 
know and therefore is able to carry on control over himself/herself, nature and society. ^  
This is the basis of the modern individualist understanding. But to decide what is best for 
individuals is in the hands of a specific group of persons who know the human nature and 
needs .Tha t  is, knowing is power which makes the modern subject and determines and 
imposes a law of truth and forms which are shaped through the preference of that group 
by asking the question “who we are.”* *’ Having inner depth and autonomy, each person 
needs guidance to find and realize his/her individuality. In fact, as it is argued above, the 
elite’s attempts at looking for new “certainties” or unity of Truth aimed at designing and 
establishing an “ordered”, meaningful world for the subjects. These attempts might be seen
* All first efforts to form a new vision of the world aimed at producing “an account 
of morality freed as much from the unexamined notions and rituals passed down in families 
and small communities.” Fleischacker, Culture, 20.
 ^For an extensive study on modern self, see Taylor, Sources o f The Self.
*** Agnes Heller talks about the success of early European modernity in producing a 
“cultural elite based on merit rather than on birth”, carrying on the power of authority. See 
Agness Heller, “Omnivorous Modernity”, in Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays 
in Honour o f Zygmunt Bauman, ed. Richard Kilminster and Ian Varcoel (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 108. It is this context in which modern elitism developed as one main 
result of the “demand to base political action on scientific standards.” Paul Feyerabend, 
“Democracy, Elitism, and Scientific Method”, Inquiry 23 (1980), 3.
*' See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, in Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinows (Chicago; 
Chicago University Press, 1982).
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as re-enchanting the world through which culture, a modern vision of realizing a 
“cultivated” '^  society and in turn a “rationalized” individual, take place.
As a determining agent in that perspective, the properly shaped modern self is 
capable of forming and developing a well-ordered social structure. It was the “cultural 
programme of modernity” associated with the “belief in the possibility of the active 
formation, by conscious human activity and participation, of crucial aspects of social, 
cultural and natural orders... [SJociety itself had become an object of human activities 
oriented to its reconstruction.” '^  This program lies to a greater extent upon the modern 
progressive ideal for which each stage of human history showed an advance over previous 
ones.''' In that program, the approach that society can be cultivated and shaped by rational 
subjects dominated the intellectual and political arena, but, at the same time, every self was 
certainly tied to such a process of forming a new social and moral base, in which each 
individual’s identity is structured. That is, by deliberately designing a social order 
especially through the state mechanism, it is aimed at dressing up subjects with new moral 
and cultural vision, or identity. Here the new ordered society is not simply based on the 
understanding that society is a collection of individuals, but in general a collective whole.
12 For a vision of culture to cultivate society see Bauman, Legislators, 51.
S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Cultural Programme of Modernity and Democracy”, in 
Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honor o f Zygmunt Bauman, ed. R. 
Kilminster and I. Varcoe (London: Routledge, 1996), 27.
Modern notion of progress - as a force in history shaping the “individual will 
according to a -natural- pattern” - was unilinear and automatic. See John Andrew 
Bernstein, Progress and the Quest for Meaning (London and Toronto: Associated 
University Press, 1993), 10.
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These are new secular moral standards determined by context-free, universal Law and 
Reason. The modern state from the late eighteenth century came to the fore as the most 
powerful and confining mechanism which has constituted the modernist program of 
culture.
2.1.2 Culture and Nation-State: “The Legitimate Use o f  Culture”
The modern conditions with new standards and certainties based on new 
discourses provided not only self and society with a new meaning for the world, but also, 
for Walzer, “politics with a series of references.” It was the state (modern nation-state) 
which must be “personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, 
imagined before it can be conceived” (my emphasis).^® It is in this sense that the nation­
state is, as generally accepted, an entity that is a convergence of the idea of state and the 
idea of symbolically ordered community, that is, nation, or culture. Only through this 
community “personification”, “symbolization” and “imagination” is possible. That is why it 
is in itself national, and so cultural. This is based on the modern belief that every state has 
its own homogenous culture and every culture has its own state. It is only in this unique 
way that a political authority is made “legitimate”.
For modern understandings of “collectivity”, see Richard Handler, “Is ‘Identity’ 
A Useful Concept?”, in Commemorations: The Politics o f National Identity, ed. John R. 
Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 33.
Walzer, “Symbolizm,” 66-67. Modern political and cultural understanding 
becomes dependent upon the imagined characteristics. Walzer evaluates the role of the 
image as providing “an elementary sense of what the political community is like, of how
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In order to clarify such assumed relationship between the state and culture 
(national culture), at the beginning, it seems necessary to start with an effort to describe 
the nature of the modern state. The nation-state is the modern form of state that came into 
existence at the end of the eighteenth century. A modern state is, first and foremost, a 
legal organization, which has some distinguishing peculiarities: impersonal constitution of 
rule, centralized authority, determined territory and legitimate use of violence within its 
boundaries.*’ This legal association, mostly derived from Weber’s ideal type, came with 
the emergence of a bureaucratic structure and became autonomous from any particularistic 
interests in society, which meant supremacy over every kind of social group.** And also, it 
is capable of effectively collecting together the social forces under its jurisdiction and 
implementing official goals especially over the existing or potential oppositions of 
powerful social groups. This meant “central control” through which it is aimed at forming 
an administrative system “extending directly from the central power down to individual 
communities and households.”*^ These definitions shed light on two major functions of the
physically distinct and solitary individuals are joined together, so ...individuals... exist only 
as member of a body.” Ibid., 67.
*’ For the legitimate use of violence, see Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1978), 54.
** See Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology o f the State (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1983). In fact the approach to see the state and society as two 
completely distinct entities was questioned in various way. Mitchell argues that state 
autonomy should be treated within historical contexts where various processes shaped the 
state’s relations to the society. See Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond 
Statist Approaches and their Critics”, American Political Science Review, 85/1 (1991), 
77-96.
*^  Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe, 1492-1992.” Theory and 
Society. 23 (1994), 140.
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modern state. The first is its “integrating” fianction with which the state seeks to unify the 
disparate elements of society around norms and symbols; and the second is its 
“legitimizing” fianction which involves an acceptance of the state’s rules of game, its social 
control, as true and r i g h t . I n  the Weberian sense, this all-encompassing description 
implies a union that is not only institutionally but also culturally structured.^*
All these empower the state to speak in the name of society as a whole and to 
describe the people living in its determined territoiy by the criterion of citizenship. This 
description occurs at two levels. It is a legal status through which the individual’s relations 
with the state apparatus are arranged, that is, citizens are seen equals before a “uniform” 
law, and, at the same time, it is a cultural status, a culturally-defined identity ascribed to 
every individual.
Citizenship is the identity that expresses the culturally and legally determined 
membership to a political community. It comes out as the important result of a 
coincidence of the idea of the state and the idea of the nation. This coincidence lies at the 
heart of Max Weber’s theory of state and society. For him, the nation-state exists as one 
crucial result of linking of the two mentioned ideas. It has a double-feature: “the belief in 
group affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important
See Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In”, in Bringing the State Back 
In, eds. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985).
21 See Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I, 385-398 and vol. II, 921-926.
On the relations of citizenship status with shared culture and state, see Will 
Kymlicka, “Misunderstanding Nationalism.” Dissent. (Winter 1995), 130-137; idem. 
States, , John Keane, “Nations, Nationalism and Citizens in Europe.” ISSJ. 140 (1994).
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consequences especially for the formation of a political community” whereas it is 
essentially “the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the 
belief in common e thn i c i ty . I n  this sense, his notion of a political community is an entity 
which is held together not merely through coercion, but also through shared values and 
experiences. Thus, it is an “community of shared memory” {Erinnerunggemeinschaft)^^ 
Weber clarifies this in his following statements that;
Material and ideological interests of strata, privileged within a polity and by its 
very existence, comprise especially all those who think of themselves as being the 
special ‘partners’ of a specific ‘culture’ diffused among the members of the polity. 
Under the influence of these circles, the naked prestige of ‘power’ is unavoidably 
transformed into other forms of prestige and especially into the idea of nation.
In his view, in opposition to the nationalist claims, the nation is not determined by the 
well-known objective criteria (language, common descent, etc.), but it is mostly described 
in a political process by the constant interactions with interests groups in society. So the 
nation-state, as a polity of culturally and linguistically homogenous people, combines 
rationalized administration with communal ties based on emotions. That is why the 




Weber, Economy and Society, 389.
Guenther Roth, “Introduction”, in Economy and Society, LXXXIV. 
Weber, Economy and Society, 922.
“The concept”, writes Weber, “ seems to refer...to a specific kind of pathos 
which is linked to the idea of a powerful political community of people who share a 
common language, or religion, or common customs, or political memoirs; such a state may 
already exist or it may be desired. The more power is emphasized, the closer appears to be 
the link between nation and state.” Ibid., 398.
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politics. The result is a “imagined community” developed under the established control of 
the modern state through holding the task of socialization.^’
The honor of being a member of that nation is available for everybody who belongs 
to the “subjectively believed community of descent”. This rests on the idea of “chosen 
people” that “derives its popularity from the fact that it can be claimed to an equal degree 
by any and every member of the mutually despising groups, in contrast to status 
differentiation which always rests on subordination.”’* In this regard, every sort of 
difference is seen as culturally disgusting. They are harmful to determined symbols of 
membership through which solidarity is produced as a political artifact.’  ^ Because the 
importance of nation is closely tied with the belief in its superiority, these symbols or 
cultural values are “preserved and developed only through cultivation of the peculiarity or 
the people.”*'* This is indeed the process of “nation-building” by which “cultural”’ 
affiliation is developed. This process, coupled with centralized control, embodied in large 
measure “cultural control” which was possible by the “creation of a single linguistic, 
historical, artistic, and practical tradition from all those present within the national 
territory.”** The result was less heterogeneous populations. In the process, together with
”  For imagined communities, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities 
(London: Verso, 1991); and for the role of the state, see Gellner, Nations.
’* Weber, Economy and Society, 391.
See ibid., 391-392.
*'* Ibid., 925.
*’ Tilly, “States,” 140. For gaining that control, “the state began as never before to 
create national educational system, to impose standard national languages, to organize
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the state agencies, national bourgeoisie and intellectuals played a significant part 
dominantly.
In the process, the self-nominated intellectuals who seize leadership in a cultural 
community play a determining role of a culture because their task is to develop and spread 
it.^  ^ They represent cultural prestige. Nevertheless, other groups of elite that are the 
political representatives of power appeal to the idea of the state. They represent power 
prestige. According to Weber, cultural prestige and power prestige are closely 
associated . It is in this respect that besides the linking of the idea of the state and the idea 
of nation the association of these two groups is another base line of the nation-state.
The above argument brings us to the point that the state’s strength and legitimacy 
does not only revolve around its legitimate use of violence, but also, perhaps most 
importantly, its “legitimate use of culture” or cultural products. The cultural products are 
the forces that direct the action of individuals in a unifying and normative way towards the 
common purpose. This is the nation-state’s “imagined harmony”, because in modern 
conditions the most fundamental form of binding people to the state is brought about on 
the whole in terms of an imagined “national culture” and “shared common identity”.
2.1.3. Culture and Nationalism: A Critique o f  the Ethnic /  Civic Dichotomy
expositions, museums, artistic subventions, and other means of displaying cultural 
production or heritage, to construct communications networks, to invent national flags, 
symbols, anthems, holidays, rituals, and traditions.” Ibid.
Weber, Economy and Society, 926. For him, this group, by virtue of their 
peculiarity, have passage to particular goods that are seen “culture products”, ibid.
”  Ibid.
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As argued above, culture, in connection with the modern nation-state, exists as 
something signifying a collective shared identity as a crucial element of legitimacy. In this 
sense, it is considered in terms of its relationship to nationalism. Nationalism, as a modern 
ideology, can not be separated from the idea of state, with the claim that those who 
assume to be a coherent nation have their own independent state or vice-versa^'^ So one 
of the central roles of the nation-state, which is the expression of cultural values and the 
means of socialization into common norms, is to reproduce a culture: standardized, 
homogenous and universal.This has been the modern “nationalist” idea of a culture, an 
end product of the nationalist ideology of the state. In this respect, culture enriched with 
invented history and tradition makes possible everyone in a definite territory to think they 
belong to an “imagined community.” ®^ To the extent that culture provides a sense of 
identity for this community, the state tries to provide a link between state and society, 
between individual and community, between past and future. Here, as an ideology of
For the ties between the modern nation-state and nationalism, see Eric 
Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 9-10; Gellner, Nations. Hobsbawn explains this relation with the equation 
state=nation=people. See Hobsbawn, A'aiiowi, 19, 22-23.
Ernst Gellner, Culture, Identity and Politics (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), especially 5-28.
36 Anderson, Imagined, 1990.
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common culture^’, nationalism is prone to the process of identification evolved around 
symbolic attachments and a sense of collectivity.^*
As indicated in the Introduction, almost all analysis of nationalism employ dual 
categories, Western / civic / liberal / individualistic versus Eastern / ethnic / cultural / 
collectivistic.*^ This separation recently attracts many criticisms for it is not so easy to 
differentiate nationalism in the civic and ethnic type accentuated mostly by the liberals and 
republicans. In this distinction culture has a peculiar position generally tied with the ethnic 
/ Eastern type of nationalism. Nevertheless, all aspects thought within culture are in fact 
deep-seated in both conceptions, and so all that is collected under the name of civic is also 
bound up with a specific conception of culture.'**’ To understand much better culture’s 
deep-rooted relationship with the modern state, nationalism in an ideal typical model in 
Weberian sense is classified as top-down and bottom-up, as Charles Tilly aptly
elaborates. 41
Nationalism, like all other modern ideologies is, first and foremost, an ordered 
set of cultural symbols. See Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System”, in The 
Interpretation o f Cultures (London: Fontana Press, 1993), 196.
38 For a detailed information, see Elias, “Civilization,” 233-238.
See David Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalism?” Nations and 
Nationalism. 5/2 (1999), 284-286.
'**’ See Kymlicka, States, 22-27; Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation”, 
Critical Review, 10/2 (1996); Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy”.
See “The State of Nationalism”, Critical Review, 10:2 (1996), 303-304. Also 
both are what A. Smith calls as state-led nationalism and state-seeking one. In fact, these 
two denote the two different routes to the nation-state, which are ideal types rather than 
merely classifications of particular historical realities. See Anthony Smith, “State-Making 
and Nation-Building”, in J. A. Hall (ed.), States in History (New York: Basil Blackwell,
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In top-down nationalism, nilers of the sovereign state'*  ^ fight against any 
particularistic orientations and try to impose a collective and generalized culture and 
identity. They produce “doctrines and practices that implemented their visions of the 
Nation: standardized national languages, national histories, pageants, ceremonies, songs, 
banners, museums, schools, and much more.”''^  This stand makes their orientation 
legitimate in interpreting the collective interest of the defined nation/people. This has a 
direct relation with two functions of its pioneers: first, to reform the existing state, and 
second, to modernize people believed to be “backward”."'''
It is obvious in this kind of nationalism that the state that carries out a nationalist 
project describes and determines the nature and boundaries of culture. Thus, it is “subject 
to the logic of nation-building and needs to explore ways of turning its more or less 
heterogeneous people into a nation.”"'^  According to that logic, membership to a political 
and cultural community is defined more or less in political terms rather than as a racial and 
ethnic one. It is therefore not exclusive in accepting outsiders as members, but they must 
give up their old ways of life and culturally integrate into the imagined cultural
1986); Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism”, 23 (1994), 133; B. Parekh,
“Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse”, 1/1 (1995), 36.
This state that seeks to have a nation with the help of its nationalist ideology is 
indeed a strong state. It is autonomous from every particularistic interest and provides a 
framework for the society with its tradition of a centralized state that state is the “principle 
expression of the nation and its unity.” Michael Keating, Nations against the State 
(London: MacMillan, 1996), 17.
Tilly, “The State of Nationalism,” 304. Revolutionary France seemed to be much 
closer to this type with its efforts of crashing all particular privileges and affiliations. Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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community/'^ The view of culture such affinity is based on does not denote an ethnically 
and racially homogenous community, but denotes a civilized way of life surrounded with 
cultural memories, myths and symbols. However, it seems to be “assimilative” and 
“hierarchical” in nature with a “civilizing” mission.
Unlike the state-generated nationalist ideology, bottom-up nationalism is about a 
movement to form a state. In that, the pre-existing nation or people that does not have its 
own state precedes the state. By struggling and organizing on the basis of nationalism the 
leaders of national or ethnic group strives to form their own independent political entity. 
They claimed a separate state on “the ground that the population had a distinct, coherent 
cultural identity.”'*’ That is expressed in the logic of ‘state building’ with which they look 
for proper ways to turn “fellow nationals into fellow citizens” and create “a secure public 
space.”'*** This logic comes to be a unifying force by collecting separate power centers 
under the canopy of a unified, centralized state, as was in Germany, and self-conscious 
nationalist groups setting up the state, as in the case of Israel.
In that nationalist understanding, ethnic and cultural features taken for granted as 
the identity of people are regarded as the identifying aspects for membership in both nation
'*^ Parekh, “Ethnocentricity,” 36.
'*^ Ibid., 37.
“*’ Tilly, “States and Nationalism,” 133. Tilly argues that this bottom-up 
nationalism is usually generated by top-down nationalism as “its antithesis and mirror 
image”. Under the effect of the doctrines of top-down nationalism some leaders with 
particular and regional attachments begin to voice cultural and political autonomy through 
emphasizing their distinct ways. See idem, “The State of Nationalism,” 304.
48 Parekh, “Ethnocentricity,” 36.
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and state. In other words, the people who do not belong to the defined cultural community 
can not easily be accepted as members of its political community or citizens. This outlook 
finds its clear expression in an “organic” view of culture that is exclusive in defining the 
criteria of citizenship.
Both types, ideal typical in the Weberian sense and not reflecting a true form in 
reality, manifest two main ways in the process of establishing a strong tie between the 
state and nation.'*  ^In fact it is the “direction” of this process which has a determining place 
in the production and dissemination of culture. That is, in its broader terms, this distinction 
makes it possible to separate “two distinct understandings” of culture which are firmly 
established in terms of memories, myths, rituals and common ancestry, and also to grasp 
the nature of how the state treats particularisms.
2.2. Culture as a Part of “Civilizing Process”: The Roots of the Hierarchical- 
Assimilative Notion of Culture
There were two dominant conceptions of culture: Enligthenist-Jacobin and 
Romantic. The former developed within the Enlightenment movement, the Jacobin 
revolutionary tradition and top-down form of nationalism. It came to the fore as a vision 
of the creation of “ordered” and “civilized” society, especially in France. Here it was part 
and parcel of the process of transforming the socio-political order in the path of 
civilization, certainly tied to the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution: 
science, reason, freedom and equality.
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Culture that was, for the first time, often used to represent the artistic and 
intellectual activities and so softened behavior, took place under the name of civilization in 
the French intellectual and political tradition.^*’ Then, together with the concept of 
civilization it dominated political thought and practice, led by the emergence of a new 
form of polity (modern nation-state) and socio-economic changes as well as ideational 
transformations. The process of the emergence of modern conditions in which certainties 
and sense of wholeness were reconstructed gave way to the concept of culture as a vision 
of “ordered” and “civilized” society. Gellner argues, one can roughly divide cultures into 
two main groups: “savage” and “cultivated” ones. In the pre-modern times, where there 
had been an understanding of God-given and -created world, “savage” cultures were self- 
reproducing, that is, reproduced “themselves from generation to generation without 
conscious design, supervision, surveillance or special nutrition.” ’^ They provided the unity 
of Truth to their members and the notion of natural differences between people; their 
political rulers never evaluated them as things directed by deliberate intervention, and “the 
lack of experience of such intervention”, writes Bauman, “prevented the thought of a man­
made nature of the human world. The Reformation movement (questioning of one 
absolute truth represented by the Church), emergence of new forms of politics (centered 
power making visible the differences between countries and nations), and the gradual
SeeNieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 157.
Lucien Febvre, Uygarlık, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler [Civilization, Capitalism 
and Capitalists] (Ankara: İmge, 1995), 52.
Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, 50.
52 Bauman, Legislators, 83.
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weakening of “wild cultures” and subsequently forming a new one, were all influential in 
the “discovery of culture.””  At the end, as a moral and social vision, “cultivated” cultures 
came into the scene; they can be “most usually sustained by literacy and by specialized 
personnel.””  This notion firstly appeared in France and England as one significant part of 
civilizing project and later in Germany as an “authentic” idea and the critique of 
civilization, signifying collective personality of the people belonging to an organic 
community.
2.2.1. Culture, Civilization, and Enlightenment
During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term “culture” had been 
mentioned in connection with the concept of “civilization”.”  In French and English, 
culture was used as equivalent to civilization, although in German these terms were clearly
”  Ibid., 84. Bauman discusses that in the definition of culture there was a strong 
reformist inclination associated with the meta-nerratives of modernism. As the ideology of 
intellectuals culture constituted the transformation of all primitive, backward and local 
forms of life. See Zygmunt Bauman, “Legislators and Interpreters; Culture as the Ideology 
of Intellectuals,” \n Intimations o f Postmodernity (Lonéon: Routledge, 1992), 1-25.
54 Gellner, Nationalism. 50.
55 The etymology of the word ‘civilization’ goes back to a family of Latin words 
such as “civilis (civil, civilian), civis (citizen), civitas (self-governing municipality) and 
civilitas (citizenship)”. The Greeks and Romans used them to distinguish themselves from 
the barbarians who were “inhuman -  outside of the society of accomplished citizens ” John 
Rundell and Stephen Mennell, “Introduction; Civilization, Culture and the Human Self- 
Image”, in Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization (London; Routledge, 1998), 6. 
Around the term civilité and police, it took a new from throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in France and England. For the genealogy of the word in the early
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differentiated. In the former one, civilization was used to describe a progressive and 
ordered world of the Enlightenment, which mirrors a refined and developed mode of 
human conduct in contrast to the barbaric and savage form. In this sense, both concepts 
refer to “a general process of human development, of becoming ‘cultivated’ and 
‘civilized’ .” *^’ In its most general modern usage, according to Norbert Elias, the concept of 
civilization reflects the “self-consciousness of the West”:
It sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or three centuries 
believes itself superior to earlier societies or “more primitive” contemporary ones. 
By this term Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special 
character and what it is proud of the level of its technology, the nature of Us 
manners, the development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and
much more. 57
This usage stemmed from a long political transformation and state formation in the West. 
Nevertheless, its use represents different characteristics in various Western societies; the 
French and English usage is greatly different from the German one. In French and English, 
the term “civilization” was firstly invented to “denote not only a code of manners, but also 
an intellectually cultivated style of life.” *^ In this usage, referring to “political or economic, 
religious or technical, moral or social facts”, it appeared to reflect the progress of the 
West and of whole mankind. Nevertheless, in the German usage, civilization is “something 
which is indeed useful, but nevertheless only a value of second rank, comprising only the
modern times, see Lucien Febvre, “History and Civilization: 'Civilization: Evolution of a 
Word and a Group of Ideas,” in Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization, 164-168.
John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1990), 124.
57 Elias, The Civilizing, 3-4.
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outer appearance of human beings, the surface of human existence. The word through 
which Germans interpret themselves...is kultur (my emphasis) .Since civilization began 
gaining widespread usage especially in France, it became a moral ideal of the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment, the ideal of producing “civilized” and “enlightened” citizens making 
up a “nation”. And it was based on the progressive philosophy under which one nation 
could be “civilized” step by step in an endless manner in the lights of science and reason.^*’ 
Progressive ideals first of all necessitates enlightened rulers or “philosopher” kings who, 
having acquired necessary knowledge with the help of science and reason, know the 
people’s interest and needs, and so reshape them. They then grant the upper and 
significant positions to other enlightened men. All these give way to advancement in the 
fields of administration, law and education. That is why, in its specific form, civilization 
expresses a “choice of strategy for the centralized management of social process” that was 
“to be a knowledge-led management” aiming first of all at governing “individual minds and 
b o d i e s . I n  this sense, Diderot says, “to educate a nation is to civilize it; to extinguish 
knowledge is to reduce it to the primitive condition of barbarism.”®^
On the road to reach an ordered and civilized society, local customs and values 
were regarded as obstacles, and so graceless, rude, irrational and undeveloped. In this
Rundell and Mennell, “Introduction:,” 6.
Ibid., 4. This notion will be elaborated in later part.
Febvre, Uygarlık, 33-35 and 42, and Elias, The Civilizing, 5.
61 Bauman, Legislators, 93. 
Quoted in Febvre, Uygarlık, 35.
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notion there did not emerge any understanding of plurality of ways of life, and, instead, 
what was proposed was the coherent and unitary notion of civilization where all human 
beings come under its effect. Being “civilized”, as Elias aptly clarifies, describes a “social 
quality of people, their housing, their manners, their speech, their clothing... which refers 
exclusively to particular human accomplishments”; that is why the “national self-image” of 
the French see their own way as a universally applicable and desirable t h ing .Th i s  
nurtures the self-awareness of being superior in every fields of life such as science, 
technology, administration, arts and so on. The main question this understanding seeks to 
clarify therefore appears as “what ought to be.” Based upon the question, such perspective 
does not only strive to transmute their own society into a more civilized one, but also 
opens the gates to legitimize the expansionist and colonizing tendencies,®'* while insisting 
on their civilizing mission. This belief came to the fore with a desire to set hierarchy 
among ways of life, such as savage forms and civilized ones; the teleological 
understanding or the idea of progress of the Enlightenment, modernization brings every 
human society to the civilized one. It is obvious that it was a “universalized order-making” 
notion of civilization, in general used in the singular.
63 Elias, The Civilizing, 5-6.
®'* Ibid., 5 and 49-50. This gave rise to an understanding of “a nation-with-a 
mission”, a civilizing mission flourished through universalistic idealism of the 
Enlightenment. In other words, the non-European societies believed to be backward were 
seen as being easily assimilated to a linear idea of European civilization. Walzer argues, in 
this respect, “The members of the nation... carry to foreign lands a culture to which other 
people ought to be assimilated or a doctrine by which they ought to be ruled. They teach 
the others a way of life that more closely expresses natural law or divine command or 
historical development.” Michael Walzer, “Nation and Universe,” in The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), 541. For example.
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The social base of the concept of civilization in France lay upon firstly the courtly - 
middle class intelligentsia, the basis of Physiocratism, using it in the internal social conflict; 
in their usage, it denoted a peculiar way of behavior belonging to their circles.Later,  the 
emergence of the bourgeoisie with considerable and influential power changed the 
direction and it became the thing comprising the whole nation and expressing the “national 
self-image” ’^'’, that is, gradually bound up with the identity of the nation. Initiating a 
civilizing project largely based on the idea of civilization, the pioneers of the French 
Revolution and the Jacobins strove to establish a well-ordered, progressive, developed 
way of life.
Coupled with such perception of civilization, the concept of culture came to be its 
sub-derivative aspect. In other words, it appeared as an intimate aspect of the process of 
describing new standards and certainties which set new boundaries to human life, and of 
patterning and forming a new way of life and social structure. Culture, for a long time, 
was used as farming activity. “To culture (cultivate) land,” writes Bauman, “meant to 
select good seed, to sow, to till, to plough, to fight weeds and undertake all other actions 
deemed necessary to secure an ample and healthy crop. This was exactly the shape of the
Napoleon attempted to justify his efforts to conquest Egypt in the name of civilization.
Ibid, 5 and 49-50.
In the hands of the Physiocrats and other reformists, it became an “indication of 
the existence of systematic social regularities”, and stood “in opposition to ‘barbarism’”. 
Jonathan Fletcher, Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work o f Nor her t 
Elias (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 9.
66 Elias, The Civilizing, 49.
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task in relation to human society.” ’^ The cultivation of land, with the modern turn, was 
transformed into cultivation of the human mind and society. In other words, Williams aptly 
notes that, in its social, intellectual and artistic sense, the “word ‘culture’... is a 
metaphorical term derived from the act of cultivating the soil (Latin, cw/twra).” *^ Here, it 
stood to serve as tool in the hands of “cultural gardeners” for designing and organizing 
human life needed to be shaped. It was this usage of culture that, as Philippe Beneton 
argues, represented the “formation of spirit, and always used in singular, it reflected the 
unitary ideal of the eighteenth century and its universalist perspective; it applied to Man - 
with a capital “M”- beyond all national or social distinctions”.T h i s  notion of culture thus 
implies “the processes of creativity, innovation and a break from the past, and thus the 
movement and ceaseless activity of the present.”’“ It is generally deemed as high culture. 
It is this modern perception through which social order is redefined as one end product of 
human activities. And, at the same time, the individual human being is dressed with new 
qualities determined through the gardening works of a group of people dominating the 
sphere of knowledge and power, namely the elite. This brought about activities that led to 
the attempts to pattern and shape suitable modes of behavior and ways of life. It
67 Bauman, Legislators, 94.
Raymond Williams, “Culture and Civilization”, in. The Encyclopedia o f 
Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Collier and MacMillian, 1967), 273.
69
70
Quoted in Bauman, Legislators, 94-95.
Rundell and Mennell, “Introduction;,” 13; and also see G. Markus, “A Society 
of Culture: The Construction of Modernity,” in Rethinking Imagination: Culture and 
Creativity, eds. G. Robinson and J. Rundell (London: Routledge, 1994), 18. Although this 
understanding was used by some idealist German thinkers like Kant against the
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manifested the processes of “cultivation and acculturation”. In this sense culture was, as 
Bauman puts it, the “orthodox notion of culture” or the “order-making” and “society­
making” notion of culture.’’ Here it reflected an entity or process.
In the hands of cultural gardeners, the above mentioned notions of civilization and 
culture were used to represent the whole people by ignoring all their particular 
attachments (class, ethnic, family, traditional, etc.). That is why both are inherently 
collective, evolving around two phrases: a “collection of individuals” and a “collective 
individual.””  Collectivist notion as a collection of individuals was at the beginning based 
upon the idea of the common good, general will or will of subjects, of which individuals 
become part. For J. J. Rousseau, “general will” as the source of the law represents 
common freedom, under which all citizens are equally honored; for him, freedom, equality 
and common purpose can not be separated. This conception of society comes with the 
requirement for creating citizens and teaching them how to become virtuous citizens’ .^ In 
this sense, what is needed is a kind of “perfected art” which is inevitable to “forge a self
Enlightenment’s universal reason and understanding of nature, it came to be counted as 
the basis of the development of the French conception.
”  Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1997), 130, 134.
”  The expressions belong to Louis Dumont. Quoted in Richard Handler, 
Nationalism and The Politics o f Culture in Quebec (Madison, Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 32.
In the words of J. J. Rousseau, “It is not enough to say to the citizens, be good, 
they must be taught to be so.” See J. J. Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy,” in 
Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 
1975), 130.
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capable of living under the conditions of modernity” '^'. Each self must beware of the 
realization of his/her individuality “only in its relationship to the body of the State” and 
therefore identify himself/herself “in some degree with this greater whole.”’  ^ This 
collectivity mirrors a community of equals reciprocally recognized. In the hands of the 
Jacobins who strove to turn all differences into a homogenous whole, this understanding 
became associated with the idea of a “collective individual.”
That acquired and possessed conception of culture is based on hierarchical and 
value-laden understanding.’  ^ “The original hierarchical concept of culture” was based on 
the idea that “satisfaction of human needs may be improved in one fashion only; human 
history is the story of that improvement; the term ‘culture’ must therefore be used in the 
singular only.””  It is closely tied with the idea of progress and perfection. People and 
communities are ranked in accord with the level of their culture in “a hierarchical 
ordering”’*; if there is a cultured group, there is automatically an uncultured, archaic one. 
Similarly there is the notion of cultured person versus wild one. What the savage/wild 
culture comprised of was that which came from the ancient regime: traditional and local 
tastes. It is evident that, during the early modern period, the upper stratum and
See Tracy B. Strong, “Introduction; The Self and the Political Order,” in The 
Self and the Political Order, 11.
Rousseau, “Discourse,” 135.
For a hierarchical concept of culture, see Zygmunt Bauman, Culture as Praxis 
(London. Routledge, 1973), 7; Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London; 
Sage Publication, 1998), especially chp. 4.
” Bauman, Postmodernity, 130.
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intellectuals saw the people from the lower echelons of society as carriers of backward and 
archaistic values/^ Only could they be freed from their inferior position with the guidance 
and instructing efforts of the elite by using the state agencies. One aspect of these efforts 
was to free people from the tight local ties and to end the autonomous local power 
centers. Then they could be educated and be good citizens through the centralized state 
mechanism. In France all these were due to the rising tide of centralizing and unifying 
structure of the state. Before and after the Revolution all particularisms became the object 
of a “cultural crusade”. Only one form of culture, that of the intellectuals and state elite, 
came to be legitimate form. The cultural gardeners began to extend it to everybody as part 
of a civilizing pro j ec t .Up  until the French Revolution and its aftermath, the project 
gained new and radical impetus to transmute people’s souls and minds into a cultured and 
civilized form. The ultimate aim then was to merge the diverse and traditionally patterned 
forms into oneness that existed later as a legitimizing force for the modern polity. That 
meant to collect different social, ethnic and sub-cultural groups under the centralizing and 
unifying state and to symbolically pattern them into a union, a collective union made up of 
civilized individuals. In this sense it is inclusionary and assimilative. But people from the 
lower echelons of the hierarchical structuration suffered a social exclusion. To be included
78 This phrase belongs to Tony Bennett. See Bennet, Culture:, 91.
This made legitimate their hegemony over these people. See Jacques Revel, 
“Forms of Expertise: Intellectuals and the ‘Popular’ Culture in France (1650-1800),” in 
Understanding Popular Culture, Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth 
Century, ed. Steven L. Kaplan (London: Mouton, 1984), 262; Bauman, Intimations, xiv.
This quest for homogeneity was the name of the ‘civilizing conquest’ in France. 
Bauman, Legislators, 60.
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they had to be assimilated, or “modernized”. That is, inclusion does not take place on 
equal terms for everybody.
For that reason, the original hierarchical notion of culture is assimilative. It was 
this sense in which, as the main target of socio-cultural engineering (The objective of the 
Enlightenment), this notion intended to produce uniformity around the Enlightenment’s 
conquering terms: freedom, equality and fraternity. The result would be the existence of a 
social arena where each citizen expresses himself freely and equally and participates in a 
uniform, determined and modern life. This is the process of “becoming,” coupled with the 
political process while being directed by the intellectual groups. Perceiving society and 
societal difference as man-made, constructed and calculable prepared the ground for the 
attempts to revise and form cultural structure to a greater extent in accordance with the 
taste of a group of people. It was these people who can hold the power resulting from 
knowledge and so know best for the people. They had organic ties to the state and its 
agencies. In the following section, that aspect of culture will be elaborated together with 
the state and nationalism, especially by focusing upon the case of France.
2.2.2. The Political Roots o f  Culture in France: The Revolution, Jacobenism and the 
Cultural Crusade
The hierarchical-assimilative notion of culture began to take root in politics with 
the French Revolution. The Revolution was at the first insight based on a new idea of the 
state taking its legitimacy from the consent of free citizens. In other words, the 
sovereignty of the French people was at the heart of the Revolution. The state came to be
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as an active agent transforming the society by setting boundaries and imposing a new 
order. Then this idea of the state came to be associated with the idea of the nation that is a 
cultural community with a common language and a shared history. In the discourse of the 
Revolutionaries together with the idea of nation, republicanism took an important place. 
The Revolutionary Republicans promoted the radical break with the past in the name of a 
new beginning.** The Revolutionaries brought together republicanism and nationalism, and 
so the formation of the republic was closely tied with the emergence of the nation.*^ 
However, the new national past did not have to be something that could be used by the 
proponents of ancien regime against the new regime.**
The Jacobins, a new wave of intellectuals who were mostly migrants without any 
local ties and looking for something new, made efforts to create such an imagined 
community, with the Revolutionary and Republican mission. They tried to define new 
categories for the people, which were thought to be immature form, and determined the 
boundaries of a new community with a new world of sacred based on a new symbolic 
order.*'* Under this community everybody would be “equalized” with their titles and their
** “A political reason for this ideological move”, writes Meadwell, “was the control 
or appropriation of other regnant or emergent languages of legitimation by political rivals 
in the old regime.” Hudson Meadwell, “Republics, Nations and Transitions to Modernity.” 
Nations and Nationalism. 5/1 (1999), 26.
*^  Biancamaria Fontana, “Introduction,” The Invention o f the Modern Republic, 
ed. B. Fontana (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.
83 Meadwell, “Republics,” 26.
*'* In order to reconstruct a new symbolic order, the Revolutionaries adopted a new 
calendar (to recreate time), changed the names of days and months, renamed themselves 
and even chess pieces, and changed crockery, furniture, law codes, the map of France and
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dress as well as their legal and political status.*  ^ It seemed to be the “community of 
equals”**", imagined as contrary to any heterogeneity, any sort of particularistic tendencies 
and regionalism. This quest for homogenizing the new society in their discourse came with 
the rejection of the separation between the public and the private that the Enlightenment 
thinkers put forward. For them the private represented the particularistic and traditional 
affiliations and values and so was in contrast to a collective identity the revolutionaries 
attempted to create. So it had to be erased in the name of the public (society) by means of 
revolutionary acts.*’ This effort to extend the boundaries of the public sphere toward the 
private one was also one of the goals of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey. The 
revolutionary rulers strove to form a public sphere by targeting and attacking all values, 
customs and habits belonging to the private sphere.
dress. See Robert Darnton, The Kiss ofLamourette (New York: Norton, 1990), 6-9. The 
new world of sacred may find its true meaning in the public festivals and ceremonies. The 
festivals, with its new sense of time and space, “functioned as the new ritual basis of the 
revolutionary community” through providing new social values and categories and 
emphasizing “oneness rather than distinctions.” See Lynn Hunt, “The Sacred and the 
French Revolution,” in Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies, ed. Jeffrey C. 
Alexander (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1988), 29-30; Mona Ozouf, Festivals 
and the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
*’ It would be a community where, as mentioned in a petition given to the National 
Convention (1794), “there will be less pride, less discrimination, less social reserve, more 
open familiarity, a stronger leaning toward fraternity, and the therefore more equality.” 
Quoted in Darnton, The Kiss, 8; Larry Roy, “’Fundamentalism’, Modernity and the new 
Jacohins” Economy and Society. 28/2 (1999), 210.
**’ For the community of equals see Jacques Ranciere, On the Shores o f Politics, 
trans. Liz Heron (London and NY: Verso, 1995).
87 See ibid., 8.
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In the Jacobin formulation the idea of people had a fundamental place. The new 
identity was created through imagining the people as the true player of history.** The will 
of the people aimed at being instituted by the Revolution. It manifested the collective will 
based on order and progress. All outsiders and opponents were portrayed as the enemies 
to “the order of reason and universe.”*^  The imagined community of the Jacobin elite was 
largely inclusionary in the sense that everyone had a potential to be turned into a civilized, 
patriotic citizen. This mission of inclusion was irresistible. All opponents who were 
portrayed as “enemies” of the Republic suffered to be overwhelmed.Around this mission 
the boundary of membership to the imagined community expressed in French (national) 
culture was constructed.
In the discourse of the Jacobins, membership to the French political community, or 
the public, was only possible through cultural assimilation. This stemmed from a strong 
link between citizenship and nationhood set by the Revolution. The outsiders would be 
accepted as members of the French nation if they gave up their old ways of life and
** “The People” became the new sacred center for the Revolutionary Republicans 
when the King who had been “the sacred center of French society” was removed. See 
Hunt, “The Sacred”, 32-39.
*^  See Bernhard Giesen, “Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics.” 
Deadalus. 127/3 (1999), 241. They had to be destroyed in the name of saving “the future 
from the past and the public from the private... The king had to be decapitated, as he 
represented the past, the personal, and the unnatural order. At the end, la nation une et 
indivisible [of the French Jacobins] was to emerge, the perfect realization of the new 
collective subject of history.” Ibid., 241-242.
^  On this mission, Giesen writes, “every act of resistance on the part of outsiders 
not only puts the inclusion of an individual at risk but also challenges the entire mission of 
inclusion. Outsiders cannot resist inclusion, neither by right nor by reason. Whoever 
questions the mission has to be overwhelmed and destroyed.” Ibid., 247.
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culturally integrate into the nation. Here the result was the “inclusionary” and 
“assimilationist” understanding of membership to French culture.’*
At this juncture, access to citizenship passed through linguistic and cultural 
assimilation. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, the French tried to 
actualize language unification by means of state agents. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century in the language and cultural integration, the army and schools had a 
decisive role.’  ^ In such a way the French state had sought to give a common cultural 
content to the new French identity. In the time of the Third Republic (1871-1940) 
appearing with the claim that it would complete the Revolution, this act reached its zenith. 
The French Republicans made efforts to civilize and assimilate the masses, especially the 
peasants who had been untouched by the center. This cultural crusade aimed at building a 
nation and forging the sense of the homeland.’  ^ This civilizing mission, or “civilizing
’* For the connection between citizenship and nationhood, and their assimilationist 
and inclusionaiy characteristics, see W illiam R. Brubaker, “Imigration, Citizenship and the 
Nation-State.” International Sociology. 5/4 (1990).
Josep R. Llobera, The God o f Modernity : The Development o f Nationalism in 
Western Europe (Oxford; Berg, 1994), 200.
This “Third Republic’s civilizing efforts in rural France” was rationalized by “the 
example of original ancestors -brave, inspiring, but primitive and uncouth- civilized by 
Rome and much better off as a result despite the discomforts of conquest.” To educate 
children by using the textboks, by the 1880s, was one of these efforts. See Eugen Weber, 
My France: Politics, Culture, Myth (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1991), 
31-32; idem. Peasants into Frenchman (, 1976), 486. Also about the transformation of the 
French peasants, see James R. Lehning, Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Rural 
France during the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
especially chapter 2.
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conquest”, was also applied to justify the French imperialism outside France .Thi s  
nationalism of the 1880s largely provided the roots for “an expansive, assimilationist 
reform of citizenship law whose central provisions have endured to this day.”^^  Since then, 
the law has also been applicable for the newly naturalized foreigners (mostly immigrants) 
and the colonized. The Republican institutions worked for them and turned them into 
Frenchmen as in rural France.
Nevertheless, this assimilationist understanding of membership includes some 
inconsistencies in terms of inclusion and exclusion. Inside France the way for full 
membership to the political community passed through being assimilated into the French 
culture or similar to those who formed a new life at the center. If anyone insisted on his 
particularistic affiliation, he would be deprived of attaining public identity. This is 
“particularistic exclusion” within a universalistic system.^  ^ This became very clear in the 
cases of the position of the colonized and recent immigrants. According to the French 
colonial regime, they were seen as potentially assimilated as “citizens of the Republic”, but 
“[T]his assimilation depended on a process of transformation that could only take place 
gradually through education and a transformation from tradition to modernity. The
94 According to this belief, the colonized people were “also expected to benefit 
from French conquest, as France had gained from that of Rome. Conquest was painful but 
salutary and, in the spirit of the nineteenth century, progressive.” My France, 32.
95 Brubaker, “Immigration,” 393.
Laurent Dubois, 'Fa République Métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the 
Borders of French History.” Cultural Studies. 14/1 (2000), 26.
Ibid, 27; Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea o f Empire 
in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
It is “this complex of inclusion and exclusion, and of the deferral of the application of
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exclusion here came to the fore only when considering them as immature to act as free 
citizens and to have “full citizenship. To be a full citizen means to be free from 
“savagery” and traditional forms of life.
With its strong state tradition, France is the most representative example of the 
state pursuing the policies of ‘nation-building’ project. The French model attempted to 
attain a culturally and linguistically homogenous society by top-down, or state-generated, 
nationalism. The French conception of culture is based on self-cultivation and cultivation 
of the ideal. But it is embedded in a newly formed symbolic order based on “hierarchical” 
structuring. Here culture is something which is largely “achieved”. So it is inclusive only if 
anyone willing to be assimilated into or merge his/her soul into this order. Otherwise it is 
exclusionary.
2.3. The Romantic Understanding of Culture
2.3.1. Romanticism, Culture and the Hatred o f  Civilization
The second dominant conception of culture in its relation to nation-state was of 
the organic one developed in the late eighteenth century in Germany. It was the time that 
the intellectuals, of the rising new middle class in Germany began asking the question
universal ideas, is the very ‘Republican racism’ which continues to haunt the 
contemporary discussions around immigration in France.” Dubois, “Zct République
Métissée·.'' 27.
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“who are we really?” This attitude came to the fore as “resentment” of the existing 
condition stemming from real politik, the cultural and intellectual hegemony of France 
through the eighteenth century, and its direct political domination at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. And then a new Weltanschauung appeared under the name of 
Romant ic i smin the fields of philosophy, literature, art and, lastly, that of politics. 
Indeed, this was the main response to the symbolic and intellectual domination of the 
French way especially over the aristocratic and newly emerging bourgeoisie stratum. The 
most significant outcome of this movement was the emergence of a new vision of culture 
(an organic one) as a reaction to the French universal and “assimilative” understanding of 
civilization, culture. In other words, for the German Romantics, the ideal of community 
that granted a new meaning world came as a result of their attempt to find out the German 
unique tradition. Such a search for particular and authentic way came into being in 
contrast to the universal ideals and principles of the Enlightenment: Reason, equality.
This expression is used by Tim Nieguth to refer the position of non-white 
Americans facing with some racial hindrances which prevent their equal participation in 
the public life of the United States. See Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 162.
^  See Elias, Civilizing Process', idem, “Civilization, culture, identity: 
‘’’Civilization” and “Culture”: Nationalism and Nation-State Formation’: an extract from 
The Germans,"' in Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization, 111. The “resentment” 
aspect is dominant in late-coming nationalisms; it was evident in the case of the emergence 
of German nationalism, its roots including resentment feeling among the middle classes 
against France and its hegemony. See Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to 
Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
As a philosophical, intellectual and political movement, it was the product of 
the process of what is happening from Reformation to Revolution. Then, first of all, it 
must be seen as the “antithesis of rationalism and the Enlightenment.” Carl Schmitt, 
Political Romanticism, trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 6.
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freedom and the individual, were regarded superficial and alienated from history and 
nature.
In this context, Kultur, which, as indicated above, was expressed in contrast to 
Zivilisation, came to be used by the new German intellectuals to depict their peculiar 
position as a self-identification, as an “expression of their self-image and their ideals. 
Then it turned into the reflection of “the self-consciousness of a nation. Generating 
from the Romantic philosophy, Kultur, which was the basis of the Romantic view of 
community, was simply defined as an organic whole, and all the integral parts of such 
whole (traditional values, manners, customs, and so on) were seen as “taken-for-granted”. 
This was the open challenge to the Enlightenment understanding of society that was “man­
made” and “constructed” and with its constructed nature based on the distinction between 
the private and the public. The Romantic thinkers began to work by bringing forward the 
individual life worlds in contrast to the banalities of the politics and the public sphere.**’^  
The self is not free from its bonds with its community. And thus subjects whose 
personality comes from their communal ties can not provide new mores for their society 
and make rational calculations on it. Like the individual, each culture has a unique, self- 
satisfying entity. Histoiy in this regard came to the fore as a force to draw up the meaning
Elias, “Civilization,” 226. On the other hand, Zivilization reflecting real 
alienation to themselves was deemed as “a symbol of the world of princes, courts and the 
ruling upper classes.” Ibid., 228.
Elias, Civilizing Process, 4-5. In this sense there is a constant search for 
determining the boundaries of culture politically as well as spiritually. Ibid.
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of culture represented in the “spirit of the people”.’'^ '' It meant that each group of people 
sharing the same heritage and destination should be taken for granted.
That new idea of community has close ties with changes in the theory of 
knowledge, the perception of the self and understanding of history. Opposite to the 
previous God-given (divine revelation)*”^  and naturally determined (natural law) views of 
morality of the Enlightenment, it is obtainable from “an inner voice of conscience and 
duty’’.'”” The human being is not the product of Nature and experiment, and does not have 
a universal Reason independent from communal ties and traditional values. But the self is 
embedded in self-consciousness, personal experience and “the life of Spirit”.*”’ That is 
why the personality of each human being is not only tied to individuals but also, perhaps 
most significantly, to groups in which they share manners, norms and values common to 
all. The Truth that is needed to decide on what is wrong and what is right “never lies in 
what the individual person comprehends or wants because everything is the function of a
*”^  In the Romantic understanding, the public and the private are merged into an 
organic and authentic whole in favor of the latter. For that understanding see Giesen,
‘Cosmopolitans,” 242-245.
104 Ibid., 24.
*”^  Romanticism, as well as its Enlightenment counterpart did, brings about the 
process of secularization. Since it “replaces God -the ultimate principle of traditional 
philosophical occasionalism- with the individual aesthetic consciousness, this not only 
secularizes metaphysics but subjectifies and privatizes it as well”, Guy Oakes, 
“Translator’s Introduction”, in Political Romanticism, xxxi. In this way, it is possible to 
raise the isolated individual to the level of a cosmic unity.
*”” Antony Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought to the 
Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 198.
107 Charles Taylor, Hegel (1975)
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reality that acts beyond him,”*®* In short, the notions of self, knowledge and freedom in 
Romantic philosophy can gain their true meaning only by embedding them into a 
communal life. Thus, community, as a reflection of society, is seen as an organic whole in 
which traditional elements (ignored by the Enlightenment thinkers as “irrational”) played 
an active, constitutive role. Its inner Geisi (spirit) only determines its essence. It has 
provided the basis for the German concept of Kultur.^^^ In the Romantic formulation 
culture denoted a collective personality, but not particular affiliations.**® Culture as a 
collective structure is regarded as an individual who is “authentic”*** and has the freedom 
to choose and ability to determine its destiny, that is, self-determining. The particularized
108 Schmitt, Political Romanticism, 80. In this sense, Antony Black notes, “Since 
the basis of moral thinking is the “positing” and recognition of the “other”, morality -even 
knowledge itself- stands in a vital relationship to community: man is a social being, not 
only in the sense that his needs and aspirations require him to associate with others..., but 
in the further sense that without communion with others he would lack all truly human 
character. Such a view gave rise to the doctrine that freedom and community can only be 
realized together.” Black, Guilds, 198.
*®® In Romantic philosophy, as Bauman aptly argues, this “Spirit came to fill the 
empty center of the stateless nation” and in this conext “the people” became the main 
subject of history. Zygmunt Bauman, Hermenuitics and Social Science, Approaches to 
Understanding, 2"** ed. (Hampshire; Gregg Revivals, 1992), 24.
110 Elias, Civilizing Process, 7.
*'* The modern notion of individual is authentic, for each individual has his/her 
own unique way of being and so she has a moral vision making possible deciding what is 
wrong or right. “Modern freedom and autonomy centers on ourselves, and, the ideal of 
authenticity requires that we discover and articulate our own identity.” Charles Taylor, 
The Ethics o f Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). It is this event 
that is “part of the massive subjective turn of modern culture, a new form of inwardness.” 
Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and the Politics o f 
Recognition: An Essay by Charles Taylor, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ; Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 29.
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authentic group is cohesive, homogenous and unique, and has a collective personality; 
thus it is not derivative, and it is one among others in the world.
In this respect, the explanation of J. G. Herder’s concept of culture is worth 
mentioning. Herder, one of the founding fathers of the Romantic philosophy, was the first 
to put into use the concept of Kultur (culture) in its actual term as an explanatory category 
in both philosophy and politics. This concept finds its explanation in his concept of Volk 
(people, but its usage commonly overlaps with nation); each Volk developed its own 
Kultur, which was bound with Herder’s idea of belonging. At the first hand he attributed it 
to a culture. According to Herder, the way to be a human runs through feeling at home 
together with the same kind.*^  ^ That is to say, those humans belong to groups that are 
naturally determined, and find their individuality and freedom by being embedded in an 
organic community as Kultur. According to Herder, each group has its own Volkgeist or 
Nationalgeist (national soul) composed of a mode of perception and understanding only 
belonging to it. In this sense, culture is simply the expression of the national soul. It is “a 
product of the group mind... which, having a body and a soul, becomes a single being. 
This being expresses itself in all the phenomena of its history, in language, in literature, in 
religion, in custom, in art, in science, in law, and the sum of these expressions is the 
culture of a nationality. All aspects of cultural life take form in a flow of tradition that 
arises from a collective history shared by the group’s members. It is rooted in nature 
because humans belong to and are part of particular natural environments that are the
112 See Isaiah Berlin, “Volgeist’in Dönüşü.” NPQ Türkiye. 3 (Kış 1992), 7.
Robert Reinhold Ergang, Herder and The Foundations o f German Nationalism 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1976), 87.
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sources of national folk traditions. Herder’s notion of culture is just based on the view that 
each people have a right to determine its cultural destiny. It is the idea that all cultures are 
equal with their own inner qualities; that is, the uniqueness makes each culture valuable 
and irreplaceable. Thus he rejected imitating a foreign culture and building a new one in its 
place. Any sort of imitation and the idea of building culture on foreign appropriations, here 
he means the imitation of the French one, could bring about, in his words, “disease, 
flatulence, abnormal surfeit and approaching to death.”“ '* Upon that, he believed that 
plurality of cultures could not be reduced into an absolute universal category. This stand is 
contrary to the belief of combining incommensurable things (which are cultures) under the 
rubric of one polity. This is based on the approach that, opposite to the Enlightenment, 
Truth was not one, but various. Here he rejected the idea of cosmopolitanism, and 
embraced plural diversity and intrinsic cultural distinction.*“
At the heart of Herder’s discourse on culture, there is language, territory, 
literature, a shared past and tradition, but not race and blood. Among them language has a 
vital importance; only it gives rise to the sense of belonging. Language as a natural basis of 
Kvltur's intrinsic character and soul expresses a particular history, taste and
**■* Quoted in ibid., 119. This reflects his resentment to the hegemony of French 
culture and civilization over German culture. At his time he was at unease with the 
situation of the German culture facing a great division as in politics. The cultural leaders of 
Germany, mainly imitators, “sought perfection in foreign writings, foreign manners, 
foreign culture.” Ibid., 115. In this respect with his formulation of culture he aimed to save 
German culture from destructive influences.
On his view about plurality in culture, see Berlin, “Volgeist’m,” 7, 9; also see 
idem, Vico and Herder, Two Studies in the History o f Ideas (London; Hogarth, 1976), 
150-157.
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experiences.'^^ In this regard, it came to be a means that provided continuity in history. 
Imposition of a foreign language thus leads to cultural degeneration; for example, for him, 
the ongoing education in French among the upper and aristocratic stratum prevalent in his 
time distorted the mind of German youths. Like language, in his view, literature has a 
determining place in reflecting the national and cultural feeling and allegiance. Herder’s 
view of culture is primarily organic, authentic, socially and historically embedded, plural. It 
was this conception from which the anthropological usage of culture coming into the 
scene in the late nineteenth century especially with E. B. Tylor’s formulation emerged."^
In Herder’s social and political thought, state and politics as temporary and 
superficial entities have a secondary place. Nevertheless, culture came to be a basic tool by 
which national unity might be attained. Here, Herder dealt with states and politics “only in 
so far as they contributed to cultural national unity.”"* Intellectuals and men of literature 
and arts “expressing the inner-most feelings of the Volk’s collective experience and 
stimulating its cultural awareness” should assist a possible nation-state, the expression of
cultural autonomy 119
“Each nation”, writes Herder, “speaks the way it thinks and thinks the way it 
speaks.” Quoted in H. J. Hahn, German Thought and Culture: From the Holy Roman 
Empire to the Present Day (Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 1995), 63.
See Bennett, Culture:, 87. In contrast to Herder, however, Tylor’s account 
includes a hierarchical evaluation of ways of life, due to his Eurocentric biases. Ibid., 93-
94.
"* Sam Pryke, “Nationalism as Culturalism: A Critique.” Politics. 15/1 (1995), 66. 
Hahn, German Thought and Culture, 64; also, see Ergang, Herder, 87.
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The relationship between the state and culture in the Romantic tradition finds its 
clear expression in the thoughts of J. G. Fichte. He, while insisting on Herder’s concept of 
culture, emphasized the necessity of a state with the rule of law. The state in his discourse 
is the vehicle of becoming and remaining “a human being... A man outside the state is a 
savage. All culture originates from man’s relationship with the s t a t e . I t  was this idea of 
the state that reflects the soul and spirit of the people. In this regard it is an artistic 
institution and “its purpose is culture. Culture is the process whereby man becomes really 
man..., it is this realization which is the perfect freedom.”'^’ Thus, for Fichte, the new 
German state had to end the alienated attitudes of upper and aristocratic stratum, and 
revitalize the real character of the Germans through education. The product would be a 
patriotic citizen whose will would merge in the will of the state. In education, a purified 
language and literature which constitutes the society as an organic whole plays a leading 
role.'^^ The New German State as an expression of culture, or wholeness, would direct 
and conduct the process.
2.3.2. The Organic and “Authentic” Concept o f  Culture and German Nationalism
120 Quoted in ibid., 68.
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4‘*' ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1985), 38. But, 
contrary to Herder’s views, he brought to the fore the idea of superior, refined culture 
developed through more historical creativity.
For further details, see Hahn, German Thought and Culture, 68-69; Kedourie, 
Nationalism, 47-48.
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The intellectuals from the rising new German middle class in the late eighteenth 
century provided a new cultural and political model for Germany. It came as a reaction to 
the French hegemony over German court society and aristocracy. From the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, the search for a unified political structure among the intellectuals 
started to take place under the impact of Romanticism’s unique, particularistic and organic 
view of culture. It was an ideology of nationalism that defined its nation and sought a 
secure political structure for it. Here nationalism was established on the concept of Kultur 
expressing Germanness, more against Zivilisation generally associated with France and the 
non-German components .The  search for a new political ground by means of German 
nationalism was coupled with the changes in the social and legal spheres of Germany, 
especially through expanding markets.' '^* In the German case, nationalism emerged as a 
movement of a group of elite who wished to unify various power centers in a state. Thus, 
it was a state-seeking nationalism, with a strong emphasis on an organic and unique 
community, a nation that was the political equivalent of the concept of culture. 
Flourishing in an atmosphere where there was no state-led symbolism, it was based on the 
principle of “spiritual nationhood of a nation-in-search-of-a-state.”*^  ^ This nationalism.
123 Rundell and Mennell, “Introduction:,” 7.
For the transformation in the social structure, see Reinhard Bendix, Kings or 
People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978), 
378-430.
It was the name of politics anticipating that the culture as a product of the spirit 
forms the nation. See George L. Mosse, The Nationalization o f the Masses (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 214.
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through the nineteenth century, largely coincided with Romanticism and so “made symbols 
the essence of its style of politics.”*^ ’ In this regard, symbols as the objectified forms of 
myths that are created through nationalist endeavors came to the fore as part and parcel of 
the people’s identity.
During the middle of the nineteenth century, the middle-class groups with their 
nationalist ideals became the sole dominant social and economic g r o u p . T h e i r  ardent 
efforts and their coalition with other groups played a decisive role in the unification of 
Germany toward the end of the 1860s. In conjunction with the new nationalist project 
generally inspired by the Romantic concept of culture, the new state, under the intellectual 
and cultural domination of the middle-class groups, attempted to “revitalize” and set in 
motion the German culture. It endeavored to penetrate more and more into the life of the 
people through institutionalizing and politicizing myths and symbols. In the periods of 
Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and National Socialism, public festivals, national 
monuments, national dramas, had been inaugurated to restore a “world made whole 
again”, or a sense of wholeness. Efforts were made to shape the mass through
Bauman, Hermenuitics, 28. The nationalism of the intellectual groups became 
popularized during the war waged against the French occupation. The pioneers of new 
politics used the Romantic notion of the culture -denoting Germanness- to mobilize the 
youths largely for the sake of an imagined community. For the effect of the French 
occupation causing the rise of nationalist feelings in Germany, see Birnbaum, 
“Nationalism:,” 378-379.
127 Mosse, The Nationalization, 7.
In fact this was the result of their rising close ties with the higher state officials 
and the business class. See Wolfang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1897-1918: Politics, 
Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State (London: Arnold, 1995), 121.
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nationalizing them.*^  ^ Throughout these periods, German nationalism and its efforts to 
regenerate Germanness evolved into a tradition of political culture. That political culture 
found its clear expression in the politics of citizenship in Germany. According to these 
politics based mainly on the German citizenship law of 1870, citizenship was defined in 
terms of descent or ethnic ties, which were coupled with the principle of jus sanguinis. In 
this respect it denotes a status of membership distributed around a culture of common 
ancestry.' '^* It was the result of German nationalism that defines the people as an organic 
and unique community. This attitude has been very evident in the German policies toward 
immigrants. Rigorously “controlling access to citizenship”, the German state in general 
excluded and deprived immigrants from citizenry. They, with distinct cultures, have been 
seen as non-assimilative into the German culture.*^' This has been the main policy of 
Germany since the nineteenth century. It is in this respect that the German concept of 
culture, coupled with an exclusionary nationalism, is organic, differentialist and historicist. 
It differentiates itself from that of the French that denotes a process of cultivating the 
people in accordance with an idealized “image” of the human being, and is assimilative and 
sets up hierarchy among the life forms.
For these periods where the artistic turned political, see Mosse, The 
Nationalization.
See Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 163; Brubaker, “Immigration,” 396-397. 
This understanding of membership is in coincidence with “[t]he German conception of 
nationhood” that “has been particularistic, organic, dififerentialist and Fb/A:-centred.” This 
stems from the nature of “national feeling developed before the nation-state.” Ibid., 386.
For the German concept of citizenship’s relation with immigrantion, see 
Brubaker, “Imigration,”, 396-398. It takes for granted “a virtually impossible form of 
cultural assimilation” (my emphasis). Birnbaum, “Nationalism:,” 382.
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All in all, the Republican understanding of culture in Turkey appears to become settled 
since it is considered and evaluated in comparison with the above-mentioned two 
dominant conceptions of culture. The two conceptions are elaborated as two different 
models, namely the French and German one, which, coupled with a nationalist ideology, 
indeed reflect the two separate ways of the processes of culture production. Embedding 
culture into the analysis of these models helps us to go beyond civic/ethnic dichotomy 
utilized in most of the studies on nationalism, nation-building and citizenship. It also helps 
us to understand the scope and parameters of the official discourse of culture produced 
through the processes of nation-building during the formative years of the Republic.
The French model constituted the idea of the creation of a new culture free from 
all traditional and particular elements, which developed in tandem with the progressive 
ideals of the Enlightenment and the Jacobin image of “revolutionized” society from above. 
The hierarchical-assimilative notion of culture, flourished from this model, from the 
beginning, was closely related to the idea of civilization denoting a developed state of 
mind and cultivated or refined way of life. It came to be a vision of “ordered” and 
“civilized” social structure. After the French revolution it became the ideological base for 
a political project led by a state-led, or top-down, nationalism. What was promoted was 
the formation of a new society by setting a hierarchical structuration among the life forms 
and applying assimilative policies that included both inclusion and exclusion. Such a model 
seems to be necessary to interpret and grasp the Kemalist civilizing rulers’ revolutionary 
ambitions to construct “secularized” culture.
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The second model, stemming from the Romantic tradition, has been the historical 
framework of references for most of nationalist and culturalist movements; this was also 
true for the formation of the official culturalism in the early Kemalist regime. The model’s 
conception of culture manifests a historically and contextually bounded-whole, an organic 
whole, which is the source of individual identity and collective happiness. In the hands of 
nationalist intellectual in the second half of the nineteenth century in Germany, it became 
something to be revitalized through the state mechanisms and intellectual/artistic works. 
The result was the “revitalized” community denoting a collective personality for all 
citizens. Beside the general comparison made between two models, this model is useful for 




OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION, THE IDEA OF SOCIETY­
MAKING AND CULTURE
C iv il iz a t io n  is  th e  s u m  to ta l  o f  c o n c e p ts  a n d  te c h n iq u e s  c re a te d  c o n s c io u s ly  a n d  t r a n s m i t te d  f r o m  o n e  
n a tio n  to  a n o th e r  b y  im ita t io n . C u ltm e , h o w e v e r ,  c o n s is ts  o f  s e n t im e n ts  w h ic h  c a n n o t  b e  c re a te d  a r t i f ic ia l ly  
a n d  c a n n o t  b e  b o r ro w e d  f ro m  o th e r  n a tio n s  th ro u g h  im i ta t io n .’
As argued in the previous chapter, the idea of reconstructing society or making a 
new social and cultural base lies at the center of all modernist programs of culture and 
civilization. As an idea and process, culture, which was used as a tool of social 
engineering in the hands of cultural gardeners, stemmed from a long process of 
conceptual and structural transformations, namely modernization, in Europe. These 
modernist programs were employed as ideal models in non-Western contexts where there 
did not exist any proper structural and material base as in the European societies. 
Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, modernizing attempts had been initiated from above 
for the sake of the state. For the purpose of this dissertation they are analyzed as the 
preliminary phases of the Republican project of modernity.
’ Ziya Gokalp, The Principles o f Turkism, trans. Robert Devereux (Leiden; E. J. 
Brill, 1968), 24.
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In the late Ottoman Empire, two basic concepts, namely civilization and culture, 
were at the center of all significant discussions of modernity and all attempts at 
Westernization. These discussions and attempts have invited a debate on the ways and 
means of achieving modernity and the limits of modernization; to what extent should the 
Ottoman institutional and administrative structure be transformed? To what extent might 
values and even manners be changed? From the end of the eighteenth century to the early 
twentieth century the Ottoman elite had been very busy with these questions in the name 
of saving the Empire from destruction. Indeed, as might be assumed, what we call 
Ottoman modernization was closely associated with the West and western civilization, 
and manifested a turn by which the Ottoman view on the world, society and culture began 
to change. That is why all analyses of the Ottoman socio-political system necessarily take 
the Ottoman period as pre-modern and modern. Mainly focusing on the modem era, the 
basic argument of this chapter is that during the nineteenth century and early decades of 
the twentieth century, a new Ottoman society, on the basis of civilization and culture, was 
discursively formed, reproduced and transformed as a mental product.
Therefore, this chapter attempts to explore the dimensions of a new Ottoman 
society and, in doing so, to show how adopted modern ideals such as civilization, culture, 
citizenship, rights and people had been very influential on the views of modernizing 
rulers and intellectuals to reorganize the social and political stmcture. For this purpose, it 
focuses on what classical Ottoman understanding of society was and to what extent it was 
transformed and reproduced in the process of modernization. And, the analysis of the 
concepts of civilization and Ottomanism, which gave way to the formation of a new 
“civilized” and “modernized” way, is the main topic discussed. Moreover, some changes
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in the discursive formation shall be analyzed through focusing on three different projects 
of modernity, namely Islamism, Westernism and Turkism, which designed a vision of 
society by means of traditionalization, Westernization and Turkification. This chapter 
highlights that these positions included three different conceptions of culture.
3.1. The Political Basis of the Pre-modern Ottoman Concept of Society and The 
Ottoman M illet System
It is obvious that any attempt at clarifying the nature of the pre-modern Ottoman 
polity and its conception of society can provide some clues to understanding the Ottoman 
institutional and social reforms which brought cultural changes. Thus, at first glance, the 
main question we deal with here is what the main characteristics of the pre-modern 
Ottoman conceptualization of social order are as well as those of different religious and 
ethnic groups and subjects. The Ottoman political structure in the pre-modern period may 
be regarded as being in tandem with its conception of society.
The Ottoman State as one of the most enduring multi-religious and multi-ethnic 
states survived for nearly half a millennium. Under the rubric of a regulatory and strong 
state, the Ottomans tried to establish an “immortal” political and social order.^ It is a 
vision of the world according to which the main task of the Devlet-i Aliye was to prepare 
the ground for a ‘just’ and ‘ordered’ structure. Two sources of legitimation came to the 
fore for the state: religious (Islamic) and örfi law. Fundamentally, Islam existed as a tool
2 This order was based on two refined principlesiDev/ef-; Aliye-i Ebed-miiddet 
(Eternal Sublime State) and Nizam-i Alem (Order of Universe). On that, see Mehmet 
Genç, “OsmanlI’da Zanaat, Ahlak, İktisat İlişkisi”, \n Anatomi Dersleri: Osmanlı Kültürü 
(İstanbul: YKY, 1995), 129.
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to crystallize political power at the top.^ However, the nature of the Ottoman 
understanding of politics went beyond such an Islamic conceptualization of politics by 
separating the sphere of the state from that of religion and, in most cases, putting more 
emphasis on the state and its affairs than any previous Islamic state. This mostly stemmed 
from the semi-‘worldly’ nature of its law, which was örfi law, patterned on daily 
practices and experience.'· The result was a center with a well-established and 
institutionalized value system, having the power to organize, in a unique way, the 
political and social sphere. The two legitimating systems find their clear expressions in 
the words of Argon Rodrigue:
Ottoman version of the Islamic discursive framework ... that was in a dynamic 
relationship with the earlier Islamic textual religious tradition; and the interplay 
between that framework and the actual day-to-day reality in which this discursive 
paradigm was continuously molded and shaped. ^
It was the setting in which the concept of nizam (order and, in some senses, balance), 
together with the concept of adalet (justice), was based. Nizam meant expressing a scale 
of political order that was taken into account to establish a balance between the locations
3 In the Islamic tradition justification of political power can only be based upon an 
ontological interpretation of power, relating power and authority to Allah (God). For 
further details, see Ahmet Davudoglu, Alternative Paradigm (Lanham: The University 
Press of America, 1994), 152.
'· It primarily gave authority to the Sultan to make into law the living norms of 
society, termed as the Örf-i Sultani, the will of the Sultan. See Şerif Mardin, Türk 
Modernleşmesi [Turkish Modernization] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1997), 82.
5 Aron Rodrigue, “Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire.” Stanford 
Humanities Review. 5/1 (1995), 82.
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and functions of the state’s parts.'" Consequently, the state-society relations reflected a 
kind of ordered integrity based on the concept of nizam.
In such a polity composed of diverse orders and estates, society was seen as made 
up of various groups and peoples who lived in a certain number of layers and 
compartments. Materialized by the state through providing order and justice, the integrity 
was, as Berkes aptly notes, “’pyramidally’ stratified and ‘hierarchically’ arranged.”’^ At 
each compartments of this integrity some cultural codes and forms became prevalent. The 
first main rank in this hierarchically structured system was between the rulers -called 
askeri- and the ruled -called reaya. ^  The group of rulers, military and civil officials, the 
learned and ulema, held huge political and military power for, as found in Ottoman state 
philosophy, the establishment of justice all over the world. In order to establish adalet 
they had to preserve the tradition of nizam. The devşirme system was the most significant 
method for their selection.^ Trained and socialized in the particular mechanism, the rulers 
internalized values and morals enriched with the Ottoman approach to state and society.
For which see Niyazi Berkes, “’İhtilal’, ‘İnkilap’, ‘Devrim’”, in Atatürk ve 
Z)ev/7w/mm/z (İstanbul: Adam, 1982), 138.
Niyazi Berkes, The Development o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill 
University Press, 1964), 10.
 ^ Halil İnalcık, “The Nature of Traditional Society. Turkey”, in Political 
Modernization in Japan and Turkey, eds. R. Ward and D. Rustow (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1964), 44.
 ^ This was the periodic gathering of unmarried male children from the Christian 
peasantry of the empire. See Braude and Lewis, “Introduction”, in Christians and Jews in 
the Ottoman Empire, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. I (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, 1982), 12; Yavuz Ercan, “Ottoman Rule over the Non-Turkish and Non- 
Muslim Communities.” Turkish Review Quarterly Digest. 2 (1985), 72-73.
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In this way, they had no social bonds and became “Ottomanized”.·® They drew upon such 
a group in whose settled tradition at the center, indeed, there had existed the “Ottoman 
way” and the “Ottomans” who were equipped with mostly cosmopolitan values and 
shared a more or less similar way of life, world view and artistic and architectural taste. 
The result was a different set of manners including a distinct language, taste, music, and 
so on.
The second group was the reaya composed of all types of religious and cultural 
communities, guild organizations, foundations, peasantry and so on. In this group, each 
subject belonged to a religio-ethnic community as well as to some secondary groups 
which were occupational organizations (e. g. guilds), dervish orders and so on. As an 
expression of the second main rank in the Ottoman hierarchy, the Ottoman system of 
treating all groups with respect to their way of seeing the world was mostly inspired from 
the Islamic view of politics. The view, at first sight, established a category between the 
Muslim and non-Muslim, which was called the millet system. The millet system, as a 
vision of society, denoted the framework within which the Gayri Müslim (non-Muslim), 
namely Christian and Jewish, communal authorities functioned under Ottoman rule. It
They therefore existed only for the sake of the state and had to be indifferent to 
the various interests in society. These servants of the State who were not from the people 
became the parts of the machine of siyasa (polity). See Berkes, “’İhtilal’,” 138. In fact, it 
was one significant way to establish the state structure in accordance with 
institutionalized mores.
"  See ilber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the 
Empire], 3'^ * ed. (Istanbul: Hil Yay., 1995), 50; Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in 
the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 9.
’2 See Bilal Eryilmaz, Osmanli Devletinde Millet Sistemi [Millet System in the 
Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Agac Yay., 1992) and Cevdet Küçük, "OsmanlIlarda Millet
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was conceived as being regulated by a pact called zimmi. The people benefiting from it 
were known as zimmiler (people of the pact). By the terms of this contract, the Muslim 
ruler quarantined the subjects’ lives, life-style and property, and allowed them to practice 
their r e l i g i o n . I n  this vision of society where the particularities with their 
“ontologically” defined status were accepted as such and not seen as a “moral” problem, 
as Rodrigue argues, the difference was the “given” and “normative”. In fact, seeing the 
social structure as given was the general characteristic of all pre-modern societies. As 
shown in the first chapter, Gellner and Bauman argued that in the pre-modem times, 
where there had been an understanding of a God-given and -created world, societies were 
self-reproducing; there was no direct intervention into its work, that is, they were not 
man-made. However, unlike its counterparts, what the Ottomans did was to create a 
social structuration under an well-organized political system in which every group was 
hierarchically counted down according to their positions in the pecking order of religion, 
naturally Islam.
Sistemi” [Millet System in Ottomans], in Osmanli [Ottoman], ed. Güler Eren, vol. IV, 
208-216, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999). In theory, because the privilege of becoming a 
protected group was only given to those whose religion is a monotheistic one (Judaism 
and Christianity), others were hardly entitled to the protection of the “Islamic” state. 
However, after the Islamic expansion, members of other religions such as Hindus, 
Zoroastrians, Buddhists, the Gnostics of Harran and pagan Berbers of North Africa were 
also accepted as protected minorities, see Braude and Lewis, "Introduction," 5.
On the position of zimmi in Islam, see C. E. Bosworth, "The Concept of 
Dhimma in Early Islam," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire.
Rodrigue, “Difference,” 84.
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New 
York, 1983), 50. Zygmunt Bauman, Lagislators and Interpreters (Ithaca, New York. 
Cornell University Press, 1987), 83.
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The millet system in its tnie sense started when Mehmet II appointed the patriarch 
of Constantinople, Gennadros Scholarios, as the titular head of all the Orthodox faithful 
in the Empire. With that appointment the Orthodox Church had a number of privileges 
which included, most importantly, legal, administrative and fiscal autonomy of the 
community.*^ Comparable arrangements were made with the Armenians and Jews. In the 
system, as an organizing force, the Ottoman State was limited to performing only the 
administrative, military and financial responsibilities of the communities.*·^ It usually 
dealt with zimmi as members of a community {millet), not as individual subjects.** Thus 
the term millet was used to refer to a religious community, or “a religiously-defined 
people”. *^  Religions and, as their sub-branches, sects facilitated the development of the 
emergence of the millet as a universal belief system, though ethnic and linguistic 
differences provided for divisions and subdivisions within each one of the Muslim, 
Christian and Jewish millets. Nevertheless, the Ottoman administration and all the 
autonomous communities, in determining the boundaries and nature of their own people, 
did not officially recognize ethnic and linguistic peculiarities.
*·^ As a head of his millet {millet başı), the Patriarch, whose authority was 
supported by the Sultan, was responsible for his own community's judicial affairs and 
taxes. See R. Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire." in Christians and Jews 
in the Ottoman Empire, 85.
Stanford Shaw, " Osmanli İmparatorluğunda Azınlıklar Sorunu," in Tanzimat 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 1002.
** This meant that membership of the subject zimmi to a community determined 
his status at the social and political level. Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun, 97.
*^  Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of Millet System,” in Christians and 
Jews in the Ottoman Empire, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, 69.
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However, the recognition in the Ottoman system did not mean that there was no 
discrimination between groups. It aroused from the rigid differentiation between 
communities whose values were ontologically taken for granted and hierarchically 
classified. The non-Muslims under the Ottoman rule were, therefore, responsible for 
some obligations; for instance, they should pay cizye (special poll tax) instead of 
participating in the military service and haraç (land tax), both of which were based upon 
certain regulations arranged in accord with the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. Beside 
these, they had to agree to certain restrictions, such as wearing separate clothes and 
colors, not riding horses (except in some special cases) and carrying arms.^o Most of 
these restrictions were more or less valid until the Tanzimat.
In short, in the pre-modern era, the Ottoman State’s view on society found its 
clear expression in the millet system in which various (religious) communities were 
incorporated into the Ottoman system by being “hierarchically” ordered. In this 
compartmentalized and hierarcisized administration system, based on religious 
communities, Muslims and their cultural priorities had a privileged position, resulting 
from the Muslim character of the state and its so-called “high culture” at the center. The 
rulers that were detached from all social strata and belonged to a particular way of life at 
the center governed them. Thus, in the pre-modern outlook, society was not something 
that was calculated, formulated and restructured over someone’s ideals, that is, it was not 
“man-made”. It was only ‘governable’, applying the mores provided through the Ottoman 
state mechanisms.
20 Eryilmaz, Osmanli Devletinde, 40.
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3,2. First Modernizing Reforms as a Sign of the Emergence of a New Concept of 
Society
I'he Ottoman classical system entered into the phase of transformation with the 
Ottoman modernization movement that was initiated at the end of the eighteenth century. 
The movement led to some fondamental changes in the Ottoman perception of society 
and people and brought about on a large scale a new discourse of society in parallel with 
the institutional and administrative reforms.
Why did the Ottomans need to make new regulations in their system? The answer 
might be found in some external and internal developments: an external one is the 
unexpected and enormous rising power of Europe that threatened the Empire and 
expanded their borders to the Ottoman lands. An internal one, and perhaps the most 
significant, is the dissolution of the centralized structure of the Empire. In the process of 
disintegration, the state always remained as “the sole legitimizing authority”^^ . It was the 
state that, coupled with the modern understanding of the centralized and institutionalized 
state, would be the sole initiator of all reform attempts to prevent the decline of the state; 
that is, the attempts were made on behalf of the state.
2* For the reasons of the decline, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern 
Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 27; Kemal Karpat, “The Stages of 
Ottoman History: A Structural and Comparative Approach,” in The Ottoman State and its 
Place in the World History, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 92.
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The idea of reform revealed by the Sultan and the bureaucrats came with the 
attempt of cutting off all that threatened the state. In the beginning, principally, it was 
thought of in a traditional line, that is, recapturing the strength of the centralized authority 
and recollecting power in the hands of the rulers at the center. At first, the way to reach 
this goal was seen as a restoration of the military power. Therefore, the first efforts 
instituted by Selim III (1789-1808) were directed at making changes in the military 
system. Thus, supported by establishing military and naval cadet schools, the Nizam-i 
Cedid (New Order) was established. However, the Nizam-i Cedid did not mean only a 
military movement; encompassing the Ottoman administration to some extent, it included 
some array of new instructions and institutional regulations. It signified the introduction 
of techniques of training and “uniforms of Europe”.2'* By this move the Ottomans for the 
first time faced “Western culture” which had been at the heart of all controversies over 
the ways of modernization.
The second main reform attempt came from Mahmud II (1808-1839), believing 
the necessity of the administrative and institutional transformation of the Empire along 
European lines. Mahmud ITs reforms basically included the development of a new
22 Halil İnalcık, “On the Social Structure of the Empire,” in From Empire and 
Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), 
55.
22 The Sultan was interested in the New Order that was initiated by the King of 
France as a result of upheavals. It was then applied to the whole program of reform in 
Turkey. See Lewis, The Emergence, 57.
2'* Here, “Western scientific thought challenged traditional Muslim thought, and 
the European uniforms challenged traditional symbols.” İnalcık, “Political 
Modernization,” 129.
22 Among his reforms were the opening of a medical school, a military academy 
and various secondary schools, the abolition of the Janissaries and the establishment of
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army and centralized bureaucratic organization with a progressive and secular 
perspective. That is, he initiated the process of state-building in the European way. In the 
process, the idea of ‘people’ came to be a “new basis for the Ottoman sovereignty... He 
[Mahmud II] threw away his cloak of sacred power with all its trappings and made 
himself not the defender of the faithful but the enlightener of the Ottoman citizenry.”^^  
The centralized organization of the state, on the path of becoming a modern centralized 
state, made it necessary also to determine “symbolically”, as well as politically, a public 
sphere.
This might be illustrated with the fez reform, apparently only enforced among 
officials, soldiers and sailors, instituted to replace the traditional male headdress.This 
was in direct relation with Mahmud IFs wish that “his subjects of various faiths should
new regular standing army, establishing a postal service and founding a police system. 
Here his aim was to restore the state’s authority and so, in its broadest sense, to centralize 
the state structure as in the modem state in the West. In this way he tried to re-establish 
the authority of the central government in the provinces by ending the autonomy of the 
provincial lords -particularly the ayan- and abolishing the Janissaries. See Lewis, The 
l'émergence, 80.
Berkes, The Development, 92. This was the first, but most cmcial, sign of 
“Enlightened Despotism” which was then the dominant administrative vision for the 
Tanzimat rulers. The name of this administrative doctrine as Şerif Mardin discusses, is 
“camaralism” that constituted the political theory of political opinion called “enlightened 
despotism”. By collecting the power at the center, it preached how to control the societal 
forces for the interests of the state. Mardin, Türk, 12-13, 83-84.
This was the starting point for using clothes as a political symbol in the process 
of modernization. After that time, westernized groups preferred to show themselves 
“civilized” at least with their clothes, wearing a fez and İstanbulin (a kind of frock coat) 
especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. This attitude reached its peak in 
the Young Turk period (1908-1918) and the Republic’s (after 1923) replacement of the 
fez with a European hat reflected a complete turn in the process of seeing clothes as a 
political symbol of Westernization. For the relations between clothes and modernization 
in the Ottoman Empire see Selçuk Esenbel, “Medeni Davranışın Aczi-I.” Toplumsal 
Tarih. 47 (Kasım 1997), 12-14.
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be no longer distinguishable by their a t t i r e . I t  was reported that Mahmud II said, 
“[HJenceforth I recognize Muslims only in the mosque, Christians only in church, Jews 
only in synagogue. Outside these places of worship I desire every individual to enjoy the 
same political rights and my fatherly p ro t ec t i on .At  the center of these words there is a 
view that all subjects and communities would be treated more or less on equal terms in its 
“modern” sense. Of course, coupled with the symbolism of reform, this equality would 
bring about a tendency toward homogenization, which might be related to the public 
visibility of subjects. In fact this later would be the basis of Ottomanist policies.
When M. Reşit Paşa, the Grand Vizier, proclaimed the Hatt-i Hümayun (Imperial 
Script) in the Gülhane Court in 1839, the Empire entered into a new stage of reform. The 
charter brought, perhaps most importantly, equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims 
before the law. With this equality, Mahmud IPs ambition to see his subjects in equal 
terms, at least by their appearance, found its clear expression in legal rearrangement. 
Besides creating a centralist bureaucratic state, these attempts were indeed the sign of the 
Ottoman rulers’ need for a new social organization.
All in all, after the first contacts with modern institutions and opinions, especially 
among the bureaucratic and intellectual elite, there gradually came into being a modern 
reformist vision based on the view of society made up of individuals.^® The shape of the 
world-view that came with the Tanzimat reform movement urged the reformist elite to 
think of the military, administrative and educational reorganizations in direct relation to
2* Geoffrey Lewis, Modern TurL·y (New York: Preager, 1974), 43.
Quoted in ibid; Yusuf Akçura, “Üç Tarz-i Siyaset” [Three Ways of Politics]. 
Türkiye Günlüğü. 31(1994), 1 0 .
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the question of “social” organization. It was mingled with two basic ideas alien to the 
classical Ottoman way. The first was the idea of civilization that reflected a progressive, 
rational and self-determining modern way of life, and the second was a new membership 
in the political community associated with the idea of citizenship. Both seem of the same 
spirit, which reflected a new vision of society composed of citizens but not autonomous 
communities.
3.2.1. Civilization as a New Socio-Political Outlook
The usage of civilization denoted a form of modernist project for forming an 
ordered society. In this respect it came with the idea of culture especially at the later 
phases of Ottoman modernization insofar as it was often used to include all belonging to 
the definition of culture. In this section, the concept of civilization is discussed with that 
of medeniyet (civilization) and its relation to the term tanzimat, meaning “to put in order” 
or “to organize”. After 1834, the term civilization began to be used at the intellectual and 
social level when Mustafa Reşit Paşa encountered it in Europe and tried to define it in 
Turkish, that is, it was his gift to the Ottoman Turkish dictionary. Nizam and tanzimat, 
which before 1839 were two concepts reflecting the yearning for European civilization 
and order, expressed what the concept of civilization meant.^' Tanzimat has same Arabic 
root as the terms nizam, nizam-i cedid and nizamat. As it is indicated, since the Nizam-i
On this vision see Şerif Mardin, “Just and Unjust.” Daedalus. 120 (1991), 1 2 1 .
Tuncer Baykara, “’Nizam’, ‘Tanzimat’, ve ‘Medeniyet’ Kavramları Üzerine” 
[On the Concepts of ‘Order’, 'Tanzimat,' and ‘Civilization’], in Tanzimat’ın 150. 
Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu [International Symposium on the 150* 
Anniversary of the Tanzimat] (Ajikara: Milli Kütüphane Yay., 1991), 64.
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Cedid came onto the scene as new regulations especially in military affairs, it conveyed 
much more than simple military reforms and had a direct connotation with the French 
phrase Reform Générale, translated in Turkish as Nizamat-i Cedide. Here, first of all, it 
meant “New Order” including military, administrative and social reorganization. In this 
sense, nizam referred to a worldview that, as a principle, relied upon reform, 
improvements and newness.
In the 1830s, parallel to the military and administrative reforms, social reforms 
began to increasingly take place. The result was a widespread usage of the terms tanzimat 
and nizamat originating from nizam, such as Tanzimat-i Mülkiye (organization of the civil 
service) (1833), Nizamat-i Müstahsene(1834), Nizamat-i Hasene(1836), Nizamat-i 
Hasene and Tanzimat- Mergube (1836), and so on. By introducing a French concept, 
sivilizasyon, Mustafa Reşit Paşa made it clear what all these e x p r e s s e d . 1 5 3 4  ^ it was 
first mentioned in its original form in his official writings sent from Paris, and he tried to 
describe it as terbiye-i nas ve icra-yi nizamat (the training of mankind and the execution 
of orders).^^ In 1838 as an equivalent to sivilizasyon, previously explained with the terms 
nizam, nizamat or tanzimat, a new term medeniyet was created. It was used to refer to 
“life in cities” or “being a city-dweller” and, in a broad term, included the meaning of the 
life-style developed in cities, in its original sense denoting a European social order based 
on city-life. Nevertheless, the concept of medeniyet did not begin to gain widespread 
usage until the 1850s. '^*
32 Ibid., 63.
33 Cemil Meriç, Ümrandan Uygarlığa [From Ümran to Civilization] (Istanbul: 
İletişim, 1996), 33.
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The easy acceptance of the concept of “civilization” (medeniyet) and of “order” 
(best expressed through the term nizam and tanzimat) might be directly related to their 
traditional connotations in Ottoman vocabulary. Civilization, in its modern usage, was the 
name of the struggle against barbarism, archaic values and wildness, and signified more 
“cultivated” and “refined” forms of life. As in such use, from the beginning, in the 
classical Ottoman perspective, there had been a widespread belief among the Ottoman 
rulers that they had a mission of good to carry into the lands they conquered. Similarly, 
the concept of order, as discussed in the previous section, was the fundamental principle 
of the Ottoman view of state and society, which preached an order in the world. The aim 
of modernizing reforms, supported with new modern concepts, was to restore the order. 
However, the modern conception of order with its totally different meaning was 
differentiated from the Ottomans’ one based on a “divinely” regulated universe. The 
modern one seemed to be more close to a “worldly” order designed, created and 
organized by rational, self-seeking human beings through institutions. With the 
modernizing movement, the content of the order the Ottoman elite tried to restore entered 
into the process of transformation in accordance with its “modern”, “secular” usage.
According to the Ottoman ruling elite, the way to achieve modern civilization was 
through establishing modern educational, as well as modern administrative, institutions. 
The idea of mass education that was for the first time put forward by Mahmud IP^
In the late 1850s, as a sign of its common use, Şinasi in one of his poems 
commended Mustafa Reşid Paşa Medeniyet Resulü (Prophet of Civilization). Ibid., 65.
35 Bernard Lewis has stated that “the Ottoman gazis and dervishes believed 
themselves to be bringing civilization and the true faith to people sunk in barbarism and 
unbelief” Lewis, The Emergence, 26.
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through providing compulsory primary education and taking necessary measures for 
modernizing official education came to be seen as the basis of institutional, and later 
perhaps most significantly social, modernization. Here, one of these institutions is 
mentioned as an example: the Enciimen-i Danış (Society of the Learned) which was set 
up in 1851 at the suggestion of x\\q Meclis-i Muvakkat, concerned with educational affairs 
for the government. Its aim was to prepare books for instruction in the planned Darii 7 
Fiinun (university), composing or translating works needed for the education of the 
people. In the first two articles of the report of the Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye (Council 
of Public Education), significant works written in western or eastern languages would be 
translated into Turkish, and in order to educate the people language had to be Turkified 
and simplified. That is, works presented for the benefit of the people should be written in 
a way that ordinary subjects could easily unders tand.The idea of “educating the 
people” and “promoting sciences” came with the idea of civilization. For this report, 
science and knowledge were the basis of the development of civilization, but the state 
played a major role in completing civilization, and so it had to improve sciences to 
provide welfare and civilization for its people.^^ The assumed attitude of the Tanzimat
He opposed the traditional medrese education and the class of ulema, and he 
preferred to use the term maarif that was required to institute education with a new and 
more scientific outlook, Howard Reed, “Tanzimat Ne Zaman Başladı ve Bitti? 
Zamanlaması ile İlgili Görüşler” [When did Tanzimat Begin? The Views on its Timing], 
in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü, 23.
Kenan Akyüz, Encümen-i Daniş (Ankara, 1975), 16
Ibid., 16. The Tanzimat elite attempted to justify their orientation through 
mentioning the golden age when their ancestors attached importance to science and 
knowledge that were under the protection of the state, making them powerful and rich. 
See ibid., 16-17. This emphasis on pristine traditions and localizing the modern 
understanding might be seen as the first preliminary efforts to look for an authentic way.
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elite with the foundation of the Encümen-i Danış reflected their great ideal of a 
modernizing movement that might be expressed in terms of the concept of civilization.
There were also echoes of this trend in other fields of education. Mustafa Reşit 
Paşa defended the foundation a Darü 7 Fünun (university). According to him, it had to be 
founded in order to increase the educational level of the public through “making modern 
science diffuse throughout our country and it is necessary that the citizens benefit from 
it’V^ so that science and education could make it possible for human beings to attain 
security and happiness in this world and the next. This is the meaning of civilization 
without which no one can achieve anything. For Reşit Paşa, it was the civilization that 
“can only come to us from Europe.
In addition, the Tanzimat elite, based on the ideal of civilization denoting a 
developed category in human life by bringing order and progress, believed to carry on a 
“modernizing-civilizing mission.”'** This understanding after the mid-nineteenth century 
turned into an official policy. The policy targeted especially nomadic peoples with 
heterodoxical and heretic beliefs, including Turkmens, Alawis, Nusayris, Iraqian Shiites,
which is one of the major aspects of the modern state-building process and the creation of 
a suitable public.
Cited in Ali İhsan Gencer, “Enciimen-i Danış ve Mustafa Reşid Paşa” 
[Encümen-i Daniş and Mustafa Reşid Pasha], in Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri 
[Seminar on Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his Period] (Ankara: TTK, 1994), 33.
'*** Cited in Şerif Mardin, “Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey”, in Nationality, 
Patriotism and Nationalism, ed. Roger Michener (St. Paul: Paragon House, 1993), 196. 
Sadık Rıfat, another supporter of Westernizing reforms, revealed civilization based on the 
“fullest realization of human rights, the freedom and security of life, property, and 
honor;” that is why, first of all, it appeared as a matter of a “way of thinking”. Berkes, 
The Development, 131.
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and so on. They had to be “tamed” and “civilized”, since they were regarded as ignorant, 
barbaric and uncivilized, by means of judging their positions according to “civilization.” 
Here “civilizing” meant, “if they were nomadic, their settlement, making them Sunni, and 
being part of centralized order.”''^  In later times Abdiilhamit II and the Committee of 
Union and Progress’ (CUP) governments maintained in a more effective way this policy 
based on the idea of “hierarchical” structuration of civilization.
Briefly, the Tanzimat elite began to consider the notion of civilization as a 
necessary vehicle to save the state. Civilization, as an outcome of scientific and cultural 
development and as a sign of most developed form of life, was something conceived of as 
a whole comprising the technical, scientific and cultural domains. That view had been a 
cornerstone of the Ottoman ruling and intellectual elite’s thoughts on political and social 
structure and, in turn, became more or less the basis of all projects of modernity until the 
end of the Empire. It was essential for them not only to make new configurations for the 
reorganization of the state but also to bring new perspectives on society. When one 
regards it in terms of the culture defined in the previous chapter, it signified a 
“developed” state of mind and “civilized” way of life.
3.2.2. Ottomanism as a Name o f  Modern Membership
See Akşin Somel, “OsmanlTdan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği” [Turkish Identity 
from the Ottoman to the Republic], in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik [Republic, 




The second idea is that the new notion of political membership seems to have 
been associated with the Osmanlıcılık (Ottomanism) movement and its effect on and 
transformations in the millet system. It was the first preliminary step of institutionally and 
politically forming modern citizenship. The Ottoman rulers initiated some institutional 
reforms to strengthen the authority of the central government, but these reforms were not 
adequate to meet the existing needs required for a modern centralized administration, and 
the challenges from the rising separatist nationalist movements. In order to redefine the 
relations between the government and the subjects and communities, the Ottoman rulers 
attempted to develop a common political membership. In fact, their attempt to look for 
new ways to provide Ottoman unity and to create a “moral” base for the centralized 
modern state was the search for a collective identity transcending all community-based 
identities in their pre-modern use. It was for this reason that the term reaya, which only 
expressed the devotion to the ruler, was replaced by the concept of teb ’a comprising all 
Ottoman subjects.'*3 Since the time of Mahmud IP'·, Ottoman reformers had tried their 
best to eradicate the differences, at least in the visible ones in the public realm, between 
the various groups through creating an “Ottoman subject”. Through a secular concept of 
Osmanli that was the term for political membership, or in some sense, modern 
citizenship, the aim was to show that ethnic and religious affiliations were of secondary 
importance.'·^ It appeared for the first time as an official arrangement, in the Gulhane
'*3 Mardin, Türk, 30.
Yusuf Akçura argued that Mahmud II put into practice politics of Ottomanism 
in its full meaning. Later Ali and Fuat Pashas turned into a widespread search for the 
creation of the Ottoman nation. See Yusuf Akçura, “Üç Tarz-i Siyaset,” 9 -1 0 .
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Hatt-i Hümayunu (Reform Edict) ini 839 called the Tanzimat Fermanı which brought the 
security of life, property and honor, and equal treatment before the law. Its main novelty 
was that all subjects living in the Empire were called Osmanh, or Ottoman citizens, 
regardless of their ethnic and religious origin. Karpat aptly clarified the later 
developments of this matter in the following way:
In order to achieve further integration, the government recognized the non- 
Muslims through the reform edict of 1856, the municipality and vilayet laws and 
the right to be represented in the newly established administrative councils... 
Thus, by 1850 the millet members began to be treated already as Ottoman 
“citizens,” although the formal nationality law was not passed until 1869. This 
law, which is often cited as having created a new and modern legal status for 
Ottoman subjects, was a mere technicality that legalized and clarified further an 
already established concept.'*^
As a result of the Tanzimat reform movement and 1876 Constitution, the subjects of the 
Empire were, for the first time, taken as individuals or citizens making society, not 
simply as being parts of the religious-ethnic communities.'*'^ In sum, all the efforts gave 
way to the reinterpretation of the Ottoman millet system and led to the moderate 
discharge of the age-old compartmentalized administrative system tied with religious
See Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Osmanlıcılık” [Ottomanism], in Tanzimat’tan 
Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 1390.
Kemal Karpat, ''Millete and Nationality; The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation 
and State in the Post-Ottoman Era,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 162
See A. İçduygu, Y. Çolak and N. Soyarık, “What is the Matter with 
Citizenship? A Turkish Case.” Middle Eastern Studies. 35/4 (1999), 193. In fact, the first 
regulation on the legal status of citizens in the Empire came with a law called Tabiyet-I 
Osmaniye Dair Nizamname dated 23 January 1869. For it, those born to Ottoman parents, 
and in a limited number of territories of the Empire, were regarded as Ottoman citizens. 
See Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku [Citizenship Law], 9‘*' ed. (Istanbul: Filiz 
Kitabevi, 1993).
92
communities. The newly defined loyalty to the state with a new collective identity began 
to erode the boundaries of the millet structuration.
It was the concept of citizenship that redefined the subjects’ relations to the state. 
They would, henceforth, establish contact with the state by going beyond their communal 
ties, for the government saw, at first hand, its subjects as members of the state. As one of 
the major institutional reforms that brought together the Enlightenment’s universal 
values, “Ottoman citizenship, theoretically intended to cut across religious and ethnic 
boundaries,” writes Karpat, “undermined the millet's autonomy and self-rule in cultural 
and religious matters.”'*^ This was arranged on the basis of certain rights and obligations, 
which made it possible for all non-Muslims, for example, to obtain the right to be 
employed in the civil service and, even, with some restrictions in the military and to 
benefit from the state’s educational pr ivi leges. In general, with new regulations the 
millets whose rights and freedoms, even though extended and certified, coming under the 
guardianship of the government, became more and more dependent on state control.
As in its modern usage, the concept of citizenship, which together with the idea of 
common (national) culture joins the state and newly emerging social and economic
Karpat, ''Millets and Nationality,” 163.
During the mid-nineteenth century, Karpat notes that the “Ottoman subjects 
going abroad were issued passports as early as 1844 which were, in fact, the counterparts 
of a document used for interior travel known as the mürur tezkiresi. The latter is the 
predecessor of the nüfus tezkiresi and of the nüfus cüzdanı which today are the basic 
documents proving Turkish citizenship. The Ottoman census conducted in the nineteenth 
century, in addition to counting the population, had the purpose of issuing to each subject 
a tezkere." Ibid., 196.
This means the erosion of classical understanding for which “rights and 
freedoms were inherent in the millet itself and could not be restricted or changed at will”. 
Ibid., 164.
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particulars to each other, appears under the name of patriotic allegiance. In the Ottoman 
Empire it was the ideology of Ottomanism^' by which the rulers aimed at forming a 
common homeland and common traits on the basis of modern patriotic nationality. The 
ideas of common homeland and common traits can be considered within the frame of 
common culture around which the modern public sphere is constructed. It seems obvious 
that what they tried to create was an “imagined” Ottoman community as in the sense of 
Anderson’s formulation; it was imagined because everyone living in the Empire was 
required to think of himself or herself as an Osmanli and belonging to the Ottoman
nation.52
The idea of homeland expressed by vatan was initiated as being the common 
homeland of that community and it also determined the boundaries of Ottoman 
citizenship. 53 Vatan  ^ equivalent to the French patrie, appeared as an expression of a spirit 
of patriotism. Applied to the concept of vatan, the intention of the reformers was to
5’ The Tanzimat Fermanı and Kanun-i Esasi (the first constitution of the 
Ottoman) provided the legal and political basis of the ideology of Ottomanism. Such an 
ideology had been the official ideology of the Ottoman state until the end of the Empire.
52 For “imagined political communities” and their relation to nationalism and 
modern state, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread o f Nationalism, 2"^  rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).
53 It began to be officially used especially after the Tanzimat reforms. At the 
beginning of its official usage, Bernard Lewis writes, “[A] report published by the Board 
of Public Works in 1838, speaking of the need for better and more extensive education, 
observes that ‘without science, the people cannot know the meaning of love for the state 
and vatan... In the following year, vatan even appears in an Ottoman official 
document. ..known as the Edict of the Rosebower, Giilhane. In this the Sultan, speaking 
of military matters, observes that ‘it is inescapable for all the people to provide soldiers 
for the defense of the homeland [vaia«]...By the mid-century, the association of country 
{vatan), with the state {devlet) and the nation {millet), as something not only to be loved 
but also to be served and if necessary fought for, has become commonplace.” Bernard
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provide a sense of solidarity between the state and people, and also common shared 
symbolic traits among the various people of the Empire by promoting O sm a n lılık .In 
order to achieve this new skeleton, especially after the mid-nineteenth century, they 
strove to set up a “secular education through which ‘Ottoman nationality’ would be 
formed and p ropagat ed .Al l  these struggles to provide a common identity through 
“Ottoman nationality” were in direct relation to the existing needs of the public sphere in 
line with modern state structure and, parallel to that, establishing political and some 
social institutions. Osmanlılık and vatan were represented as the “rhetoric” of the public 
realm. The consequence was the re-formulation of the old Muslim / non-Muslim category 
in terms of majority / minority that is the end product of the modern public sphere. The 
nature of the millets began to be redefined in a secular and egalitarian way and 
transformed into minorities and majorities. This led to the loss of the classical structure of 
non-Muslim groups as autonomous religious communities and they became “minority 
groups.”5^  Because the state and those who control it appropriate the public sphere, the 
features of the majority gradually took a significant part in the administration. Thus, the 
“Muslim character of the Ottoman government,” writes Karpat, “began to acquire a new
Lewis, “Watan,” in The Impact o f Western Nationalisms, eds. Jehuda Reinharz and 
George L. Mosse (London: Sage, 1992), 172-173.
It also promoted the desire to defend the shrinking boundaries of the empire. 
See Roderic H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact 
o f the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 8 8 .
Berkes, The Development, 179. The interests of vatan and the people, together 
with the state, became determinant for the rule of the sultan, see Kemal Karpat, “The 
Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East,” in Ethnicity, Pluralism, 
and the State in the Middle Exist, eds. M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 50.
Karpat, “The Ottoman Ethnic,” 49.
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political significance. The Muslims identified themselves with the government as 
Muslims and claimed special status and position in society.” '^^  The position of the 
minority began to be conceived as a “moral” problem, the problem that arose from their 
differences and separatist nationalist movements^® fighting for their own independent 
states in line with the European nation-state model. Using the method of taking 
administrative, juridical and economic measures to collect power at the center, the 
Ottoman rulers thought to create a consciousness of being Ottoman through melting 
various groups in one pot by establishing a modern citizenship. This paved the way for 
the ruling elite to begin to employ new techniques and ways to govern society. This 
project of the Tanzimat reformers was doomed to fail, for it was the age of nationalism 
through which every group, whether being minority or majority, strove to achieve its own 
political structure and its own culturally unique way. The critics of the Young Ottomans 
may be evaluated in terms of this frame.
Karpat, “M/7/e/s and Nationality:,” 163.
In order to unite diverse ethnic and cultural elements, Ottomanism as a response 
to the centrifugal forces of religion and nation aroused little support. It was because of the 
secularization and nationalization of the millets, led by the Tamimat and Islahat Fermant, 
the individual subject who became freed of the influence of the millet. This promoted a 
new feeling of secular identity and belonging in the new socio-political components in 
terms of ethnicity, culture and language.” Ibid., 144. The Western scientific and 
nationalist ideals, newly emerging market forces and the breakdown of age-old patron- 
client relationships prepared the end of the “arrangement of the private and personalized 
form of justice,” and gave rise to new political faithfulness legitimized by a new modern 
political language. See Rodrigue, “Difference,” 87.
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3.3. Boundaries of the New Ottoman Society and its Critics: The Young Ottoman 
Quest for Authenticity
Since the Ottoman elite accepted western military and technological superiority, 
they began to observe that there was an a priori tie between technological advancement 
and social and cultural organization. As mentioned above, coupled with the absolute 
monarchic administration and “enlightened despotism” of the Tanzimat elite, from the 
time of Mahmud II there emerged a new belief that society may be redesigned according 
to the enlightened rulers’ principles by means of shaping people. It was, at first glance, 
the outlook that brought about a new view of society made up of individuals and operates 
in accordance with the “mechanical concept of machine”. “This new ideal of society,” 
writes Mardin, “functioned with such novel impulses as change -a new social value 
which replaced ‘stability’ as a central concern. New actors -the youth- became the 
operators of the machine for change and the relations between ‘things’ became the basis 
for an understanding of the workings of society.” ®^ This perspective became widespread 
among the westernized rulers educated in the newly established military and civil schools 
and in Europe, whose perception of “nature” totally changed. Unlike the traditional elite 
stratum, the sources of their power did not come from God, but a moral capacity, 
“reason”, an inner sense of “freedom” and “conscience”, inherent to human beings.^“ As
Mardin, “Just and Unjust,” 121.
Mehmet Kaplan, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Yeni Aydın Tipi” [Mustafa Reşid 
Pasha and New Type of Intellectual], in Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri, 
[Seminar on Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his Period] (Ankara: TTK, 1994), 115. The
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a new social element, the ruling class maintained a westernized life-style, the so-called 
alafrangalık (European way), especially among state officials and intellectuals.There, 
in time, existed a dual structure in every sphere of life in the empire; “new” (modern 
educational and judicial institutions and new manners) beside “traditional” {medrese and 
religious courts, and the way of life the masses c o n tin u e d ).jhg consequence was the 
rising “discursive” gap between the ruler and the ruled.
In the end, the dual structure began to give rise to public discontent. By the mid- 
1860s, young intellectuals called the Young Ottomans began to severely criticize the 
modernizing reforms of the first and second generation of the Tanzimat elite. At the
transformation in their world-view can be observed in the books, especially literary, 
written during the Tanzimat period. In these works, speaking French, playing piano, 
identifying identical with the characters in the books read and seeing the world through 
them became widespread among the new middle class. See İnci Enginün, “Tanzimat 
Sonrası Çeviriler” [Translations after the Tanzimat], in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü 
Uluslararsı Sempozyumu, 435.
Alafranga and Alaturka (Turkish way) were the two most stressed concepts 
employed in defining and determining the boundaries of authenticity during the last three 
decades of the Empire.
The result was a dual structure -traditional and modern- at the political and 
even social level, produced by the modernizing reforms, around which all discussions on 
reforms and political and intellectual life in the Empire were maintained until the end of 
the Empire.
This was, as Mardin fittingly observes, “two universe of discourse”. Mardin, 
“Just and Unjust,” 114. Before this discursive rupture caused by the modernizing efforts, 
there had been a shared discourse among both the upper and lower echelons of the empire 
to the extent that Islam played a mediating role in the Ottoman system. On the rupture 
with modernity, see ibid., 114-116, 118.
The young intellectuals’ criticisms of their ‘alienated’ life style had some 
resemblance with the new German middle class’s harsh criticisms of the ‘Frenchised’ 
way of life of the upper class and aristocracy in the last decades of the eighteenth century. 
To the intellectuals who initiated the Romantic Movement, the Germans had a unique 
way, a peculiar culture, which had to be saved from foreign influences and from the 
harmful effects of civilization rooted in French fashion. For more details, see Norbert
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center of their criticisms, there was the accusation that the Tanzimat rulers intended to 
facilitate European economic domination and that they misunderstood Western ideals, 
principally in that they lied about parliamentarian and constitutional ideals and freedom. 
It was, perhaps, most significant for our purpose that they criticized the unrestricted 
imitations of western manners and symbols. For them, imitation resulted in the 
emergence of an upper stratum independent from traditional moral standards and who 
impeded their own culture signified with Islam. In their view, the Tanzimat was not 
founded on a moral base that provided a philosophy. To fill this void, they proposed to 
benefit from Islam. is why they put strong emphasis on Islam and traditions in
determining the people’s identity and proposed, for the first time, a synthesis between 
western ideals and local Islamic values in their political meaning. According to their 
views, there was no reason for a mismatch of western and Islamic ideals, for the 
equivalents of the basic modern notions such as democracy, freedom and progress could 
be found in Islamic thought. This makes them the first intellectuals who tried seriously to 
fabricate a synthesis between western political ideals and Islamic va lue s . I t  was through 
these principles that they thought to mobilize the masses to build a modern political and 
social structure as in Europe, for in their view the Tanzimat’s project of “civilisation” and 
“Ottomanism” failed to band together the Empire’s “new” citizens. In this respect, they 
strove to describe the nature of the people, especially the Muslims who would be most
Elias, History o f Manners: The Civilizing Process, vol. I (New York: Urizen Books, 
1978), 1-50.
Mardin, Türk, 8 8 .
Şerif Mardin, The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization o f Turkish Political Ideas (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 
3.
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faithful to the state. These efforts appeared to be the first major attempt to search for an 
“authentic” identity that seemed necessary for modern public life and for the self- 
expression of the intellectuals. Indeed, by means of this search for “authenticity”, a sign 
of a new stage of reform, they set out to look for a proper common ground, a “common 
good”, as a unifying force. The common good was based on a synthesis between 
European and Islamic values, denoting an “authenticated” cultural system.
Thus, on the one hand, the Young Ottomans modified the Tanzimat’s civilization 
thesis, though continuing to pair the concept of civilization to Westernization. In their 
perception of modernity, civilization was not something that had to be “universally” 
applied. It had “spiritual” and “material” aspects. They agreed with the bureaucratic 
rulers of the Tanzimat on the material aspects, the universal ideas: science, technology 
and progress. But they refused “identification in culture and life style.” ·^^  In that 
distinction lay the separation of the spirituality of the Ottoman Turkish religious and 
traditional ideas, of eastern civilization, from the material concerns of western 
civilization. To put it in a simple way, it gave expression to the new sentiment that 
westernizing reforms had to be limited to science and technology.
Namık Kemal’s view on civilization finds its apparent expression in that 
sentiment. For him, the civilization now flourishing in the West was the sources of an 
well-ordered society and a dignified and mature individual. It was a pillar of freedom and 
homeland. These were valid everywhere, that is, universal, and should be approved 
wherever they were found. However, progress on the path of hürriyet (freedom), 
meşveret (consultation) and asayiş or nizam (order), was not possible by abandoning the
İnalcık, “Between Europe,” 149.
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sacred manners of the Ottomans. That is why what was taken had to be selectively 
approved, as well as what was preserved. Islam was not responsible for the backwardness 
of the state, but “the domination of the West, which had deprived the east of the 
opportunity of self-advancement.” ®^ It had to modernize itself, but not submissively 
imitate the West and give up its traditions and laws. This was the only way to become a 
‘modernized’ state and a ‘civilized’ society. In the past, empowered with morality, 
Muslims had been the center of various civilizations. Today, the protective and guiding 
rules of the ÿeriat-i Muhammediye and the living manners of the people, which upheld 
the universal standards of western civilization, could be the essence of a new state and 
social structure.^^
Relying on the unique position of Islam, the Young Ottomans had a “relative” 
understanding of civilization based on a “historical” creed that there had been several 
civilizations in world history, that is, in its origin, civilization was not western-restricted. 
Their “relative” standpoint that proposed the preservation of native values through the 
filter of the post-Enlightenment ideals points out the view of “authenticating” and 
“localizing” civilization.It  seemed to be the first rough draft of Gokalp’s formulation 
separating culture (representing inner and unique world of the people) from civilization 
(displaying all material, scientific, administrative and legal achievements).
Lewis, The Emergence, 142.
On the Namık Kemal’s views on civilization see Meriç, ümrandan, 84.
Ibid., 84. In this sense, it seems to be akin to the process of “authentication” 
efforts in the colonized countries, which placed much emphasis on local values to re­
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3.3.1. Abdiilhamit I I ’s “Civilizing” Policies
The thoughts of the Young Ottomans were to some extent put into practice during 
the reign of Abdulhamit II (1876-1908). The policy of both Ottomanism and Islamism 
could be found in the Kanun-u Esasi (the 1876 Constitution) and in the policies of 
Abdulhamit II, who set up a highly centralized and autocratic state'^f With the 
constitution, although Ottomanism by which all subjects had equal rights and duties 
before the law was acknowledged to be the official policy of the state, the halifelik 
(caliphate) was recognized, for the first time, as one of the constituting elements for the 
justification of the Sultan’s political p o w e r . emphasis was regarded as the result of 
a need for an authority to solidify the symbolic power. The expectation was that the 
caliphate functioning as a symbolic power center would perform this task, in the line of 
the policy of Islamism applied in and out of the Empire to gain the support of all Muslims 
against the European powers and also to shape the identity of Muslim groups. In other 
words, the ruling elite were in struggle to reinterpret the pre-existing world of meaning 
such as halifelik and hanefi mezhehi through applying the new modern values, and project 
them as “the social cement for their increasingly intense relations with their subjects /
define a new national and cultural identity. See Partha Chattarjee, Nationalist Thought 
and the Colonial World. Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
To complete the reforms begun by the men of the Tanzimat, he strove to 
expand the scope of bureaucratic, judicial and legal, and financial and economic reforms 
by putting into practice new applications.
72 Niyazi Berkcs, “’İhtilal,”’ 138.
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c i t i z e n s . In such a way, they made an attempt to form a modern centralized and secular 
state, using traditional religious symbols and language.' '^'
Abdiilhamid II’s policy on education had a central place in the search for 
establishing the symbolic universe for the state. In the context of an imperial structure 
faced with crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects and the problem of their loyalty 
to the state, modern mass and elite education became apparent as the main vehicle to 
regain the people’s affinity. Through elite and mass education, during the Hamidian era, 
the rulers tried to place the sense of belonging into the hearts of every Ottoman subject on 
the basis of ci t izenship.In providing a common identity, the basic mission of the 
implemented policy was to “gradually ‘civilize’ subject populations into espousing the 
value system of the center.’’’^  ^Civilizational aspects applied in the centralized educational 
policies were also observed in the policy of the compulsory settling of nomadic people; 
this trend was, as best expressed in Deringil’s phrase, “the ‘civilizing’ or ‘Ottomanizing’ 
of the n o m a d . T o  sum up, Abdiilhamit II “functionally” used the policy of both
Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of 
Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 6 6 . Also, during 
that era, “the systematization of the Sheriah” happened, in such a way that it “became a 
fluid notion and was used in conjunction with, indeed as the ultimate justification for, 
change”, 168. It was in this sense that, as Ahmet Yaşar Ocak argues, the Islamism of the 
Hamidian period was essentially a modernist movement, and so it was “entirely a 
reaction against classical Ottoman Islam.” Cited in ibid., 67.
Ibid., 166.
On the Hamidian educational policy see ibid., 90-110.
Ibid., 1 1 0 . Also for civilizing attempts by instituting a centralized educational 
system, especially in the backward areas of the empire, see Şerif Mardin, Religion and 
Social Change in modern Turkey: the Case o f Bediuzzaman Saidi Nursi (New York; State 
University, 1989), 32, 253.
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Ottomanism and Islamism to form a secure symbolic ground, and also, for this purpose, 
firstly applied pan-Turkish ideals and supported the study of Turcology for the same 
reason/^* It appears as a pragmatic aim that was to save the state by forging a feeling of 
common Ottoman identity. That was why all the official searches for a common ground 
had not been a sole legitimizing ideology for the state’s action until the CUP government 
used a modern ideology, namely Turkism in which the idea of culture had a privileged 
place, especially after the Balkan wars (1912-1913).
3.4. The Young Turks and the CUP’s Rule: Scientism and Nationalism as Basis of 
“Cultivated” Society and Culture
In addition to the efforts of the advocates for Ottomanism and Islamism to look 
for a common purpose and bond among the empire’s subjects, the third attempt came 
from the Young Turks, the second opposition movement in the process of modernization. 
To overcome the problem of creating a bond, they tried their best to arouse the 
consciousness of Turkism as their major premise, on a large scale, coupled with a rough 
scientism. The rise of this opposition group had a direct connection with the extensive 
modernizing reforms of Abdiilhamit II. As mentioned above, educational reforms had a 
central place among his reforms. By broadening and founding several professional 
schools he “re-modernized” and expanded secular education. These schools, as centers 
for elite education, constituted a typical context for the spread of western thought, mainly
Deringil, The Well-Protected, 61
Standford J. Shaw, “Sultan Abdiilhamit II: Last Man of Tanzimat,” in 
Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararsı Sempozyumu, 194-196.
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positivism and biological materialism, among young students. The graduates came out 
equipped with new values by which they opposed the rule of the sultan and promoted a 
“utopian” perspective on society.'^  ^ In the end, as the main end-product of the new 
schools, a new learned generation having a new-fashioned vision colored by the 
positivistic and nationalist imagery of nineteenth century Europe came to the fore.^°
The new world-view the reformist elite obtained in secular schools largely made it 
possible for men of the new genre to gain this very different view of reality. As Mehmet 
Kaplan argues, school and books appeared to be the two things that separated them from 
the life and practices of the ordinary people. For that reason, they both fulfilled the 
function of socialization in producing a profile of the elite who treated religion as an 
obstacle to social advancement and so were in conflict with the living values of society 
rooted in the religious t radi t ion.This gave way to a deep rupture between these 
reformists and the traditional segments of the e l i t e .The  reformists began to obtain a 
“speculative, utopian and projective mentality.” '^* These were the “knowing” elite who
The graduates of the Harbiye were the first group who, gaining the best secular 
education, began to conceive of themselves as constituting a “class of knowledge”. See 
Şerif Mardin, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset [Society and Politics in Turkey] (İstanbul; 
İletişim, 1997), 223.
Mardin, Türk, 119.
Cited in Mardin, Türkiye 'de, 227.
Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet 
[Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker] (İstanbul; Ücdal Neşriyat, 1981), 8-9.
This was, as Mardin aptly puts it, the rift between Him (traditional knowledge) 
putting the “stamp of morality on knowledge and its application to human relations” and 
fiinun (modern scientific knowledge) systematizing “human relations as a scientifically 
observable process and a part of the realm o f ‘things.’” Mardin, “The Just and Unjust,” 
123-124.
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were uneasy with the Ottoman socio-cultural life and searched for a model to attain a 
perfect socio-cultural system in which everyone was pleased and happy.
This search explained the young intellectuals’ rising interest in positivism, social 
Darwinism and biological materialism providing a philosophical and methodological 
basis for their project of modernity. In their view, more than its significance in the study 
of nature, science had a moral implication, especially tied to the Comtian Positivism. 
Science therefore served as a “method” and a “mechanism” to restructure society 
according to the Westernist ideals of the intellectuals claiming to know the nature of the 
people sinking in “darkness”. This positivist interpretation of science then came to be a 
main guiding principle for the revolutionary zeal of the Republic.
Belief in science and progress appeared to be the essence of the Westernist 
tendency increasingly gaining popularity among the civil and military elite who 
supported the Young Turk Movement. At the same time, nationalist principles began to 
take root among them. Studies on the history and language of the Turks by Orientalists 
and Turcologists and the emigration of people of Turkish origin from Central Asia, the 
Caucasus and the Volga Region to the Empire led to the rising interests of the new 
intellectual groups on the character of the Turks. Newspapers, becoming widespread, 
reaching and affecting all educated persons, dealt with issues relating to the outside 
world, especially the world of Turks, and historical and cultural matters because of the
84 Ibid., 124.
85 Comte aimed at founding a naturalistic science of society capable of explaining 
the past, present and future of humankind by applying to it the scientific methods 
successfully used in the study of nature. L. J. D. Wacquant, “Positivism,” \n Dictionary o f 
Twentieth-Century Social Thought, eds. W. Outhwaite and T. Bottomore (Oxford. 
Blackwell, 1993), 496.
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ban over the discussion of internal politics.* *^ All these began to lead to the rise of 
consciousness of being a national group among the larger segments of the intellectuals of 
the Hamidian period; and even some of the Westernists and Islamists managed to justify 
their position with “nationalisf’ ideals.
Turkism became popular with the well-known pamphlet of Yusuf Akçura’s Üç 
Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Ways of Politics) published in 1904 in the newspaper Turk, 
appearing in Cairo. Yusuf Akçura^^, a leading figure in pan-Turkist movement, 
considered Turkism as one of three ways of politics -Ottomanism, Islamism and 
Turkism-, which were proposed to solve the problem of dissolution the Empire faced:
The first is to create an Ottoman nation by representations and unification of 
various nations which are the subjects of the Ottoman government. The second, to 
unify all Muslims under the authority o f the Ottoman State (called by the 
Europeans as Panislamisme)... The third, to form a polity o f the Turkish nation 
based on irk (race).^^
For him, Ottomanism failed to be a project of binding different ethnic and religious 
groups in the Empire, because of the changing international and internal social, political
David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1977), 14-15.
During this period, as Kushner concisely indicates, “the concept of Türk had 
been transformed into a honorable and proud term; chapters of Turkish history had been 
brought to light; Turkish-speaking Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire had been 
recognized as racial brothers; and the significance of Anatolia as a Turkish homeland had 
been established. The role of the Turkish language and culture as the foundations of 
Turkish nationality, and the need to promote and develop them, had been similarly 
affirmed.” Ibid., 97.
** Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933), a journalist, teacher and politician, played an active 
role in the Turkist movement and also in the formation of the Republican history thesis.
Yusuf Akçura, “Üç Tarz-i Siyaset,” 9.
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and economic conditions. The last two came to be only alternatives to establish a modern 
polity necessary for a strong state. Although he seemed to be uncertain as to which of 
them was more useful, he placed quite an emphasis on the politics of Turkism, because 
the Turks were not outside the trend of the rise of the nationalist ambitions of various 
groups in the Empire. At the end, he said he did not find a convincing answer to the 
question: “which, of politics of Islamism and politics of Turkism, are the most beneficial 
and applicable for the Ottoman state?” °^ Besides science, particularly positivism, by then, 
nationalism became the one of the core parameters of the Young Turks.
As an opposition movement the Young Turks firstly became organized secretly 
under the name of Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti (Ottoman Union Society) in 1889. The 
group took a new name a little later, Osmanli İttihat ve Terraki Cemiyeti (Ottoman Union 
and Progress Society) in which the positivistic influence was observed. Their 
fundamental aim in setting up such a secret society was to work for saving the state and 
“nation” from the tyranny of the existing government and the external enemies.^' In time, 
in the Young Turk Movement there existed two main groups with two distinct ideological 
stands. The first was Ahmet Riza’s group stressing the belief of a strong centralized 
administration, the continuation of the Committee for Union and Progress; the second 
group led by Prince Sabahattin was organized as Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet 
Cemiyeti (Society of Private Initiative and Decentralization).Ahmet Rıza, as an zealous
90 Ibid., 18.
9' This objective was the basis of the Society’s Nizamname (regulations of the 
organization) prepared in 1895. For the Nizamname see Tevfik Çavdar, İttihat ve Terraki 
[Union and Progress] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991), 17-18.
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follower of Comte, proposed a reform program for which progress was possible through 
taming and edifying the thoughts of people. It was only education that provided the 
necessary means to shape individuals, and so it was in his “positivistic” inclination that 
there was “no means of saving the country and the nation from the danger other than 
education and the positive sciences...the best way to enlighten people’s minds.”^^  This 
was the basis of his social and political project that put forward the necessity of the 
centralized administration affirmed by the restoration of the constitutional regime. Such a 
sort of entity would make it easy to reach a “civilized” and “cultivated” social system that 
was the core of modern life. In contrast. Prince Sebahattin, a student of Le Play 
sociology, had a liberal outlook and so, for the first time, proposed a social reform 
program according to which the real problem was not simply political but was to 
“transform society from a collectivistic formation to an individualistic order.” '^* The 
reason was because the collectivistic nature of society was the basic source of 
backwardness and an obstacle to progress. For him, it was the reformers’ mistake that all 
the modernizing efforts had strengthened the collectivistic structure in the Empire. He 
offered a new system of education in which individuals would be educated to rely upon 
themselves. In this way private property ownership would take the place of collectivistic 
ownership. He also offered a new system of administration that had to be decentralized. 
At the end, in his view, we would reach a social system where there are individuals
For all splits in the movement see Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The 
Role o f the Committee o f Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905- 
1926 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 14-18.
Cited in Berkes, The Development, 306. In this sense his ideas were prone to 
more “centralism and Ottoman-muslim nationalism.” Zürcher, The Unionist, 17.
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capable of standing alone and a democratic and decentralized political system.^^ His 
liberal ideas did not come out as principles of a strong political movement becoming 
dominant over the state structure. Nevertheless, the Committee for Union and Progress 
(CUP), under the leadership of Ahmet Rıza, consolidated its position as the main 
opposing organization and in 1907 declared a new Nizamname (Regulations of the 
Organization). We find in this Nizamname his views on forming a “cultured” and 
“civilized” system. Its first article promised to strengthen local manners by taking into 
account national and regional needs; it further aimed to spread education and culture and 
to raise the Ottomans to the level of contemporary civilization.^^ In fact, the creation of a 
“cultured” and “civilized” order by this ideological outlook appeared to be, in its general 
sense, the CUP’s basic legacy to the Republic’s project for social and cultural 
engineering.
The CUP played a leading role in the 1908 Revolution as a result of which the 
Young Turks comprising young military officers, intellectuals and bureaucrats, became 
influential in the state affairs. It came to power in 1913 and was in government until the 
end of the First World War, 1918. During the early years of its administration, it appeared 
to be under the influence of Üç Tarz-i Siyaset, namely Islamism, Ottomanism and 
Turkism. The principles of İttihad-ı Anasır (Union of Elements) and Vatan-i Umumi 
(Common Fatherland) were significant parts of the CUP’s program until the Balkan
94 Ibid., 311.
95 On the views of Prince Sabaheddin, see ibid., 310-312.
9<5 In the second article, the emphasis was on to provide the unity of the Ottomans; 
and the third was about the reinstitution of the constitution, the application of general 
reforms and setting up the constitutional monarchy based on equality. Çavdar, İttihad 
Terraki, 2 1 -2 2 .
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Wars, the last great war in the Balkans resulting from the spread of nationalism among 
the subjects of the Sultan. The CUP government now had to meet the question of what 
would be the focal point of patriotism and the basis of identity of the Empire’s subjects. 
Mainly there were three options -the Ottoman, Islamic community and the Turkish 
nation, which were commonly discussed in the circles of the intellectuals. From time to 
time, the CUP’s leaders referred to the pan-Islamist policies to justify their position and 
reforms and to hold up support, especially during the wars, although on account of their 
reformist and secularist structure they put into practice common secularizing changes 
notably in education and law.^ "^
With its 1916 Congress the CUP completely gave up Ottomanist and liberal 
policies, and instead began to undertake a Turkist, secularist and statist at t i tude. I t  was 
because of this the Unionists conceived nationalism and secularism as inevitable aspects 
to obtain a modernized social and political system. These views brought about the 
discussions for the complete replacement of Islam as the basis of identity. Thus, they 
introduced the “notion that the nation was the sources of all au thor i ty .The  institutional 
and structural reformulation also came to constitute the basis of the Unionist concept of 
culture. It became clear in two basic aims. The first one was to gain the benefits of 
“civilization” that was universalized Western civilization, and the second was to search 
for a national Turkish identity that, for them, had been for a long time submerged 
underneath the Ottoman cosmopolitan identity. Both inclinations may be observed in
On that policy of the CUP, see ibid., 95-96. 
98 Ibid., 91.
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their imitation of the West and the rise of interest to Central Asia, due to the Turkist 
ideology and the activities of the Türk Ocakları (the Turkish Hearths). What were 
found out as unique peculiarities of the people (the Turks) had to be proved in accordance 
with the modern nationalist ideals. At the same time, together with civilized manners of 
the West, they had to be taught to the people, conceived as sinking into the darkness of 
ignorance and unaware of their true identity. This, according to the prevalent views of the 
Unionists, who claimed to know what was best for the people, was the only way to 
become moderni zed . I t  was this elitist position which provided a political, as well as 
ideological and intellectual, ground for the development of Kemalism as an elitist 
revolutionary tradition.
3.5. Three Intellectual and Political Movements in the Second Meşrutiyet
Metin Heper, “Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern 
Micidle East Journal. 35 (1981), 345-363.
100 Çavdar, îttihad ve Terraki, 134.
101 On the characteristics of the Unionists, see ibid., 132-134.
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There were the three dominant currents of thought during the period of the CUP, 
namely Turkism, Westernism and Islamism. As it is indicated above, the first two 
gradually gained significance over the CUP’s policies. The pioneers of these three 
currents were in the search for a common political and cultural identity to which the 
Empire’s subjects belonged. All their efforts and discussions came to invite a debate on 
“to which civilization we belonged and whether or not we had a unique way,” and the 
result was three notions of culture and civilization.
3.5.1. Islamism and the Idea o f  “Alternative” Civilization
Islamism as a political and cultural project during the first decade of the twentieth 
century was put forward and reformulated by a group of intellectuals. But its roots 
dated back to the Young Ottomans and Abdülhamit IPs Islamist policies. In this regard 
Ittihad-i Islam (Union of Islam), which had been the frequently repeated motto of 
Islamism, was the name of the Young Ottomans’ search for authenticity. In this new 
modern outlook^®  ^ Islam was a different and unique civilization compatible with the
Among these intellectuals Sait Halim Paşa, Babanzade Hakkı, 
Çerkeşşehhizade Halil Halid, Mehmed Akif Ersoy, and Bediuizzaman became the 
prominent figures. They came around Şebi-ül Reşad, Sırat-I Müstakim and Volkan 
journals. See Ismail Kara, İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri [The Political Ideas of the 
Islamists] (Istanbul; İz Yay., 1994). For detailed information about these thinkers, see 
Ismail Kara, ed., Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, Metinler/Kişiler [Islamist Thought in 
Turkey, Texts/Persons] (Istanbul: Risale, 1986).
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western one and others. Such relativism mostly inspired by the social thought of 
Romanticism, could be also observed in the thoughts and writings of Muslim intellectuals 
in other Islamic societies, such as Jamal’ed-Din Afgani and Muhammed Abduh. Like 
Namık Kemal and other Young Ottomans, they attacked the universalistic notions of 
civilization and instead, in their “differentialist” discourse, the Islamic value system was 
unique and had a pregiven nature. This was the “discourse of “authenticity”, in which 
societies chosen as the field of application of the totalizing category “Islam” -  “Islamic 
societies” -  are thought to constitute a Lebenswelt with an essential and closed 
homogeneity.” ®^'^  Such discourse relied on the notion of “ontologically differentiated 
history,” resulting in a particularism and the rejection of universalistic aspects. Continuity 
in history strengthened with the idea of a return to the “Islamic golden age” was in 
tandem with procuring individual identity. With a modern ideological outlook, Islam 
was regarded as a civilization or a secular power more than anything else was; it required 
loyalty much more than piety. The ideology of particularism in Young Ottoman thought 
came with the idea of body politics. In this sense, as in the modern nationalist ideology in 
the West, Islam was perceived and interpreted as a modern ideology to redefine the 
masses and to mobilize into gaining transcendental ideals. It began to function as a 
category with the “non-religious” or “secular” as its binary opposite and came to 
“represent itself as the language of the public sphere.” It was in this connection that it *
*03 For which see Mümtaz’er Türköne, Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu 
[The Emergence of Islamism as Political Ideology] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 245-246.
*04 Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London; Verso, 1993), 22; and also 
on the relativism and Islam, see ibid., 5-6.
105 Ibid., 27, 42-47
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indeed appeared to be a symbolic justification for the centralized modern state and the 
way to determine the symbolic boundaries of the newly shaping public sphere. 
Abdiilhamit II tried to put into practice these ideals by means of active use of the 
institution of the Caliphate.
In the answer of the Islamists during the Second Meşrutiyet to the question of “to 
which civilization we belonged and whether or not we had a unique way,” it was obvious 
that Muslims had their own distinct civilization. They, developing a counter argument to 
the Westernists, saw Islam not as an obstacle to progress, but that it could even provide a 
technological and political awakening if the Islamic traditions that made the Ottomans a 
great state were retrieved and reinterpreted.·®^ The Muslims had to belong to an Islamic 
civilization, but for the Islamists of the Second Meşrutiyet there existed the need for 
some steps of reform mostly related to the material aspects of Western civilization, 
Thus, borrowing technology and science from the West was acceptable; nevertheless, 
Islam had to stay in command in spheres of government, law, social usage, education and 
basic loyalty.' This was the base line of their understanding of civilization, according to
Rodrigue, “Difference,” 85. In fact, this was the crucial outcome of process of 
modernization from the time of Tanzimat. Muslims as a majority gradually came to 
identify themselves with the state in the course of which Islam was offered to be a 
binding ideology. This was the territorial and centralized state, the vatan, to which all 
Muslims would pledge loyalty. And the “state-Islam relationship was politicized and 
popularized and became the basis of a new national-Islamic identity.” Karpart, “The 
Ottoman Ethnic,” 45, 50.
For the Abdülhamif s use of Islam as a political instrument, see Mardin,
Türkiye 'de, 53.
•®* Tank Zafer Tunaya, İslamcılık Cereyanı I  [Islamist Movement I] (Istanbul; 
Cumhuriyet, 1998), 26-28.
For their view of civilization see Kara, İslamcıların, 24-25.
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which each had a particular history and roots in the past, which were the sources of its 
true identity. There was no one true civilization and no one road to progress. Relying on 
that, they proposed a program of Islamization in which, by refraining from the vigorous 
imitation of Western manners, “social reform would be achieved by putting even its 
details under the sacred sanction of religion.” *^^  It is obvious from the views of the 
Islamists that the culture of each society was a historically unique entity incompatible 
with the Western one. This was mentioned together with plural civilizations. Here culture 
could not be reformed and transformed, and, if it was, people would lose their cultural 
identity and become slaves. Only this understanding of culture and civilization, based on 
Islam, which was the sole language of public sphere, provided a legitimacy for politics 
and all its mechanisms.
3.5.1. Westernism: The “Universalized” Conceptions o f  Civilization and Culture
Unlike the Islamist resistance to the total conversion from the traditional order to 
a modern one, the “Westernist” strand of the intellectuals argued for, to a greater extent, 
the complete transformation of administrative, political and socio-cultural system, that is, 
complete Westernization. Although Westernization had been a movement with the efforts 
of reformation of the Empire since the late eighteenth century, after the 1908 Revolution 
Westernist thoughts, a school of thought was called Garpçılık (Westernism), began to be
This was “Islamization”. Said Halim Paşa defined it as “the successful 
interpretations and adaptation of Islam’s belief, moral, social and political system 
according to the needs of age.” Quoted in Tunaya, İslamcılık, 25. For his political views, 
see Said Halim Paşa, “İslamda Siyasi Teşkilat” [Political Organization in Islam], in 
Türkiye ’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, 79-157.
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systematized and proposed as a primary problem of s o c i e t y . According to the 
Westernists’ views, complete Westernization was inevitable; this account was based on 
the political, social, cultural and economic superiority of the West, which could not be 
questioned because it was based on science. It was impossible to separate the material 
side of civilization from its manners and ideas that were the bases of technological 
domination of Western civilization. In other words, the West, as an “image”, and Western 
Civilization did not simply reflect material and technological development, but also, most 
importantly, “a completely different mode of thinking.”'*^  The obstacles to the progress 
of the Ottoman society were the traditional values and religion itself, Islam. That was 
why society had to be freed from these “archaic” values which were in contradiction with 
the contemporary ideals. The Westernists therefore aimed at forming a new moral 
structure and creating a new ‘humane’ equipped with the European adab-i muaşeret 
(etiquette) as well as the scientific mind who would reject traditional mores, That 
would bring about the needed material superiority. One of the leaders of that strand, 
Kılıçzade Hakkı, prepared a reform proposal, published in the îçtihad of Abdullah Cevdet 
in 1912, that appeared to be a rough draft of Atatürk’s later reforms. Shortly, the proposal 
suggested a complete transformation of society and a new vision of social order.
Berkes, The Development, 363.
1*2 Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Batıcılık” [Westernism], Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 1384. Among its prominent figures were 
Abdullah Cevdet, Kılıçzade Hakkı, Celal Nuri (İleri) and Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın).
>13 Berkes, The Development, 352.
" ‘i For the Westernists’ thesis, see Hanioğlu, “Batıcılık,” 1384-1385.
117
Abdullah Cevdet had a leading position in the movement. Thus, the explanation 
of his views help us to settle the Westernist ideas of civilization and the West. For him, 
the West was not our enemy; it was our guidance. Our enemy was in fact “our own 
inertia, ignorance, fanaticism, and our blind following of tradition... The West is our 
teacher; to love it is to love science, progress, material and moral advancement.”’ 
“There is no second civilization. The one, unique civilization is European Civilization, 
and it must be imitated with its roses and its thorns”, he continues.” '^  It was in this sense 
that civilization was defined in universal terms and seen as “the outcome of positivistic 
universal science and rationality”” * and free from particular, traditional culture. Thus, in
It included the following ideas; “The Sultan would have one wife and 
concubines; the prince would be...given a thorough education, including service in the 
army; the fez would be abolished, and a new headgear adopted; existing cloth factories 
would be expanded, and new ones opened, and the Sultan, princes, senators, deputies, 
officials, and soldiers made to wear their products; women would dress as they pleased, 
though not extravagantly, and would be free from dictation or interference in this matter 
by the ulema, policemen, or street riff-raff; they would be at liberty to choose their 
husbands, and the practice of match-making would be abolished; convents and tekkes 
would be closed, and their revenues added to the education budget; all medreses would 
be closed, and new modern literary and technical institutes established; the turban, cloak, 
would be limited to certificated professional men of religion, and forbidden to others; 
vows and offerings to the saints would be prohibited...; exorcists, witch-doctors, and the 
like would be suppressed, and medical treatment for malaria made compulsory; popular 
misconceptions of Islam would be corrected; practical adult education would be opened; 
a consolidated and purified Ottoman Turkish dictionary and grammar would be 
established by a committee of philologists and men of letters; the Ottomans, without 
awaiting anything from their government or from foreigners would, by their own efforts 
and initiative, build roads, bridges, ports, railways, canals, steamships, and factories; 
starting with the land and Evkaf \zsn% the whole legal system would be reformed.” Lewis, 
The Emergence, 236-237.
Cited in Berkes, The Development, 357.
Cited in Hanioğlu, Doktor Abdullah Cevdet, 359.
” * Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics; The Case of 
Turkey,” in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1995), 22.
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order to reach the level of that civilization, it was necessary to entirely demolish 
traditional values regarded responsible for the decline of the state, and instead to re­
institute a “civilized” one. These were what were found in his view and other positivist- 
nationalist intellectuals who were in constant search for the “idealized” life style. In the 
process of “civilizing”, for him, traditional motifs peculiar to the Ottoman society which 
were unable to adopt to the course of being perfected could not be benefited from, and so 
they had to be changed with suitable European ones.'*  ^He, therefore, waged war against 
illiteracy and ignorance of the people, as the “great danger to the health of the nation”, 
which would be eliminated by making them perfect,
The project Abdullah Cevdet proposed included the idea of setting up a new 
belief system, a new “ethic”, for which Islam might be instrumentally used in a 
temporary manner because of its existing role in social relations. In this regard, Islam was 
seen only as a tool in justifying changes in the path of establishing European ideals. The 
planned ethical system would be based on the idea of “biological materialism” that would 
substitute for religion in the near f u t u r e . p r o v i d i n g  substantive changes in the 
thoughts of every individual and cultural accumulation in society, he believed in the 
importance of the activities of translation because translated books from the west would
Hanioglu, Doktor Abdullah Cevdet, 361
120 Frank W. Creel, “Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism.” Int. Journal of 
Turkish Studies. 4(1980), 14-15. This could be provided through the mass schooling in 
the hands of enlightened rulers. On his views on education, see 11-12.
*21 Hanioglu, Doktor Abdullah Cevdet, 333-337. To benefit from Islam’s social 
content he tried to separate its social aspects from its religious one and to attract attention 
of people to its second aspects. See ibid., 131. It was his aim to solve the social problems 
arising from Islam itself through using its social contents, and, at the end, to get 
materialism hold up all functions that had been fulfilled by Islam. Ibid., 139.
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bring to us enlightened modern t h o u g h t s . in his “utopian” project, the elite played a 
leading role as the administrators of society. A group of elite educated in western 
standards would administer the mass that, in every sphere, indeed had to be controlled. 
They would have to raise the “educational” and “cultural” level of all people, especially 
peasants, to control and manage them easily. It was the process of making people 
conscious of being humane. Only in this way would the Ottoman society become an 
integral part of the civilized world, the West. The proposed principles in his project 
would provide suitable ground for protecting the national existence by “submitting to the 
current of civilization”. *24 For him, the politico-cultural identity of the Ottomans as a 
civilized nation of contemporary civilization had to be defined in terms of the idea of 
citizenship and the idea of a common fatherland. In this respect, he espoused a “view of 
Turkishness which emphasized the need of Turks, Kurds and Armenians to unite their 
destinies as a matter of common survival and which placed the rights of all on the same 
level.”'25 All living in Turkey shared commonalties inferred from habitually accepted 
aspects of the civilized world. The emphasis was on the idea that brought into scene not a
'22 Ibid., 367-368.
'23 Ibid., 368-9
'24 Cited in Creel, “Abdullah Cevdet,” 21.
'25 Ibid., 16. This is most clear in the following words of Abdullah Cevdet; “You 
are an Armenian, I am a Kurd, but both you and I have the right to be a minister of the 
nation in the “Council of Turkey”...Isn’t Turkey the common fatherland of all us?... 
Neither of these elements (the Kurds and the Armenians) has given to mankind a 
Shakspeare, a Molière, a Gutenberg, a Pasteur”, “We are not at a time to be playing with 
the words Kurdistan, Arabistan, Lazistan, Ermenistan; we are at a time to be giving 
material manifestations that we are capable worthy of living free and united.” Ibid., 17
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racially and ethnically restrictive notion of nation, but a culturally “assimilative” and 
“hierarchic” (civilized or modern versus archaic or ignorant) one.^^e
The Westernist program of civilization was very akin to the French conception of 
civilization and culture. In this program civilization was defined as a far-reaching concept 
comprising every aspect of life or the “whole way of life.” This life denoted a socially, 
economically, culturally and ethically developed category according to which other ways 
of life (generally regarded as barbaric, ignorant or less developed) were judged. It also 
had a great potential to transform “others” into a civilized form. One might argue that the 
hierarchic, progressive and assimilative understanding of civilization and ethic (reading 
culture) was a former description of the Republican discourse on civilization and culture.
3.5.3. Turkism: The Name o f  “Authenticated” Culture
Turkism as mentioned above, emerged as an intellectual movement in the last 
years of the nineteenth century and turned into a powerful and influential political 
movement, especially during the CUP governments. The Turkists’ understanding of
126 Abdullah Cevdet’s project, offering the idea of “Westernization” to fiilly 
transform the pre-existing social reality, provided a faction within the Westernist strand, 
which was called the moderate wing. This wing led by Celal Nuri opposed the complete 
transformation and instead promoted the acceptance of technical side of civilization. 
Celal Nuri divided civilization into two kinds: technical and real. Technical civilization 
could be applicable for the Ottoman society, for Europe had attained “the highest peak of 
technical civilization, but had not achieved and never would achieve any ‘real’ 
civilization.” Lewis, The Emergence, 235. For him, up to his time, the Ottomans mixed 
both, and had imitated its real aspects. In his view, it was necessary to benefit from 
traditional patterns by selecting among them, which would be more beneficial to the 
Ottomans. SeeHanioğlu, “Batıcılık,” 1386.
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the West, modern civilization and authenticity, in the first instance, differentiated them 
from the other two movements. But, as Berkes aptly states, “[t]hey were as pro-Western 
as any Westernist and as anti-Western as any Islamist. They accepted both attitudes, but 
only p a r t i a l l y . I n  their project of modernization, the basic argument, in contrast to 
Westernism, was that Turks had a peculiar “culture” truly expressed in emotive terms. It 
could not be easily changed and replaced with strange ways of understanding that 
belonged to other nations. Nevertheless, culture was not in contradiction with 
modernizing reforms through which it would be refreshed. Western civilization, made up 
of various (national) cultures, was not simply seen as reason or humanity as claimed by 
the Westernists. That was why being part of modern civilization, “as the Western nations 
had, was . . . a matter of appropriating the international civilization, but not the national 
cultures of the Western nations.” In this sense Turkism was also in direct conflict with 
Islamism that rejected Western civilization which brought moral decadence to the world 
of Islam. In short, according to Turkist principles, to become a true nation was the only 
way to become an integral part of the civilized world, the world of nations, only by 
preserving their authentic culture.
>27 Among the prominent representatives of the movement there were Ziya 
Gökalp, Ömer Seyfettin, Hamdullah Suphi, Yusuf Akçura, Halide Edip and Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu, who were the leading and enthusiastic young journalists, writers, politicians and 
scholars. In the 1910s Turkism developed around periodicals Genç Kalemler (Young 
Pens) and Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland), and a cultural organization called Türk Ocağı 
(Turkish Hearts). For a short history of Turkism, from inside, see Ziya Gökalp, The 
Principles, 1-11.
>2* Berkes, The Development, 355. 
>29 Ibid., 355.
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At this point, briefly elaborating the views of Ziya Gbkalp who was the leading 
theoretician of the Turkist movement and the ideologue of the CUP, made it conceivable 
how the terms of civilization and culture were visualized in the period of the Young Turk 
era. To begin with, Gbkalp’s view on society^^® that is the source of all uppermost moral 
values, constitutes what belongs to nation {millet) and culture {hars). All its divine ideals 
are identified with the nation that is the perfect society and in fact “the highest stage in 
human development.”'3· His views on society and nation became more explicable with 
his dualistic notions on culture and civilization. He defined both concepts as comprising 
“all aspects of social life -  religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, economic, 
linguistic and technologic.” But there are two main differences between culture and 
civilization;
First of all, culture is national, whereas civilization is international. Culture a 
harmonious whole of the eight above-mentioned aspects of the life of a single 
nation. Civilization, on the other hand, is a mutually shared whole of the social 
lives of many nations situated on the same continent... Secondly, civilization is 
the sum total of social phenomena that have occurred by conscious action and 
individual wills... The elements included in culture, however, have not been 
created by conscious action and individual will. They are not artificial. ^ 32
130 Mostly generating from Durkheim’s theory, his theory of society based on the 
idea of “the collective consciousness of the group” from which “social phenomena” 
emerges. This is “conscious realizations” named as “collective representations” (myths, 
epic, rituals, moral, legal, economic rules, practices, etc.) As the source of collective 
consciousness the society was the highest moral authority. Ziya Gbkalp, The Principles, 
51-52.
131 Uriel Heyd, Foundation o f Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings o f 
Ziya Gokalp (London; Luzac and Company, 1950), 59. He defined a nation as a society 
composed of “people who speak the same language, have had the same education and are 
united in their religious, moral and aesthetic ideals -  in short, those who have a common 
culture and religion.” Ibid., 63.
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Civilization is the product of modern sciences and techniques by which human beings 
can create “all knowledge and theories relating to ethics, law, fine arts, economics, 
philosophy, language and technologies.” It is artificial. In his view, it was common to 
cultures of the West but was not reduced to its own specific cultures; and so it was 
universally applicable. Culture, however, is not man-made; It is something that has 
spontaneously and naturally developed and can not easily be imitated by other nations. 
Gökalp translated the French concept of culture into Turkish as hars partially in parallel 
with its original usage which refers to both cultivating the land and worshipping. It was 
derived from the word ihras that means plugging and cultivating land. Although this 
usage seemed parallel to the French practice of the term as an understanding of 
cultivating and civilizing the people, it had some connotations with the Romantic view of 
culture.
Gökalp used culture and nation as interrelated concepts, and every culture has its 
own dynamic structure that separates a nation from others. “Turkishness” with its unique 
language, ethics, sentiments and arts, evolving through a long history, was the core of the 
national culture of the Turks. However, it was not racially determined, but was the name 
of a shared, common culture because “a nation can be defined as a group which possesses 
a culture peculiar to itself Therefore, a Turk can have only one language, only a single 
c u l t u r e . I s l a m ,  together with Turkishness, was part of the Turkish culture. Mostly 
inspired from Durkheim, it was seen functional for social cohesion and solidarity, but not
•32 Ziya Gökalp, The Principles, 22.
>33 Ibid.
>34 Ortaylı, “OsmanlI’da Kültür,” 150.
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a source of law that was the inviolable basis of the modern, secularized state, 
guiding principles in the modern state and society were national morals; that is, the nation 
was the exclusive justifying force for political authority. A powerful state, therefore, 
existed only in the context of which there was a culturally and politically integrated 
group, the nation.
According to Gokalp’s nationalist ideas, civilization and culture, at that time, 
could not be separated from each other easily, because that “civilization is the sum total 
of many institutions. However, the sum total of institutions peculiar to a specific nation is 
called culture”. Civilization had to penetrate into the daily life of the people, especially 
through education, which made it possible to keep up their cultural elements; but, at the 
same time, the improvement of culture contributes to the rise of civilization. It was this 
perception that would make it possible for the Turkish nation to keep alive its “cultural 
authenticity” and, at the same time, be a powerful member of the world of nations. 
Stressing plural civilizations Gokalp saw each having “its own logic, its own aesthetics, 
its own interpretation of life. For the same reason, a civilization must be accepted in its 
e n t i r e t y . I n  other words, the adoption to modern civilization would lead to achieve
>35 Ziya Gbkalp, The Principles, 19.
>36 On secularization in the thoughts of Gdkalp, see Andrew Davison, 
“Secularization and Modernization in Turkey; Ideas of Ziya Gbkalp.” Economy and 
Society. 24 (1995), 189-224.
>3·^ Ziye Gbkalp, The Principles, 38-39. On this point Heyd argued that in the 
thoughts of Ziya Gbkalp both are “compatible and jointly determine the life of modern 
nations.” Heyd, The Foundations, 86.
>38 Ziya Gbkalp, The Principles, 39. For this reason the Tanzimat elite failed to 
adopt European civilization through “outward imitation”, since they could not understand 
this point. Ibid., 39.
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modernity besides revitalizing its authentic culture. At this juncture, it is worth 
mentioning that Gokalp’s conception of culture and civilization differentiated from 
Romantic idea on culture and civilization especially in terms of culture’s relations and 
interactions with civilization. Although his distinction between culture and civilization 
seemed to be just one reflection of the dualistic tendency of Romanticism (a distinction 
between spirit and material) and his understanding of “authenticity” was in line with its 
organic and historicist view to some extent, there could not be any conflict between 
culture and civilization. Unlike the Romantics, he used the word civilization in its 
broadest sense to refer all aspects of social life, not simply technological and material 
ones. Both were indeed jointly interdependent. Put in another way, civilization was not 
something that prevented flourishing of cultures and distorted their authenticity.
That was why he proposed a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic values and modern 
civilizational aspects, which would be the basic premise of Turkish national culture. The 
synthesis was the only way to obtain a harmonious unity that was only possible with 
symmetry between the components of both civilization and national culture.
Here, Ottomannes was excluded, because, in conformity with the necessity of the 
time, those Turkish culture and Western civilization had to / would take the place of the 
Ottoman civilization. This was one inescapable result of a process that Western 
civilization should substitute eventually Eastern civilization everywhere. Ottoman 
civilization, a part of Eastern civilization, was; “[A]n amalgam of institutions stemming 
from Turkish, Persian and Arab cultures, from Islam, and from Eastern and, more 
recently. Western civilizations. These institutions never merged and, therefore, never
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produced a harmonious s y s t e m . I n  fact, outside it, possessed by havas (a group of 
elite at the center), avam (the governed mass) composed of Sunni Turks, a national 
culture had developed with a unique judgement of tastes carried on from the times of the 
ancient Turks of Central Asia. Because Ottoman civilization was artificial, disharmonious 
and imitative, it had been an obstacle to spontaneously developed, original and unique 
Turkish culture. Being Ottoman, therefore, constituted a position of anti-Turk in every 
realm of life.i'*® As a consequence, in the views of Gbkalp, the rejection of all that 
belonged to Ottoman civilization appeared to be one of the corner stones of the true 
cultural identity of the Turks; to put it in real terms, it was transformed into the position 
of the “Other.” In a similar way, Westernists treated it as a basic ‘Other’ of projected 
‘civilized’ Turkish identity, but they went one step further in the sense that it included all 
traditional elements.
His distinction between civilization and culture and his view on Ottomanness 
shed light on the problem of modernization in Turkey. It was in such a way that it 
conditioned what is and what is not to be borrowed from the West. All that belonged to 
modern civilization should be adopted without any hesitation, but not that belonged to the 
realm of culture. To catch up with that level of modern civilization, Turkish culture must 
be studied, and some of its aspects that were archaic and out-of-date must be eradicated. 
Therefore, his projected scheme for a future socio-political system was based on a pair, 
pathological versus normal, as in a similar dose with modern dichotomies such as 
traditional/modern, faith/reason, etc. For him, to decide what was pathological and what
139 Ibid., 31.
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was normal in society was the work of the political and cultural elite. ^ '*1 Studying in detail 
the consciousness of the society and bringing to light the new inclination in the society, 
they could “turn the unconscious groupings into conscious, cultivated, systematized, co­
ordinated ideals.”'''2 This was indeed the cultivation and, in some sense, civilization of a 
national culture that was simply neither the culture of the West nor Islamic or the pre- 
Islamic ethnic culture. In the process, “the cultural elements of the West would be 
appropriated only as models for the cultivation of a modern national culture.” '^^  ^ His 
project of modernity anticipated a total re-organization of ethics, language, religion and 
aesthetics in line with authentic Turkish culture evolving from the time of the ancient 
Turks.
This mission of the hunt for purification and genuine roots, first and foremost, 
was at the center of his Turkism that was to “seek out the Turkish culture that has 
remained only among the people and graft onto it Western civilization in its entirety and 
in a viable form.”·'*'^  The fundamental aim was to free the national soul from alien 
elements, to make the people conscious of being Turkish with a rich historical and 
cultural heritage, and to transmute them into civilized individuals as in Western cultures.
This was very clear in language, music, arts, etc.; their Ottoman versions were 
constructed. See ibid., 22-30.
The elite, with their superior education and knowledge, possess civilization but 
the people possess culture. In his motto of halka doğru (towards the people), the elite had 
to go to the people. Two reasons behind this move are; “(1) to receive a cultural 
education from them, and (2) to carry civilization to them...Thus, to speak of “going to 
the people” means “going to culture,” because the people are a living museum of our 
national culture.” Ziya Gökalp, The Principles, 34.
’^ 2 Berkes, The Development, 365.
>43 Ibid., 365.
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This was, first and foremost, the most salient precondition for modernizing reforms that 
should be implemented in an evolutionary way, not a radically revolutionary one.
In short, Ottoman modernization brought a new state of mind, new world-view, and new 
life forms and practices, which seemed to be, in one way or another, associated with the 
concepts of civilization and culture. The pre-modern Ottoman view on society began 
transforming into a new form with the escalating tight of modernizing reforms from the 
early nineteenth century. After the post-Enlightenment ideals (science, reason, progress 
and order) came to affect the world-view of the Ottoman elite, in parallel with a new 
ruling class with a modern-oriented mentality, there existed a new vision of polity and 
society. From now on, society was perceived as being composed of individuals, and as a 
continuously changing mechanism that was the idea of ordering society by the hands of 
the knowledgeable and enlightened rulers. This idea of society construction went hand in 
hand with a search for a common ground or purpose to collect various groups under a 
symbolically determined canopy.
Hence, from the Tanzimat to the end of the Empire, all projects of modernity and 
intellectual movements (mainly the Tanzimat reform. Young Ottoman and Young Turk 
Movements, Ottomanism, Islamism, Westernism and Turkism) looked for a feasible 
common purpose, or, in some sense, a collective identity for the Empire’s subjects. In this 
search the concept of medeniyet, Osmanlılık, Türklük and hars came to the fore as 
regulatory forces in the creation of new identifications during the last decades of the 
Empire. All tried to answer the above-mentioned question of “which civilization the 
Ottomans / Muslims / Turks belong to and whether or not they had their own way.” In
Ziya Gökalp, The Principles, 33
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fact the question was about ways of modernization. It was above all based on East versus 
West dichotomy. Culture as a concept and a whole way of life was targeted in all the 
modernist projects. Within the frame of policy all “civilizing” and “modernizing” efforts 
of the Tanzimat and the First and Second Meşrutiyet reformers aimed to transform 
traditional ways into a more developed (ordered and progressive) form. This perception 
was also at the center of three dominant modernist projects of the last decades of the 
Empire. The Islamists, rejecting the Western way of life, perceived the “living” culture 
corrupted and so tried to make it “authentic” through exploring its spirit from the golden- 
age of Islam, the source of Eastern civilization. The Westemists, on the other hand, 
emphasized the necessity of complete transformation of the society toward the West and 
the construction of new ethical, artistic, legal structure, reading culture. Unlike either of 
these, the Turkists proposed a kind of synthesis between West and East; culture had to be 
authentic but subject to an evolutionary process directed toward the dominant 
civilization, the Western one. Here culture was not a focal point of challenging and 
rejecting the basic premises of modernity. What is common in these discourses of culture 
is the will to create new identifications by transforming the past and present and creating 
a new world of meaning, and also to construct a new moral base for the political 
authority. At this juncture, as discussed in the first chapter, in modem times culture came 
to provide a legitimatization for the modem polity.
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CHAPTER IV
THE KEMALİST REVOLUTION AND THE PROCESS OF 
CULTURE PRODUCTION
The aim of the present chapter is to expose the process in the formation of the 
official discourse on culture by discussing the westernizing reforms and nation-building 
project during the formative years of the Republic. It was this historically rooted process 
that made clear the dimensions of culture production, and its intimate ties with the state 
that was the sole legitimate power to determine the boundaries of the “new” culture. Here 
it is argued that with its civilizing and modernizing mission, the Kemalist discourse of 
culture came to imply a hierarchically structured entity coupled with the logic of 
assimilation·, this assimilationist orientation includes a dual-partite inclusion-exclusion 
process. In this understanding the Republican elite’s perception of civilization, 
modernization, nationalism, laicism and populism had a central place.
The Kemalist notion of culture was first of all a product of a specific political 
project fabricated within the frame of a particular historical and political context. To 
understand its boundaries, therefore, seems possible only by portraying the dynamics of 
this political project. At first insight, as mentioned in the Introduction, the Kemalist 
project of modernity anticipated a revolution, the so called Turkish Revolution, which
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was a “Cultural Revolution”. It essentially implied the will to reconstruct a new cultural 
identity and to become a member of the Western civilization. Basic obstacles in front of 
this goal were the prevailing traditional structures, including all that belonged to the 
Islamic/Ottoman heritage, and all particularistic affiliations of the people. Thus, it 
involved radical westernizing reforms that totally aimed at cutting off all ties with 
tradition/Islam and the Ottoman Empire (portrayed as the relevant “Other” of the 
Republic) and rearranging all pivotal social values to set up a new society and new men 
with a new state of mind.
It was this rearrangement that was based on an ideology, Kemalism, mostly 
formed in the 1930s.^ So it may be seen in its broadest term as a “political discourse” 
fixed firmly on the standpoint that had been shaped throughout all discussions and 
implementations during the Mustafa Kemal era. As an official ideology, it was presented 
as a unique ethos of legitimacy for political authority, used for both describing the 
boundaries of politics and also as the standard of judging attitudes in every sphere of 
social life. This may be called a civilizing process from above. The term culture together 
with the concepts of civilization, Westernization and secularism, one might argue, lied at 
the center of that firm outlook. Primarily, it had a culturalist approach in terms of which 
it provided a set of “idealized” and “methodized” symbols, images and rituals for a new 
social personality. The main questions dealt with here are; what was the nature of 
Kemalist conception of culture in the early Republican period? What was its role in the 
nation-building process which was the main target of the civilizing process from above? 
How did the Kemalist elite perceive its relationship with their ideals of civilization.
' For a discussion on whether Kemalism is an ideology and, if it is so, what kind 
of ideology it is, see footnote 7 in the Introduction.
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nationalism, secularism and populism? Did an idea of authenticity have a place in the 
Kemalist civilizing project?
4. 1, The Revolution and the Kemalist Politics of Culture
After the War of Independence (1919-1922) and the Treaty of Lausanne, the 
name of the state was proclaimed as a republic. It was no longer an empire ruled by the 
dynasty, but became a nation-state. In fact, this was the last point of long searches for 
arresting the reasons of “backwardness” in the Empire. In the history of Ottoman 
modernization, the elite who were one way or another fascinated by the European 
development began to criticize their own institutions and strove to reform them. This self- 
criticism brought about various projects on modernization. In the last decades of the 
Empire, as noted in Chapter III, there were three main competing ideologies {Islamism, 
Turkism and Westernism), each seeking to provide a determined project for transforming 
the state and social structure. The pioneers of these three currents primarily dealt with the 
question of what would be the focal point of patriotism and the basis of identity of the 
Empire’s subjects. As a strand slightly different from Westernism and Turkism, Islamists 
proposed the idea that Muslims had a unique civilization totally opposite to the Western 
one, especially at the cultural level; that was why they had to preserve it as the true 
essence of their identity. By contrast, the Westernists defended a project of modernity 
that called for complete transformation and secularization in every domain of social life 
in line with Western models. The Turkists were between the two movements: despite
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putting emphasis on the Turkish culture exposed from tradition and history, being part of 
the civilized world was usually accentuated.
The founders of the Republic, led by Mustafa Kemal, seemed to be chiefly 
inspired more from the Westernists’ ideals than the Turkist perspective,^ As argued in 
Chapter III, we can find the ideological framework of Atatiirk’s reforms in the 
Westernists’ project of modernization. This can be observed especially in terms of their 
inclination and formula to build up a new social structure and new culture. Beside this 
ideological continuation, it is clear that the reforms initiated during the last century of the 
Ottoman Empire provided a solid background to the Kemalist reforms.^ The institutional 
and conceptual transformation in the last century of the Empire provided a suitable 
ground on which the Turkish Revolution flourished. However, the sweeping reforms of 
the 1920s and 1930s were radical in nature; these reforms gave way to drastic changes
2 As opposed to common opinion. Creel argues that Atatürk was mainly inspired 
by the “futurist-utopian” ideas of Abdullah Cevdet, the chief figure of Westernism in the 
period of the CUP regime, rather than those of the Turkist Ziya Gökalp. See Frank W. 
Creel, “Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism.” Ini. Journal o f Turkish Studies. 
4(1980), 9-26. And also, see Dankwart A. Rustow, The Founding o f a Nation-State: 
Atatiirk’s Historic Achievement (Ankara; THS, 1981), 15. In fact, the existing real politic 
during and after the First World War terminated the possibility of Islamist and 
Ottomanist politics; that meant to discard any dreams of recovering an Ottoman Empire, 
or an Islamic Empire. Such failure of the imperial conception was also instrumental in 
eliminating the Turanist side of Turkish nationalism.
3 New modern institutions and military and civil officers of the Ottoman Empire 
appeared to be the base the Republic was grounded on. In this sense there was a historic 
continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. See Dankwart A. Rustow, 
“Atatürk as an Institution Builder”, in Atatürk: Founder o f a Modem State, eds. A. 
Kazancigil and E. Özbudun (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 73; Roderic H. Davison, 
Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1990), 243-260. For some doctrinal legacy of the Ottomans see Bernard Lewis, “The 
Ottoman Roots of the Turkish Republic,” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization, 
eds. Kemal Çiçek, and et al, vol. Ill (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 221-228.
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felt in every sphere of life.'* The Kemalists had a different interpretation of modernization 
from the Tanzimat and Second Meşrutiyet reformers who saw modernization as a 
technique to save the state. For them, it was “a project” seen as an end in itself rather than 
a technique as a means to an end.  ^ In this respect, in the discourse of the modernizing 
elite, modernization (regarded in close connection with the idea of Westernization) meant 
bringing the existing rules of the political and social life in conformity with something 
that existed in the civilized nations of the West.^ Here, modernization and nation-building 
(anticipating the creation of all the apparatus of a nation-state such as emblems, patriotic 
holidays, music, statues, and monuments) were equated with the belief of endless and 
irresistible progress of modern civilization. Thus, the concept of civilization constitutes 
the core of the Kemalist project of modernization. Civilization as an idea and discourse 
was employed as a main instrument of the official identification process. It becomes more 
clear as it is considered within the frame of Elias’s conceptualization according to which
Its radically finds its clear expression in Mustafa Kemal’s words: the goal was 
to build “a new country, a new society, a new state ... respected at home and abroad.” 
Quoted in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 480.
5 Bobby Said, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricim and the Emergence o f 
Islamism (London: Zet Books, 1997), 67.
 ^ Here the idea of westenization was related to the idea of one world and one 
mankind’s future represented in the West. It came with the understanding of state- 
centered modernization from above. Thus, modernity was conceived only through its 
“institutional, ritual, symbolic, and aesthetic manifestations.” Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat 
Kasaba, “Introduction”, in Rethinking Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in 
Turkey, eds. S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 
5. The Kemalists strove to forge modern manifestations and images on the people as the 
very essentials of their identity.
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in Europe civilization came to be in use as an “self-image of Europe”; it was mainly used 
as expression of identity based on a “we-image” versus a “they-image”.'^
The official thesis of civilization was, in Peyami Safa’s words, “civilizationism.”  ^
According to this doctrine, civilization was not something that was defined in 
technological and scientific terms. It was a whole compromising a dense network of all 
practices in life. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal said, in 1923, “there are various countries, 
but civilization is one. And a nation willing to progress must take part in this unique 
civilization.Thus, in every respect, the civilization Mustafa Kemal promoted referred 
to “the whole modern way of life” as well as “the modern mentality.” The only way to 
survive as an independent and developed nation was to make transformations in every 
sphere of life in tandem with this universal civilization. It is obvious that the Kemalist 
conception meant the internalization of universal, ahistorical and progressive sense of the
 ^ See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: History o f Manners, and State 
Formation and Civilization, trans. Edmund Jephcott, two volumes (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978).
 ^For Peyami Safa, civilizationism together with nationalism was a fixed principle 
of Atatürk’s Revolution. It was the movement that aimed at ending the dual structure 
created by the Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet reforms. Before the Republic, courts were half­
modern and half-religious (modern courts beside sharia courts), education half-secular 
and half-religious (modern secular schools and religious ones -medrese), and so on. 
Atatürk’s reforms ended the half structure by instituting the modern one. Peyami Safa, 
Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar [Perspectives on the Turkish Revolution], (Istanbul: Ötüken, 
1993) (original publication, 1938), 92. All reforms on secularization, the dress code, the 
alphabet change, the ban on the a-la turca music in the conservatoire, the adoption of the 
Western calendar and of Sunday as the weekly day of rest, and the adoption of all social 
intercourse and clothes of the West, all were revolutionary acts which emanated from 
Kemalist civilizationism. Ibid., 100.
 ^Atatürkçülük (Birinci Kitap) [Atatürkism (First Book)] (Ankara: Genelkurmay 
Basımevi, 1983), 351. For him modern civilization was a sole representative of “all of 
humanity”, and so “[Our] country has to be modern, civilized and renovated; this is a war 
of life of death.” Ibid., 353.
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civilization of the West, especially of the French type. Like the French conception, it was 
used to delineate the aestheticized and softened behavior, shared common values and the 
idea of progress; and so, it refused the Romantic view of civilization according to which 
civilization as a technological and moral quality disturbed national culture. At the 
center of that “Europeanization” of world history and civilization there was the belief that 
the West was at the peak of the unilinear progress of the world. As indicated in Chapter 
II, that idea of civilization is based on the logic of totalizing dichotomies, such as 
civilized / barbarian, traditional / modern, progress / backwardness, and religious / 
rational.*^ In these ontologically and epistemologically defined categories, the first 
member of the pairs were regarded in general as belonging to the Western civilization, 
and the second, the Eastern civilization. West, and its civilization, denotes, perhaps
more than anything else, a state of mind, and so for the civilizing rulers it became 
essentially the name of a cultural identity. It was in fact based on the belief that other
For a comparison of Mustafa Kemal’s notion of civilization with the French 
and German one see Enver Ziya Karal, “Atatürk’ün Siyaset Üzerine Düşünceleri” 
[Atatürk’s Views on Politics], in Atatürk Hakkında Konferanslar [Conferences on 
Atatürk] (Ankara: THS, 1946), 37-54.
This was in line with Said’s analysis of orientalism. In that the West and the 
East are ontologically and epistemologically defined categories, working through 
totalizing dichotomies. The modernizing intellectuals and rulers, especially in non- 
Western contexts, judge, freeze and polarize all traditional elements according to these 
categories. This means the orientalizing and essentializing of “the other”. See Edward 
Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
The West and the East are not simply geographical entities, but denote a state of 
mind. On the West and East in the Kemalist discourse, see Peyami Safa, Türk Inkilabma, 
111-135. Thus, the basic goal of the civilizing reformers was to bring all Turks up to the 
level of the West and its science, philosophy, arts, mentality and worldview. See Tark 
Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye ’nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri [The Movements of 
Westernization in the Political Life of Turkey] (Istanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, I960), 154.
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civilizations and cultures have a legitimate position only in so far as they become 
assimilated into Western civilization or culture. Western civilization and culture, which 
were seen as “unique” and “universal”, were at the top of the hierarchical structuration of 
civilizations and cultures. In the modernist projects of nineteenth century Europe, as 
Bennett argues, “the progress of civilization” had eliminated all particular and traditional 
forms portrayed as “‘survivals’ of prehistoric forms of life... [TJhey represented a past in 
the present that needed to be removed - that is, to be effectively assigned to the past as 
past.”*3 Being devoted to such a belief, the Republican project chose Western civilization 
as a model for the cultural transformation. It strove to “assign” all living traditions and 
forms to “the past as past”.^ '*
In this respect, it meant a clear rejection of both the Islamist idea that promoted 
the separation of civilization into two parts: the spiritual domain (religious and traditional 
values) and the material one (technological and scientific aspects), and the Turkist idea 
that culture and civilization are two distinct things. Like the binary structure between the 
elite’s life and the masses or between “high” culture and “low” culture in the Ottoman 
Empire, the duality in thought was mainly attached to Kemalist ideology.
Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science, (London; Sage Publication, 
1998), 97-98.
1'' The result was the complete disgust of the Kemalist elite on the living values 
and shapes. They did not easily welcome the display of “native” aspect even as touristic 
objects. For example. Yaşar Nabi expressed the discomfort he experienced at “the display 
of the “picturesque East” with its old wooden buildings, men with a strange headgear and 
dress, veiled women, and chaotic bazaars, as a commercial commodity.” Yaşar Nabi, 
“Turizm Meselesi ve Türkiye” [The Question of Tourism and Turkey]. Ülkü. 67 
(September 1938), 57.
'5 Laid on the monist understanding of modernization and nationalism, the 
Kemalist project rejected the “dualist cultural theory” of the Turkists and Unionists. 
Thus, it came with a quest for universalized ideals rather than a particularized and
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In the Kemalist program of civilization, the aim was to create a secular, moral, 
and cultural base for the society to replace the existing religious/tradition-oriented social 
structure. Through dissolving the hegemony of traditional institutions and values over the 
state structure and society, the state elite, initiators of the Cultural Revolution, made 
efforts to build a totally secular state and a new culture. In other words, attempts were 
made to secularize the state institutions and society for redefining the basis of political 
legitimation (nation-state) and the boundaries of a civilized community.*^ This was 
mainly the task of Kemalist politics of culture.
As the sole architect of such politics, the state was the main active agent in 
institutionalizing a (national) culture through which the boundaries of Turkishness and 
Turkish citizenship were clearly described. This formulation from above was to a greater 
extent the cause of belief in the Jacobean and positivist ideals of the nineteenth century 
Europe, especially France. Kemalism took nourishment from scientism, particularly 
Comtean positivism, together with laicism, nationalism, solidarism and the idea of 
progress.*'^ To put it in a somewhat in different way, scientific validation appeared to be a
authenticated one. For this rejection see Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin, “Introduction”, 
in Modern Turkish Architecture, eds. R. Holod and A. Evin (Pennsylvania; University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 6. The existing dichotomy between the elite and mass was 
targeted for elevating the people to the elite’s level. See Hasan Ali (Yücel), “Dil 
İnkılabımızın Karakteri” [Characteristics of Our Language Revolution], Ülkü. 22 
(November 1934), 257; Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali [Atatürk Revolution] 
(İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1995) (original publication, 1940).
See Ergun Özbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime”, in 
Atatürk: Founder o f a Modern State, eds. A. Kazancigil and E. Özbudun, 83-84.
In this sense, it “owes a lot to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and 
nineteenth-century scienticism.” See Ali Kazancigil, “The Ottoman-Turkish State and 
Kemalism”, 'm Atatürk: Founder o f a Modern State, eds. A. Kazancigil and E. Özbudun,
37.
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moral base for the ruling elite’s activities, which was legitimized by “superior” and 
“rectified” knowledge. It was Jacobean utopianism directing the ruling group to build up 
a new society. In the process, such a belief in science made necessary the elimination of 
all traditional forms and customs that were seen as incompatible with progress and 
science.
In the context where there had not existed any opposing political and social 
groups as a force of modernization, a group of ruling elite and intellectuals emerged as a 
chief figures to play this role by initiating modernizing policies from above. Their 
ideology reflected their aesthetic preferences, which indeed manifested their will to 
constitute themselves as “Western.” Because of their belief equipped with scientific 
knowledge, they claimed to know the nature of the people and so could decide what was 
best for them.i^ Mustafa Kemal defined them as bilen (knowing) revolutionaries: “they 
are true revolutionaries who can affect deeply the true leaning of the people’s
In the discourse of Kemalist revolutionaries throughout the period from 1923 to 
1945 all efforts were made to construct an “idealized” social base for future generations; 
for this aim they abandoned their taste and habits. In the article on the twelfth anniversary 
of the People’s Houses in 1944 Reşat Şemsettin Sirer (Director of Higher Education, 
Ministry of Education) portrayed the future Turkish society by the following example; 
“In one day Turkish mine and textile workers, a Turkish peasant (who will come to the 
city for one day to watch the opera “Tahir” and “Zühre”), a professor and a general with 
clean, black clothes will be lined in front of the box office.” Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, 
“Halkevlerinin Bugünkü ve Yarınki Vazifeleri” [Today’s and Tomorrow’s Functions of 
the People’s Houses], Ulus, February 20, 1944, 2.
They belonged to the elite tradition going back to the late Ottoman period. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, having been educated in the secular schools of the 
Empire, they became intellectuals with secular, scientifically oriented mind and a closed 
group mostly cut off from traditional social ties. See Şerif Mardin, “Just and Unjust.” 
Daedalus. 120 (1991), 117-129.
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consciousness and soul to make them part of the revolut ion.Based on “objective” 
knowledge that sheds light on Truth in verifying their nationalist and culturalist ideas, the 
enlightened rulers would only speak in the name of the society, manage the people and 
raise the educational and cultural level of the people. 2· The Kemalists had strong faith to 
carry out such mission of civilizing the ignorant and unconscious people.22 They strove to 
make them aware of being humane by eradicating all patterned standards and imposing a 
new life style. In other words, in general, the society became an object of their activities 
as something that had to be reconstructed.
For this generalized and universalized end, they undertook several reforms to 
sweep away all remains of the ancien regimeP In addition, some cultural institutions.
Mustafa Selim İmece, ed., Atatürk’ün ŞapkaDevriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu 
Seyahatleri, 1925 [Atatürk’s Trips to Kastamonu and İnebolu during the Hat Revolution] 
(Ankara: THS Basımevi, 1959), 59.
In the discourse of the Kemalists, the rationale for this end was set in a way that 
the masses had not reached a sufficient level of maturity so their problems had to be 
solved, and reforms needed to make them civilized had to be applied from above. This 
was very clear in the decisions to make regulation in cultural and artistic fields For a 
typical example, see Burhan Asaf (Beige), “Kurultay” [Congress], Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 
September 26, 1932, 2.
This mission may be illustrated with one of the Kemalists’ statement on the 
villagers: “we have to improve these villages, to make these our brothers speaking, 
dressing and living like us.” Abdullah Ziya, “Köy Mimamrisi” [Village Architecture]. 
Ülkü. 1 (August 1933), 40.
2-’ The basic institutional reforms were the abolition of the Sultanate (1922), the 
proclamation of Republic (1923), the abolition of the Caliphate which mainly symbolised 
ties with the past and Seyh-ul Islam (1924), the closing of the. Medrese (religious schools) 
and the unification of education in secular schools (1924), the termination of the tekkes 
and zaviyes (religious orders and tombs of saints) (1925), and the adoption of the Swiss 
civil code, the Italian penal code and the German commercial code (1926). These 
institutional changes provided the basis to attack the culture of the ancien régime. To 
intensify the intended symbolic turn, the dress code abolishing the headgear and veil was 
instituted (1925), the Islamic calendar was abolished (1925), the Arabic script was
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such as the Turkish History Society, THS {Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK), the Turkish 
Language Society, TLS {Türk Dil Kurumu, TDK), the People’s Houses, and even the 
Turkish Language, History and Geography Faculty (TDTCF) - charged with a mainly 
cultural rather than academic missions - were founded to cultivate and refine a culture.
By means of these official agencies, as well as schools, extraordinary amounts of 
energy was spent on the secular socialization of the people. Their masterful role was not 
to express, in the words of Metin Heper, “the unconsidered thoughts of the crowd, but 
rather to add to them more mature thoughts. ”2'* It was evident that the mature thoughts 
were inferred from the scientifically and rationally rooted and universalized terminology 
of the West. It was this terminology which provided a strong sentiment for the civilizing 
rulers to certify and judge the existing value structure of the society. That is to say, 
denoting a form of westernized reference-world, it emerged as the basis of determined 
“certainties” and “symbols” of Kemalism. Notably what its certainties judged was to set 
precisely how citizens should speak, dress themselves, behave in public and (even) 
private life, and so on.^  ^ The civilizing process from above was based on these 
certainties, which were observed in almost all-official and popular texts of the 1930s. 
The following extract from the editorial commentary o iMilliyet (Istanbul daily) in 1932 
may exemplify that:
replaced with the Latin alphabet (1928), the ezan (call to prayer) was changed from its 
Arabic form to a Turkish one (1933), and the code on surname was instituted (1934).
2'* Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: Eotheon Press, 1985),
50.
25 This was an attempt on the part of the civilizing elite to “penetrate into the life 
style, manners, behavior and daily customs of the people, and to change the self­
conception of Turks”. Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The
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A person wearing a European hat can not eat his food with his five fingers. A 
nation borrowing the Latin characters must not use the medieval pieces of wood 
as musical instruments. A person that permits its women to enjoy social 
intercourse, does not put his fingers in his nose and clean it out in the street. A 
society understanding the dangers of microbes does not worship by rubbing his 
face on the floor of the mosque where others have trodden with their feet (my 
emphasis).
These exterior appearances of modernity provided a solid ground for the public 
representations of the new Turkish identity. In the above-mentioned process, the end 
product would be new “civilized” Turks who are equipped with new modes of behavior 
and are faithful to their own enlightened leaders and state.
4.1.1. The Principles o f Kemalism
All above legal rearrangements, cultural reforms and newly established cultural 
institutions were embracing efforts to prepare a suitable ground for the solidification of 
Kemalist culturalism. It is possible to find out the essence of that culturalism in the Six 
Principles of Kemalism, namely Cumhuriyetçilik (republicanism). Milliyetçilik 
(Nationalism), Halkçılık (Populism), Laiklik (Laicism), İnkılapçılık (Revolutionism) and 
Devletçilik (Statism). '^^ Here, to give more focused attention to these principles, statism is
Case of Turkey”, in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J, 
Brill, 1995), 21.
Lootfy Levonian, ed. and trans.. The Turkish Press, 1932-1936 (Beirut: The 
American Press, 1937), 66.
These six principles were for the first time adopted at the 1931 Congress of the 
RPP. For the full text of the 1931 program, see Mete Tunçay, T. C .’nde Тек Parti 
Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-30) [The Establishment of the Single Party Regime in T. 
R.] (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 447-454. On February 5, 1937, they were placed in
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skimmed. It seems useful to explain these ideals in a brief way to provide a framework 
for later detailed examination of the Kemalist conceptualization of culture.
Republicanism and Revolutionism:
The Kemalist way of modernization was mainly inspired from “the centralist 
Jacobin model of r epubl i cani sm. I t  was this perspective that made the notion of 
republic in the discourse of Kemalism not simply a name of the political system. In other 
words, in early Republican Turkey, it did not only denote the change of the regime from 
the Sultanate to the Republic, but also the elimination of superstitious mentalities and 
manners which had poisoned the consciousness of the Turks throughout history, that is, 
the name of a civilizational shift. And also, it was commonly believed that it made it 
possible for the Turks to live free and civilized among modern nations of the world. 
With its universal and eternal characteristics, the republic was seen to habitually open the 
gates for being rational and modern in every sphere of life.
The Republic is not the name of a time which is quiet and stagnant. On the 
contrary it is uf symbol o f life which constructs and creates every day...The 
present age and the future require the Turkish society to be invested with various 
qualities such as activity, hard work, knowledge and scientific and artistic 
creativity. Or we may express these qualities in one single word, civilization (my 
emphasis).^®
the Constitution by adding an item that the Turkish State is republican, nationalist, 
populist, statist, laic and revolutionist to the Article 2. For the 1924 Constitution and later 
rearrangements see Şeref Gözüböyük and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri : Senedi 
İttifaktan Günümüze [Turkish Constitutional Texts from Senedi Ittifakt to the Present] 
(Ankara: A. Ü. SBF Yay., 1957).
Nilüfer Göle, “The Freedom of Seduction for Muslim Women.” New 
Perspectives Quarterly. 3/15 (1998), 49.
1
Mediha Muzaffer, înkilabın Ruhu [The Spirit of the Revolution] (Istanbul; 
Devlet Matbaası, 1933), 41, 44, 48.
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It meant the transformation in morality, alphabet, dress and language. The result would 
be a particular form of a vision of life, agoot/life to which all citizens should adopt.
Kemalist republicanism, preaching new values which were set for an embracing 
way of life, was not merely a political and cultural republicanism .It was, one might 
say, culturalist. Based on a Jacobeanist disciplining understanding of republic, it seemed 
to be one of the ways to establish cultural images, which determined who belonged to the 
politico-cultural community. It seemed to be a priory category for a new society.
In that sense it is tied with the Kemalist idea of revolution. In the discourse of the 
Kemalists, the basic goal of all revolutions was to “institute a new way of life in place of 
an old one;” here “new way of life” manifested the will to “disapprove of the existing one 
and its philosophy and substitute it with new one.”^^  It became the name of the creation 
of a new society, which had to be realized as stated in the RPP 1935 Program in a 
revolutionary way rather than evolutionary steps of development.^^ It was expected that
The PM İsmet İnönü made these statements at Malatya in 1928 on the Alphabet 
change. See Tarih IV  \ExsXory IV] (İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti Yay., 1931), 253-254; Milli 
Eğitimle İlgili Söylev ve Demeçler [Speeches and Statements on National Education], vol. 
I (Ankara: TDTE Yay., 1946), 97-98.
3' For Thomas Jefferson political republicanism requires cultural republicanism. 
Cultural republicanism means “tolerance, diversity of opinion and disagreement, and 
education into the arts of rulership”. Thomas Jefferson, “Civilization, enlightenment and 
the New World: extracts from Notes on State o f Virginia”, in Classical Readings in 
Cidture and Civilization, eds. John Rundell and Stephen Mennell (London: Routledge, 
1998), 61 and 67.
32 Zeki Mesut, “İnkılabımız Cihanşümuldür” [Our Revolution is Universal], 
Hakimiyeti Milliye (March 23, 1934), reprint, Tarihi (March 1-31, 1934), 75-76.
33 See Program o f the People’s Party o f the Republic (official translation) 
(Ankara, 1935), 3. Cited as Apendix E in Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey o f Atatürk:
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by creating a “new national entity” and opening a “new historical phase for the Turkish 
nation”34 the Turkish Revolution would construct a new social and moral structure. As 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the leading theoreticians of Kemalism, claimed, “from the 
aesthetic point of view, newness, in comparison with oldness, always demonstrated 
beauty, kindness and goodness. Only a revolution brought about newness by cutting of all 
ties with the past.”^^  For him, on the basis of Kemalism’s six principles, the “Turkish 
revolution erased the past completely. And instead it created economically, socially, and 
politically the most radical newness.
Nationalism:
The model Kemalist nationalism depended on was simple: the principle of one 
state, one nation and one people. At first glance, it was totally different from the 
Turkist/Turanist nationalism of the last two decades of the Empire in the sense that it was 
based on the principle of territoriality, pragmatically conditioned within the confines of 
Anatolia, but not on the basis of ethnicity.A lso, because of its rejection of a living.
Social Process in the Turkish Reformation (Philadelphia: The American Academy of 
Political And Social Science, 1939).
Ahmet Asım, “Türk İnkılabının Mana ve Mahiyeti” [Meaning and True Nature 
of the Turkish Revolution]. Vakit (March 22, 1934), r e p r i n t , Tarihi (March 1-31, 
1934), 74-75.
35 Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali, 72-73.
36 Ibid., 53.
3^  E. J. Hobsbawn sees the equation state = nation = people as the locus of 
nationalism. It seems that in this equation the state has an active, decisive role. E. J. 
Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19 and 23.
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authentic value system, it was automatically distinguished from Gokalp’s understanding 
of nationalism. Although both promoted the idea of nationalism to establish a culturally 
and linguistically homogenous state, the idea of cultural authenticity, as in the Gokalpian 
sense, did not take part in the nationalist ideology of the Republic. Unlike the attempts of 
other non-Western and anti-colonial nationalists, putting strong emphasis on traditional 
and local values in determining their very identity, Kemalists did not wish to make a 
synthesis of the material civilization of the West and indigenous cultural t r a i t s . In doing 
so, they refused the idea of culture as a protest against Modernity to preserve its own 
particular way. Their understanding of nationalism was not anti-imperialistic,'^^ and 
excluded a resentful nationalism''^ challenging the cultural traits of the West. In fact, that 
meant the rejection of being the Oriental and the antagonistic Other of the West.''^ Simply
On its territorial characteristics, see Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and 
Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, (London; Hurst and Company, 
1997), 93-94.
In anti-colonial nationalism, a backward society could modernize itself through 
gaining a synthesis between the materiality of the west and the spirituality of the East, 
and so to assert a cultural identity distinct from the foreigners or the colonizers was 
possible, while achieving material progress. For anti-colonial nationalism, see Partha 
Chattarjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota press, 1992).
For Atatürk, the Turkish people were responsible for their own backwardness, 
and so the blame was not just put on imperialism or any European nation. The real enemy 
of the Turks was their state of ignorance, or uncivilized condition, which was only due to 
the despotism of the Sultans. See C. H. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey 
(Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1979), 86; Karal, “Atatürk’ün,” 44.
'" For the resentment in the emergence of nationalism, see Liah Greenfeld, 
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 
1983).
''2 Said, A Fundamental, 68.
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put, Kemalist nationalism manifested resentment against the traditionalism of Islamism 
and Turkism,
First of all, by its nature, Kemalist nationalism was top-down, or state-led, 
nationalism. Its first goal was to modernize the state and social structure as a project of 
social engineering. It was in a vigorous search from above for the creation of a new 
nation'^  ^and the invention of a new Turk by eliminating the popular notions of Islam and 
Ottoman heritage. Its project of turning existing more or less ethnically and culturally 
heterogeneous people into a nation depended on the binary logic of “old” and “new”. 
“Old” designated all things in the darkest age of the Ottomans, but “new” denoted Turk 
and Turkishness rooted in the Western way.'*'* The main intention was to end the Ottoman 
legacy by seeking to overcome the multinational character, and inscribe a new temporal 
order in order to eradicate the duality -high culture or elite culture versus mass culture. 
The discourse of unity with which creating a new order was associated, was at the center 
of Kemalist nationalism. This discourse led to a strong orientation to explore ways of 
preserving the cohesion of the state and nation in the face of ethnic separatist demands.
Populism:
Kemalist nationalism did not reflect simply an ethnic nationalism that preached an 
ethnically and racially closed community.'*^ It was because the principle of populism
At the time of the early years of the Republic, the Turkish nation was a “non­
existent, hypothetical entity” and the Revolution “breathed life into it.” Şerif Mardin, 
“Religion and Secularism In Turkey,” in Atatürk: Founder o f a Modern State, eds. A. 
Kazancigil and E. Özbudun, 208.
Webster, The Turkey, 164-165.
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played a determinant role in such direction of nationalism .This principle finds its clear 
expression in the most repeated motto declaring the Turkish nation as “a fused mass 
without any privileges or class.” That emphasis on a classless society came with the 
necessity of establishing a social order and solidarity among the different segments of the 
society . T h e  concept of people which signified “a new and perfected whole” {mutecettid 
ve mütekamil bir kütley^^ was at the heart of such understanding of society. The people in 
the hands of the revolutionaries seemed to be first of all the name of a “community of 
equals”, which determined who belong to the category of citizens.'·^ Kemalist populists 
claimed that in the Ottoman times the people having been chained in the hands of the 
“ignorant” clerical classes were not capable of deciding what was best for them. By the 
process of “educating” and “enlightening” through policing, they would become 
conscious of being people who could direct their destiny. In the process it was the task of 
the knowing populists “to develop the people’s mental power, make them enjoy the high
‘*5 This was associated with the nature of The Kemalist project of Turkification 
that did not include racism. See Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ 
Politikaları [‘Capital Tax’ and ‘Turkification’ Policies] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), 90-92.
For the articulation of nationalism and populism in the state discourse, see 
Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [Kurdish Question in the State Discourse] 
(İstanbul: İletişim, 1999], 96-97.
In the speech delivered at the RPP’s Fourth National Convention, Recep Peker 
said, “even if there is linguistically and culturally united structure, a national aggregation 
with class and privilege conflicts or a nation without populist feelings cannot form a large 
united nation made up of individuals with equal rights and honors. The national 
aggregation has to have such populist feelings in order to form a united body by means of 
mutual love produced by the power of nationalism.” CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay 
Görüşmeleri Tutalgası [Proceedings of the Fourth National Convention of the RPP] 
(Ankara, 1935), 5.
İmece, ed., Atatürk’ün, 47.
149
arts and thought, and knowing what is right and what is wrong, as well as to elevate their 
economic and social l e v e l . T h a t  formulation of the people was used with the concept 
of nation interchangeably.^* The Turkish people were the Turkish nation aware of 
solidarity, and the Turkish nation was the Turkish people, conscious of its Turkish 
character.
Dependant on the Kemalist principle of populism, national unity overtly and 
frequently mentioned in the state discourse would be possible only through providing 
tesaniid (solidarity) between different social groups. In other words, it was the unity, due 
only to a harmony of interests and national solidarity instead of class struggle. Overall, 
populism and its emphasis on solidarism appeared as the name of conceptualizing the 
society through substituting the traditional social union with a new and perfected 
structure that was grounded on a generalized national culture. This is a point at which 
Kemalist view on society appeared as a new integrative system to unite all interests under 
the rubric of an imagined community. Also, this was a vision of cultural life that would 
represent the common good and national interest, and not a particularistic and 
individualistic one, for the latter was risky for national unity. In short, this ideal was 
based on the view of “rationally” constructed society which is free from all “destructive” 
and “suffocating” influences of tradition.
'*** For community of equals, see Jacques Ranciere, On the Shores o f Politics, 
trans. Liz Heron (London and NY: Verso, 1995).
Yaşar Nabi, “Halkçılık ve Halk Dili” [Populism and People’s Language] Ulus 
(May 30, 1938), 2.
Hamza Eroğlu, “Atatürk’s Conception of Nation and Nationalism”, m Atatürk’s 
(Istanbul: Otomarsan, 1982), 168.
See Program o f the People’s Party o f the Republic, 2.
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Laicism:
Laicism emerged as an official attitude towards Islam in the discourse of the 
Kemalists who saw it as one of the fundamental components of modernization. For them 
laicism meant the separation of the state from religious life where religion would remain 
as a matter of conscience; on the other hand, in practice, it resulted in the state control 
over religion. As a project, it also, perhaps most importantly, aimed to end the hegemony 
of Islamic concepts and practices over the mind of the individual. It was because that the 
modernizing rulers saw the mores of traditional power centers (Caliphate, Sheyh-ul 
Islam, sheiks, religious orders, and so on) as fossilized traces of a social and cultural 
archaism. All belonged to, as Necmeddin Sadık asserted, “the Middle Ages” where there 
was no “freedom of mind, and no freedom of conscience. Everyone was required to think 
according to the judgements of religion.”53
By means of efforts to describe new principles for the state and society, Kemalist 
laicism prearranged a process of secularization covering all spheres of life: science and 
reason instead of religious thought would provide the legitimate ground for power. For 
example, in modern times, for Necmettin Sadık, the source of morality was the society 
itself “Morality is not defined by the unchangeable judgements of this or that religion, 
but the changing society... This is a laic morality of which the laws, sources and goals 
base on the human will.” '^* But in Turkey, the state, as the disseminator and protector of
”  Necmettin Sadık, “Laik Ne Demektir?” [What is Laicism?]. Ülkü. 12 
(December 1933), 371; for the partial English translation see Devonian, The Turkish 
Press, 31. In Necmeddin Sadik’s view, in the Middle Ages, religious feeling came to be 
the basis of social solidarity and individual identity. Ibid.
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progress in every sphere of life, maintained the process of secularization from above. It 
placed emphasis on secular, national rather than religious affiliation as a legitimizing 
force. That is to say, the civilizing elite saw laicism as a constituent part of their cultural 
identity. It was in this respect that they tried to use Islam, in its traditional form, as the 
integral Other of Kemalism; because of its “reactionary”, “obscure” and “inferior” 
characteristics, Islam was considered responsible for the backwardness of the society. 
They tried to control and domesticate Islam by institutionalizing it under state control.
In short, laicism became not only the name of secularization of institutional, legal and 
educational structures of the state, but also, perhaps more importantly, the name of the 
quest for creating a secular culture.
4.2. The Idea of Civilization and the Early Phases of the Kemalist Nation-Building 
Process
Kemalist principles were greatly grounded on the above-mentioned thesis of 
“civilizationism”. In this regard, civilization, especially during the 1920s, came to be a 
stimulating force behind the sweeping reforms, and also the first name of the Kemalist
Ibid., 372.
In fact, the relation between the state and religion during the early years of the 
Republic was not settled. At the beginning the idea of reform in Islam was commonly 
accepted among the ruling circles; so the modernizing rulers strove to reform Islam and 
even create new rituals for it. Here the aim was to make a creation something like 
Protestantism; and the enlightened form of Islam would serve to justify the new reforms 
at some initial stages of reform. But due to some popular reactions against reforms in 
Islam in the early 1930s the policy was ended. After that time, since Islam, and even 
religion in general sense, which was regarded as an “archaic” element, would lose its all 
significance in the course of modernization, it was completely negated in the official 
discourse.
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notion of culture. Thus the Republican project of modernity was indeed a project of 
civil ization.It  was obvious that the aim was to adapt totally to a new civilization, 
Western civilization, to raise the Turkish people to the scientific and cultural level of the 
West .Unt i l  the early years of the 1930s, the emphasis on civilization came to the fore 
as the only means to justify the radical sweeping reforms.
However, during the War of Independence (1919-1922) that was enforced over 
against the allied forces occupying some parts of Anatolia (heavily Muslim and Turkish 
populated territory), the main tendency of the rulers of the Ankara governments was in 
the opposite direction. It was a war waged against the “civilization that was a monster 
with one tooth.” During the war Islam was stressed as a sole force to legitimize the 
national struggle and to mobilize the masses against the “infidels.” The regulation of the 
Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (Anadolu ve Rumeli 
Miidafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), established in the Sivas Congress on September 1919, 
stressed that it was an Islamic organization that defended Ottoman patriotism. Then, 
this also became the motto of the Grand National Assembly - the specification of 
“Turkey” added later - (The GNA), founded on 23 April 1920 in Ankara. Similarly, in the 
program of the executive committee on national education proclaimed on 3 May 1920,
Mustafa Kemal, from the early days of the Republic to 1938, insistently dwelt 
upon the project by emphasizing medenileşmek [becoming civilized], medeni milletler 
camiasına girmek [being part of the world of the civilized nations], muasır medeniyeti 
iktisap ile onun seviyesinin üzerine çıkmak [by reaching the level of modern civilization 
going beyond it], asrileşmek [becoming modernized] and garplılaşmak [becoming 
Westernized]. See Abdurrahman Çaycı, “Atatürk’ün Uygarlık Anlayışı” [Atatürk’s 
Understanding of Civilization]. Belleten. 204 (1988), 1105.
On the Republican will to accomplish a civilizational shift, see Tunaya, 
Türkiye 'nin, 110; Göle, “Authoritarian,” 20-23.
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the main goal of education was to make children religiously and nationally well- 
equipped. The GNA emerged as a sole administrative body during the war, and 
consolidated its position with the abolition of the Sultanate.^®
After the victory, the GNA and Mustafa Kemal gained popular support, prestige 
and authority in the eyes of the people. This opened the gates for Mustafa Kemal and his 
cadre to gather power in their hands by abolishing the Sultanate and eliminating the 
opposition groups in the GNA, namely the Second Group.The first sign of later reforms 
can be seen in the program of the PP declared in April 1923. It included three main items: 
the first was mainly about “modernization” and “the law of the state”; the second, the 
principle of opposing any privileges, based on the concept of people fused without 
privileges and class; and the third described the membership to the party in the way that 
every person who is Turk or accepts Turkish culture and citizenship could become a
5** Tunçay, T. C. ’nde Тек Parti, 29.
The program put the strong emphasis on the authentic national values as a basis 
of determined national culture. See Selçuk Kantarcıoğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümet 
Programlarında Kültür [Culture in Republic of Turkey’s Government Programs] 
(Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1987), 36. And on the committee, see T. С. Hükümet 
Programlarında Kültür Politikası [Politics of Culture in T. C. Government Programs] 
(Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1990), 1-8.
The basic implicit justification for the abolishment was to declare the shift of 
the sovereignty from personal rule to the nation. The Sultan represented the shameful, the 
personal and the unnatural order of the past. For Mustafa Kemal’s views on the Ottoman 
Sultanate, see Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk [Speech], ed. Zeynep Korkmaz (Ankara: Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi, 1994), 470. This was really the most important step in the way of 
becoming a nation-state.
The domination of the Mustafa Kemal-led First Group’s name was changed as 
Halk Fırkası (the People’s Party, PP) with Mustafa Kemal’s declaration of Dokuz Umde 
(Nine Principles) in April 1923 and officially on 9 September, was consolidated by the 
election in June 1923. As was expected, the controlled and rigged election resulted with 
the great success of the candidates of the First Group, but a conciliatory assembly could 
not be created. See Tunçay, T C. ’nde Тек Parti, 51-52.
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member of the Party. 2^ -rhe f,j-st j^ em was related to the open declaration of the Turkish 
State as a nation state on the path of modernization. The second, which would later 
became a principle of Kemalist populism, led to a different conception of the people from 
the Ottoman times. And the third, the main part of nation-building, was about the first 
step for the formation of citizenship as membership to the state and cultural community. 
And it also brought about the will to define a culture of which the citizens would be part, 
not as an ethnically closed entity but based on the idea of assimilation. If they were 
willing to assimilate into the newly determined culture, it would be available for 
everybody who lives within the boundaries of the Turkish State. The non-Turkish 
Muslim groups became subjects of the policy of assimilation into the Turkish culture, as 
well as the Muslim Turks who had lived in a traditional way to which the new regime 
was a mortal blow. On the part of the non-Muslim communities, coupled with the Treaty 
of Lausanne, this new understanding encouraged them to give up their old millet status to 
be part of new community on the basis of citizenship.
In the years after 1923, the nationalist movement evolved into a movement with a 
far-reaching goal of radically transforming the society and culture.*'  ^The proclamation of
62 Ibid., 58.
62 This can be clearly observed in the program of the Fethi Okyar government 
established on August 14, 1923. The educational policy laid stress on the terbiye 
(education and training) of the public through three goals: (1) education arid instruction 
of children, (2) the adult education, and (3) providing means for the rise of national 
intelligentsia. The basic principles of terbiye would be based on national culture and 
modern civilization, which would be supported through giving more importance to the 
organization of national culture. All these rearrangements, as declared in Article 6 of the 
program, would be applied to provide the progress of bodily, intellectual, moral and 
social capabilities of all individuals. See T. C. Hükümet, 14-15. This tendency became 
more rigid in the 1924 program of the II. Fethi Okyar government: the goal of national
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the Republic (29 October 1923), with Mustafa Kemal as its first president and İsmet 
İnönü as its first Prime Minister, was the first and most significant political act to acquire 
a culture firmly rooted in modern civilization. It was the first step of the Republican 
program of civilization that included the abolition of the Caliphate, the suppression of the 
Ministry oi Şeriat, the closing of the medreses and tekL·s, the introduction of the hat .^ "· In 
fact, the furkish state as a newly shaping modern nation-state held up centralized power 
and authority by means of the previously modernized institutions. It then became the sole 
power center with its legitimate use of violence. It was now on the route to consolidate its 
power by gathering the legitimate use of culture in its hands. In that, institutional 
secularization was the first step.
In this respect, the Caliphate was seen as the first obstacle to provide full cultural 
control embedded in a new symbolic universe. In this way the civilizing rulers saw it as a 
center strongly linked with both tradition/Islam and the past, and as a source of 
reactionaries to civilization.*^  ^ Thus, the abolition of the Caliphate (3 March 1924) was 
followed by another series of secularization attempts.^^
education which was settled with the law of unification of education was to produce a 
young generation equipped with monolithic education and instruction. Ibid., 23.
Mustafa Kemal mentioned these in Nutuk. See Nutuk, 605-606.
*^5 Mustafa Kemal believed that the Caliphate was a myth of the past that had no 
place in modern times. Quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, trän. Yılmaz Öz 
(Ankara: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982), 52.
These were the closing of the medreses (religious schools) and the unification 
of education under the secular Ministry of Public Instruction {Maarif Vekilliği), the 
elimination of the office of Şeyh-ül- Islam and the Ministry of Sheriah established in 
1920 and instead setting up a Presidency of Religious Affairs {Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) 
under the Prime Minister, and the abolishment of the Sheriah courts. All these were 
ratified in the new constitution that was adopted on 20 April 1924. For these laws, see 
Resmi Gazete, 06. 03. 1340 (1924). And for their full text in English, see Henry Elisha
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The movement was institutional secularization that meant to abolish the 
“traditional strongholds of the institutionalized Islam of the The process was
completed with the abolition of religious law -  before the Republic, just limited to the 
family law-, and the adoption of Türk Kanun-i Medenisi (Turkish Civil Law).^^ By 
instituting monogamy and new regulations in the affairs of marriage, divorce and 
inheritance on a secular basis, the legal reform led to the rearrangement of private and 
public life. Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of Justice, saw the change as a matter of 
civilization:
On the day that this document of the New Civil Law is promulgated, the Turkish 
nation will be rescued from the false beliefs and traditions which have 
encumbered our nation during the last thirteen centuries. It will close the door on 
the old civilization, and our country will enter upon the contemporary civilization 
of life and progress.
Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (original publication, 1935), 176-177. The law also 
included a regulation of the Evqaf (foundation) affair by controlling the rich Evqafs 
money. The effort to control such an autonomous social organization, which had been set 
up for religious reasons, claimed to be made to be in conformity with the genuine 
interests of the nation.
Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 194. 
This was the first step of secularization. “The secularization of social life and attack on 
popular Islam” and “the attack on religious symbols and their replacement by the 
symbols of European civilization” were the second and the third steps. See ibid., 194- 
195. The result of these three steps was the creation of “a new secular legitimacy for the 
state.” Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and 
Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
1978), 28.
It included the Swiss Civil Code (17 February 1926), the Italian Penal Code (1 
March 1926) and the German and Italian Commercial Code (29 May 1926).
He made this statement in February 1926 while the new legal code was under 
discussion in the GNA. Quoted in Charles H. Sherril, A Year’s Embassy to Mustafa 
Kemal (JAtvj York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 181.
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In short, it brought the elimination of remaining affects of the Sheriah on the state affairs 
in general, and the law in particular, and the ban over forming any autonomous 
association on a religious basis.
Although the State became secularized, it strove to keep control on what kind of 
religious activities its people could practice through re-institutionalizing religion. From 
then on, by abolishing religious institutions, Islam began to lose officially its significance 
in the legal system and in education. As Mustafa Kemal claimed, these were the 
preliminary footsteps to “become a modern social body as a whole in the world ... on this 
route it is unacceptable to stop and anyone who hesitates to walk on will be suffocated 
under the gushing flow of civilization.”™ All the above-mentioned official efforts to 
secularize went beyond the Ottoman reformers and the project of the Turkists for whom 
Islam was seen as part of a Turk’s identity, and that of Turkish culture.
The secularizing reforms attracted more grievances to the government. The newly 
emerging opposition group in the Assembly began to organize as a party, Terrakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası (The Progressive Republican Party, RPP) founded in November 1924 
by a number of leaders of the War of Independence with conservative and liberal 
orientation. They opposed the authoritarian rule of Mustafa Kemal and his cadres, and 
perhaps most importantly the radical westernizing reforms of the government. The 
leaders of the PRP preferred a gradual transformation in contrast to the revolutionary 
tendency of the Kemalists; that is, it wanted ıslahat (reform) rather than inkılap
™ Atatürkçülük, 351. In speaking to the Assembly in November 1924 on these 
new regulations, he said, “ the Turkish nation has perceived with great joy that the 
obstacles which constantly, for centuries, had kept Turkey joining the civilized nations 
marching forward on the path of progress, have been removed.” Quoted in Lewis, The 
Emergence, 267-268.
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(revolution). The PRP was conservative in the sense that it wanted to make the new 
Turkey adhere to the living traditions and manners.'^* Coupled with its opposition to the 
statist, centralist and revolutionary attitude of the People’s Party, its emphasis on 
“authentic”/traditional values drew the masses’ attention towards the PRP.
At the same time, as a reaction to the reforms, in 1925, there existed local 
uprisings in the eastern provinces particularly among the Kurdish tribes. A local religious 
leader (Sheih Sait) led the most widespread and violent one, with an aim at restoring the 
Caliphate. By passing Takriri-Sukun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) on 4 
March 1925 and reinstituting the Independence Tribunals that was previously set up in 
1923, the Kurdish uprising were put down forcefully after military operations. At the 
same time, the PRP was accused of responsibility for the uprisings, especially because of 
an item in its program that the party respected the religious beliefs of the people, and was 
closed down.
The next decisive step in the struggle with “ignorant fanaticism” came with a new 
law to erase its social roots. Law no. 677, which was passed on 30 November 1925, 
closed all tekke and zaviye (dervish convents), prohibited individuals from continuing 
with all initials (titles and clothes) associated therewith, and closed all mescid (small
For the PRP’ manifesto and program, see Erik Jan Ziicher, Political Opposition 
in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925 (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1991), especially 97-102 and 111. And, on its evolutionary orientation, see Feroz 
Ahmad, “Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925”, in. Political Parties and Democracy 
in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and J. M Landau (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 61.
■^2 By the Kararname (written decree) of the government issued on 3 June 1925, 
the PRP were closed down. In Kararname, the Kemalists interpreted the High Treason 
Law in the case of the PRP for the use of religion for political purposes so the 
reactionaries were encouraged by the Party that, for the rulers, became the sources of 
//7/ca (reactionism). T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Aded 1987.
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mosque) attached to the orders and all türbe (tombs)7  ^ On this change in 1925 Mustafa 
Kemal said:
I cannot accept that in our civilized society people continue to be so primitive in 
the sense that they seek material and spiritual happiness through the guidance of 
some sheikh or others, while they now face to the light of today’s knowledge and 
science and the whole scope of modern civilization... The Turkish republic 
cannot be the country of sheikhs, dervishes, novices and members of orders. The 
tmest, the most rightful Way (tarikat) is the way of civilization. To be a human 
being, it is enough only to do what civilization orders and demands.' '^*
For Mustafa Kemal, these institutions in the hands of “ignorant” religious persons 
became the source of fanaticism and hatred for civilization and progress, prevented the 
Turks from the true way of civilization, and maintained a threat to the regime politically 
with their secret meetings and rituals. That was why they could not have a place in a 
civilized country. These efforts to secularize the society went parallel with the eradication 
of all symbols belonging to the past.
Resmi Gazete, 30. 11. 1925/243.
İmece, ed., Atatürk’ün, 59-60. On this matter, in Nutuk, (two years later) 
Mustafa Kemal asked, “[Could] a civilized nation tolerate â mass of people who let 
themselves be led by the nose by a herd of Sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, Tschelebis, Babas and 
Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, magicians, dice- 
throwers and amulet-sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish State, in the Turkish 
Republic, elements and institutions such as those which had for centuries given the nation 
the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have 
committed the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and reawakening?” 
Nutuk, 606; for the English translation. Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, 
President o f the Turkish Republic (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1929), 722. For him the
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As a basic part of this struggle with “superstitious customs and t r ad i t i ons , the  
most important symbolic act in the civilizing process from above was the hat reform. It 
was a fundamental part of the question of dress, which has been the main subject of 
political process in Turkey. That is to say, it became an issue of politics, rather than of 
fashion, intended to civilize the Turks. Before the hat was amended, with two karanames 
the wearing of religious garbs and the clothes of public servants were regulated.The hat 
was introduced in place of the fez and sank (turban) with a legislative act that obliged all 
men to wear the hat."^ "^  This reform was indeed the most significant end product of the 
Kemalist view that appearance of the people gained utmost importance in the quest for
4.2.1. Civilization and Symbolic Transformations
elimination of all these remnants of the Middle Ages was “necessary to show that we are 
not a primitive society.” Ibid.
Atatürk (Istanbul; T. C. G. Harp Tarihi Encümeni Basımevi, 1939), 92.
Two kanunames (decrees), together with a kararname on the closing of the 
tekkes, were passed on September 2, 1925. The first one defined those who belonged to 
the class of ilmiye and prohibited the wearing of religious garb by unauthorized persons. 
The second was on the clothes of officials. Accordingly, if they were not required to wear 
a special uniform, all officials were to dress in the ordinary clothes as in use among the 
civilized nations, and were to uncover the head indoors and also out-of-doors as a mark 
of salutation (because the uncovering of the head was a universal sign of respect); 
ordinary people could wear these clothes of officials. For these decrees, see T. C. 
Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Aded 2413; and also, see Allen, The Turkish 
Transformation. With a law passed in 3 December 1934, the wearing of religious garb by 
authorized persons was limited by granting only the head of any religious community to 
wear clerical dress, but others could not, in the public realm, except during religious 
services. And this law also determined under which conditions certain uniforms could be 
worn. Resmi Gazete, 13. 12. 1934/ 2879.
For the Law on Wearing of the Hat, see Resmi Gazete, 28. 11. 1925/ 230. 
Ironically, a hundred years ago the fez had been adopted by Mahmut II as a reform, 
which symbolized the re-structuration of the state as in the modern state structure.
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becoming a civilized society; in this respect the hat was principally valued as one of the 
images of modernity.
It was in accordance with the tendency that the dress of the Turks had to be rooted 
in a similar fashion with all civilized peoples. For Mustafa Kemal, this was an important 
step in the process of turning the course of Turkish identity definitely towards the West, 
and of building an appearance or a visible mark of western culture. To show his ideals by 
deeds, during a provincial tour to Kastamonu, where he carried on his propaganda on the 
dress reform, he dressed up in western style with a panama hat."^ * In the words of Mustafa 
Kemal delivered in Kastamonu on 26 August, 1925:
We must be civilized men from every point of view. We have suffered much. The 
reason for this is that we did not understand the condition of the world. Our ideas, 
our reasoning will be civilized from head to toe. The Turkish and Islamic world 
suffered from too much pains and diseases because of failing to adopt their 
mentality to the progress and transformation of civilization. We have only saved 
ourselves in the course of these past years, thanks to change in our outlook... we 
cannot stop now. We must go on and on. Our people must know that civilization 
is such a powerful fire that it destroys those who ignore it. It is the source of 
welfare, happiness and humanity.
In a similar account, Mustafa Kemal on the occasion of introducing the hat in İnebolu 
proclaimed that if the Turkish people wanted to be modern, they had to be modern in 
“family life or the way of life, and had to display being modern and perfect men by their 
appearance .This  was the sign of the later sweeping reforms aimed to transform the
This attitude, of “charismatic and narcissistic leader”, did not appear at once. 
When he was in Sofia as the military attaché, he began to wear a European style hat that 
he preferred instead of the Ottoman kalpak and fes. See Vamik D. Volkan and Norman 
Itzkowitz, The Immortal Atatürk (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 78.
İmece, eú., Atatürk’ün, 17-18.
162
private sphere. In the civilizing project from above, new life constructed at the center was 
extended to the private realm through erasing its traditional moral base. This seemed to 
be parallel with what the Jacobins did in post-Revolutionary France.* ^
The issue of dress lied precisely at the center of the understanding that even 
private life with all its forms should be taken into similar line with civilized social life of 
the West For Mustafa Kemal, like its intellectual and technological values, the clothes of 
the West were universal, and so they could be not particularly attached to one nation. It 
was therefore not acceptable on the part of the civilizing rulers that the national and the 
international were on different f o r m s . I n  this sense the belief that the authenticated, 
distinctive dress is one of the aspects of having a genuine and distinct national culture 
was excluded in Kemalist discourse. Accordingly, he said:
In times we had a national dress, but we forgot it. Today the dress we are wearing 
is not national but universal ... Friends! there is no need to investigate what our 
ancestors wore in the past and to revive that. The modern civilized, international 
form of dress is well suited to Turkish nation and we shall achieve it. We will 
wear shoes or boots, trousers, waistcoats, shirts, jackets with collars, and the 
headgear with a rim called the hat.*^
Ibid., 45.
The Revolution formed a new public life and extended the public into the 
private sphere, see Robert Darnton, The Kiss ofLamourette (New York: Norton, 1990), 
8; Bernhard Giesen, “Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics.” Deadalus. 
U7/3 (1999), 241-242.
*2 This was one result of the Kemalist understanding of “modem life-style” based 
on the idea that the national and universal (read western) ways of life could not be 
separated and so it was unallowable to restrain “new way of life” within “the national 
boundaries.” Zeki Mesut, “İnkılabımız,” 76.
Ibid., 46. His description how the new Turks dressed up reminds us how the 
Jacobins revolutionized dress after the Revolution. “[T]he revolutionaries adopted a term 
from clothing: sans-culotte, one who wears trousers rather than breeches.” See Darnton,
The Kiss, 9.
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They had to be adopted in place of the Oriental ones (rawhide sandal, baggy trousers, fez 
and turban). For him, a civilized man’s dress could not have “a fez on his head, a green 
turban around that, an old-fashioned shirt-jacket on his back with a jacket like mine over 
it.” All these clothes, regarded as badges of being “Oriental,” were symbolized under the 
fez. Later, in Nutuk, he declared.
It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, 
offanaticism, of hatred for progress and civilization, and to adopt in its place the 
hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilized world, thus showing, among 
other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the 
Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized mankind (my emphasis).^'·
To free from those symbols of “fanaticism” and “ignorance” meant to escape from the 
humble thoughts of the past and the Orient. Here the enlightened officials would carry on 
the task of remedying these “outmoded” dress forms depicted as “uncivilized” and 
“unhygienic.” For Mustafa Kemal, modern dress had to be worn because it was 
experienced from every point of view as “scientific” and “healthy” in a practical sense.
It is obvious that, stressed on the “hygienic” and “unauthenticated” national dress unlike 
most of the non-Western nationalists, the state elite strove to make the members of the 
“Turkish nation” -  in modern clothes - imagining themselves to belong to two 
communities; a national community based on a new language and history (but not
Nutuk, 605; for the English translation, see Speech, 122.
See imece, ed., Atatürk’ün, 61. In this sense Kandiyoti writes, “The Western 
hat and tie were not merely items of fashion but... a uniform of secularism that also 
signified loyality to the state. The new cadres of the republic, civil servants and 
professionals, wore the insignia of their allegiance; conversely, insubordination could be 
indicated by misplaced facial hair or the wrong hat.” Deniz Kandiyoti, “Gendering the
164
completely distinctive), and at the same time a community of “civilized” peoples of the 
world.
Mustafa Kemal’s efforts to provide a moral and aesthetic ground for the new 
reform resulted in the above-mentioned law on the hat, “the headgear of civilization”. 
During the discussion on a bill on the hat, the first reaction came from one of the 
deputies, Nurettin Paşa. He declared that this would violate the articles on the rights of 
personal liberty in the Constitution and that the proposed headgear did not fit to the 
national dress form. This objection awakened the revolutionary spirit of other deputies. 
The critics on the objection were centered on the claim that the Constitution that was 
itself a product of civilization, and could not be violated by “adopting hats which were 
the very symbol of civilized peoples.”^^  Şükrü Bey (deputy of Muğla) rejected Nureddin 
Paşa’s assertion on the non-authentic character of the proposed dress. For him, ''national
Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity”, in Rethinking 
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, 122.
This had been one of the most emphasized themes in the discourses of the 
Kemalists throughout the period this dissertation covers (1923-1945). Kazım Nami 
(Duru), one of the enthusiastic pro-Kemalist elite, in his article on humanism, wrote in 
1934; “We are both Turkish nationalists and internationalist. It is our ideal to be an 
Europeanized nation rather than Asian one. By being Europeanized with our all 
institutions, we become part of internationalism.” Kazım Nami (Duru), “Humanisma” 
[Humanism], Ülkü. 17 (May 1934), 336.
H. E. Wortham, Mustafa Kemal o f Turkey (New York: William Edwin Rudge, 
1930), 173. This was the very tone of Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt)’s (Minister of Justice) 
words: “freedom is limited. Its limit is the benefit of Turkish nation. There is nothing or 
laws for which the progress of Turkish nation can be sacrificed.” For these and other 
speeches in the parliament on the issue, see Mahmut Goloğlu, Devrimler ve Tepkiler, 
1924-1930 [Revolutions and Reactions, 1924-1930] (Ankara: Goloğlu Yay., 1972), 153- 
156 In Nutuk (Speech), Mustafa Kemal severely condemned Nurettin Paşa for trying to 
prevent the implementation of the hat reform and as being a “conservative” and 
“reactionary” provocateur. Nutuk, 606. As a reaction to the reform, there occurred some 
demonstrations at Erzurum, Maraş, Sivas and Rize in favor of the fez. Goloğlu, 
Devrimler, 156-158.
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dress can be seen only in history and in museums. Today, the dress of all nations are the 
same” (my emphasis).*^ This claim just manifested the will for freezing some 
“unwanted” living things by making them worthy of a museum and folkloric elements. It 
appeared that this act of “antiquation” would pave the way for the complete prevalence of 
a modern life, and so it was about the construction of an alternative culture instituted in 
place of the living one. Here the issue of dress became the significant part of the process 
of culture production that is elaborated in Chapter II.
Women, in the Kemalist discourse on civilization, appeared as another image for 
social engineering towards Westernization. In other words, the creation of a modern 
woman with her dress and status in society, or the transformation of the basic features of 
the private sphere, was part of the process of forming a civilized society. In the process, 
women had to be set on the path of progress by improving their position in social and 
family l i f e .Women’s dress was at the heart of the issue. In the first instance, to be 
liberated from the chains of “tradition”, they had to be freed from the uncivilized form of 
dress, especially from the veil.^o This was the task of men to show women the true 
civilized path. After touching on the uncivilized and impractical aspects of the traditional 
women dress, in Kastamonu, 1925, Mustafa Kemal went on to say:
Gologlu, Devrimler, 155.
In his speech in Kastamonu on 23 August 1925, Mustafa Kemal said, “a society 
is made up of two kinds of human being, called men and women. Is it possible for the 
whole group to progress by making one part progress while ignoring the other part? ... 
The two sexes must take the steps of progress together as friends... If this is done, our 
revolution will be successful.” İmece, ed., Atatürk'ün, 61.
For the Kemalists, the veil was a sign of “ignorance” and “backwardness,” and 
a tradition stemming from the darkness of Middle Ages. For one evaluation, see Hikmet 
Bayur, “Atatürk.” III/IO (1939), 264.
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My male friends, this is somewhat the product of our selfishness...But our 
women are sensitive and rational people like us. After inspiring the sacred 
morality, explaining our national ethics to them, and equipping their minds with 
enlightenment and virtue, there will no more need for selfishness. Let them show 
their faces to the world, and let them be able to view the world carefully.
They had to display modern attitudes with their dress and their conduct in the public 
realm:
In some places I see women who throw a dustcloth and waistcloth over their 
heads to hide their faces and their eyes. When men pass by, they turn their backs 
and sit down on the ground. What is the meaning of this behavior? Ladies and 
gentlemen, does a mother and daughter of a modern nation act in this strange 
way? This must be immediately corrected.^^
However, correction of the veiling and the practice of women’s dress were carried out in 
a legislative way as in the hat case. On the issue, the belief was that, in time, the forward 
march of culture would bring about the end of the usage of the veil in social and private 
r e a l ms . On l y  upon the request to set the modern style, wives of public servants went 
unveiled and dressed up like Europeans. Nevertheless, it was obligatory for all women 
employed as officials and all girls in the schools '^* to dress in a modern way. All these
İmece, ed., Atatürk’ün, 47. According to Kandiyoti, this attitude may also be 
seen as the redefinition of “the paternal role” for modern women. “The remote, 
authoritarian father fiqure began giving way to a new intimacy and paternal involvement. 
The modern father had a special link to his daughters, who were valued, educated, and 
nurtured -  men gave social birth to the new woman of the Republic.” Kandiyoti, 
“Gendering,” 123.
92 Ibid., 61-62.
93 See Bayur, “Atatürk,” 264.
94 Schools, in the discourse of the Kemalists, appeared as the most trusted 
institution to inculcate the ideas of civilization in the new generation.
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meant that women dressed in the “traditional” way were deprived of being represented 
and did not benefit from the public sphere.
This fact was heightened with a symbolic, cultural crusade and legal 
arrangements. The official attitude attempted to spread through a nation-wide dress 
campaign in which local newspapers and officials played an important role to “enlighten” 
the people on the new styles. Legally, the social status of women was changed with the 
new Civil Code through an adaptation of the Swiss Code. It led to the regulation of the 
private life of Turks with a secular law as practiced in the West, instead of an Islamic 
one. It brought monogamy, the resolution of marriage and divorce by secular authorities 
and the change in the law of inheritance grounded more or less on the Kemalist principle 
of a community of equals. In April 1930, with a law on municipalities, women gained the 
right to participate in local elections, and in December 1934, the parliament granted 
women the right to vote and to be candidates in national elections. Women, legally 
empowered and dressed in the modes of Paris, in conformity with the civilizing program 
of the Kemalists, began to be more and more visible in the public realm. A woman 
dancing at balls and working and being educated side by side with “shaven” men became 
henceforth one of the chief images of the Republic, the images by which modernity was 
symbolized. As Göle aptly puts it: “Photographs of women unveiled, women pilots, 
women professionals and photographs of men and women in European fashion depicted 
the modernist representations of the “prestigious life.” Civilized Republican individuals
95 While stressing both men’s and women’s dress style, the campaign was 
maintained mainly on women’s dress and how they could be saved from the veil and 
bedclothes. See Mesut Çapa, “Giyim Kuşamda Medeni Kıyafetlerin Benimsenmesi ve 
Trabzon Örneği” [The Adoption of Modern Clothes as Garments and the Case of 
Trabzon]. Toplumsal Tarih. 5/30 (1996), 22-28.
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went to tea salons, mixed-gender dinners and b a l l s . I n  this regard the organizations of 
“Miss Turkey” contest during the 1930s were seen as a necessary nationalist step in the 
path of civilization and to maintain a potent assault on the patterned value structure of 
“tradition.” By these contests it was shown to the civilized nations that in Turkey there 
existed a “modern way of life” and Turkish women lived no longer in harems as 
prisoners. As a consequence, in the nation-building project, women were represented 
and symbolized as the carriers of the modern way of life and so denoted to be Western.
Beside these, the calendar and clock change (bringing the rearrangement of 
time),^ ** the elimination of all signs reminding of the Ottoman past,’  ^ the question of the
Göle, “The Freedom,” 50. For Kandiyoti women became “symbolic pawns” in 
the hands of the civilizing rulers. Deniz Kandiyoti, “Women and the Turkish State: 
Political Actors or Symbolic Pawns?” in Woman-Nation-State, eds. N. Y. Davis and F. 
Anthias, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988).
Duğan Duman and Pınar Duman, “Kültürel Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak Güzellik 
Yarışmaları” [Beauty Contests as an Element of Cultural Change], Toplumsal Tarih, 7/42 
(1997), 21.
On 26 December 1925, the Gregorian calendar in place of the Muslim calendar 
{Hicri) and the 24-hour day were adopted. For both laws, see Resmi Gazete, 2. 1. 1926/ 
260. These changes displayed a critical break with the Muslim world, as well as with the 
past. Although further emphasis was put on its practicability, for the rulers the old 
calendar had been one of things that set up the wall between Turks and the civilized 
nations. Mustafa Baydar, Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz (Istanbul: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1973), 
229. That line of reasoning brought forth the abolition of the Friday holiday in favor of 
Sunday in 1935, to make rearrangement in working days in line with the Western 
countries.
The modernizing rulers’ venture to eradicate all signs reminding the Ottoman 
past went on by a law, passed on 28 May 1927, on removing all Sultan’s monograms 
(imperial signature), riggings, inscriptions from all buildings. All these would have to be 
displaced (by transferring to museums or covering over) because they were symbols of 
the Ottoman Sultanate. Resmi Gazete, 15.6.1927/ 608.
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emblem of the new Turkish S t a t e , t h e  alphabet change in 1928'^’^  were the end 
products of the cultural crusade on the traditional symbols. Evidently, when the aim was 
to make it possible to unite new Turkey with modern civilization, symbolic 
transformations manifested a tendency to save the young Turkish generations from the 
past, that is, the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage.
Consequently, it seems to be obvious that all the above sweeping reforms, 
removing all age-old intermediary structures between the state and the individuals and 
establishing a new symbolic universe, were valued positively under the notion of 
civilization that was depicted with science and progress. Here it was perceived in regard 
with the process of nation-building based on the republican and nationalist understanding.
100 Towards 1928, as Afetinan reports, Mustafa Kemal rejected some wolf headed 
figures prepared for the state emblem. For him, none of them was going to be the emblem 
of a modern state; it would be symbolized with a human head that was the source of 
everything. A. Afetinan, M  Kemal Atatürk’ten Yazdıklarım [My Writings from Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk] (Ankara; Altinok Matbaası, 1969), 9. No doubt, this was the head of 
Atatürk, for all reforms were seen as the product of his brain which was of the genius 
Leader. Thus, the photograph and sculpture of his head as badges of his “personality cult” 
have been one of the component emblems of the Turkish Republic. One of the leading 
interpreters of Kemalism, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, saw the “Turkish revolution” as nothing 
but “a mere photograph of Atatürk’s mind.” Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali, 75. This 
canonization resulted from a role attributed to Mustafa Kemal who as a real “Man of 
Genius” changed the destiny of a nation with a touch of his finger.
It is certain that the most critical symbolic turn came with the replacement of 
the Arabic script with the Latin in the writing of Turkish. Here the blame of being 
“backward” was placed on the Arabic alphabet that was regarded as colonizing the mind 
and mentality of Turks, that is, had tied Turks to the Orient. In fact, the adoption of the 
Latin alphabet was the most significant point of a radical cultural break with the past that, 
for the civilizing elite, was now complete. It provided the “greatest effect on Turkish life 
from the cultural point of view”, together with the adoption of the Swiss Family Law, 
from the social point of view. See Halide Edip Adivar, Conflict o f East and West in 
Turkey (Delhi: Jamia Millia, 1935), 135 and 163. The language reform had been on the 
agenda until the end of the Single-Party period, especially through efforts to purify 
Turkish from Arabic and Persian origins. The new “Turkish” script and purified language 
were regarded as one of the most usable and useful tool to spread the civilizational ideals
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As mentioned above, the aim of the Kemalist civilizing project, with its emphasis on a 
distinction between civilization and archaism or between modern and traditional, was to 
create and forge the new mentality and the modern way of life by a total break in the 
cultural legacy of the past. It was the name of the public life only through which 
individuals in Turkey would become cultivated and perfected “patriotic” citizens. It, 
therefore, made it possible to judge who was human or savage, or who would be included 
and who would be excluded. New images, symbols and rituals were invented for 
signifying the modern one, which was done by establishing a hierarchy in ways of life. 
These were politically determined dress, styles, tastes, badges, status and mode of 
behavior, which were valued through the condemnation of the “traditional” ones. They 
provided the legitimacy for being represented in the public sphere of the Republic. So 
was the concept of civilization -  used as part of culture production in the official 
discourse - essentially deemed as a “concept of identity” denoting to be both Western and 
Turk. This Kemalist conception of civilization, especially after 1930, began to be 
integrally identified with the term culture.
4.3. Culture as Part of the Civilizing Process From Above
Until the early 1930s, the reform movement found its justification to a greater 
extent in the concept of civilization that had been seen satisfactory to create a new moral 
and social structure to which all Turks would adhere. Changes in the socio-economic 
conditions and the rising need for a new ideological outlook to diffuse the Republican
of the new regime. These language policies will be elaborated in Chapter V in a detailed
way.
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ideals deeper, brought about an ideological turn in 1930. The concept of culture became 
on the part of the ruling groups the motto of a new ideological orientation. The new 
conceptualization of culture in the 1930s may be traced in the thoughts of Mustafa 
Kemal, some main official texts and the cultural institutions. Thus, this part is very 
selectively formulated around the analysis of Mustafa Kemal’s statements and their 
echoes in intellectual life, of İskan Kanunu (The Law of Settlement) and the RPP’s 
Programs, and of the ideology and activities of the People’s Houses. In this sense, the 
following two chapters are set aside for other two prominent institutions of the Republic 
(The THS and the TLS) directing the process of culture production.
By 1929 the radical westernizing reforms of the 1920s, bad economic conditions 
substantially caused by the 1929 Great Depression, and continuing rebellions in eastern 
Anatolia, led to the rising tide of social discontent. This began to threaten an important 
degree the Republic and its reforms. To air the accumulated social opposition and to 
cover up the mortal menace of stagnation and opposition, a political party, the Free Party 
{Serbest Fırka, FP), was founded in August 1930 as a loyal opposition party.i^^ xhe FP’s 
critics on the RPP’s economic policies and its promise for more liberal political 
conditions immediately attracted a large group of enthusiastic followers. Coupled with 
the demands of a return of the fez, the Arabic script, and so on, its growing popularity
Fethi Okyar established this with the direct encouragement of Mustafa Kemal, 
who urged others to join it, including his sister. The reason behind the selection was that 
they were not challengers to Mustafa Kemal’s authority and the regime. He did not only 
determine the founders, but also the FP’s program. See Tevfik Çavdar, “Serbest Fırka” 
[the Free Party], in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 
2053 and 2055. And also, on the purpose of its establishment, see Kemal Karpat, 
Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to A Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 64-65.
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began to turn immediately into a rising opposition to the westernizing reforms. The 
Republicans regarded it not only as a threat to their own rule, but also to that of the 
regime, and so, for them, this support mainly came from the reactionaries. Meanwhile it 
ended with the dissolution of the FP by its leaders in November 1930, by alleging that it 
had become the instrument of counter-revolutionaries. This was followed by the 
Menemen incident which was seen as one of the most dangerous reaction to the 
regime.
The social discontent and the experience of the FP gave on the part of the ruling 
elite a signal of the failure of the first phase of the civilizing project from above. 
Although the modernizing reforms had become strong in the center (constituted by a 
close circle of elite), they failed to create a sense of belonging and collectivity among the 
masses, That is to say, as Ahmad argues, “[T]he mass of the people, even in the more 
advanced parts of the country, did not identify with the new state.”^^  ^ This meant that a 
cultural duality between the ruling cadre and the masses seen as the main enemy of the 
Republic continued to exist, and even widened through forging a modern way of life that
103 por the modernizing elite, this incident was important because it took place in 
one of the most developed provinces of Anatolia, not in a backward one. Feroz Ahmad, 
The Making o f Modern Turkey (London; Routledge, 1993), 60. In the words of Yakup 
Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), the resentment and anxiety of the state elite found its clear 
expression: “it is as though nothing has happened all these years, as though ... the idea of 
any of our radical reforms has not altered anything in this country.” Quoted in ibid.
•O'* In fact this was a common opinion among the ruling elite. This may be found 
in A. H. Başar’s study covering Mustafa Kemal’s visits to some provinces to grasp the 
reason for shortcomings of the regime. See Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Atatürk’le Üç Ay ve 
I930'dan Sonra Türkiye [Three Months with Atatürk and Turkey after 1930] (Istanbul: 
Tan Matbaası, 1945).
Ahmad, The Making, 61.
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was of the ruling elite and intellectuals in big cities. The ideals of science and progress, 
the basis of the Kemalist understanding of civilization, failed to raise the cultural level of 
the people.
Thus, to refresh the revolutionary spirit of the Republic, a new ideological 
orientation was put to use. The name of the ideology was Kemalism, which came into 
existence firstly at the Third Republican People’s Party Congress in 1931.’°'^  
Accordingly, the measures taken at the Congress brought about the merging of the State 
and the Party; the result was a one party-dominant polity. All autonomous organizations 
besides the State-Party control were banned, Among them there were the Masonic 
lodges, the Women’s Association, and most importantly the Turkish Hearts; instead, new 
state-controlled institutions such as the THS, the TLS, and the People’s Houses were 
established. Here, what was aimed with new measures resulting in the reorganization
This life did not, as Beige argues, reflect the existing social relations, but 
“wished human relationships. In this regard it was assumed that the people in times 
would evolve on the path of modern civilization.” Murat Beige, “Kültür” [Culture], in 
Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Republican Period Encyclopedia of Turkey] 
(Istanbul: İletişim, 1983), 1300. In fact, the duality between the elite life-world and that of 
the masses was one of the legacies of the Ottoman-Turkish reform movement, which was 
fostered by the Republic’s sweeping reforms. See Cemal Kafadar, “The New Visibility of 
Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life”, in The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Arts, 
and Sufism in the Ottoman Empire, ed. R. Lifehez (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1992), 316.
107 Here, Kemalism was built on the above-mentioned six principles. See Tunçay, 
T. C. 'de Tek-Parti, 447-454. For the ideological turn, see ibid., 308.
108 Mustafa Kemal emphasized the necessity of unifying all power centers in one 
hand to reach revolutionary goals and so declared to approve the works of “all nationalist 
and republicanist forces” under the RPP. Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri [Atatürk’s 
Speeches and Statements], vol. Ill (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 
1989), 130.
109 For the RPP’s “totalitarian tendencies,” see Zürcher, Turkey:, 184-88.
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in the sphere of culture was to gain complete cultural control. In fact, this reflected an 
ideological turn in the process of culture production. Now, the greater emphasis in the 
Republican civilizing process was placed on the concept of culture that was deemed 
essential for the self-identification of the people. This is indeed what Ranciere argues 
that, in its relation to modern politics and nation-state, culture is tied to “a logic of 
identification” so it is one of the most significant forces to turn citizens -  politically 
defined as equals - into a culturally identified whole.*** It is in this respect that, after 
1930, culture appeared as the name of the search to promote collective identity to provide 
a sense of belonging necessary for social and cultural affinity. **^  So, the rising interest of 
Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues throughout the 1930s in history and language was
'*** Recep Peker clarified this reorientation in his opening speech of the People’s 
Houses {Halk Evleri). See Recep Peker, “Halkevleri Açılma Nutku” [The Opening 
Speech of the People’s Houses]. Ülkü. 1 (February 1933), 6-8.
·'* Jacques Ranciere, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization”, in The 
Identity in Question, ed. John Rajchman (New York and London; Routledge, 1995), 66- 
67.
'*2 After the civilizing elite realized that the emphasis only on civilization was 
regarded as insufficient to meet the people’s spiritual needs which were as necessary as 
political ones, for being a modern society, the role was now given greatly to culture. In 
fact before 1930 there existed some views stressing the ties between civilization and 
culture and cultural transformation among the ruling circles. Celal Nuri in 1928 used the 
concept of civilization and culture interchangeably. See Celal Nuri (İleri), “Latin Harfleri 
Meselesi” [The issue of the Latin Letters], in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe 
Tartışmaları [Discussions on Alphabet from the Tanzimat to the Republic], ed. Hüseyin 
Yorulmaz (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1995) (original publication, 1928), 293 and 298. Hasan 
Cemil (Çambel) in 1929 talked about a cultural shift in Turkey in a way that the 
Revolution “eliminated the old, dead culture and began a quest for a vigorous culture in 
the realms of life, art and thought.” Hasan Cemil (Çamhbel), “Hars Tebdili” [Change of 
Culture], in Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II, eds. Mehmet Kaplan, and et al. (Ankara: 
Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1992) (original publication, 1929), 66 (66-68). For the role of the 
Alphabet change in the creation of a new culture, see Yunus Nadi, “Yazı İnkilabı” 
[Alphabet Reform], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 [Atatürk and the Turkish Language 2], ed. 
Zeynep Korkmaz (Ankara: TDK, 1997) (original publication 1929), 11-13.
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regarded necessary for the construction of an identity on the basis of modern ideals. 
This was a cultural crusade, led and maintained by Atatürk himself All efforts 
throughout the 1930s seemed to be the most significant steps in the attainment of 
monopolizing the legitimate use of culture, that is, establishing full cultural control over 
the society, which had not been fully realized during the first decade of the Republic.
4.3.1. Mustafa Kemal and Culture
At this juncture, there existed the need to re-conceptualize culture that until that 
time, as a discourse, remained in large measure under the influence of Gokalp’s notion of 
“authentic”, “distinctive” culture. The seeds of the new official attitude to culture with 
the above-mentioned ideological turn may be best found at first in the thoughts and 
expressions of Mustafa Kemal. In 1930, in the early days of the FP, Mustafa Kemal for 
the first time expressed his assertion on culture as being part of his thesis of 
civilization.'15 On the issue, he said;
Here history and language were regarded as, in the words of one of the 
Kemalist interpreters and legislators, İ. Necmi Dilmen, two backbones of national culture 
in the sense that both were essential “to form a new and developed cultural ideal in our 
country.” i. Necmi Dilmen, “TDK Adına Genel Sekreter Burdur Mebusu İbrahim Necmi 
Dilmen’in Nutku” [Burdur Deputy İbrahim Necmi Dilmen’s Speech in the Name of the 
TLS], in III. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 15-20 Kasım 1943, Kongreye Sunulan 
Tebliğler [III. Turkish History Congress, Ankara 15-20 November 1943, Papers 
Presented at the Congress] (Ankara; TTK, 1948), 13.
" ‘'T o  write this section some of his views on culture are chosen which can not be 
easily linked with any specific contextual frames of the 1930s. It is obvious that the 
context was the social milieu of this period as the state and its “knowing” rulers entered 
into re-defining their conceptual framework in terms of culture and its relation to 
civilization.
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There are some people who define civilization in different ways. In my opinion it 
is hard and unnecessary to separate civilization from culture. In order to clarify 
my point of view, let me explain what culture is; it is the product of all 
achievements of a human society in the domains of (a) state, (b) thought, that is to 
say, science, social science, and fine arts, and (c) economy, that is to say, 
agriculture, crafts, trade, transportation and communication. When one talks about 
a nation’s civilization, I think it may not be other than a product of all these three 
kind of domains. Of course, the degree of culture, or civilization, could not be the 
same. The difference may be seen in each sphere of life, as well as the 
agglomeration of three spheres. A high culture does not only belong to its owner 
nation, and, at the same time, has strong effects on other nations. Maybe, it is in 
this respect that a high and extensive culture is called civilization, such as 
European civilization, asr-i hazır (modern) civilization.
What is significant here is the equation of the concept of culture with that of civilization 
and the setting of a hierarchy between a high and cultivated culture and primitive and 
savage one.
This conceptualization excludes the idea that a culture is the solid structure of 
living values and manners. At that point, in the words of Mustafa Kemal who dictated to 
Afetinan in 1930, we find his implicit criticism of Gdkalp’s claims on the pre-eminence 
of spiritual peculiarities over civilization:
There are those who limit the concept of culture only to some arduously, slowly 
changing racial and hereditary characters of nations. This becomes fundamental 
for them ... This viewpoint and explanation is incorrect ... Summing up, 
civilization is noting but culture. The meaning of culture can not be reduced to the 
concept of character called seciye (moral quality).
'15 Parallel to his general orientation until 1923, his view on culture seemed to be 
under the effect of Gokalp’s ideals; well built in moral character {seciye) and history of 
the Turks, it should be saved from all corruptive and immoral influences coming from the 
West and the East. After that time, in his statements we can not witness such an emphasis 
on “authentic,” unique notion of culture. For his statements on the issue during the 1920s, 
see Kantarcioglu, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti, 88-94.
Afetinan, M. Kemal, 48. Also Appendix A.
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In his discourse, culture could not be something challenging or in contrast to civilization, 
but rather inherent to civilization. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal first of all conceived 
culture as a mentality:
Culture is to read, to understand, to see, to infer meaning from all seen, to take a 
lesson, to think, to train intelligence ... Culture is a fundamental component of 
being humane in the sense that, with his energy and his rising and expansive 
intelligence given by nature, the human being who calls himself as “human” 
becomes a peculiar quality. To put it into a brief explanation, culture means to be 
happy with the rich spiritual power that emanates from nature; it is this definition 
that includes cleanliness, purity, refinement, humanity, etc., all of which are 
humane qualities. In this regard, when the term culture is put into an infinitive 
form, it means to transfer all qualities given by nature, to young and future 
generations (my emphasis).*’*
Thus, on the basis of this definition, he went on to say, “all children of the 
Republic are cultural men, that is, they should internalize culture and, at the same time, 
be convinced of spreading this peculiarity to the whole Turkish nation.”' I t  was the 
mentality that every “civilized” Turkish citizen should have in picturing and determining 
his own way. *20 For him, the way to reach that end passes only through benefiting from
Ibid., 48-9; Appendix A. On the matter of distinct qualities of civilization and 
culture, he explained his views by giving examples from Turkish history. As opposed to 
some claims (of Gökalp), he asserted that the Turks had been successful in conquering 
Istanbul because of being civilized and cultured in every sphere of life. See ibid., 49.
*** Afetinan noted these words down in 1936. Ibid., 50; Appendix A. And also, on 
Mustafa Kemal’s views on the relationships of nature, progress and human being, see 
ibid., 28.
> *9 Ibid., 50.
*20 Afetinan, A. Atatürk Hakkında Hatıra ve Belgeler [Memoirs and Documents 
on Atatürk] (Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1959), 272.
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the culture and methods of Europe to which the elite have to be in constant cultural 
relation.'2*
Thus, in the civilizing project, science and scientific thinking seemed to be 
determinant in setting up new modes of behavior. Mustafa Kemal strongly believed that 
scientific thinking should be dominant as “a basic principle and as a world-view, which 
shape culture as a whole”. n vvould result in the progress of culture. In order to work 
on and crystallize national culture in a scientific way, some institutions of culture (the 
THS, the TLS, and the DTCF -Faculty of Language, History, Geography (1936) were 
founded. Their role was to work towards inventing new myths to bring the new Turks 
much closer to modern civilized nations, and, in this way, to create a sense of community 
around these myths. In such a way they became the instruments of cultural control over 
the people.
The basic impetus behind all investigations and scientific studies on the Turkish 
language, Turkish history and fine arts and music was to raise Turkish national culture to 
the highest level of civilized nations. The endless elevation of national culture as the 
basic desire of the Republic, attempted to be maintained by rediscovering its historical 
characters and capabilities. As Mustafa Kemal declared in the speech on the tenth 
anniversary of the Republic, 1933, the Turks’ “high civilized character and capabilities” 
had been to “love fine arts and elevate it, to be committed to science, and to cultivate the 
sense of national unity under every condition.”^^  ^ This was also the very tone of his
121 Ibid.
122 For Mustafa Kemal’s assessment on the role of science and scientific thinking 
in the production of culture, see Çaycı, “Atatürk’ün,” 1115-1116.
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opening speech of the Fourth Grand Assembly of the RPP in 1935. On cultural affairs, he 
made the following remarks:
By being loyal to the program of the Party we have gained a lot of achievements 
in social and cultural domains from the last assembly held in 1931 today. These 
have given way to the national countenance of the Turkish Republic. Now there 
exists a modern Turkish sosyete (society) with a new script, national history, 
purified language, (modern) art, scientific music, technical institutions and 
equality between men and women ... Only when the Turkish nation surrounds its 
existence with deep and strong borders of culture, its high capacity and morality 
will be recognized in the international arena (my emphasis). ^ 24
This society included “elegant” and “refined” qualities on which the boundaries of 
culture were determined. They had to be spread and diffused in deeply by means of state
agents. 12^  *
*23 Atatürk’ün Maarife Ait Direktifleri [Atatürk’s Orders about Education] 
(Istanbul: Maarif Vekilliği, 1939), 33-34.
'24 Ibid., 37. What is most significant here is his use of the term sosyete (today it 
is often used to refer to a life style of upper classes including highly modernized 
manners). It is so obvious that by this term he meant a “modernized” and “civilized” life 
that he and his co-workers strove to create. After his use, it became one of the most 
applied terms among the Kemalist elite to denote a modern life style. For example, 
Şemsettin Günaltay and H. Reşit Tankut tried to situate the Turkish Language Thesis into 
the Republican project by emphasizing “Kemalist Turkey’s creation of sosyete and 
appropriation of a (modern) mentality”. See Şemsettin Günaltay and H. Reşit Tankut, DU 
ve Tarih Tezlerimiz Üzerine Gerekli Bazı İzahatlar [Some Explanations on Our Language 
and History Theses] (Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938), 27.
'25 This was attempted through instituting new conventions and gatherings. Balls 
were the most significant one. As Wortham reports, “[A]s the result of the impetus by the 
President, whose (official) balls at Angora and [at Istanbul] became a regular feature of 
social life, the inhibitions of the professional and official classes were overcome, and 
‘dancing,’ thanks to the gramophone, which played an important part in this revolution in 
all the larger cities, enjoyed such a vogue that young men with social talents found 
lucrative openings as dancing-masters.” Wortham, The Turkey, 111. This was the result 
of Mustafa Kemal’s “unmerciful” incentive: “More and more Turkish Women began to 
attend the increasing number of gala events at which the Ghazi was the main attraction. 
He derived enormous pleasure and satisfaction from seeing Turks dance and display 
“civilized” manners.” Volkan and Itzkowitz, The Immortal, 292. For the use of
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At the heart of his definition above there were the two theses, the Turkish history 
and language theses, which were sustained through the activities of the THS, the TLS and 
the People’s Houses. Both were used to prove, by “scientific” discoveries and evidences, 
that all civilizations were of Turkish origin; that is, Turkish history and language were the 
mother of world culture. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal claimed that “Turkish historical 
proofs” had a greater importance even to reinvestigate “the history of world culture”. '^ 7 
The aim behind the linguistic and historical studies was to provide a spiritual background 
and structure for culture. Thus the official discourse of culture was based on a “Spirit” 
which was something “living” and “giving a life”; it was “the national and social sources 
of best feelings, knowledge and acts” by which each element of a nation is equipped. 
Thus, as Necip Ali maintained, “spiritual factors” had a significant place in the progress 
and development of c u l t u r e . I n  fact, this was a highly “secularized” Spirit. What was 
needed, as Mehmet Saffet (Engin) claimed, was to make a “spiritual revolution to attain a
“Republican Balls” as an ideological tool in the 1920s and 1930s, see Doğan Duman, 
“Cumhuriyet Baloları” [Republican Balls]. Toplumsal Tarih. 7/37 (1997), 44-48.
126 It was “positive” science which was empowered to direct and determine the 
activities of the THS and the TLS. For that see Afetinan’s speech in the third Turkish 
Language Congress of which contents were determined by Mustafa Kemal, Üçüncü Türk 
Dil Kurultayı [The Third Turkish Language Congress] (Istanbul; Devlet Basımevi, 1937) 
7. In the opening speech of the same Congress, in 1936, Saffet Arikan, the Ministry of 
Culture and the President of the TLS, declared that, as core of the Kemalist cultural 
movement, “the Turkish History Thesis and the Turkish language Theory are aimed to 
arouse a cultural, social and ideal awakening establishing the nation’s psychology in a 
new progressive outlook and understanding.” Ibid., 3.
'27 Atatürk’ün Maarife, 39. Also on his views on proofs, see Afetinan, M. Kemal,
52.
'28 Mehmet Saffet (Engin), “Kültür İnkılabımız” [Our Culture Revolution]. Ülkü. 
5 (June 1933), 351.
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great cultural structure by being aware of directing the training and education of whole 
human kind in history.”'^° All these made it possible to provide a sense of belonging and 
identity for new generations who were being trained and educated, through the school 
system, to be “civilized” citizens within the Revolutionary culture of the Republic 
thorough the school system, universities and the People’s Houses.*^* These institutions 
were regarded as the agents of terbiye. Nusret Kemal defined terbiye as “culturating” 
which meant giving “ideals.”'^  ^ It was in this sense that on 28 December 1935, the name 
of the Ministry of Education was changed from Maarif Vekaleti to Kültür Bakanlığı, 
which was used until 1941^^3 In this change, the official discourse on culture used in a 
broader sense had a determinant role, while the language purification efforts had some 
effect. Mustafa Kemal and his collaborators wished to produce and spread cultural 
structure on wider ground as far as possible.
In fact, this was the quest for a shared cultural identity which was necessary in the 
process of forming a sense of belonging together. Every sort of particular and traditional 
attachment was seen dangerous for this identity. Thus, relying on the polity that the idea
129 Necip Ali, “Kültür ve Medeniyet” [Culture and Civilization]. Ülkü. 3 (April 
1933), 245.
>30 Saffet (Engin), “Kültür,” 351.
>3 > The success of the Revolution in every sphere was dependent on “the 
extensiveness and deepness of kültür kuvveti” (cultural capability) through these three 
agents. Necip Ali, “Kültür ve Medeniyet,” 245.
>32 Nusret Kemal, “Terbiye Meselesi” [The issue of Training/Education]. Ülkü. 6 
(July 1933), 436.
>33 For this use, ste Atatürk’ün Maarife, 40; TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. V, C. 4, 3 
Kanunievvel 1935, 92-93; Bahir Sorguç, 1920’den 1981’e Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [The 
Ministry ofNational Education from 1920 to 1981] (İstanbul: MEB, 1982), 9.
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of unity constitutes its basis, the policy was implemented as part of official nationalism to 
assimilate all customs and practices of particularities into a newly designed common 
good. What was aimed through policing was the construction of culture free from all 
traditional and particular elements. It was the culture to which only civilized individuals 
belonged. In this sense, as Kahraman aptly notes, it was “distanced from its sources ... 
and defined within the boundaries of a virtual m i n d - w o r l d . I t  denotes a deliberate 
choice for the place of living culture.
To sum up, what can be drawn from Mustafa Kemal’s views on culture is best 
summarized by Afetinan: “In his usage of kültür (culture) Atatürk, beside its dictionary 
meaning, dwelt especially on the comprehensive meanings of the term medeniyet 
(civilization) and hars (culture), and he meant the expression of the same thing via these 
three concepts.”'35 To put in a more simple way, culture in his usage includes all 
practices, habits and manners thought within the frame of civi l izat ion.They for 
instance came to be modes of “softened” behavior, “high level” of tastes, a way of 
thinking, scientific knowledge, and so on.
'34 Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “A Journey of Rupture and Conflict: The Culture in 
Purgatory.” Pr/vaA/ew. 1-2/4-5 (1997), 108.
'35 Ibid., 273.
'36 For example, culture was closely associated with hygiene and a healthy future 
generation. Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, in his Turkish Revolution Lectures (1933-1935), 
mentioning the importance of cultural policies in providing hygienic and healthy 
conditions, stressed that “the main ideal of culture in our age is to produce mentally and 
physically strong Turkish youths.” Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, “Türk İnkılabı Dersleri 
Ekonomik Değişmeler” [Lectures on Turkish Revolution: Economic changes], in Ilk 
İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları [Lecture Notes of the First Revolution History Lectures] 
(Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997), 314. Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek was, 
together with Recep Peker and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the lecturers on the 
Revolution at Istanbul University from 1933-1935.
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It is self-evident in his definition that a law of Nature seems to be fundamental to 
direct the manners around which human life forms are patterned. This is the result of 
empowering science as a force in the regulation of human life in an endless manner. 
Accordingly, the human being that is intrinsically valuable and rational has an active role 
in determining and constructing models for social structure. A group of “enlightened” 
and “cultured” elite had a mission of bringing out this capability inherent to everybody. 
In other words, they are Men of Genius who further the progress of human mind and 
taste. Therefore, the new manners, which are projected in the skilful hands of this group, 
are seen to be universally applicable and context-free. These are developed in a 
privileged way through assaulting and delegitimizing all traditional and particular 
affiliations. In short, in the discourse of Mustafa Kemal, culture as a mentality and as a 
“civilized” way of life was subject to men’s conscious actions licensed by the law of 
Nature, Reason and Science. It denotes high qualities and values defined as “elegant”, 
“pure” and “refined”, which were set in motion in contrast to the “traditional”, “savage” 
ones. That is, the concept of culture was used to differentiate the cultivated and the 
civilized from the traditional and the primitive. By these qualities it belonged to the 
people who had “knowledge”, and, at the same time, it accompanied an “advanced” 
consciousness and moral virtue. So did it come to be the basic criteria for determining 
who was going to participate in the public sphere.
4.3.2. The Ideological Base o f  the Concept o f  Culture
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This discourse on culture - defined in “the virtual mind-world” -  was obviously 
seen in the official legal and popular texts such as the RPP’s programs and the Law of 
Settlement. Firstly the political roots of the Kemalist view of culture of the 1930s may be 
found in the 1923 program of the RPP. In that, there was a more or less clear definition of 
common culture based on the idea of assimilation that set in motion membership to the 
political community, namely the state. It was also based on the notion of community of 
equals, made up of the people who were fused without any privilege and class. This 
orientation also took place as a general rule in the 1927 program of the RPP. Similarly, 
the program attributed a key role to the acceptance and internalization of Turkish culture 
as a basic criterion for admission to the party. Culture here was revolved more around 
nationalist and populist inclinations. Its fifth article was on this: “being convinced that 
unity of language, unity of ideal and unity of thought are necessary for the strongest ties 
between the citizens, the basic goal of the party is to improve and diffuse the Turkish 
language and Turkish culture and to make every individual appropriating them by means 
of the law.”’37 Qf course, as rigidly broached in the program, the endeavor for the 
progress of culture would be firmly established on “scientific” grounds.
The distinguishing peculiarity of the RPP’s 1931 and 1935 program ’39 which 
were written almost with a similar insight was the existence of a clear definition of the
’3·^ For the full text of the 1927 program, see Типфау, T. C. 'de Тек Parti, 382-394.
’38 This program brought about first of all the ideological restructuring for the 
state policies on creating a new society. The basic emphasis was now placed on culture 
that would be created. In general, it denoted a state of mind and a life style of an 
imagined Turkish community. For the 1931 program, see ibid., 447-458. The program as 
an official document for the first time mentioned the six principles of Kemalism.
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nation; “the nation is the political and social unit composed of citizens tied together by 
the bonds of language, culture and ideal.” In other words, culture together with 
language and ideal were constitutive parts of the nation in the way that they were 
fundamental to provide a sense of belonging together for the citizens. Culture was 
something achieved with the constant education and training of children through 
schooling and of adults especially through the People’s Houses. In this sense, as openly 
expressed in Part 4 on National Education and Instruction, the goal of the cultural policy 
was expressed as the “suppression of ignorance” by the process of education through 
which every citizen would be patriotic, civilized and nationalistic, At the heart of the 
policy was their intellectual and physical development necessary to enhance “the 
character to the high level inspired by our great national history.” For this purpose the 
education of Turkish history in which the Turks’ civilized ancestors had shown the true 
way to all civilizations, and the Turkish language had to be taught. Also the fine arts and 
especially western-style music, as determined in Article 44, gained the utmost importance 
for the Party to instill “the revolutionary culture” in the people. *'*2 in sum, what was 
found in the programs was the notion of culture which was something achieved, 
including aspects ranging from sharing a common language to attaining physical strength.
See “Program of the People’s Party of the Republic.”
140 Ibid., 307.
141 Ibid., 314.
142 Ibid., 312. Article 52 set “the national opera and the national theatre” as one of 
important tasks of the Party. Ibid., 316. The opera and theatre as components of the new 
high culture seem to have owed much to Mustafa Kemal’s personal preferences or his 
desire to appear Western and modern at all times. See Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Birth of 
A Nation (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Brother, 1984) (original publication, 1964), 469-470.
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In this sense, as cement to bound individuals together, it came to be the name of the 
modern way of life woven around the civilizing ideals of the Revolution which every 
Turkish citizen had to adopt through appropriation.
The other text, elaborated here, is the 10 Anniversary brochure published by the 
Ministry of Education, entitled as it was the standard and most circulated
brochure in 1933 and later years.*'*'* This propaganda brochure was based on the 
comparison between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, focusing on “how it was” 
and “how it is”, and full of condemnations of the past by revealing its “backwardness”, 
“ignorance” and “reactionism” and the “historic” achievements of the new regime. The 
contents of “10” contained almost all the modifications, novelties, and the concepts the 
new regime dwelt on. It is worth mentioning here to portray the pages on the appearances 
and styles of the new generation of the Republic. On the page “how it was” the princes of 
the Empire were portrayed as unhappy and sulky in the “oriental” dress, but in the page 
“how it is” children and youths dressed modernly were healthy, joyful, happy and 
certain. *'*5 The children and youths pictured in “what it is” seemed to be from a country
*'*3 It was prepared by Vedat Nedim (Tör) and Burhan Asaf (Belge). See 10 
(İstanbul; Devlet Maatbası, 1933). For its selective pages, see Appendix B. The brochure 
“10” included two main copies; the first was a thick text with 208 pages, mainly prepared 
for the intellectuals. See Webster, The Turkey, 184-184. The other was the pictorial and 
colorful, popular text (the 50 pages), which was circulated to almost all official bureaus 
and institutions in the country.
*'*'* It became the model of all other publications on the Anniversary. On this 
Webster reported that he read all special editions of the more important daily newspapers, 
the special publications of chambers of commerce, Party locals and national 
organizations. And he realized that “they appeared to follow a single model. That model 
was the Anniversary brochure..., bearing the simple title ‘70’.” Webster, The Turkey, 
184.
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of Europe, nearly all with blond hair and blue/green eyes. Other images and writings, 
ranging from women in schools and working places side by side with men to the well- 
covered volumes on modern Turkish history, were embedded in a dichotomy, the 
traditional/modern. Thousands of copies of “10” as a main propaganda text were 
published and circulated in all parts of the country. Its slogans and illustrations were 
wallpapered on the walls of almost all school classrooms, the People’s Houses, the 
Party’s local organizations, the official bureaus, and even the coffeehouses.*'*^
4.3.3. The Law o f Settlement and the Boundaries o f Culture
The Kemalist task of turning the existing human dust into a “cultivated,” 
“cultured” whole finds its clear expression in the Law of Settlement {İskan Kanunu), 
issued on June 14, 1934, which has been one of the most contested laws.*'*'^  For the 
purpose of this dissertation it is chosen to bind the factual events to the main arguments 
of the dissertation. It was the significant document which determined the official policy 
of the population initiated to re-populate Anatolia and re-organize its population
*'*5 10, 8-9. In fact, as Linke reported, “in the recruitment poster of the 1930s 
shifty looking youths were transformed into fit strapping young men wearing modern 
Western clothes in contrast to the old days of bearded turbaned men.” See Lilo Linke, 
Allah Dethroned: A. Journey through Modem Turkey (London: Constable, 1937), 330.
*'*^ Throughout his journey in Turkey, Webster reported to see these images and 
graphs whenever he went to. Webster, The Turkey, 184-185.
Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], “İskan Kanunu” [Law of Settlement], n. 
2733, (Ankara: Prime Ministry, June 21, 1934).
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structure. The Law, as defined in Article 1, was on “the settlement and distribution of 
the population with respect to Turkish culture.”*''^  Although the reason for the Law was 
to determine the fundamentals of the population policy, the basic impulse, as Yusuf 
Kemal Tengir§ek evaluated, was “to provide cultural u n i t y . I t  was for this reason that 
it was part of the creation of the citizens faithful to Turkish culture. In terms of 
settlement, Article 2 of the Law constituted a new regulation in the map of Turkey by 
which it was divided into three main regions according to whether or not Turkish culture 
preva i led :The  first one included the places where those who belonged to the Turkish 
race and culture were dense. The second comprised the places reserved for those who 
would be transferred and settled to provide for their adoption to Turkish culture. And the 
third, the places which would be emptied and prohibited for settling and dwelling due to 
reasons of location, health, economy, culture, politics, military and security. Even if
The RPP’s 1935 program adopted the policy for “the increase of the 
population and the bringing up of a strong and healthy future generation” determined in 
Part VI. See “The Program of the People’s Party of Republic,” 316. The goal of re­
population realized through migrations from abroad was one of the main policies to 
increase the population; others were to lower the mortality rate and increase the number 
of birth. See Bahaeddin Yediyildiz, “Osmanlmm En Önemli Mirası: Türk Toplumu” [The 
Most Important Ottoman Inheritance: Turkish Society], in Osmanli (Ottoman), ed. Güler 
Eren, vol. V, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999), 22.
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 73. This Article was amended 
with a Law no: 5089/1, 18/6/1949, as “the settlement of muhacir (a Turk or Muslim who 
has emigrated from Balkans and Caucasia), refugees, nomads and gypsies, and the 
regulation of settlement and distribution of the existing population in accordance with the 
level of their attachment to Turkish culture.” SeeResmi Gazete, 21. 6. 1934/ 2733.
Tengirşek, “Türk İnkılabı,” 314.
151 See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 142.
152 The boundaries of these regions were not clear even during the discussions on 
the Law at the Parliament. Mehmet Bey (deputy of Kütahya) pointed out one of these 
regions as “forbidden military zone” and one of them as “ places beyond the Eastern
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they were old dwellers, anybody who did not belong to the Turkish culture would not be 
permitted to re-settle in the first region. In this region the people of villages and aşirets 
who had forgotten their language, but were of Turkish origin were to be settled around 
villages, towns and cities, where Turkish culture prevailed. what was clear from these 
regulations was that Turkish culture came to be a main criterion in determining the policy 
of settlement. This was accomplished on the basis of external (migration and refugees) 
and internal (position of nomads and different ethnic and religious groups) factors.
In the Law, the term muhacir, as established in Article 3, was used to refer to all 
settled and nomadic groups from the Türk ırkı (Turkish race), and to all settled peoples 
belonging to the Turkish culture, who lived in foreign countries, especially in the 
Balkans, and wanted to migrate to Turkey as permanent settlers, Indeed, in practice as
region”. And he said, “the government will describe their boundaries with a map.” Ibid., 
148. It seems obvious that the first region included places of the Eastern region mostly 
inhabited by the people with Kurdish origin; yet the second one included areas where 
people speaking Turkish were dominant groups. The forceful migration of the Kurds 
toward western regions, especially in the mid-1930s, may be evaluated in this re­
mapping. For the migrations, see Ismail Beşikçi, Kürilerin Mecburi İskanı [Compulsory 
Re-settlement of the Kurds] (Istanbul: Komel Yayınevi, 1978). The third one included for 
example militarily sensitive regions. Among these areas were the Dardanelles and Thrace 
where the displacement of the Jews occurred in 1934. See Aktar, Varlık, 71-99.
This was determined in Articlel2. See ibid., 144. Similarly Article 13 
established those who were not going to settle in the second region set aside for 
immigrants, refugees, nomads of the same region and those transferred from the first and 
third regions. See ibid., 145. Both Articles were amended with the Law no. 5098/13, 
18/6/1947.
The basic reasons for such a policy of migration appeared to re-populate 
Anatolia and nationalize and modernize the Turks of the Balkans who had been free from 
the effects of the Turkish Revolution. Emphasizing the second point. Yaşar Nabi 
evaluated their migration as necessary, because they had been untouched by the 
Revolution which was creating ‘civilized’ life forms. So there began to emerge a huge 
gap between “the Turks of homeland and those Turks of the Balkans who are still using 
old letters in their schools, consulting with religious men in their daily affairs and 
wearing red fez.” For him, before getting deeper, this gap had to be removed, which
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well as its official account, the Turkish race was not depicted merely in racial and ethnic 
terms, but as a sign of affiliation, and so the wish to be part of Turkish culture came as a 
basic criterion in the def in i t ion. I t  was clear in the Law that anyone who was accepted 
as a muhacir was easily and immediately naturalized, but, as made it clear in Article 4, 
“those who did not belong to the Turkish culture,” “anarchists,” “spies,” “nomadic 
gypsies” and “exiles” were excluded. A and B Paragraphs of Article 7 determined the 
muhacir' f r e edom of choosing where they settled; “the migrants of Turkish origin” 
would be free to choose the suitable places to dwell, but “those of non-Turkish origin” 
would have to settle where the government would approve for them; otherwise their 
Turkish citizenship would be withdrawn. Although the former groups would settle in 
the first and second regions, the latter would only settle in the second one.'^ "^  This means 
that membership to the Turkish culture was accessible to those who were Muslims living 
in the Balkans and Caucasia with or without Turkish ethnic origin. Because of their
would be realized only through their migration to Turkey. See Yaşar Nabi, 
“Balkanlardaki Türkler” [The Turks of the Balkans]. Varlık. 22 (1 June 1934), 1.
155 During the sessions on the Law, one of the heated discussion was on the usage 
of the term soy (in its broader sense, race). B. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior 
Affairs, proposed the term irk (which may be roughly translated as race) instead of soy, 
which was accepted. In his usage, and that of other defenders in the Parliament, irk came 
to mean a comprising term expressing more than racial ties. On this account, Mustafa 
Reşit stated, “those who have migrated to Turkey but do not belong to Turkish culture 
were called Turks from a racial point of view. But due to being not part of Turkish 
culture, they do not speak Turkish. In fact, they are our true citizens and also true 
brothers.” See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 144-145.
Ibid., 142. In 1947 these two items were dropped from the Law with a 
rearrangement. Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.
157 Ibid., 144-145.
158 Although the migration of Muslim groups (Bosnians, Albanians, 
Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the Caucasus were accepted, the migrations of
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Ottoman background they were thought of as Turks who had forgotten their language. 
Therefore in the official discourse those immigrants could not be called “Bosnian,” 
“Albanian,” “Circassian,” “Georgian,” or “Laz,” which had all been allowed as different 
languages in the Ottoman “cosmopolitan structure.” The basic difference was just 
linguistic, which would be overcome through Turkification policies bringing about 
linguistic integrat ion.The leading RPP elite, Recep Peker, previously set this official 
mode, in 1931, in the following way:
[W]e consider as ours those of our fellow citizens who live among us, who 
politically and socially belong to the Turkish Nation and who have been 
inculcated with ideas of sentiments like ‘Kurdism’, ‘Circassianism’ and even 
‘Lazism’ and ‘Pomakism’. We consider it as our duty to end, by sincere efforts, 
these false conceptions inherited from the absolutist regime and which are the 
products of long historical oppression.
Here it was evident that Muslim people with a different language or of non-Turkish 
origin were to be deemed part of Turkish culture. The other main issue emphasized 
during the session on the Law was the position of the non-Muslim groups (Greeks, 
Armenians and Jews). They had been previously called Turks only in respect to 
citizenship, but not to nationality. But it was possible for these groups to accept the 
Turkish culture through being linguistically and culturally assimilated.*^' The debate on
the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with a Christian origin, were rejected. See 
Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanli’dan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği” [Turkish Identity from 
the Ottoman to the Republic], in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik [Republic, 
Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (Istanbul: Bağlam Yay., 1997), 81.
These were stressed in the Parliament by Ruşeni Bey (deputy of Samsun). See 
TBMM Zahit Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 69-79.
160 Quoted in Poulton, The Top Hat, 123.
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the status of different ethnic and racial/religious groups continued during the discussion 
on Soyadı Kanunu (the Law of Surname) occurring in the same month, where the official 
line was on their assimilation into the Turkish n a t i o n . A l l  these show that the Turkish 
culture was open to non-Muslim groups as well as non-Turkish Muslim groups, who 
were accepted as members of the Turkish nation and state so long as they were willing to 
integrate culturally and linguistically or assimilate into the Turkish culture. The way to be 
a Turkish citizen was the desire to be assimilated into the Turkish culture that manifested 
a civilized and westernized life-world.
With regard to some of the people in the boundaries of Turkey, the Law brought 
forth the rearrangement of the status of nomadic tribes and nomadic gypsies, and the 
abolishment of the aşiret, a sort of tribal social group in the Eastern region of Turkey 
especially among the Kurds. By the former regulation (Article 9 of the Law) the
In fact their Turkishness was proved through the works on history and 
language of the new Regime. On the issue Ruşeni Bey said, “one day they will 
understand the benefits of being a Turk and feeling Turkish.” Regarding the Jews, he 
went on saying, “it is not necessary to exile them. But according to our law, these people 
with high trading capabilities may mix with the Turks. This does not only honour them 
but is also beneficial for them. In fact, they do not have another alternative to be 
represented' (my emphasis). See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 70. 
Indeed this was seen as a part of debates on the status of the non-Muslim communities 
and their assimilation continuing during the formative decades of the Republic.
On the ciritics of Refet Bey who claimed to disapprove of the abolishment of 
names of foreign race and nation, B. Şükrü Kaya insisted about its necessity. “The main 
task of a country”, said he, “is to merge and represent in its own community everybody 
within its borders... If the Ottomans had had such a thing, today we would have a 
country extended to the Danube... So it is our urgent responsibility to make them part of 
the civilization of Turkish society and make them benefit from civilization. Why do we 
still call the names of Kürt Memet, Çerkeş Hasan, Laz Ali. Such a thing reflects the 
weakness of the dominant group... It is not correct to allow these differences. If anyone 
feels anything different, we will erase it in schools and society. And then he will be a 
Turk as well as myself, and serve the nation.” TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, vol. 23, 21- 
6-1934, 249. For the Law, see Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], “Soyadı Kanunu” [the 
Law of Surname], n. 2741 (Ankara: Prime Ministry, July 2, 1934), 506.
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Revolutionary elite strove to settle, educate and tame those nomadic groups, which 
coincided with Abdülhamit IPs and the CUP’s efforts of forceful settlements in the name 
of making them “civilized.” Those groups not belonging to the Turkish culture would be 
settled in towns (but not as a group), and also through scattering they would be settled in 
villages of Turkish cu l t u r e .Such  a regulation, as B. Şükrü Kaya (Interior Minister) 
stated, was inescapable because “[T]hey are deprived of humanist, moral, national and 
political education and training. The fruits of the Republic have not yet reached to 
them... This law included the rules to make those citizens civilized and improved^ (my 
emphasis), According to Paragraphs A and B of Article 10 of the Law, the aşiret was 
no longer acknowledged as a legal personality; all previous rights and titles -reis 
(chiefdom), bey (master), ağa (feudal lord), şeyh (sheik)- associated with tribes, 
stemming from either some legal or traditional structure, were brought to an end. Ç 
Paragraph stated that those members of an aşiret who were Turkish citizens but did not 
belong to the Turkish culture would be settled separately in the second region, and other 
nomadic aşiret, of Turkish citizens and culture, would be settled in other suitable 
places. Thus, the tendency to destroy the local, traditional power centers through
>63 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, V. 23, 7-6-1934, 143.
>64 Ibid., 141.
>66 Ibid., 144. Together with Item C anticipating the forceful migration of reis, 
ağa, şeyh, and their families living in the borders. Item Ç was amended with the Law no. 
5098^3, 18/6/1947. The status of the aşiret also became an issue in the Parliament 
during the session on the Law of Surnames immediately after the Law of Settlement. 
Then B. Şükrü Kaya described aşiret life as a social organization belonging to the Middle 
Ages, and, today, as a source of division among the people. There existed more than 200 
aşirets in the Eastern region. For him, if they were not abolished, they would become 
autonomous entities within the Turkish nation. See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 
21-6-1934, 246.
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closing of tekkes, zaviyes and medreses in the mid-1920s culminated in the elimination of 
the remaining sections of particularistic, traditional affiliations in the society. These 
intermediary structures had to be destroyed, for these “last social organizations of the 
Middle Ages” were regarded as “unnatural”, “archaic” structures threatening the new 
“Turkish social entity” based on “the unity of language, culture and ideal”. That was 
why they were regarded as chief obstacles on the part of the state agencies to reach those 
people and so to form a “cultured,” high society composed of equal citizens, which would 
be free from all traditional affiliations. In fact, both regulations might be conceived 
mainly in terms of the Kemalist civilizing tendency in creating the community of 
cultured equals.
The Law, as mentioned above, was mainly focused on linguistic and cultural 
integration. The main measure was to scatter individuals with different languages and 
different cultures. Its 11^ '’ Article brought the ban on “the establishment of a village and a 
quarter in towns, workers’ and artisans’ organizations, composed of individuals whose 
mother tongue was not Turkish”, or “such individuals monopolizing a village, a quarter, a 
job or a craft for their same kind.” ^^ '^  At the same time, it charged the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs with an authority to remove the people, of different culture or language, who had 
previously established a separate group, to other places, but not as a whole. The duration 
of settlement was described in Article 27: the government-led settlers (Muhacir, refugees, 
nomads and those who were transferred from the first region) had to live at least for ten 
years in the places they were settled by the government. Nevertheless, those who were
See Neşet Hakkı’s statements, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934,
6 8 .
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transferred from the first and third regions to the second one, and from one place to 
another within the second region, could not leave their settlement places even after ten
years. 168
The rationale for all the above measures was to provide “cultural unity” by 
destroying the social basis of various linguistic and cultural groups, and so preventing 
them from organizing as separate communities where they would maintain their distinct 
languages and manners. Here it was aimed at fusing them with the people speaking the 
“Turkish language” and belonging to the “Turkish culture” through providing for their 
linguistic and cultural integration into the nation. That is, the goal was to create, in the 
words of Şükrü Kaya, “a nation/country with one language, one thought and one 
f e e l i n g . T h i s  is the logic of cultural and linguistic assimilation, not simply based on 
ethnic or racist concerns. This quest to make “similar” is of course much more than 
simply making all people speak the same language. Also, homogenization meant sharing 
and internalizing a “civilized” way of life, manufactured at the center. In this regard, 
speaking the same language as a first step gained the utmost significance for the 
Republican rulers. Under a “modern” canopy, emerging as the form of an imagined 
community, all citizens were going to be “cultured” equals appropriating the “Turkish 
culture.” In short, as an official document, it implies in a general sense boundary making 
in such a way that the boundaries of the Turkish culture were differentiated from its 
“reactionary” and “particularistic” surroundings.
Ibid., 144. This article was amended with the Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947. 
Ibid., 148. 27 Article was dropped from the Law in 1947.
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4.3.4. The Institutional Base o f  the Kemalist Conception o f  Culture: The People 
Houses as “a Fount o f  Culture fo r  the Turkish People” '^^ ^
Within these boundaries efforts were made to construct and disseminate the new 
Turkish culture seen indispensable for being a modern society. During the early 1930s, 
overlapping with the ideological turn in the process of culture production, new cultural 
institutions were established to realize this goal. In this sense, in 1931, as a “cultural 
institution of the Revolution”*'^ ·, the People’s Houses were founded with a mission of 
transforming the masses into a more “elegant” and “cultured” form. *”^ 2 Working as a 
cultural branch of the RPP the Houses came to be the centers of adult education, thought 
of in terms of halk terbiyesi (the people’s training and education). In this regard, it was
obvious that the Houses replaced the Turkish Hearths {Türk Ocağı) that had served as the
•••^Ibid., 141.
This was the motto of Izmir’s People’s Houses displayed at its entrance. See 
Ehud Houminer, “The People’s Houses in Turkey.” Asian and African Studies. 1 (1965), 
86 .
The expression belongs to B. Şükrü Kaya, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
the General Secretary of the RPP. B. Şükrü Kaya, “Halkevleri’nin Açılış Konferansı” 
[Opening Speech of the People’s Houses]. Ülkü. 61 (March 1938), 9. The rationale for its 
establishment was to turn the immature masses into a collective, conscious and cultural 
entity. Ibid., 5.
*''2 Recep Peker, in the opening speech of the People’s Houses, frankly expressed 
the rationale for establishing the People’s Houses. For him, the Houses were founded to 
carry out the people’s education and training beside the regular school education. This 
sort of education would make the nation a collective whole sharing a similar ideal. For 
the text of his speech, see Recep Peker, “Halkevleri Açılma,” 6.
For one representative example of how the terms halk terbiyesi was conceived 
among the elite circle, see Hamit Zübeyir (Koşay), “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları” [Vehicles 
for Training/Educating People]. Ülkü. 2 (February 1933), 152-159.
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centers of adult education. In fact during the 1920s the Hearths were used as effective 
agents by the ruling elite to make the people adapt to new standards.
The establishment of the Turkish Hearth went back to the early years of the 
1910s. Until the mid-1925, under the effect of young pioneers of Turkism, especially 
Ziya Gbkalp, it had served as centers of refining and diffusing the ideals of Turkism. 
Attaching more importance to the need for such cultural organization, the rulers of the 
new regime supported its organization to be nation-wide and tried to give it semi-official 
s t a t u s .H e re  the aim was to propagate the necessity and benefits of the r e f o r m s . A t  
first sight, it targeted especially young people who were seen as more ready to accept 
new ideals. By 1930, once the rulers realized that their cultural policies had failed in 
indoctrinating the new standards, a desire to make reforms in the Turkish Hearths came
See Kemal H. Karpat, “The People’s Houses in Turkey, Establishment and 
Growth.” The Middle East Journal. 17 (1963), 59.
The Turkish Hearths took semi-official status, by the 1927 Congress of the 
RPP making the Hearths the RPP’s cultural branch. See Yusuf Sarmay, Türk 
Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931 [The Historical 
Development of Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931] (Istanbul: 
Ötüken, 1994), 308.
In this regard, the Turkish Hearths, as Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) -the 
president of the Hearths- said during its Second Congress, were committed to work for 
“the Turkish nation passing from one civilization to another”... as “representatives of 
Westernism.” See Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, Seçmeler [Selections], ed. M. N. 
Sepetçioğlu (İstanbul; MEB Yay., 1971), 72-73.
To this end, the Turkish Hearths used “every device of the missionary 
technique - the school, the dispensary, the spoken and printed word, the talkie and the 
movie to convert the youth of the country to the new ways.” Wortham, Mustafa Kemal, 
180. For more details on the Turkish Hearths, see Füsun Üstel, İmparatorluktan Ulus- 
Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931 [Turkish Nationalism from the 
Empire to the Nation-State: The Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1997); 
Yusuf Bayraktutan, Türk Fikir Tarihinde Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türk Ocakları
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to the fore,*'^  ^ The Hearths began to be conceived as insufficient to meet the needs of the 
civilizing rulers who wished to create a new culture free from all particularisms. That is 
to say, the ruling elite believed that the Hearths failed to provide mass polico-cultural 
education and indoctrination on the basis of new ideas they put forward. Perhaps the most 
important rationale for this was that the influence of Ziya Gokalp’s formulation of culture 
that gave special importance to the living values in the definition of “authentic” culture 
was still felt among the circle of this institution. Beside this ideological difference, with 
the semi- autonomous status, the Hearths continued to be the means of potential political 
opposition for the new regime. Then in 1931 they were compelled to close, and the 
Hearths’ property was transferred to the RPP.
In this context, the establishment of the People’s Houses was in direct relation to 
the revolutionary rulers’ efforts of monopolizing the legitimate use of culture in the 
context of a firm one-party system. This monopolization of use of culture gave the 
Houses a unique position in the civilizing process from above, especially in bringing the 
values of the Republic to the ordinary p e o p l e . T h e  expectation was that the Houses
[Modernization, Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths in the History of Turkish Thought] 
(Ankara: Kültür Bak. Yay., 1996); Sarmay, Türk Milliyetçiliğinin.
For the necessity of reform in the Hearths, see Reşit Saffet (Atàbinen), “Milli 
Tarih” [National History], in Atatürk Dönemi Fikir Hayatı II (original publication 1930), 
237. All discussions on the status and works of the Hearths occurred around the 
ideological disorder, and, as implicitly emphasized, the uncontrollable structure of the 
Hearths. See Karpat, “The People’s,” 57.
’■^9 The Houses, from the beginning, had organic ties with the ruling party, the 
RPP, by working as its cultural branch. Only the members of the RPP and civil servants 
could become administrators in the Houses. See CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi [The 
RPP’s Regulations of the People’s Houses] (Ankara, 1934), 72. Even all officials and 
party leaders were ordered to become active members of the Houses, by an official 
decree (19/7/1932, n. 13178). See Karpat, “The People’s,” 59. Only the RPP’s Central 
Committee had an authority to open a People’s House and determine its general policy.
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would be the places where new cultural ideals and images, manufactured and advanced 
by the THS and TLS and other cultural institutions of the RPP, would be disseminated 
and those from all strata of society would be indoctrinated. In other words, the Houses 
were the institutions of the dissemination of ideological principles and practices produced 
at the center. This made it a house of cultivation where the “Turk-human” would be 
processed and advanced.'** Here “cultivation,” or perhaps more correctly “culturation,” 
meant an intervention by means of constant training and education in order to, in the 
words of Cevat Nasuhi, “provide a harmony and unity among differences in soul and
See Ibid. In addition to this, the leading elite of the RPP such as Mustafa Kemal, Î. İnönü, 
R. Peker, A. Kansu, C. Bayar, and many others “often visited the People’s Houses and 
closely supervised their operation.” Houminer, “The People’s,” 110.
i*" Its goal was, in the words of B. Şükrü Kaya, to “raise the level of the people 
with respect to culture and knowledge, and to make the ideals and reforms of Kemalism 
reach the hearts of the People.” Şükrü Kaya, “Halkevleri’nin”. For this purpose, a series 
of conferences was held in the People’s Houses to teach and spread ‘positive’ knowledge 
necessary for everyday life. The RPP asked for some specialists (especially from the 
universities) to give lectures at the People Houses B. Şükrü Kaya, “Önsöz” [Preface] to 
Spor-Sağlık-Kültür [Sport-Health-Culture] (Ankara: CHP Yay., 1938); for the lectures 
given at some Houses by 1939 see “Halkevleri’nin Yedinci Yıldönümü ve 158 
Halkevi’nin Daha Açılışı -  Halkevleri’ne Toplu Bir Bakış” [The Seventh Anniversary of 
the People’s Houses and The Opening of 158 New Houses -  A General Outlook on the 
People’s Houses]. Ülkü. 73 (March 1939), 83-84.
Stressing this act of cultivation, Cevdet Nasuhi made an analogy between 
natural sciences and a kind of social engineering and wrote: “What the farmers do in the 
fields is an act of cultivating, implanting. A bacteriologist’s effort to grow up a colony of 
bacterium in a test tube is an act of cultivating. A state of mind arouse through implanting 
into human mind is also an act of cultivating... Of course, in their essence, there are a 
great difference between the third one and the former two.” Cevdet Nasuhi, “Halkevinin 
Çatısı Altında” [Under the Canopy of the People’s Houses]. Ülkü. Nisan (1933), 1. This 
stand reflects a rigid belief in (natural) science and its social science version, positivism, 
which in the case of Kemalism ended in the search of the political elite for examining and 
ordering social structure as scientists did with objects. In fact it is also parallel to the 
credence in the will of human beings intervening into the works of society.
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consciousness, prevailing in the society” (my emphasis). por him, it had to be thought 
in terms of national identification. It is for this reason that:
The People’s Houses are the places of those who strive to create a collective 
consciousness, that is, a cultivation of the “Turk-human”, and to cultivate the 
minds of citizens with our own personality, history, language, art and 
knowledge...Our characters belong only to us. In the next years it will be our 
main task to collect, manufacture and mature them... Under the umbrella of the 
Houses, we are cultivating a common language, belief, affection and ideal.
This act of cultivation was, as another pro-Kemalist stressed, occurring around 
“revolutionary education” {inkılap terbiyesi) that mainly included the information of the 
homeland and life, learning how to be civilized and patriotic citizens. According to the 
RPP elite, the result would be melting of the people into a social body, coming more and 
more close to “new way of life.” It was in this respect that everybody was encouraged 
to participate in all activities of the Houses, and the sense of belonging was aimed to 
generate through eliminating all their particular attachments.
In addition to the function of dissemination, the People’s Houses provided to 
some extent information and raw materials to the central institutions which were charged 
to produce official ideologies .The collection of information occurred mainly around
>82 Ibid., 2.
>83 Ibid., 4.
>84 See Hifzirahman Raşit Öymen, “Köy Eğitimi ve Bize Göre Yeni Köy 
Pedagojisi” [Village Education and a New Village Pedagogy for Us]. Varlık. 82 (1 
ilkkanun 1936), 147.
>83 See Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku” [Recep 
Peker’s Opening speech of New People’s Houses]. Ülkü. 2il (March 1936), 2, 4.
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the collection of raw materials such as the active participation of the TLS campaign of 
collecting words from various dialects in Turkey, of the THS efforts for obtaining old 
texts and historical remnants, and of some folk tales and songs. In its broadest sense, 
these may be seen as attempts to discover and describe the nature of the people that in the 
hands of the civilizing elite came to be an object of social engineering. In fact this act of 
“knowing” would make them project a “well-refined” way of life from above.
As stated above, the basic goal of the People’s Houses was to transform the 
immature masses into a more ‘civilized’ people regarded akin to the true nation. In 
addition to that, as Karaomerlioglu argues, the Houses were charged with providing the 
affinity of the intelligentsia to the principles of Kemalism.*®'  ^In other words, the Houses 
were seen as places where the literate and the members of upper classes would be tamed. 
From the early 1930s, the Kemalist elite understood that there was still doubts among 
intellectuals about the revolutionary reforms. Urging them to participate in the House 
activities came with the will to make them loyal to the state and its ideology. In all 
writings on the Houses during the 1930s, the intelligentsia and literate who had been 
“tamed” were portrayed as civilizing missionaries going to meet and join the people in 
the H o u s e s . T h a t  is, beside the schoolteachers, officials and members of the Party,
As Öztürkmen argues, the Houses fulfilled the function of transferring 
“information to such central organizations [the TLS and the THS] for the formulation of 
these ideologies and projects.” Arzu Öztürkmen, “The Role of People’s Houses in the 
Making of National Culture in Turkey.” New Perspectives on Turkey. 11 (Fall 1994), 
160.
M. Asım Karaomerlioglu, “The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in 
Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies. 34/4 (1998), 69; also see Walter F. Weiker, Political 
Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath (Laiden; E. J. 
Brill, 1973), 179.
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being the carriers and spreaders of a new way of life, they were driven to take part in the 
Houses in civilizing the people. Here the basic aim was to overcome a deep cultural 
chasm between the elite and ordinary people through raising the cultural level of the latter 
to the former. This shows that even among the elite groups the possibility of the 
emergence of different life forms, even “being modernized” in a different way, was not 
easily welcomed.
To achieve this end, the activities of the People’s Houses concentrated, more 
than anything else, on cultural issues. In a People’s House there could be nine main 
divisions: 1) Language, Literature and History, 2) Fine Arts 3) Dramatics, 4) Sports, 5) 
Social Assistance, 6) Public Classes and Courses, 7) Library and Publishing, 8) 
Peasantism, 9) Museums and Exhibi t ions . In  these divisions, there occurred activities 
ranging from politico-cultural education by means of lectures, propaganda films and 
ceremonies to giving some practical information on farming techniques. Among them 
lectures, music concerts, performances and exhibitions came to the fore to generate in the 
hearts of the people a love for Western-style music, taste, fine arts and the modernist 
principles of Kemalism.‘^ ° In general the RPP elite strictly controlled the forms and
188 por typical examples, see Ziibeyir (Koşay), “Halk Terbiyesi”; Şükrü Kaya, 
“Halkevleri’nin”, 8; Behçet Kemal Çağlar, “Halkevleri Çalışmaları” [The Activities of 
the People’s Houses]. Ülkü. 1Ъ (March 1939), 85-87.
At the opening ceremony of the Houses, Reşit Galip explained these branches 
in detail and what kind of activities each branch would maintain. See Hakimiyet-I Milliye, 
20 February 1932. Due to the main tendency of the official ideology, the first, second, 
seventh, eight and ninth divisions were seen as more essential. See Karpat, “The 
People’s,” 60.
190 For example, in 1938, there occurred 2827 lectures, 1420 concerts, 1703 
performances, and 267 exhibitions in 209 Houses with 136,500 active members. For the 
statistics of all activities year by year from 1932 to 1938, see “Halkevleri’nin Yedinci,” 
82. In 1943 the number of concerts, film shows and art exibitions held in the Houses was
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contents of all these activities in this sense that Ankara People’s House, under the direct 
control of the Secretaiy General of the RPP, was used as a model for others, where plays 
and compositions chosen for the People’s Houses were first performed.
As argued above, the Houses, as one the constituting agents of the civilizing 
process from above, served to function as a social and cultural milieu where mode of 
behaving, dressing, speaking, attending a public meeting or concert, and mode of eating 
were shown in explicit or implicit ways. This was possible through many new social 
activities like dance parties, balls, dramatic representations, concerts, exhibitions, 
lectures, national celebration days,* *^ and so on. In addition, a House was the only public 
hall and “legitimate” organization in town, it was used for some local celebration and 
activities. jhe Houses tried to be constituted as a social space where not only politico- 
cultural education and adopting civilized manners could take place, but also people were 
encouraged to use the Houses for individual activities such as weddings and 
circumcisions. In such way some of the tradition of the age-old ceremonies and other 
practices were aimed to be civilized according to modern standards, and new artistic and 
aesthetic forms were introduced. Within this broad framework, the Houses were designed 
to serve as the places of both entertainment and leisure time.^^  ^ In time, the People’s
impressive. See Halkevleri ve Halkodaları [The People’s Houses and the People’s 
Rooms] (Ankara, 1943).
*9' National celebration days, or “commemoration days,” included “the 
foundation of the Great National Assembly as Children’s Day on 23 April, the final 
defeat of the Greek Army as Victory Day on 30 August; the proclamation of the Republic 
on 29 September and many others marking symbols of national history, were 
enthusiastically celebrated by the People’s Houses throughout the country.” Öztürkmen, 
“The Role of ,” 167.
See Houminer, “The People’s,” 90.
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Houses played a most important role in creating a significant social base for the Republic. 
They produced the new generations that had adopted new cultural styles and Westernized 
life forms promoted by the state.
4.4. Culture in the Official Discourse During the İnönü Period (1938-1945)
After the death of Atatürk on November 1938, the period of Milli Şef (National 
Leader) signifying the rule of İsmet İnönü began in Turkish politics. From this time on, 
Atatürk became Ebedi Şef (Eternal Leader). As second man in the Atatürk era, İnönü had 
come to the fore as one of the most persistent pioneers of the radical westernizing 
policies. Following the path of Atatürk, the politics of culture in his presidency were 
bound up with similar ideals in conformity with the efforts to create a westernized, high 
culture in the previous epoch, it went one step even further in the new epoch. Being 
devoted to the idea that the culture of “civilized” nations was high culture and, when 
adopted, the problem of backwardness would be solved, İnönü and his collaborators 
urged a widespread cultural crusade by means of educational mobilization. As in 
previous decades, the reason was, to be part of cultural milieu of the West was only 
possible through transforming the society and instilling secular ideals and tastes of the 
ruling elite. To this end, during his reign, the state put forward some cultural policies 
such as the translation of classical works into Turkish, setting up operas and 
conservatories, spreading village schools, establishing the Village Institutes and People’s 
Rooms, and even making classical Greek and Latin compulsory courses for high schools.
See Sirer, “Halkevlerinin.”
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In this respect, in the İnönü era, there were two main steps in maintaining the 
process of culture production. The first was to accelerate the “scientific” studies on 
Turkish history and language and to spread the activities of arts. The second, to make the 
masses (especially the peasants who constituted 80 per cent of the people according to the 
1940 census' '^*) appropriate all constructed myths, symbols and rituals of their own. The 
latter was clearly expressed in the 1939 program of the RPP that put strong emphasis on 
the cultural and political education of the peasants through village schools (led by 
missionary school-teachers trained in Köy Enstitüleri -  the Village Institutes) and 
People’s Rooms. In other words, the transformation of the peasants became the new 
motto of the RPP’s program.
4.4.1. “Humanicizing” Culture
In fact, the first step was in harmony with the efforts made during the Atatürk era, 
manufacturing a life-world and normative order through the works of new cultural 
institutions (the THS, the TLS, music conservatories, schools of fine art, the People’s 
Houses) and, for this purpose, subsidizing the activities and performances of the theatre, 
operas, bale, orchestra. But now the difference was that the official ideology came under
Frederic C. Shorter, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Nüfus Yapısı ve Sosyo- 
Ekonomik Değişmeye Etkisi” [The population Structure and its Impact on Socio- 
Economic Changes in the First Years of the Republic], in Türkiye’de Sosyal Bilim 
Araştırmalarının Gelişimi [The Development of Social Science Research in Turkey], ed. 
Sevil Atauz (Ankara: Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 1986), 353. Also for some statistics 
on the late 1930s, see Köy Enstitüleri, 1 [The Village Institutes, 1] (Istanbul: Maarif 
Maatbasi, 1941), 1-4.
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the influence of an intellectual movement, called Humanism. Hasan Ali Yücel, as the 
minister of education in the governments from 1939 to 1945 came to the fore as the most 
significant figure in determining the cultural policies of the state, adopted it as part and 
parcel of the official cultural policy. It was based on the official efforts to prove the roots 
of modern civilization and culture belonged to the ancient Turks. On the issue, Hasan Ali 
Yücel declared, “nationalist understanding brought us to a new humanism. We are now 
on the path of forming humanism comprising all products of the human mind.”^^ '^  The 
seeds of this movement can be found in the early 1930s in some translations from Greek 
classics by Yakup Kadri and Ruşen Eşref and some studies of Nüshet Haşim and 
Nurullah Ataç.*^  ^ In 1935, this orientation turned into a movement with the efforts of a 
group of intellectuals around Yücel, a periodical, called as Yücelciler (belonging to 
Yücel). Their basic aim was to provide a milieu where Turkish humanism could flourish. 
Around this ideal, the movement anticipated a cultural transformation in Turkey, which 
would take place in accordance with Turkey’s realities. For that purpose, the first step 
was the translation of all classics into Turkish and then the internalization of their 
s p i r i t . A s  Kazım Nami (Duru), more close to the ruling circle of the 1930s as one of its
'95 See Kemal Ünal, “C. H. P. Beşinci Kurultayı” [The RPP’s Fifth Congress]. 
Ülkü. 77 (July 1939), 388-389.
'96 In writing this section the intention is not to give the ideological roots and 
contents of the movement, but just to elaborate its impact on the official ideology
'99 Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar ve Milli Eğitim Bakanları 'mm Milli Eğitim 
ile ilgili Söylev ve Demeçleri [Speeches and Statements of Presidents, Prime Ministers 
and Ministers of Education on National Education], vol. III (Ankara, 1946), 13.
'9^  See Suat Sinanoğlu, Türk Hümanizmi [Turkish Humanism], 2"'* ed. (Ankara: 
TTK, 1988), 92.
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representatives, claimed, the translation of the classics would provide for the 
development of modern literature and the national language, and at the same time, most 
importantly, 'Jikri terbiye” (intellectual training/education).^®® For him, his act was not 
contrary to Turkish nationalism, but even supported it. This previous intellectual 
movement in the 1938-1946 period began to gain root as part of the “official cultural 
ideology”, and so it had some effects on all cultural and educational mechanisms of the 
state and even on school textbooks.
In this official humanist understanding, greater emphasis was placed on the 
Greco-Latin roots of western civilization. In fact, it was this reorientation which gave 
way to a new reinterpretation of the Kemalist notion of civilization and history thesis. 
According to the new understanding, “the source of modern civilization was the classic 
Greek and Roman cultures”, not central Asia, and so it was necessary to learn its basic 
masterpieces to be part of it.^ °* In order to raise consciousness of the continuity in the 
historical development of Western culture, classical Greek and Latin began to be taught
•99 For the program, subject and method of “Turkish humanism”, see Orhan 
Burian, “Hümanizma ve Biz” [Humanism and We]. Yücel. 62 (1935) and see his other 
two articles with same title, in n. 63 and 64. For the movement, see Tunaya, Türkiye ’nin, 
158-159.
200 Kazım Nami, “Humanisma,” 335.
201 In his essay on the necessity of education of classical languages, Reşat 
Şemsettin Sirer (Director of Higher Education, Ministry of Education) implicitly negated 
the Turkish history thesis by associating ‘modern, European civilization’ with ancient 
Greek and Latin roots but not with the East and Central Asia. For him ancient 
civilizations such as Central Asia, Sumerian, Egypt, Hind, China, Anatolia and so on, 
were all different in large measures from modern civilization by their essence. On the 
other hand all modern qualities can be found in classical Greek and Rome cultures. See 
Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, Klasik Kültürü Tanımanın ve Dilleri Öğrenmenin Faydaları 
[Benefits of Knowing Classical Culture and Learning Its Languages] (Ankara: TTK, 
1942), especially 35, 39-44.
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in some high schools.202 This was based on the belief that to know these languages would 
make it easier to understand the evolution and true nature of modern civilization and to 
feel as part of this genealogy.
In addition to that, another important activity was the translation of classical and 
modern literary and philosophical works into Turkish. For this purpose, in 1940, as a part 
of the Ministry of Education, Tercüme Bürosu (Bureau of Translation) was set up. Its 
goal was to translate all classics into Turkish in a systematic and “scientific” way and to 
watch and criticize the activities of translation.^o^ To this end, the Bureau began to
Por H. A. Yücel, both languages would serve to fill the void created by the 
removal of Arabic and Persian, which was “one of the manifestations of nationalism” as a 
result of “cultural understanding of the Republic.” See Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar, 
13. To put into practice the teaching of these languages, from the beginning of the 1940- 
1941 educational year. Klasik Kol (Classic Branch) in three high schools was established. 
Then in 1949 it was abolished. See Hasan Cicioglu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde İlk ve 
Ortaöğretim [Primary and Secondary Education in the Republic of Turkey] (Ankara: 
DTCF Yay., 1985), 141.
203 See Sirer, Klasik Kültür, 35 . In Sirer’s view, being the language of a life with 
high scientific and artistic qualities made Greek indispensable to establish a ‘civilized’ 
society for Turkey as in all modern nations. At the same time, Latin came to be the 
carrier of these qualities until then. Ibid., 43-4. In a similar vein, Nurullah Ataç, one of 
the leading figures who had a great influence on the cultural policies of the İnönü period, 
saw both languages as the source and essence of the Western tradition, for “the 
Europeans achieved today’s state of mind, thought and level of civilization by learning 
both languages and making them the basis of their education.” Quoted in Sinanoğlu, 
Hümanizm, 48.
204 See Cevdet Perin, Atatürk Kültür Devrimi [Atatürk’s Cultural Révolution], 4*'’ 
ed. (İstanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 1987), 148; Mustafa Çikar, Hasan-Ali Yücel ve Türk 
Kültür Reformu [Hasan-Ali Yücel and Turkish Cultural Reform] (Ankara: T. İş Bankası, 
1997), 81-84. Beside the Western classics, among the translated works, there were a few 
Islamic and Hindu classics, collected under the serial of Eastern-Islamic Classics. See 
Cumhuriyetin XXL Yıldönümünde Yayınlanan 105 Klasik ve Modern Eserin Listesi [The 
List of 105 Classics and Modern Writings in the Sixteenth Anniversary of the Republic] 
(İstanbul. Maarif Matbaası, 1944), and Cumhuriyetin XXII. Yıldönümünde Yayınlanan 
129 Klasik ve Modern Eserin Listesi [The List of 129 Classics and Modern Writings in 
the Seventeenth Anniversary of the Republic] (İstanbul: MEB, 1945).
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publish a periodical called Tercüme (Translation). In his preface to its first issue, H. A. 
Yücel explained why they had taken up such an activity:
Civilization is a whole! With their different characters, the East, the West, the 
New World or the Old World, each may be respected as one appearing of such a 
whole. The intellectual background of cultural communication has always come 
into existence with the exchanges of language and written works everywhere,
For him, the first sensorial stage of the essence of humanism was the acceptance of 
artistic works which were concrete expressions of human existence; thus, the activity of 
translation would make it possible for the Turks, by opening new gates, to better 
understanding of classical works of In this respect, the expectation was that
translated “masterpieces” would contribute to the development of the culture of the 
Turkish nation.2°'  ^Culture that was provided in accordance with the new humanist utopia 
of the state elite seemed to reflect both a state of mind and a way of life.
4.4.2. Modernizing the Peasants: The Village Institutes and the People’s Rooms
205 Hasan Ali Yücel, “Önsöz” [Preface]. Tercüme Dergisi. 1 (1940).
206 For his views see “Preface” to the serial of world classics.
202 In the preface of the serial of world classics, in 1 August 1941, President İnönü 
wrote, “the translation of masterpieces which had been created in the artistic and 
intellectual fields from the ancient Greece would help those who wish to serve Turkish 
culture. It is natural to benefit from highly developed things to achieve perfected 
literature, fine arts and thoughts. For that reason, I believe that complete works of
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As a second step of the state cultural policy, the modernizing elite now turned 
their face toward the countryside, which until that time had not been touched by the 
civilizing fingers of the state agencies to transmute their life style into more civilized and 
cultured form. In other words, the masses, especially the peasants, whose life had been 
becoming more and more distant from that of the center with the sweeping Kemalist 
reforms, had to adapt to a culture manufactured at the center. Besides, the peasants, in 
fact, lived in very miserable conditions, suffering huge material and economic 
deprivations. Their life was woven into strong kinship and feudal ties and traditional 
patterns were regarded as a threat to the Kemalist model of civilized Turkishmen. This 
new effort came to mean expanding cultural control of the modernizing center to the 
countryside. As indicated above, this new attitude took a significant place in the 1939 
program of the RPP that set new measures to provide cultural education to the peasants 
and improve their life forms.’ To this end, there were two main attempts; firstly, creating 
Köy Enstitüleri (Village Institutes) and spreading village schools, and secondly, 
establishing new People’s Houses and founding Halk Odaları (People’s Rooms). They 
were new agents of integrating the peasants into the center by means of setting up strict 
cultural control.
On the one hand, the Village Institutes^ should be considered in terms of the 
general tendency of the Kemalist project of culture production. According to the main
' Ünal, “C. H. P.,” 389. In this regard, the Program also included the goal to put 
the leisure times of the people to good use with some activities which would enhance 
their knowledge and civilized manners. Ibid. It was expected that the works and activities 
of the People’s Houses and the People’s Rooms would fulfill this goal.
2 For the general organization of the Village Institutes, see Köy Enstitüleri: 1, 9- 
35, and for their characteristics and goals, see 1. Hakkı Tonguç, “Köy Eğitimi ve
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pillars of the Turkish Revolution, as one of the state cultural institutions, the Village 
Institutes would undertake the responsibility of transforming the Turkish society, 
particularly Turkish villages.^
This was because the position of the peasants, who were considered to be 
culturally backward, was depicted as a deficit in the path of Westernization.'· The 
problem could only be solved through the development of the peasants, which meant that 
their life conditions would come close relatively to that of the civilized nations in terms 
of social, cultural and economic sense. ^  However, this civilizing process had to be 
maintained locally, that is, “the peasants would be modernized in their resident places, in 
their villages.”  ^What was important here was that the position of the peasants portrayed 
as “untamed” was needed for the efforts to make them “cultured,” although in the earlier
Öğretiminin Amaçlan” [The Goals of Village education and Instruction], in Köy 
Enstitüleri: 2 [The Village Institutes, 2] (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1944), 4S68.
3 See Fay Kirby, Türkiye’de Köy Enstitüleri [The Village Institutes in Turkey] 
(Ankara: İmece, 1962), 7.
'· When this regulation came on the agenda, over the 80 percent of the people 
lived in the villages and village-like small towns. Among them, only 10 percent were 
literate. This “underdeveloped” position of the rural hinterland was regarded as the basic 
reason to put into practice the project of rural transformation for integrating the peasants 
into the homogenous national whole. For this and the other detailed statistics on village 
life, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 6 , Vol. 10, S. Sayısı: 98, and also, see the speech of 
Hasan Ali Yücel, ibid., 77-78.
5 On the issue for the views of İnönü, H. A. Yücel and Ali Suha Delilbaş (the 
Deputy of Kütahya), see ibid., 76-79.
 ^ This was stated by Kazım Nami Duru, (the Deputy of Manisa). See ibid., 75. 
The education of “the peasants by the peasants” was aimed in a way that the Village 
Institutes would create an elite among the peasants. See M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “The 
Village Institutes Experience in Turkey.” Biritish Journal o f Middle East Studies. 25/1 
(1998), 58-59.
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phases of the Republican regime they were sometimes seen as the reservoir of national 
prided
The creation of the Village Institutes, in which Ismail Hakkı Tonguç- the leading 
pedagogue and one of the founding fathers of the Institutes - had a special role, was the 
first main step in the above mobilization. According to the Law on the Village Institutes, 
their goal was to train the village youths as primary-school teachers for village schools, 
who would give normal education to children and also provide some cultural and 
practical information to peasants, such as on agriculture and modes of behavior.*  But, for 
our purpose, the most important side of the Law was Article 10 which determined the 
role of village teacher not only as a mere teacher, but also a pedagogue who was 
responsible for the education of all residents in villages. According to the B paragraph of 
the Article, the mission of a village teacher was “to raise the national culture of the 
peasants, to train and educate them in accordance with the requirements and conditions of 
the age from the point of social life; to take necessary measures to spread and strengthen 
the positive values of village culture; to organize and direct ceremonies at the times of 
national festivals, school openings and local festivals, taking into account local songs and 
dances; to make them benefit from radios.” Also, the other five subsections of the 
paragraph determined his role as organizer in the economic and social life of the village.
For this ambivalence, see Kandiyoti, “Gendering,” 122-123.
* As a preliminary stage, a Law (no. 3704) issued on 7 July 1939, brought the 
regulation on Köy Eğitmen Kursları (Village Instructor Courses) and Köy Öğretmen 
Okulları (Village Teacher Schools). After a one year trial, with a Law (no. 3803) issued 
on 17 April, 1940, the Village Teacher Schools were called Köy Enstitüleri (Village 
Institutes). For the full text of the Law on Village Institutes, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 
D. 6 , Vol. 10, 82-92 and S. Sayısı: 98. In 1942, Hasanoğlan High Village Institute was 
opened.
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Article 11 of the Law describes the functions and responsibilities of peasants: they were 
charged with the obligation to help and work together with teachers while performing 
their functions determined in the previous article. If they did not do so, they would be 
punished.9 The question of why this role was given to village teachers can find its clear 
expression in the Law on Organizing Village Schools and Institutes:
If the peasants were not involved in the activities of schools, it would be 
impossible to spread the positive values of village culture; if they were not raised 
to the level of performing several duties by arousing their national consciousness, 
the activities of schools would not have any effect on the peasants. In order to 
rescue the villages from their unchanging and stagnant position and make them 
alive and active, the task of educating the adults of villages like students and join 
their life with the schools was given to village instructors and teachers.'o
Here, teachers as agents of the state in the country were assigned a “role of 
prophet/leader.”" This mission appeared to be the basis of the state discourse that from 
the beginning gave teachers a leading role in constructing a new nation. So, as the 
representatives of power, they became the privileged class of the Republic. Now, they, 
“missioners of the Republic,”'^  had a new task of bringing civilization to the villages 
which were believed to have been suffocated by the archaic and traditional customs. In 
this regard, H. A. Yücel, during the discussions on the Law in the Parliament, said: “A
9 In a similar way, according to Article 25, peasants were obliged to work in the 
construction of village and district schools. For the relevant articles of the Law on 
Organizing Village Schools and Institutes {Köy Okullarım ve Enstitülerini 
Teşkilatlandırma Kanunu) (issued in 8  May 1942), see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 6 , Vol. 
26, S. Sayısı: 150, 16-17 and 23.
>0 Ibid., 2-3.
" This expression belongs to Emin Sazak (deputy of Eskişehir), see ibid., 62.
'2 This expression belongs to Ismail Hakkı Kılıçoğlu. Ibid., 77.
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village teacher is one who is the spreader, guard and instructor of the Republic and the 
Revolution. By means of these components, it will be possible to bring our secret values 
to our people living into remote villages.”’^  For Tonguç such teachers were being trained 
in the Institutes, for “the student of the Institutes like and believe the truth and the true 
qualities. They try to convince others to believe in them and disseminate these 
qualities.”''* Here what was portrayed as “the civilizing mission of the village teacher” 
was, in the words of Kandiyoti, “the struggle of science and enlightenment against 
ignorance and obscurantism.”*^ At the heart of this struggle, it was their duty to make the 
peasants imagine themselves as part of the organic whole through putting in order and 
teaching “the right way” to them. To this end, all particularistic ethnic and linguistic 
affiliations would have to be sacrificed.'^
That was why the basis of the process of establishing political and cultural control 
over the rural hinterland through civilizing was the main part of the formation of a
'3 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 6 , Vol. 26, 56. In the views of the rulers who 
prepared the Law, because they were equipped with all modem knowledge on the life of 
the ordinary people, there would not be any resistance to village teachers and so would be 
easily welcomed. Ibid., 70.
*'· Tonguç, “Köy Eğitim,” 55.
'5 Kandiyoti, “Gendering,” 122.
During the discussions on the Law at the Assembly, this tendency was 
emphasized as the core of the project. For example, on the issue, Feridun Fikri, deputy of 
Bingöl, said that “since teachers became busy with the peasants, from the social, cultural 
and especially linguistic point of view, they have to rectify the language of the peasants, 
and so they have to indoctrinate them with all ideals of our fatherland, our nationality and 
our solidarity wherever they go. This should be taken into consideration especially for the 
eastern provinces of Turkey more than other places.” TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 6 , Vol. 
10, 74-75.
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homogenous national culture.’’ It is in this regard that, like other cultural institutions of 
the Republic, the Village Institutes were charged with aiding the process of melting the 
heterogeneous structure of the society into a homogenous culture and constructing a 
national identity.'* At this point, it is worth-mentioning that during the discussions on the 
Law at the Assembly the basic critique came from Kazım Karabekir (the president of the 
Assembly). His point was that if the training of teachers were accomplished within the 
borders of the rural areas, there would exist two totally different cultures in the cities and 
villages because of completely different existing social and cultural conditions in both 
areas and the lack of interaction among them. His critiques were rejected loudly by Hasan 
Ali Yücel, K. N. Duru, Emin Sazak and Feridun Fikri. According to their assertions, 
culture was something that was constructed through applying a fixed program; that was 
why, after using similar techniques, instructing similar courses in the village schools and 
showing a similar mode of behavior to the peasants, it would not be possible for two 
different cultures in the cities and villages to come into being.Accordingly, the cultural 
mission of the Village Institutes was to make the peasants imagine themselves as citizens 
belonging to the culture of the new Turks; the citizen, as H. A. Yücel described, would be 
“well-informed, healthy, devoted to his country, and productive. ” 20 In short, the Village 
Institutes were planned as new agents of the process of culture production to bring the 
Republican ideals to the rural hinterland. In the process of rural transformation, they
'2  See Yeğen, Devlet, 200.
'* For the Institutes’ task of national identification of the peasants, see 
Karaömerlioğlu, “The Village Institutes,” 64.
For the discussions, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 6 , Vol. 10, 83-86.
20 Ibid., 79.
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would play their attributed role by promoting new social values, creating a sense of 
belonging, and reviving economic life. To put it in other words, in the civilizing and 
modernizing process from above, they seemed to be the agents to monitor and control the 
countryside by the modernist center.2 '
As mentioned above, the civilizing mission, of transforming the masses into more 
civilized and cultured form, was also attributed to the People’s Houses. Until 1938, they 
were established only in the cities and towns; at the end of 1938, the number of the 
People’s Houses had reached 209.^  ^ Parallel to the new policy of bringing the 
revolutionary ideals to the masses of people, especially the peasants, there emerged the 
need for new People’s Houses, and, resultantly, in 1939, 158 new Houses were opened in 
the countryside - small towns and some villages near urban areas.^ 3 Now, the Houses 
were on duty to work to increase the cultural and social level of all strata of the nation 
and society. The activities of the Houses were expanded to focus mainly on cultural 
education through stressing music, fine arts and some local artistic manifestations, while 
the ultimate aim, which was to diffuse “civilized” manners among the peasants through
2‘ During his reign (1938-1946), İnönü’s support kept the Village Institutes in 
existence. With the transition to the multi-party period, which provided a suitable place 
for politically discontent to raise their voices, he was not strong enough to maintain his 
political and favored support. This caused the weakening of its support base because of 
its nature of reform from above which prevented it from taking root among the people. 
See İlhan Başgöz, Türkiye’nin Eğitim Çıkmazı ve Atatürk [Turkey’s Education Dilemma 
and Atatürk] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1995), 223. In fact this paved the way for 
the emergence of an opposition to them and brought about their end. Finally, in 1949 they 
were converted into the Teacher Schools.
22 “Halkevleri’nin Yedinci,” 82. In 1944, the numbers of the People’s Houses 
were over 400. See Tahsin Banguoğlu, “Halkevleri: Milli Kültür Ocakları” [The People’s 
Houses: The Hearths for National Culture], Ulus, 20 February 1944, 2.
23 Ibid., 82.
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making them internalize the positive views and values of the Republic, remained 
similar.24
The program also anticipated expanding the organization of the People’s Houses 
toward the villages by establishing the People’s Rooms where similar activities would be 
made according to their scope. Thus, in 1940, the People’s Rooms were founded to 
support the People’s Houses and to reach small towns and villages in order to disseminate 
and diffuse the Republican ideals.^s The reason behind the establishment of the People’s 
Rooms was to expand the assumed social and cultural control of the new regime toward 
the villages; they would be its “managing” and “monitoring” agents in the villages. Like 
the Houses, the Rooms had organic ties with the RPP that provided technical support and 
materials.26 In the first year, 141 People’s Rooms were opened. With the devotion of the 
RPP to the establishment of the Rooms rather than the Houses, in 1945 there were 2,688 
compared with just 365 in 1944; by 1946 this munber had reached 4068, and by 1949, 
4,306.22 As in the People’s Houses, the peasants would come together in the People’s
24 For this reorientation see Karpat, “The People’s,” 62; Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, 
Halkın Evi (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950). For the activities of the Houses in this vein, 
see “Halkevlerimizin Son Yil İçindeki Çalışmalarına Bir Bakış” [A General Outlook to 
the Activities of the People’s Houses in the Final Year], Ulus, 20 February 1944, 3.
25 For the decision approved in 1939 by the RPP’s Council, CHF Halkevleri 
Çalışma Talimatnamesi [The Working Program of the RPP’s the People’s Houses] 
(Ankara, 1940); K. Ünal, “Halkodaları” [The People’s Rooms]. Ülkü. 79 (September 
1939), 13-15.
26 The chairman of a People’s Room and members of the managing committee 
had to be the members of the RPP. All Rooms would be under the control of the party’s 
secretariat in the district. Ibid.
22 ]7inci Yıldönümünde Halkevleri ve Halkodaları [the People’s Houses and the 
People’s Rooms in the Seventeenth Anniversary] (Ankara, 1949), 8 .
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Rooms for social meetings and functions to leam the civilized forms. The basic 
difference between the People’s Houses and the People’s Rooms was that the People’s 
Rooms did not have distinct branches of work which carry on the social and cultural 
activities, but their activities were mostly concentrated on organizing meetings on several 
issues. In each People’s Room there had to be a reading room containing books directly 
approved and sent by the RPP, which functioned as a classroom of the school. However, 
most of the People’s Rooms did not work as effectively as the People’s Houses did, 
because of the lack of peasant interest, local enterprise and educated professionals who 
maintained the activities in the Rooms.^^ Both institutions, as cultural modernizing agents 
of the RPP, were seen as a modem need for cities, towns and small towns, and even 
villages.
During the İnönü period, the main emphasis in the state discourse was placed on 
diffusing the new cultural tastes, codes and images among the masses. In that, the 
People’s Houses and People’s Rooms appeared to be the basic cultural institutions, which 
fulfilled this function. In the views of the National Chief, İnönü, they were indispensable 
for the cultural and social education of the society. ^ 9 They were strongly tied to the ideal 
of creating a new and high national culture. For Tahsin Banguoğlu, one of tie managers
28 Karpat, “The People’s,” 63; Houminer, “The People’s,” 111. In the villages, in 
spite of the greater expectation, they could have been as successful as the People’s 
Houses had been in the towns. For example, there did not exist any change in the status 
of women in the villages, whereas they took part in the social life of the towns. There, 
“veils are still common, and there is no such thing as a village function or dance in the 
‘People’s Houses’ at which women and girls attend.” M. Philips Price, A History of 
Turkey: From Empire to Republic (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1956), 188.
29 On his views see Sabaheddin Sönmez, “Halkevleri Bayramımız” [The People’s 
Houses Festives], Ulus, 20 February 1944. For his earlier claims, see “Milli Şeften 
Halkevleri’ne Direktifler” [National Chiefs Orders on the People’s Houses]. Ülkü. IS 
(Mayıs 1939), 195-196.
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of the People’s Houses, this would be “real” national culture, and not display a 
cosmopolitan character and such a strange taste and life style. It would be “a high 
people’s culture, its each stratum created from a similar essence ... this is the clear 
expression of our populism .T hus, every layer of the society shared this unique culture 
which was being created. This was the process of “making the people know, understand, 
and recognize what they want, and speak; that is, making the mass a cultured element. ”3> 
Consequently, maintained by state institutions, the process was in direct relation to the 
elimination of the huge cultural gap between the symbolic universe of the Anatolian 
masses and that of the modernizing elite, in favor of the latter.
All in all, the Kemalist project of modernization from the beginning accompanied a 
process of culture production. The state as the sole initiator of the project was the main 
active agent in the process. This was done through employing the new techniques of 
power including the state instruments’ efforts to revolutionize the society from above. 
Kemalist nationalism lied at the center of this new form of politics. It was very akin to 
Tilly’s top-down format of nationalism. What is significant here is that it reflected the 
direction of the process of the official modernist program of civilization and culture 
during the formative decades of the Republic. Here, the aim was to transform the society 
by transmuting all traditional structures into a “developed” and “civilized” whole; that is, 
society came to be an object of targeting to construct a “better” future. It was this process 
through which the state discourse on culture was produced.
30 Banguoglu, “Halkevleri:.”
3' §ukrii Kaya, “Halkevleri’nin,” 5.
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The cultural institutions of the Republic, such as the THS, the TLS, the People’s 
Houses and Rooms and Village Institutes, came to the fore as both producers and carriers 
of the official discourse on “culture”. These disciplinary institutions became the basic 
agents for promoting and imposing a new way life, or new cultural format. The Kemalist 
conception of “way of life”, including the prescriptions of how people think, perceive life 
and act, was rather close to the concept of “mentality.” This mentality was seen in terms 
of collective notions that the civilizing rulers strove to make part of everyday practice.
Culture as an idea and discourse seemed to be the civilizing rulers’ “science”; it 
manifested the construction of an orderly society and both of “civilized” and 
“nationalized” citizens. So the state discourse on culture did not accept the equal value of 
all forms of life and then assumed a strict hierarchy among them. As a basis of the 
Kemalist nation-building, it coincided with the de-legitimization of the past and tradition. 
The denial of the “other” came with targeting all forms of difference and transforming 
them into sameness. It was the basis of national identification.
The official concept of culture differentiates to a greater extent from that of 
Romanticism, because that culture was not defined within the circle of Geist historically 
and contextually formed throughout centuries. Culture was not taken as the basis of a 
critique of civilization. What was most emphasized around the concept of culture was the 
images of human self-cultivation and cultivation of society, which lie at the center of the 
Kemalist civilizing process from above. As in the Enlightenist-Jacobin model, the 
Kemalist one appeared to be largely matched with the idea of civilization.
Culture in the Kemalist regime was the name of two imagined communities: First, 
it came to determine the boundaries of national community and manifested its
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membership status by playing a major role in the construction of a citizen identity. 
Secondly, it reflected the will to be part of a modem civilization representing the sole 
legitimate international community of “civilized” nations. To achieve this imagination 
the new Turkish culture strove to be created according to their standards. At that point, 
the main question comes into scene on the relation between two communities from the 
perspective of “Turkish” culture: to what extent would Turkish culture be differentiated 
from the cultures of Western civilization? Would it serve to express a unique way? These 
questions become somewhat settled when they are considered in terms of history and 
language, both of which in nationalist narratives serve to provide the suitable ground for 
the idea of authenticity. Both shed light on the life of two communities in history. The 
last two chapters are about this investigation.
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CHAPTER V
THE TURKISH HISTORY SOCIETY AND CREATING A
SUITABLE PAST FOR A NEW CULTURE
Turkish reformism was heavily influenced by the two dominant trends in the nineteenth century European 
thought: positivism and historicism. The notion of history as a progression toward more rational, more 
enlightened societies and of the inevitability of the triumph of progress was deeply entrenched in the minds 
of the reformers. They viewed their task in terms of ushering in the new, which was by its very succession 
better than the old. Even if this superiority was not immediately recognized, in time it would be through the 
state’s steadfast insistence on upholding the new and suppressing revivalist tendencies. The ideological 
fervor of nationalism did effect a heightened interest in history but a highly selective interest that focused 
only on those aspects of Turkish history thought to prove to the Turkish people and the rest of the world 
that Turkey could be a civilized nation because it was civilized. ‘
The state discourse on “culture” during the formative years of the Republic was 
greatly produced and re-produced through the works and activities of the official cultural 
institutions. In the process of the production, the Turkish History Society, THS {Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, TTK), together with the Turkish Language Society, was in the most 
important place among them. As discussed in the previous chapter, these institutions as 
the main instruments of the Kemalist civilizing process from above came to the fore to be 
the agents of ordering and culturing the society. What was promoted with the help of
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these institutions was a new way of life which went hand in hand with the construction of 
a national culture and identity. Aiding the projection of new forms of life, the Republican 
cultural institutions became very influential in determining the status of ordinary people 
as citizens of the state.
Any analysis of the formation of Kemalist historicism^ -  the Kemalists’ efforts to 
find out historical variability for its system of thoughts and deeds - has a wider 
implication for understanding the boundaries of the new Turkish culture, projected as a 
“modern” mentality and “civilized” way of life during the early Republican period. It is 
because all-historical claims of Kemalism were necessarily significant parts of the 
process of culture production around the ideals of the new nation-state. As one of the 
leading cultural institutions, the THS had an important place in the process. The 
following pages will document and explain its place in the process of providing a 
historical background to a new Turkish culture. In order to achieve this aim, the 
formative years of the Turkish History Thesis - the early years of the 1930s -  will be 
analyzed primarily through focusing on the role of Mustafa Kemal, the history textbooks 
and the First Turkish History Congress (1932). The later process will be clarified around 
the analysis of the role of archeology and anthropology, and the place of civilization and 
culture in the official history thesis. The main argument here is that the THS was the 
main figure in the formation of the official historical thesis and the Turkish historical 
identity, and in this way contributed to the efforts to create a new cultural content by
' Cemal Kafadar, “The Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life”, 
in The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in the Ottoman Empire, ed. 
Raymond Lifchez (Berkley: University of California Press, 1992), 315-316.
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bringing out the “forgotten” Turkish past through a national historiography. Also it is 
argued that it did all these by tracing the genealogy of the West, that is, forming an 
ahistorical genealogy of the Turks linked with the West.
5.1. Problematizing the Turkish History Thesis and the Way to the Turkish History 
Society
The writing of a nationalist history, the basis of the construction of a national 
identity, comes with the act of “commemoration” and “forgetting”.^  At this juncture, each 
nationalist project invents and edits its own past through remembering “glorified” events 
and heroic figures, and at the same time forgetting many “shameful” occasions in the 
past. For example, as Anderson puts it, in writing “the nation’s biography... these violent 
deaths [exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and 
holocausts] must be remembered/forgotten as ‘our own’.”'’ It is the invention of a suitable 
history for a people without a “national” history.^ This makes it possible for this people to 
imagine themselves as a community deep-rooted in history.
 ^ For historicism, see William Outhwaite, “Historicism,” in The Blackwell 
Dictionary o f Twentieth-Century Social Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 261-262.
 ^ See Benedict Anderson, “Memory and Forgetting,” in Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, revised ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 
187-206. For commemoration and its relation with identity, see John R. Gillis, “Memory 
and Identity: The History of a Relationship,” in Commemorations: The Politics o f 
National Identity, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3- 
24; and on the relationship of history with the act of remembrance and forgetting, see 
David Lowenthal, “Identity, Heritage, and History,” ibid., especially 50-51.
Ibid., 206.
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The Kemalist project followed such course. It was even very radical in nature to 
construct a new history by a complete break with the inherited near past (the Islamic- 
Ottoman heritage). It came to be primarily a matter of communal national identity around 
a common culture which required both remembering and forgetting.^ Thus the Kemalist 
history thesis was formed to a greater extent through the political project.^ Parallel with 
the creation of new values for the younger generations of the Republic, the civilizing 
rulers strove to invent a new history to “compensate for the real ones that were being 
abandoned.”* As “an expression of collective self-consciousness” Kemalist 
historiography, or history-writing, was affected by “changing concepts of group identity”
 ^See Eugen Weber, “What Rough Beast?” Critical Review. 10/2 (1996), 289; Eric 
Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).
® The relation between hi story-writing and the formation of an identity for citizens 
was well portrayed in the 1935 program of the RPP. Article 41 made it clear in the 
following way; “Our party lays an extraordinary importance upon citizens knowing our 
great history. This leaning is the sacred essence that nourishes the indestructible 
resistance of the Turks against all currents that may prejudice the national existence, his 
capacity an power, and his sentiments of self-confidence.” See “Program of the People’s 
Party of the Republic,” quoted as Appendix E in Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of 
Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation (Philadelphia; The American 
Academy of Political And Social Science, 1939), 313.
’ I draw here on the perspectives of Mesut Yeğen who situates the formation of 
the Turkish History Thesis in the historical and political context of a definite political 
project leading to the construction of Turkish national identity. In that sense he criticizes 
Büşra Ersanli-Behar who relates the emergence of the Thesis mainly to the works of 
historians, anthropologists and archeologists, of the period, with a political, rather than 
scientific, mission. See Mesut Yeğen, “Türk Tarih Tezi Bir “Kaza” An’ı mıdır?” [Was 
the Turkish History Thesis an Accident?]. Mürekkep. 6  (1996), 23. For the political 
mission of historians, see Büşra Ersanli Behar, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye ’de “Resmi 
Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu [Power and History; The Formation of the “Official History” 
Thesis in Turkey] (Istanbul; Afa, 1996), 13.
* Kevin Robins, “Interrupting Identities; Turkey/Europe,” in Questions o f Cultural 
Identity, eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London; Sage Publications, 1996), 70.
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through the reforms and at the same time “in turn affects those concepts.”  ^To use another 
expression, if it is thought in terms of the civilizing project of the Republic, it implies that 
history, regarded as being “distorted” at home and “misrepresented” abroad, was 
rewritten to supplant the new Turkish culture, emphasizing its historical peculiarity even 
by creating myths on the role of the Turks in history. Here, the expectation was that the 
rewriting would provide the basis of a common language, collective consciousness and 
self-respect among the Turks,**’ considered in terms of the peculiarity of the historically 
constituted cultural production. It was in this regard that history was used, more than 
anything else, as, in the words of Toby Miller, “a technique of cultural policy, a 
technique that sees historians acting as referees in, for example, discussions over 
memorials in museums, heritage sites, and historical mini-series.”** In fact, it was one 
result of the need to legitimize the centralized mechanism of a nation-state.
The process of the emergence of Kemalist historiography, which was eventually 
constructed within the frame of the culture formation, took part in a limited time period: 
especially the early 1930s. This process reflected what Copeaux calls a “coup d’Etat in 
history.” *^  It is for this reason that this chapter focuses chiefly on the developments of the
 ^ Bernard Lewis, “History-writing and National Revival in Turkey.” Middle 
Eastern Affairs. (June-July 1953), 218.
One of the basic aims of the Kemalist hi story-writing was to create a self- 
confidence and self-respect among Turkish citizens. See F. Öymen, “Atatürk.” Belleten. 
111/10(1939), 282-283.
” Toby Miller, The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and Postmodern 
Subject (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 32.
227
period from 1930 to 1933, and the First Turkish History Congress (1932), where the 
Turkish History Thesis was declared and shaped, more than the second (1937) and the 
third (1942) one.’^  The rising interest of the state in history writing during the early 1930s 
emerged just in a political context where, as discussed in Chapter HI, the state took on a 
new ideological orientation. The state apparatuses tried to monopolize totally the cultural 
affairs in every sphere of life, that is, the “legitimate use of culture”. This resulted in the 
closing of civil societal elements, which maintained to some extent a cultural tradition 
from the time of the Young Turks. Instead, some new centralized institutions were 
created. In this way, the knowing statesmen of the Republic attempted to collect all 
instruments of power in their hands to interpret to the new generations the “glorified,” 
“mythicized” traditions of their ancestors, that is, to direct the process of 
remembering/forgetting. At the heart of this process lay the Turkish History Thesis. It 
seems necessary here to give its general outline. As Re§id Galip, one of the leading 
figures of the THS, summarized it, there were nine principles of the thesis;
1 -  The cradle of the human race is Central Asia, the homeland of the Turks. 2  -  
the earliest civilization of the world was founded there by the Turkish race that 
was the original inhabitant of Central Asia. 3 -  In the anthropological
See Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih 
Tezinden Türk-lslam Tezine [From the Turkish History Thesis to Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis in History Textbooks (1931-1993)] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayi, 1998).
The seeds, of this process were found in 1928 when he encouraged Afet İnan to 
undertake the rewriting of Turkish history to show the Turks were not “secondary human 
beings.” In 1928, she reported; “Showing Mustafa Kemal a book in French which said 
that the Turks belonged to the yellow race and were considered by Europeans a 
“secondary human type”, I asked him: Is this true? Atatürk answers; No, that is 
impossible; we should investigate this. Start working.” See Afet İnan, “Atatürk and Tarih 
Tezi.” Belleten. III/IO (1939), 244. in 1929, Mustafa Kemal together with Afet İnan 
initiated a feverish work by reading and translating history books into Turkish. It was in 
this process that the THS began slowly taking shape.
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classification of races, the Turkish race was represented by brachycephalic - 
alphian one. 4 -  The great migrations have always been from east to west, not 
west to east. 5 -  The drought events in different times of Central Asia were the 
most significant factors compelling the Turks to migrate to various places of the 
world, where they founded all ancient civilizations. 6  -  The Turkish language is 
the mother of all tongues. 7 - As in all ancient civilizations, the creators of the so- 
called Islamic civilization, were also the Turks. 8 -  Anatolia has been a Turkish 
homeland since prehistoric times; the oldest history of Turks can be traced in 
Anatolia as well as in Central Asia. 9 -  In the last few centuries, because of 
external causes, the Turks lost their leading position in directing the course of 
world civilization. But, today, these degrading causes are being removed with the 
reforms, and so the Turkish nation is looking forward to undertake again its role 
in bringing mankind to a higher grade of civilization.’"’
This thesis as stated above manifested the attempts to construct a collective identity 
substituting for the dominant Islamic and traditional collective consciousness.
It was in the process of the thesis production that the THS , as one of the new 
institutions, played a leading role. In 1931, in order to study Turkish history more 
“scientifically” and “professionally,” the THS was set up as a “semi-autonomous” 
institution, which was firstly organized in 1930 as a special committee. But, its 
foundations were laid deep in the development of modern Turkish historiography in the 
late Ottoman period. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it was formed under the 
effect of European Orientalism and Turcology which firstly imagined the figure of the 
Turk in history as a historical, ethnic and linguistic identity.’^  Enthusiastically embracing 
the modern rational principles of European historiography, the new elite group became
''' Reşit Galip, “Türk Tarih Tezi ve Yabancı Tezler” [Turkish History Thesis and 
Foreign Theses]. Ülkü. 9(1933), 142-143.
For further information on the effect of orientalism and Turclogy, see Lewis, 
“History-writing,” 220-221; Ziya Gökalp, The Principles o f Turkism, trans. Robert 
Devereux (Leiden; E. J. Brill, 1968), 1-3.
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deeply interested in this new discipline of Turcology and began to produce new works. 
Hence, corresponding with the rise of Turkish nationalism during the reign of 
Abdiilhamid II, there were discussions in the newspapers on Turkish history before the 
Turks’ conversion.*^ In the process, all the Ottoman cultural items began to be gradually 
substituted by ancient Turkish heroes and myths. This Turkification was very apparent 
especially in the field of history throughout the Second Meşrutiyet. Thus, although the 
Turkish conception of nation had no affinity to the state, overall references in Turkish 
nationalism of the period aroused interest in the pre-Islamic past and culture of the 
Turkish people.**
With the change of the regime, from the first years of the 1920s, the Republican 
governments began to institute successively Turkist historical ideals as their official view 
of history. This may be clearly seen in school textbooks of the period in which the 
historical greatness of the Turks in history was presented. For example. Yurt Bilgisi
One of the first major work on Turkish history from a nationalist point of view 
was of Süleyman Paşa’s (served as Director of Military Schools and of the Military 
Academy from 1877-1877) Tarih-i Alem (History of the World) published in 1876. It was 
on the prehistoric Turks and for the first time used the Turkish instead of the Ottoman 
language and civilization. See Kerim K. Key, An Outline o f Modem Turkish 
Historiography (Istanbul, 1954), 3.
” In this period, much of the stress was on their service to humankind to whom 
they had transmitted civilization See David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 
1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 31-32 and 36.
This period accompanied the first history organization in its modern sense 
founded in 1909, called Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni (The Ottoman Historical 
Commission), with Abdurrahman Şeref as its first president. Its aim was to write a new 
Ottoman history with a broader perspective. The commission published a journal, Tarih-i 
Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası, which appeared until the end of the twenties, and in 1924, 
its name was changed to Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası when the society was renamed 
as Türk Tarih Encümeni.
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(Knowledge of the Home) written by Mithat Sadullah for use in primary schools was füll 
of new historical “facts” on Turkish presence in history:
Turks are the oldest independent nation in history... While the other nations were 
in a state of near barbarism, the Turks had a strong government and good laws. 
The Turks who lived in Central Asia some thousand years ago have left many 
traces of their civilization... Turks have formed great and independent states since 
very old times and from time to time have taken many nations under their
domination 19
This was also the tone of Türkiye Tarihi (Histoiy of Turkey) by Hamid Muhsin used 
between 1924 and 1929 in the intermediary schools, in which much emphasis was laid on 
Turkish racial characteristics as a nation before coming under the domination of Islam.
5.1.1. Mustafa KemaTs Interest and Institutionalization in History
The need for a new institution, during the last years of the twenties, was on the 
agenda with the rising interest of Mustafa Kemal in rewriting Turkish history. For this 
purpose, in 1930, the Turkish History Research Committee (Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti) 
was instituted as a part of the Turkish Hearths, while holding the Vlth congress of the 
Turkish Hearths in Ankara in April 1930. Its main task was to “study and investigate 
Turkish history and civilization in a scientific way.” *^ It was composed of sixteen
Henry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and 
Religious Development (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (original publication, 1935), 
113-114.
See Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and 
the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 104.
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members. The founding members of the Committee came to the fore much more with 
their political identity as politicians than his torians.I t  was because many of the 
historians who undertook the task of hi story-writing were indeed politicians and political 
f ig u r e s .T h e  most significant end-product of their works and efforts was the 
politicization and, in parallel, “ideologization” '^* of history which was stimulated for the 
sake of the search for a new cultural ground. Indeed, parallel to the general trend that all 
existing political and civil societal organizations came under the control of the RPP, the 
Committee and later the Society (founded in place of the Committee) worked as a 
cultural branch of the RPP and functioned to invent a “mythical past” in order to provide 
a legitimate, secure ground for political authority throughout the Single-Party Period.
Afet İnan, Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler Belgeler [Mémoires and 
Documents on Atatürk] (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981), 198.
Mehmed Tevfık (Bıyıklıoğlu), the Head of the Committee, was the Secretary- 
General of the Presidency; there were two assistant presidents, Yusuf Akçura and Samih 
Rifat, who were members of parliament; Dr. Reşit Galip, the Secretary General of the 
Committee, was also a member of parliament. Other twelve founder-members -Afet 
(İnan), Vasıf (Çınar), Halil Ethem (Eldem), Yusuf Ziya (Özer), Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), 
Reşit Safvet (Atabinen), Meşaros, İsmail Hakkı (Uzunçarşılı), Ragıp Hulusi (Özden), 
Mükrimin Halil (Yinanç), Zakir Kadiri (Ugan) and Hamit Zübeyir (Koşay)- were either 
members of parliament or members of the RPP. For the founders of the Committee, see 
Uluğ İğdemir, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish History Society in 
the 50‘ Anniversary of the Republic] (Ankara; TTK, 1973), 4-5. Afterwards, instead of 
Meşaros and Zeki Kadiri, Hasan Cemil (Çambel) and Şemsettin (Günaltay) were 
accepted as new members. See Mete Tunçay, T C. ’ nde Тек Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 
(1923-30) [The Establishment of the Single Party Regime in T. R.] (İstanbul; Cem 
Yayınevi, 1992), 299.
This was a continuation of the pattern of the CUP period, “when most historians 
were political figures working for nationalism in the form of Turkism -for example 
Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Göklap, Fuad Köprülü, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Some, like Akçura, 
lived through to the new thesis.” Poulton, Top Hat, 103.
For the ideologization of history in the early Republican period, see Copeaux,
Tarih, 31.
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In the formation of the Committee, of all the fundamental parts of the process of 
creating a new past, or a “coup d’Etat in history,” the most striking one was the role of 
Mustafa Kemal. In fact, from the beginning, he took a keen interest in history. His 
interest was affirmed with his own library which included a lot of history books. Among 
the books he attached the greatest value were ones evaluated the Turks in very positive 
terms, such as, H. G. Wells’ Outline o f World History^^, Léon Cahun’s Introduction a 
r histoire de l ’Asie, Eugène Pittard’s Les Races et l ’historié, which were extensively 
made use of in forming the “Turkish History Thesis.” *^’ Bounding the origin of the Turks 
to the West, these books made it possible for him to combine the history of the Turks to 
that of the civilized nations of Europe.
He was very active in all stages of the process of a coup d’Etat in history. Indeed, 
as a “sole initiator of the activity of recreating national history,”^^  he himself formulated 
the official historical course. It was the very tone of all writings of the period that, as in
H. G. Wells and his book had a fundamental effect in the formation of his 
historical perspective. After reading its French translation, the book became a book of 
revelation to Mustafa Kemal. He had it in Turkish in 1929 and one year later in a similar 
line Türk Tarihinin Anahatlari (an Outline of Turkish History) appeared. “Wells became 
his principal hero ... He was a great historian and prophet ... He opened Kemal to a new 
view of history.” Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth o f a Nation (Nicosia: K. Rustem 
and Brother, 1981), 468.
In addition to these books, Mustafa Kemal’s views about prehistory was to a 
greater extent influenced by Georges Passion’s book entitled Les Ayens putting forward 
the representatives of “cimotric brachycephalic” race as Pamirians, Turks, Tajiks, 
Caucasians, Armenians and Anatolians. See Ahmet Cevat Emre, Atatürk’ün İnkılap 
Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi [Atatürk’s Revolutionary Goal and History Thesis] (Istanbul; Ekin 
Basımevi, 1956), 59.
The expression belongs to Köprülüzade Fuad Bey. See Birinci Türk Tarih 
Kongresi: Konferanslar Münakaşalar Zabıtları [The First Turkish History Congress: 
Minutes of Papers and Discussions] (Ankara: T. C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933), 47.
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“well-working” reforms, the Turkish History Society was an outcome of “Ghazi’s great 
ability”. For example, for Yusuf Akçura, the emergence of the Society was explicated 
only in this way; “In a way of serving our national goal, he strove to find out himself 
possible ways to teach history, which had a pivotal function in national education and 
socialization, to all children of the nation.” *^ In the same manner, Mustafa Kemal himself 
decided the Committee’s principal duty as doing research on and writing an Outline of 
Turkish History and the Turks’ services to civilization.^^ It was evident that he checked 
all writings of the Committee members on its first book entitled an Outline of Turkish 
History and made corrections on it.^ ° All these illustrated his greatest interest in the 
activities of the Committee and later Society.^'
In the Congress of the Turkish Hearths, once again Mustafa Kemal urged Afet 
İnan to undertake the revolution in history. Thus, a speech of Afet Hamm delivered at the 
Vlth congress of the Turkish Hearths, whose content was determined by Mustafa Kemal, 
had a major place as a first step in founding the Committee. It was about the idea of the 
re-writing of Turkish history and, particularly, about the so-called “history thesis.” It
Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, “Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi” [First Turkish History 
Congress]. Ülkü. 3 (1933), pp???26.
29 Ibid., 243.
For his readings and corrections, see Belleten. III/IO (1939), Lev. LXXXII - 
Lev. XCI. He named Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti. See ibid.. Lev. LXXXI. And also, he 
named the journal of the THS as “Belleten” beginning its publication in 1937. See Uluğ 
İğdemir, “Atatürk ve Belleten” [Atatürk and Belleten]. Belleten. III/IO (1939), 355-356.
This interest remained until his death in 1938. For example, even when he was 
in his sickbed, he wanted to see the new ruins of excavation in Thrace. After assessing 
them, to urge archeological excavations Atatürk said to Afet İnan, “go on! You will bring
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became the preliminary narration of the Turks’ role as civilizing and culturing gardeners 
throughout history, who had been the highest and first civilized people of mankind.^^ It 
emphasized the re-writing of Turkish history under the light of new “historical facts.”
It was the task of the new Committee. The Committee would provide the 
information on Turkish history to overcome some “prejudices” on the Turks in the 
historiographies of the Western countries, which for the historians of the Republic had 
resulted from the deficiency of knowledge on the Turkish past. Immediately, after its 
establishment, the Committee began working. On 4 June 1930, it held its first meeting 
under the presidency of Hamdullah Suphi (Tanridver). In the meeting, the remarks of 
Mehmed Tevfik (Biyiklioglu) who was elected as the president of the Committee, are 
worth mentioning in terms of directing the activities of the Committee and determining 
the route of the official historical thesis at the beginning;
The problem which will concern us is national Turkish history. There are good 
reasons for writing such a history. Turkish national history is distinguished not 
only as a glorious, honorable history which can not be compared with the history 
of any other nation on the face of the earth, but also as the first to have 
discovered, used and spread the basic means of civilization which assured the 
prosperity and comfort of all mankind. Until recently the only known sources of 
contemporary civilization have been Greece and Rome. However, it has been 
absolutely proven that Greek civilization is merely a translation from older 
Turkish civilizations... I am certain that Turkish history will emerge in a 
completely different way than it has heretofore, and will receive all the glories of 
which it is deserving.
out more and more the richness of our country’s cultural history.” Afet İnan, “Atatürk,”
243.
32 Ibid., 197.
” Quoted in Walter Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy, the Free Party 
and its Aftermath (Liden; A. J. Brill, 1973), 228; Lutfy Levonian, trans, and ed.. The 
Turkish Press, 1925-1932 (Athens: School of Religion, 1932), 190. For the other 
delegates’ statements, stQ M qX İnan, Atatürk Hakkında, 198-199.
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Based on these ideals, the Committee began to work on the ancient and near past of the 
Turks. At the outset, it was aimed to determine the general and rough boundaries of 
Turkish histoiy, which would become the base-line of a new historical understanding of 
the Republican Turkey. This aim would be maintained by the Society created instead of 
the Committee. After the closing of the Turkish Hearths on April 1931, the legal status of 
the Committee came to end in actual terms. In 15 April 1931, the same committee set up 
the Society for the Study of Turkish History {Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti)^'^ In fact, there 
did not exist a break in the studies of the Committee, for the Society undertook all its 
studies and projects with similar members and program. Even, the first meeting of the 
Society held on 26 April 1931 was issued as the eighth meeting as a sign of the 
continuation of the previous one.^  ^ Still, its responsibility was the prosperity of studies 
and publications on history. In general, as a professional institution, it was first of all 
assigned with the task of “imagining a version of Turkish history” from the nationalist 
point of view.^^ This is evidently seen in the Society’s statute which prepared on 12 April 
1931. Its fourth article established its goals: “the goal of the Society is to analyze all the 
matters related to Turkish History and the Histoiy of Turkey and to distribute the 
obtained results by using every means.” This goal included the activities of (a) studying
Following the year of the language purification movement or language reform, 
in 1935 its name was changed to the Turkish History Society {Türk Tarih Kurumu). 
İğdemir, Kurumu, 5. Based on the general trend, in this study, it is preferred to use the 
Turkish History Society instead of the Society for the Study of Turkish History.
35 Afet İnan, Atatürk Hakkında, 2 0 1 .
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the sources of Turkish history and making publications, (b) translating works on Turks 
and Turkish history into Turkish, (c) arranging meetings and congresses to discuss new 
discoveries and scientific themes, and (d) making and maintaining archeological 
excavations.^^ To put it briefly, the general purpose of the Society’s members was to 
write an extensive and detailed Turkish history according to their thesis and to set down 
school textbooks that would be taught at every level of education.
5.1.2 The New History Textbooks
The first main effort of both the Committee and the Society was the search for 
new textbooks in conformity with the new historical perspective. That is to say, it was 
due to the need of the new state for new history textbooks. At the end of 1930, the 
Committee put forth its first product, a book entitled The Outlines o f Turkish History 
{Türk Tarihinin Anahatiari). It consisted of eleven chapters, dealing with a wide-range 
period from the formation of the earth to the Turkish Republic.^* It was published only as 
a hundred copies and distributed amongst the related historians and intellectuals to take 
their comments and approvals. In its Introduction entitled “why this book has been
Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [Kurdish Question in the State 
Discourse] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999), 189.
37 Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish History Society] (Ankara: THS, 1970), 4.
The first chapter is an Introduction to the History of Mankind; the second, an 
Introduction to Turkish History; the third, China; the fourth, India; the fifth, Chaldeans - 
Elamites -  Akads”; the sixth, Egypt; the seventh, Anatolia; the eighth, Aegean basin; the 
ninth. Ancient Italy and Etruscans; the tenth, Iran; the eleventh. Central Asia (comprising 
one third of the book). See Türk Tarihinin Anahatiari [Outlines of Turkish History], 
ed. (Istanbul: Kaynak, 1996) (original publication, 1930).
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written”, the writers explained the goals of writing a history book in the following
ways:
The role of Turks in the world history had been consciously or unconsciously 
degraded in the books published in Turkey and in the French history books from 
which the Turkish ones aroused. This deficient knowledge negatively affected the 
development of the self-consciousness among Turks. The main goal of the book is 
to correct these mistakes which are a menace for our nationality that today is 
trying to regain its natural place in the world, and at the same time to write a 
national history for a Turkish nation in whose spirit the feeling of national self- 
respect and unity came to life with the last great events [the westernizing reforms 
from 1923 to 1930].'*°
This aim would bring forward the historical achievements of the Turks whose ancestors 
had been one of the great civilized and conquering peoples of the world. And also, 
perhaps most importantly, as indicated in its Introduction, the book was aimed at 
demonstrating the Kemalist reforms as having deep historical and racial roots. All these 
required a scientific study; it was the second principal goal of the book to provide the 
knowledge and detailed information which had been saved and purified from 
“superstitious” beliefs through scientific research.'** For the writers the book did not 
cover a perfect national history, but just provided the general framework for those who 
would study Turkish history, that is, determined the boundaries of historical research. In 
this respect, with this book, for the first time, the official historical thesis was broadly 
declared. In the thesis, as mentioned before, emphasis was placed on Central Asia, which
Almost all members of the Committee (Afet Hamm, Mehmet Tevfik, Samih 
Rifat, Akçura Yusuf, Dr. Reşt Galip, Hasan Cemil, Sadri Maksudi, Şemsettin, Vasıf and 
Yusuf Ziya) participated actively in writing. Ibid.
AO Ibid., 25.
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was the cradle of all human civilization. The first human beings lived there, and they 
were the first to invent gunpowder, the magnetic compass, paper, porcelain, silk, glass, 
the calendar and writing, which all were thought as parts of civilization. The Turks, 
wherever they went, brought with them this developed civilization.'^^ That is to say, the 
prehistoric migrations of the Turks, who were a white, Aryan people made it possible for 
other nations to reach a high level of progress. Although the book placed great emphasis 
on the ancient history of Turks of Central Asia and their relationships with other ancient 
civilizations, it left little space for Islamic-Ottoman times which were emphasized as the 
main causes of the decline of the Turks and suppression of Turkishness. Thus, especially, 
the Ottoman past was seen as an especially dishonorable period in Turkish history, and so 
it had to be forgotten. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the Ottoman times had to be 
completely wiped out from the memory of Turks but its negative effects on Turkishness 
and Turkish culture had to be on the agenda, used to rejuvenate again and again the 
Kemalist culturalist discourse.
The book was not widely accepted and attracted some harsh criticism from the 
historians, although it was ordered to be written for use as a textbook in schools. Only the 
chapter entitled “Türk Tarihine Medhal” (Introduction to Turkish History) and “Orta 
Asya” (Central Asia) of the book were circulated in a form of a thick booklet of 74 pages, 
entitled Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Medhal Kısmı {Introductory Part o f the Outline o f 
Turkish History). 30.000 copies were published for use in schools.'^^
Ibid.
'■2 See ibid., 57-72, 325-366.
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In the same way, in 1931, the Society as its first activity began to issue four 
volume textbooks for use in high schools, named Tarih They were greatly inspired 
from the Outline of Turkish History published in 1930. In the volumes, the authors’ 
names were not stated, and, as one contemporary observer justly recorded, they seemed 
to be written with “a steady eye to their purpose -making the record of the past support 
the nationalism of the present”- and it was not difficult for the authors to find “plenty of 
material suitable to this thesis.”''^  The first volume was on ancient times and antiquity, 
covering the period of the beginning of history to the Roman Empire. In that the new 
historical thesis made up its essence to a greater extent that the Turks were presented as 
creator and carrier of the most brilliant civilizations of antiquity, like the Sumerians, the 
Hittites and the Etruscans. Moreover, as other steps of the thesis, the Hittites were 
presented as Turks in order to see Anatolia from the oldest times a Turkish Land since 
remote antiquity. At this point, it is important to note that all ancient civilizations whose
See İğdemir, Kurumu, 5. One of the decisions taken in the First Turkish History 
Congress (held in 1932 in Ankara) was to maintain the project of writing a book on 
Turkish national history the Committee had undertaken. In 1933, under direct control of 
Mustafa Kemal, several meetings were held on the issue by the Society; it was decided 
that one scholar, a specialist, wrote each phase of Turkish history on the period. The 
result was extensive studies that could not be published in one volume. For that reason, it 
was generally agreed that several volumes on every phase of Turkish history would be 
provided in the course of time. Ibid., 21-3.
Tarih I  (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931); Tarih II: Ortazamanlar [History II; 
Middle Ages] (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931); Tarih III: Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlarda 
Osmanlı-Türk Tarihi [History III: Ottoman-Turkish History in Modern Ages] (Istanbul: 
Devlet Matbaası, 1931); Tarih IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti [History IV; Republic of Turkey] 
(Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931). Beside the high schools they were taught in the 
secondary schools. But, because of their difficult content for students in secondary 
education, in 1933, its simplified form of three volumes of text-books entitled 
Ortamektep İçin Tarih I, II, III for use in secondary schools and two volumes for primary 
schools were written. See iğdemir. Kurumu, 10.
240
origin was not well known were chosen to prove their roots as Turkish."*  ^ It was also 
accentuated in the first volume that the Turks’ ability to form states had a central place in 
the emergence of these civilizations, but, in this tradition, cultural and political authorities 
merged into a whole."*^  It is no doubt that this ahistoric and essentialist state as an 
outcome of the context-free, inborn feature of the Turks seems to stem from the idea of a 
modern nation state form.
The other three volumes came immediately after the first volume."** The very tone 
of the Turks’ civilizationist and statist characteristics from ancient times up till the time
Webster, The Turkey, 241.
For this tendency of the thesis, see Copeaux, Tarih, 31.46
This was the result of the Turks’ peculiar features which made them more 
superior than the Chinese, Indians, Egyptians, Iranians and Greeks in history. The last 
products of this state tradition were the Ottoman state and the Republic. In fact, the state 
described in these books “can not be explained with one of the concepts of the political 
theories of the ancient and antique times. The state is perceived as a cultural authority 
based on racial and linguistic solidarity whose political and administrative boundaries are 
uncertain.” Behar, İktidar, 111. It seems that the volumes were written to prove the idea 
that the Turks in history had formed several states; thus, this resulted in several voids 
among the events which explained the formation of states, and the incoherence of the 
information on the emergence of these states. See ibid.
The second volume was about the Turkish states in history from prehistoric 
times to middle ages, tackling cases from earlier “Turkish states”, the Huns, to later ones 
in India and Arabic basin. The third volume, of 200 pages while other three volumes 
were approximately 400 pages, was on the Ottomans. In that the ties between the 
Ottomans and the Turks were unclear, and in some parts of the volume, the Ottoman 
Empire was mentioned as an alien empire, not having any ties with the Turks. The fourth 
volume, more than 370 pages, was about the Republic of Turkey. It was made up of two 
main parts; the first contained two chapters entitled “Once again the Establishment of a 
New State by the Turkish Nation” and “the War of Independence”, the second was on the 
westernizing reforms of the Republic. In the first chapter, it was stressed that, before the 
Turkish Republic, there existed the Turkish nation that had formed several states in 
history but did not have any predetermined connections with the Ottoman Empire 
implicitly affirmed as a non-Turkish state. The second chapter had similarities with the 
1931 program of the RPP. For further elaboration on Tarihli, III, IV, see ibid., 112-115.
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of writing can be found in the four volumes. Emphasizing the relationship of the Turks 
and the ancient civilizations of China, India, Egypt, Anatolia and the Mediterranean, 
Kemalist civilizationist historiography aimed at showing the Turks as the original 
representatives of civilization through emphasizing their “achievements” in social, 
political and cultural spheres. This demonstration of the Turks as bearers of civilization 
and culture bearers became the essence of the process of culture production. So did the 
history textbooks of the Republic full of nationalistic bias come with certain assumptions 
and interpretations which were directly in contrast with the previously accepted concepts 
of the Ottomans. Aiding the Kemalist top-down formulation of civilizing, they had been 
in use as unrivalled textbooks in the schools until the end of the Single-Party Period.
5.2. The History Congresses and Scienticization of the Thesis
5.2.1. The First History Congress and Later Developments
The Turkish History Thesis, the coup d’Etat in history, was generally formed 
from 1930 to 1932. In order to introduce and spread the thesis, a convention known as the 
“First Turkish History Congress” was held on 2-11 July 1932 in Ankara, by the direct 
inspiration of Mustafa Kemal.'*  ^ There were 241 participants in the congress, and it was
As Copeaux aptly argues, it was “a great ceremony organized in honor of 
Mustafa Kemal. Until that time, Ghazi had became legendary and gained his 
distinguished place in history; as if his statue in front of Ankara Halkevi was tightly 
monitoring the discussions to keep them in a determined way. The volume which was the 
edition of the minutes of the congress was dedicated to this “biggest son of Turkish 
history”, with his half-god appearance, who was the creator of Turkey, the heir {varisi)
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more educationally oriented.Accordingly, its aim, set in the Introduction of the 
published minutes of the congress was “to explain the results of the Society’ s scientific 
researches on Turkish history to schoolteachers who undertake the responsibility of 
teaching new history textbooks... and to provide a standard history teaching.” '^ Thus, it 
is clear from this aim that the impetus behind the Congress was to strengthen and spread 
the thesis especially among schoolteachers and scholars. In this regard, it seemed that it 
was in harmony with the general purpose of the Society’s members, attempting to write a 
comprehensive Turkish history according to their thesis and to prepare school textbooks 
for every level of education. In this regard the congress became the occasion where new 
history textbooks were introduced in the act of indoctrinating participant schoolteachers 
by accentuating the new history thesis; the main discussion, though limited, was on the 
validity of their thesis and its applicability in schools.
The Congress appeared to be a major phase of instituting a new history which was 
in the process of being created. Of course, this was being done on the basis of science, 
naturally inspired from the scientism, or, if more properly expressed, positivism, of 
Kemalism. As stated before, it was firmly anchored in the will of political authority; that 
is, new Turkish history was constructed on the ideological ground as a political 
manifesto. Thus, it could not be expected from Kemalist scientism to tolerate any
and maker of Turkish history, and the founder of new histoiy-writing.” Copeaux, Tarih, 
46. Such canonization of Mustafa Kemal was very clear in the volume of the published 
minutes of the congress. See Birinci, V.
Most of the participants (198) were teachers of high and secondary schools 
from all over Turkey and others, 18 professors at universities, and 25 members of THS. 
On the participants and their professions, see Birinci, VII-XIII.
" Ibid., V.
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criticism of the historical thesis being constructed. That was why in the construction the 
politician-historians became very selective in choosing the references to prove their 
historical theory, and, referring to the works of some European scholars and making an 
extensive interpretations on these works, they tried to present their claims as universally 
accepted e v en t s . A t  this juncture, what was important was to “use the views of an 
authority as evidence: the discourse of the greatness of Turkishness becomes meaningful 
when a European depicts it.”^^  This was indeed the very tone of all discussions on the 
new historical thesis throughout the Congress. Therefore, in the Congress, some Western 
Orientalists or Turcologists whose works were contrary to the new Turkish historical 
thesis were condemned as enemies of the Turks and their theories were certainly rejected. 
For example, on the second day of the Congress, Zeki Velidi (Togan) criticized some 
claims of Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) and Reşit Galip, who together with Afet (İnan) depicted 
the basic outlines of the new thesis there. Grounding his arguments on V. V. Barthold’s 
works. Zeki Velidi rejected the idea that since antiquity the migration from Central Asia 
had occurred simply because of continuing heavy droughts and starvation. And he argued 
that the migration of the Turks resulted from political reasons and, in some places, 
population density.^"* Replying on these arguments. Reşit Galip made a severe remark by 
saying: “this author [Berthold] is a man who has tried his best to prove that Turks do not 
have any role in history, especially in the field of civilization, and the presence of Turks
Almost all papers and speeches were full of such justifying effort. See Ibid. 
Copeaux, Tarih, 37.
5d For his claims, set Birinci, 168-174.
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in Central Asia does not go back to ancient t imes.Thereupon,  one of the participants 
cut Reşit Galip off and cried, “True! Berthold is a vulgar enemy of Turkishness.”^^  This 
reaction did not stop with the declaration of Berthold as an enemy of the Turks. 
Moreover, Reşit Galip, Sadri Maksudi and Şemseddin Bey accused Zeki Velidi with 
harsh words by persistently questioning his sources . I n  due course, Şemseddin Bey 
drew attention to another direction, personal hatred, from the continuing “scientific” 
discussion on migration, geographical conditions and population. He claimed that when 
he was in Russia, Zeki Velidi brought discord to the Turkist movement by dividing the 
Turks into several culturally and ethnically distinct groups like Tatars, Baskurts, Uzbeks, 
Azeris; he went on saying, “I wonder whether Zeki Velidi Bey wants to play the same 
role in this congress? But, he can be sure that all the participants coming together around 
this congress are burning with the fire of nationality. Every attempt against this fire are 
doomed to failure.”^^  The discussion came to end with complete success in favor of the 
politician-historians who represented the will of the new regime requiring a 
historiography based on the view of constant migration from east to west.
As a result, in the congress convened to introduce and consolidate the official 
historical thesis, the opposition was not easily welcomed; that is, the imposed thesis was 
very close to any non-official interpretations and arguments. Hence, throughout the 
congress the mode of opposition was entirely “apologetic”; the criticism made without
' '  Ibid., 178. 
'"Ibid., 179.
57 For their arguments, see ibid., 178-193, 376-400.
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injuring official ideology was appreciated, for any criticism on any part of the new 
history was perceived as a hindrance to national ideals. On the mode of opposition in the 
congress, Ersanlı Behar argues:
In the Congress nobody wants to be in opposition to science and nationalism. 
Indeed, opposing both science and nationalism was regarded as identical ... In 
accordance with the direction of the method of dealing with political opposition, 
the appointed missionary historians of the Congress did not permit any attitude 
questioning and criticizing the ideology anticipated to indoctrinate. All who 
wanted to bring different interpretations to Turkish nationalism and the Turkish 
race, culture, language and history, were seen as distrustful persons. All who were 
faithful to the reform and mission with politically determined boundaries, were 
the only trustful persons.
In short, in the congress, all efforts and thoughts outside of main stream historical 
ideology were unquestionably condemned, and, of course, under such nationalistic 
circumstances, it was not so easy to promote any opposite and scientific claims. Playing a 
determinant role in the process, the Kemalist missionary historians represented the will of 
political authority which was the sole legitimate power monopolizing culture. In this 
sense, the congress appeared to be a course for the institutionalization of the official 
historical discourse that was conditioned to a greater extent by Kemalist nationalist 
ideology. And, in the congress, historians who were charged with a political mission to 
produce a continuity between the past and present, set a standard of historical perspective 
that cleared the air from the ignorant tendencies of the Ottoman times.
The follow-up on the proclamation of the Turkish History Thesis was the 
University reform that came with the abolishing of the Istanbul Darülfünun in 1933. This
' '  Ibid., 400.
Behar, İktidar, 122.
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was not simply the restructuring of Darülfünun under the name of Istanbul University, 
but making corrections in the worldviews, dominant there, belonging to the ancien 
régime. To this end, more than half of its staff was dismissed, including the professors 
and scholars who opposed the official view of history and language. The reason behind 
this rectification was its failure to adopt Kemalist cultural reforms, especially ones of 
history and language.^®
In the following years of the University Reform, there occurred the attempts to 
strengthen the Turkish History Thesis particularly in education. As one of these, in order 
to provide a framework for the thesis, a faculty called DU ve Tarih -  Coğrafya Fakültesi 
(the Faculty of Language, History, Geography, DTCF) was founded in 1935 in Ankara. 
The Faculty, its name indeed echoed the thesis’ central themes, was conditioned to verify 
Turkish achievements and contributions to the development of civilization, to document 
Turkish roots in Anatolia, the cradle of civilization, and to make a comparison of the 
prehistoric and modern languages. From then on, the educational structure of the 
Kemalist cultural authority, from primary to higher education, was settled, which helped 
to implant its historical ideals in young minds.
After the first congress, in coincidence with the cultural attitude of the Kemalist 
ideology, throughout the 1930s there emerged a total mobilization in historical research, 
which found its clear expression in the new program of the Turkish History Society made 
in 1935 by the direct initiative of Atatürk.^' In the program, the most stressed theme was
“  For further details, see Horst Widmann, Atatürk Üniversite Reformu [Atatürk’s 
University Reform], trasn. A. Kazancıgil and S. Bozkurt (İstanbul: I. Ü. Cerrahpaşa Tıp 
Fak., 1981), 31-59.
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the verification of the national histoiy thesis in a “scientific” way. For that purpose, “with 
an inclination to present to scholars at home and abroad the results of the research 
maintained for clarifying Turkish history, and to give way to scientific discussions on the 
thesis,” the second Histoiy Congress was held in 1937.^  ^ At the congress, Kemalist 
scientism reached its peak. Making the images of the idealized past visible, proofed 
through the innocent hands of Reason and experiment, archeology and anthropology 
(both of whose relation to history and the congress will be elaborated below), were the 
vanguards of this scientism of the congress.^^ The papers presented at the congress were 
mostly in concord with the political will to uphold the thesis, of high importance for 
Kemalist nationalist ideology. That meant a mass of scientists coming to an agreement on 
the “scientific truths” brought forward by the Society. '^* In that, the role of the scientists 
from abroad was emphasized to the extent that their approval was regarded as the 
declaration of a decisive victory for the thes is .The  atmosphere of the second congress
61 See İğdemir, Kurumu, 26-31.
“  Muzaffer Göker, “İkinci Tarih Kongresi” [The Second History Congress]. 
Belleten. 11/5-6(1938), 1.
On the scientism of the congress and its relation to archeology and 
anthropology, see M. Saffet Arikan, “Kongre Başkanı, Maarif Vekili Saffet Arıkan’ın 
Nutku [The Congress President, Minister of Education Saffet Arikan’s Speech], in İkinci 
Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul, 20-25 Eylül, 1937, Kongrenin Çalışmaları ve Kongreye 
Sunulan Tebliğler [The Second Turkish History Congress, İstanbul, 20-25 September, 
1937, Works of the Congress and Papers Presented at the Congress] (İstanbul; Kenan 
Matbaası, 1943), 2; also, seeBehar, İktidar, 174-175.
Göker, “İkinci,” 4.
See Şemsettin Günaltay, “Türk Tarih Tezi Hakkmdaki İntikatların Mahiyeti ve 
Tezin Kafi Zaferi” [The Aims of Critiques on Turkish History Thesis and Absolute 
Victory of The Thesis]. Belleten. II/5-6 (1938), 338. In his article, he mentions five
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was almost similar to that of the Third Turkish Histoiy Congress held in 1943, on a safe 
ground provided with the help of Kemalist sc ient i sm.By means of this scientist 
perspective, in the Third Congress as in the previous ones, for example, it was approved 
that the great monuments of Turkish culture had been established in the various places of 
the world such as the Nile and Ganges deltas.
5.2.2. The History o f  the Turkish Revolution
In the Turkish History Thesis, the History of the Turkish Revolution gained 
utmost importance when it set to determine a fresh, glorified past for the conquering 
reforms of the Republic. It became the subject of the Revolution Institute founded as the 
evolution of Istanbul University, and the Revolution Chair founded in Ankara in 1934. It 
was there that a series of lectures on the history of the Turkish revolution, by which a 
new beginning for the Turkish nation was to be acknowledged. The lectures were given
objections to the thesis, and, in harmony with his “scientific” method, he tries to refute 
the objections usually by referring and citing secondary sources of western scholars.
In Şemseddin Günaltay’s remarks made at the opening ceremony of the 
congress, this tone is so obvious. See Şemsettin Günaltay, “Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı 
Prof Şemseddin GünaltayTn Açış Nutku” [The Opening Speech of Prof Şemsettin 
Günaltay, the President of the Turkish History Society]. Belleten. VIII/29 (1944), 5-10; 
III. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 15-20 Kasım 1943, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler [III. 
Turkish History Congress, Ankara 15-20 November 1943, Papers Presented at the 
Congress] (Ankara: TTK, 1948), 1-6. Unlike the first one, most of the papers presented at 
the Congress focused on Anatolia and its ancient and near past. Archeological and 




by the leading political figures and interpreters of Kemalism, such as Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt, Recep Peker, Yusuf Tengirşek and Hikmet Bayur.^^ In 1935, the lectures 
became compulsory for all students of the senior classes of the Universities. With a Law, 
in 1942, these lectures were turned into established courses under the name of “İnkılap 
Tarihi ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Rejimi” (The History of the Revolution and the Regime 
of the Republic of Turkey); to make investigations on these matters and spread the 
findings, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü (The Turkish Revolution History Institute) was 
founded as part of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography.
It was in these courses that the politician historians started their works to describe 
the Ottomans’ view of history as being based on the criteria of divine intervention and 
norms of the right procedure in judging the genealogy of the Sultanate. Indeed, this 
tendency seemed to be an attempt made to create a new historiography attributed to the 
Ottomans. Accordingly, as Akçuraoğlu Yusuf writes, “Ottoman history did not pay 
enough attention to the Turkish language and history, and also did radically separate itself
“ Ahmet Asım, “Türk İnkilabmm Mana ve Mahiyeti” [The Meaning and Nature 
of Turkish Revolution]. Ayın Tarihi, (March 1934), 75. These lectures were seen 
indispensable for indoctrinating Turkish youths with the enlightening ideals of the 
Revolution, for they were “the most important one of the courses on culture in the 
universities which were the cultural laboratories of the society”. Ahmet Şükrü, 
“Üniversitede İnkilap Tarihi Dersleri” [Lectures of Revolution History at the University]. 
Ibid., 71. For İsmet Paşa’s lecture, “İnkılap Kürsüsünde İsmet Paşanın Dersi” [İsmet 
Pasha’s Lecture at the Institute of the Revolution]. Ülkü. 14 (April 1934), 81-88.
Most of these lectures were published in Ayın Tarihi and Ülkü. For the lectures 
given by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Recep Peker and Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek at İstanbul 
University, see Oktay Aslanapa, ed., 1933 Yılında Istanbul Üniversitesinde Başlayan İlk 
İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları [Notes of First Lectures on the Revolution History Given at 
İstanbul Uiversity from 1933] (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997).
™ For the Law on the Founding of Turkish Revolution History Institute, see 
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 6, vol. 24 (3. 4. 1942), 69.
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from Turkish history. The great victories and achievements of the Turkish nation to 
which the Ottomans belonged was not taken into account when writing history.”^' That 
is, in the Ottoman historiography, there was not a Turkish nation, but a Muslim 
community whose members had to be unconditionally faithful to the Sultanate, which, 
after the Tanzimat, was replaced with the idea of the Ottoman nation. The Ottoman 
Empire’s negation of Turkish national history resulted in negative effects on the national 
revival and became the basic cause of the failure of the Turks in their leadership in 
civilization.^^ It was the main argument in the Kemalist historiography that the reason 
why the Turks became decadent and corrupt was the rule of the Sultanate, and the 
subjection of the nation. The Ottoman rule was “the dark age” of the Turks. For that 
reason, in writing a new history for the Turks, it had to be ignored. These lectures and 
almost all public speeches made by the Republican leaders contained a review of history 
of the Republic from its beginning. This was based on the need to “remember” all the 
modernizing reforms which set in motion the Revolutionary History of the Republic.
” Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, “Birinci,” 26. He goes on to argue, “As for the Ottoman 
historians, Ottoman history began with the life of Osman the First and his father, Ertuğrul 
Ghazi, founding a small principality near Bursa... In the classical period, in the 
textbooks, prepared for use in Ottoman schools, that generally traced the genealogy of the 
Sultanate, Turkish history took a little part and the characters of the Turkish race were 
never stressed. After the Meşrutiyet, for the sake of the admiration for Western 
civilization, Turkish history was sacrificed.” Ibid., 26-7. Also, for further information on 
the Ottoman view of history from the Kemalist point of view, see Reşit Galip, “Türk 
Tarihi,” 139-140.
Tengirşek explained the reasons of being backward with the Ottomans’ 
negation of Turkish culture. Ottomanness had made the Turks “lazy” and “indolent.” See 
Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, “Türk İnkılabı Dersleri Ekonomik Değişmeler” [Lectures on 
Turkish Revolution: Economic changes], in 1933 Yılında Istanbul, 315-314.
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As one outcome of the condemnation of Ottoman despotism, the Turkish 
Revolution signified a complete rupture with the “Ottoman order”, which was seen to be 
antagonistic from the beginning to the new Turkish order with its entire worldview and 
institutions/^ The legitimate history of Republican Turkey was thus started with the 
beginning of the War of Independence, 19 May 1919, the course that prepared the way 
for founding the Republic with a new worldview, cadre and program. “Time” was 
restarted with that date. At the heart of this re-arrangement of time, there was intrinsically 
the definition of the significant Other that was the Ottoman-Islamic past. This attitude is 
exactly what Fabian argues for othering: for him the Other is something “living in 
another time”, which determines its status as low-grade, temporary and illegitimate.^'* In 
the Kemalist discourse, the Ottoman-Islamic past belonged to “another time” and had 
disappeared in the face of the continuing march of progress. None of the cadres, 
mentalities and programs existing before 19 May 1919 belonged to the legitimate history
This was the very tone of İsmet İnönü’s lecture on History of Turkish 
Revolution, in the opening ceremony of the Revolution Chair in Ankara. For him, the 
Turkish Revolution first of all meant to wage war on the Ottoman order: “We were 
successful in the War of Independence not only by resisting the attacks of the foreign 
invaders, but also by destroying the basis of the Ottoman order. So, because of its 
national character, our revolution was not merely a continuation and a result of the 
evolution of the Ottoman reform movement... Consequently, it was necessary to replace 
the Ottoman order with the Turkish national order, that is, instituting TBMM and the 
secular Republic instead of the Meclisi Mebusan, Sultanate and Caliphate.” “İnkılap 
Kürsüsünde İsmet Paşanın Dersi” [İsmet Pasha’s Lecture at the Institute of the 
Revolution]. Ülkü. 14 (April 1934), 81; reprint in Ayın Tarihi, 1-31 March, 1934, 30-36. 
For another Kemalist interpretation of the discontinuity, see Recep Peker, “Hürriyet 
İnkılabı” [Freedom Revolution], in 1933 Yılında Istanbul, 224-225.
See Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Antropology Makes its Object 
(New York; Columbia University Press, 1983), 144.
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but to a different historical realm 7  ^Throwing away all that belonged to the Ottoman past 
and tradition from the “legitimate” history might be one expression of setting hierarchy in 
the old and new way of life. A suitable past was constituted to be the basis of a modern 
way of life. The Turkish Revolution, as in all revolutionary movements, strove to 
establish this past in place of the old one.
5.2.3 Archeology and Anthropology: Determining the Historical Boundaries o f  the 
New Turkish Culture
At the initial stages of the production of the new history, the pace necessitated 
taking much material from Western secondary sources as well as Turkish ones. In 
constructing a ‘glorified’ account of past events on the basis of the remains of those 
events, the politician historians of the Republic employed archeology and anthropology. 
Especially toward the mid-1930s, the Turkish History Society began to be more engaged 
in archeological and documentary research of a primary nature.’  ^ In other words, the
” From now on, in the Kemalist historiography. Yeğen argues that “the palace, 
Sultans and Istanbul; the caliphate, Islam, tradition; Circassians, Laz, Kurd; the CUP, 
Freedom and Entente and Vahdettin; Cemal, Talat and Enver, all belonged to a some 
other historical realm, not to the past.” Yeğen, Devlet, 193. In this respect, as M. Nermi 
proclaimed in 1930, all Ottoman literary and language products, “manifesting foreign 
taste”, belonged to a different realm. See M. Nermi, “Nermi Bey Diyor ki: “Öz ve Ulu 
Yol Tutulmuştur!”’ [Nermi Bey Says: “The True and Great Way Has Begun!”], 
Cumhuriyet, 1 August 1930, 3.
The program of the Society put into use in 1935 encouraged these researches in 
collaboration with the subsidiary sciences: archeology, physical anthropology, physical 
geography and linguistics. For the program see “Türk Tarih Araştırma Kurumunun 
Programı” [The Program of the Turkish History Research Society]. Ülkü. 31 (September 
1935), 8-12.
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rising interest of political authority on history seemed to be a driving force behind the 
acceleration of archeological research. As much as investigating the documents, the 
Society attached importance to make excavations and evaluate the findings in relation to 
the history of Anatolia.’^
To begin with, the nationalist historians saw archeology, a “positive” science, as 
one of the constituent elements of maintaining the efforts to create a sense of unity 
between the land and people. To put it differently, it was used for a political cause that a 
national history deeply rooted in a given territory (Anatolia) by means of archeology was 
necessary for constructing a collective consciousness. For the Turkish archeologists, all 
prehistoric findings concerning the material culture of Anatolia that was elevated in 
practice as the milestone of Turkish and world history’* shed light on the fact that during 
prehistoric times there had been a native Turkish nation in Anatol ia .The narration of 
past events by means of archeological activities became the most stressed issue of the 
Second Turkish History Congress, held in 1937, where, in its absolute term, the victory of
” For this alignment of the Society, see Afet İnan, “Contribution to Turkish 
History through the research Activities of the Archeological Section of the Turkish 
Historical Society.” Belleten. XIII (1949), 429. Here, the aim was to prove the antiquity 
of the Turkish roots in Anatolia where from the ancient times the Turks established states 
and created a high culture. See Miraç, “Anadolu” [Anatolia]. Ülkü. 37 (Mart 1936), 32- 
33.
For an illustrative description on Anatolia, see Mehmet Saffet (Engin), 
“Anadolu’da en Eski Türk Medeniyeti ve Cihan Medeniyetlerine Hakimiyeti” [The 
Oldest Turkish Civilization in Anatolia and Its Hegemony of World Civilizations]. Ülkü. 
16 (April 1934), 263-264.
The incentive behind all archeological, anthropological and linguistic efforts 
was to confirm that “the first civilized man that lived in Anatolia was a Turk”. Enver 
Behnan Şapolyo, “Anadolu’da Kumuklar Tarihi” [History of Kumuks in Anatolia]. Ülkü. 
31 (September 1935), 69.
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the Turkish History Thesis was approved by “positive” sciences. That is to say, the 
second congress was an archeology congress. While the emphasis on Central Asia was 
still influential in forging a cultural identity, Anatolia began to gain much more attention, 
supported by archeological excavations. The aim was to emphasize the pre-Islamic and 
pre-Ottoman past of Anatolia, resulting from the secularist ideology of the new regime. 
The end product of this trend was a movement called Anadoluculuk (Anatolianism). As 
mentioned in Chapter IV, the movement came with the humanistic ideology of the İnönü 
period, which gave rise to the increasing concern in archeology until the mid-1940s. For 
that reason, archeological excavations and findings became again a dominant theme in 
the Third Turkish History Congress held in 1943.^'
At this point, it seems necessary to illustrate the role of the archeological 
excavations in the formation of a historical identity by discussing one of the results. The 
excavation, published as an article in Belleten by Hamit Zubeyr Koşay, director of the 
excavation, was made at Alaca Höyük, a city of the Hittites, in the summer of 1936.^  ^
The findings showed that there was in the Anatolia of the Hittites a high life and culture
Most of the papers presented at the Second Congress were on archeological 
excavations. See İkinci.
See Uluğ İğdemir, “HI. Türk Tarih Kongresi”[Third Turkish History Congress]. 
Belleten. VIII/29 (1944), 1-4; Muzaffer Göker, “Türk Tarih Kurumu’hün Çalışmaları 
Hakkında” [On the Works of the Turkish History Society]. Ibid., 19-21; “Türk Tarih 
Kurumu’nun Bir Yıllık Çalışmalarına Ait Rapor” [An One-Year Report about the Works 
of the Turkish History Society]. Belleten. VI (1942), 132-133. And also, for the general 
explanations of the archeological activities of the period, see Afet İnan, “Türk Tarih 
Kurumu’nun Arkeoloji Faaliyeti” [Archeological Activities of the Turkish History 
Society]. Belleten. II/5-6 (1938), 5-8, and “Contribution.”
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firstly stimulated with metal-work; it originated from Central Asia and even its traces 
could be noticed in the Central Anatolian culture of the present day. In the article, these 
findings are supported with the claims of European scholars, or “authorities”, on 
“Eurasian questions”:
We find the vestiges of this culture [the metal culture in Anatolia] in the so-called 
horseback-riding immigrants. And... the mother of this primary culture is 
certainly Central Asia. Later on this culture spread from China to Scandinavia and 
was an important step in the development of human culture. According to Alfodi, 
Menghin, and particularly Cooper, the peoples from the Altais, perhaps to some 
extent from the Ural-Altais, are the chief representatives of this culture... These 
facts have a direct bearing on Turkish history.
The following statements of these remarks make deepened the official thesis;
We call the culture of Central Asia mentioned here the Turkish culture... On the 
shores of the Pacific, on the shores of the Mediterranean and even on the shores of 
the Atlantic, they have shown great ability in state organization. They undertook 
the defense of the ideas of great religions like Buddhism, Manichaeism, and 
finally Islam. They carried artistic conceptions from East to West and from West 
to East, and, above all, they created worthy civilizations. The Turkish race is 
active now as it has been in prehistoric periods... With the light shed from the 
documents found at Alaca and other excavations, our organizing ancestors are 
emerging out of the darkness of the past from where they went forth from Asia all 
over the world.
Now, this organizing capability made the Turkish race able to create a new culture which, 
as in its heydays in the past, would be the most developed form of mankind.
Hamit Zübeyr Koşay, “The Results of the Excavations Made on the Behalf of 





Along with archeology, anthropology, seen as a subsidiary discipline of history, 
became object of interest for a political purpose to provide the scientific basis, with 
‘approved’ evidence, to show the people living in Anatolia in prehistoric times as Turks 
and reaching the zeniths of civilization in wealth, learning and power.*^ On that account, 
establishing a racial affinity between the ancient dwellers of Anatolia and the Turks of 
the Republic, and between the Europeans and the Turks, anthropological evidence 
provided great support to the archeological activities which were maintained to bring to 
light connections between today’s culture and that of antiquity.*^ It indeed overlapped 
with the use of anthropology, one of the historical sciences, in the nationalist endeavors 
in Europe during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Nationalist historians used anthropology, especially physical anthropology, to historicize 
“presently existing peoples by interpreting their anatomies, customs and artifacts as the 
remnants of earlier stages of human evolution and civilization.”*^  Like their European 
counterparts, the Kemalist historians applied anthropological evidence from the 
beginning to support their thesis. In that way they examined skulls and skeletons of the 
dead, especially that of prehistoric peoples, and living people. The expectation was that 
these research would prove the racial continuity between the past and the present, and so
Şevket Aziz Kansu, a leading Kemalist anthropologist, claimed that 
anthropology was a positive science and could be used to show how all positive sciences 
were utilized. Şevket Aziz Kansu, “Antropoloji’nin Tarifi ve Programı Hakkında (1)” 
[On the Definition and Program of Anthropology]. Ülkü. 37 (March 1936), 34-40.
For this connection of two disciplines, see Afet İnan, “Arkeoloji Faaliyeti”, 6. 
See Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London: Sage, 1998), 137.
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prove that the Turkish race, belonging to the European race group, had been white, Aryan 
and beautiful.*^
It was the discipline of “anthropology which”, writes Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, “divides 
human beings into two main kinds according to the shapes of their skulls; geniş kafalılar 
(brachycephalic) and nzun kafalılar (dolechycephalic). Until now, all measurements of 
skulls have unquestionably shown that the founders of the first civilization were 
“brachycephalic”, of Central Asia. That most of brachycephalic peoples are of Turkish 
race is also a fact proven with the research on men living today.”*^  As a result of this 
orientation, measurements of skulls and skeletons were on the agenda from the early 
1930s to the mid-1940s.
The result of one of the earliest research made in 1930 by Professor Mahir and 
Hamza of the Faculty of Medicine, and Professor Mouchet, is very typical of illustrating 
the direction of these research. They examined 1000 skulls and skeletons of Turks and 
other races in Turkey, mostly from Istanbul.
The result has shown that the Turks are the most perfect and highest of all the 
races in Turkey regarding ability and other characteristics. It has been understood
In his presentation at the first Congress Reşit Galip, by quoting one of the 
European anthropologists. Dr Legendre, portrayed a “Turk as a most beautiful example of 
the white race with a long, white face, smooth or belted thin nose, orderly lips, mostly 
blue eyes which were not slanted.” Yet, going one step further he said, “the Turks in time 
became Europeanized, but the Europeans whose origin were Protonegroit and 
Protoostraloit became Turkicized and acquired their appearance of today only after the 
Turks’ constant attacks on and their intimate relations with the Europeans.” See Reşit 
Galip, “Türk Irkı ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış” [General Outlook on History 
of Turkish Race and Civilization], in Birinci, 158-159.
8 9 Yusuf Akçura, “Birinci Türk,” 28-29; Reşit Galip, “Türk Irkı,” 106-108.
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that the Turks are like the Europeans in stature and the form of head. The facial 
angle of the Turks is 84-88 degrees, which shows high development.^®
This was the common characteristic of all anthropological measurements until the mid- 
1940s.®^  To sum up, the basic impetus behind this racist tendency in the thesis was to 
designate the existence of racial homogeneity in Anatolia from the early times of history, 
and to prove the Turks belonged to the European race group. But, at the heart of that 
claim, there was not the belief that the Turkish race is the most superior with its intrinsic 
quality, but the will to show the Turks, with their physical appearances, resembled 
Europeans, that is, white, tall, “beautiful”, but not belonging to the yellow race.^^ In other 
words, Europeans and Turks were of the same race.^^ These “approved facts” made it
9 0 Cited in Levonian, trans. and ed.. The Turkish Press, 1925-1932, 188.
The most extensive measurement was made in 1937 under direction of Afet 
İnan on forty thousand Turks, and she used the findings in her Ph. D. dissertation. See 
Afet İnan, L ’Anatolie, le pays de la "race” turque. Recherches sur les caractères 
anthropologiques des populations de la Turquie (Cenevre; Georg and Сіе, 1941); Afet 
İnan, “Arkeoloji Faaliyeti,” 6.
This tendency was clearly observed in the reactions when Keriman Halis, Miss 
Turkey for 1932, was chosen as Miss Universe. She became the symbol of Turkish 
beauty and civilization, showing that the Turks were racially beautiful as were the 
Europeans. See Duğan Duman and Pınar Duman, “Kültürel Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak 
Güzellik Yarışmaları” [Beauty Contests as an Element of Cultural Change]. Toplumsal 
Tarih. 7/42 (1997), 25; Feroz Ahmad, The Making o f Modern Turkey (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 87-88.
This was stressed by Afet İnan in the Second Turkish History Congress. Thus 
for her Turkish expansion into the inwards of Europe could not be considered as an 
invasion, but as an act of re-mixing people of the same race. See Afet İnan, “Türk- 
Osmanh Tarihinin Karakteristik Noktalarına Bir Bakış” [An Overview of Genral 
Characteristics of Turkish-Ottoman History], \n İkinci Türk Tarih, 757.
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legitimate on the part of the modernizing elite the discursive endeavors in constructing 
life forms as they existed in the West.
In sum, archeology and anthropology were seen as positive sciences, which made 
legitimate to use them in the process of creating a historical imagination necessary for 
“targeted” national identification. That is to say, the positivist historians of the Kemalist 
regime regarded both as essential tools to form a self-image, image of “we,” among the 
Turks who would consider themselves as members of an imagined community. This was 
based on the pride of being the first creators of a high, civilized way of life in history.
5.3. The Turkish History Thesis and Turkiflcation of World History: An Overview
5.3.1. Civilization and the Turkish Nation
With the First Turkish History Congress, by means of a discursive strategy, the 
“Turkish History Thesis” began to be effectively circulated as a much more controlled 
narrative. As discussed above, the thesis was a result of the need for a new history for 
culture production/construction. And also, due to a reaction against the general European 
perception of the Turks as a secondary class of humankind, and therefore barbarian and 
uncivilized, and the historical claims on the Turkish land,^'’ it was an attempt to prove the 
Turks were a civilized and cultured people from prehistoric times up till then. In the 
thesis, greater stress was placed on the pre-Ottoman period of the Turks whose national 
identity, according to its pioneers, had been very alive before coming under the
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domination of Islam. In the thesis, the main emphasis was placed on prehistory. The first 
reason for this emphasis may be related to the fact that in the early twentieth century 
there was not enough information on prehistory. This lack of knowledge made it possible 
for the politician historians to produce presumptions and scenarios for prehistoric times. 
The other reason was the wish of the ruling cadre to make a complete break with the near 
past. That was why, one might argue, the new Turkish history was created in a vacuum, 
filled with context-free, mythicized narrative, which were supplied with modern images. 
The result was the substitution of the Turks’ pre-Islamic history with the Islamic and 
Ottoman past and forming a new Turkish history with an intimate relationship with 
modern civilization.
As mentioned above, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues spent all their energies in 
revolutionizing Turkish history and rewriting a “true narrative” of the Turkish race. In his 
history thesis, two claims appeared being of high significance for the cultural attitude of 
the new regime; the first, the Turks were deeply rooted in the past, that is, had been a 
civilized race from prehistoric times. Thus, they did not simply appear at the moment 
with the appearance of the Ottoman Empire. The second is that Anatolia had been the 
Turkish homeland from the beginning, and so the view that the Turks migrated to 
Anatolia in recent times and that they could not possess this land, was not true from the
Enver Ziya Karal, “Atatürk’ün Türk Tarih Tezi” [Atatürk’s Turkish History 
Thesis], \n Atatürk Hakkında Konferanslar {Arksiva.·. TTK, 1946), 57.
In her paper presented at the First Turkish History Congress, in regard to the 
foundation of the Ottoman Empire, Afet İnan claimed that “Turkish race did not originate 
from a tribe with 400 tents, but was a nation derived from Aryan, civilized, high race 
with its tens of thousands of years of history.” See Afet İnan, “Tarihten Evvel ve Tarih 
Fecrinde” [Before History and Dawn of History], inBirinci, 41.
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historical and scientific point of view.^^ In the first claim as the starting point of the 
Turkish History Thesis, the emphasis on Central Asia became more apparent. Afet İnan, 
the voice of Mustafa Kemal as his adopted daughter, notes:
The people who lived in Central Asia were the first group to discover polish 
stone, cultivate land and benefit from mines. They became compelled to migrate 
from Central Asia to the east, south, west. Wherever they went to, they settled and 
established their culture there. The brachyephalic race of Central Asia was the 
descendant of the first founders of the civilizations in Iraq, Anatolia, Egypt and 
the Aegean. Today, we, the Turks, are their children.
Therefore, to the pioneers of the thesis, there was undeniable proof that the Turks were 
not a minor segment of humanity, but the purest representative of the first civilized 
human lineage. All ancient civilizations were of Turkish stock. Thus all civilized and 
cultural formations in the Middle East, Egypt, Aegean, India, China and Europe were 
considered in a similar framework as part of Turkish construction. But the thesis mainly 
focused on the Anatolian and Middle East civilizations. As Mustafa Kemal stated;
Of all those early excursions of our venturesome ancestors we, the Turkish nation 
of today, are most interested one, not in the movements such that broke through 
China’s great wall into the heart of her hitherto safeguarded civilization, nor in 
that which swung northwesterly up into the great Scandinavian area, nor in that 
which, under a great Turk that history calls Atilla the Hun, raided central 
Europe... We are naturally and chiefly concerned with that group which, coming
See Afet İnan, “Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi,” 244. The main questions Mustafa 
Kemal dealt with at the beginning of the process were what the Turks’ relationship with 
the ancient civilization of Anatolia, the Hittites, was. Who the settlers in Turkey and the 
people creating civilization were. What the role of the Turks in the history of world and 
the emergence of civilization was. Ibid., 245.
Ibid., 246. On a general evaluation of the thesis on Central Asia, see Afet İnan, 
“Tarihten”.
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due west toward the Near East, developed those various ancient civilizations now 
called Sumerians, Hittite, and other prehistoric ones of Asia Minor.^^
For this reason, before the Semitic Babylonians, Chaldeans, Ninevites and Assyrians in 
the Middle East, 2000 years B . C., the Sumerians and Elamites, lived there and founded a 
high standard of life, 5000 years B . C. They were not peoples depicted under the name of 
Aryan and Semitic, but of Turkic origin circulated under “the name Turanian.”^^
It is obvious in the thesis that the concept of civilization was the most stressed 
theme. As stated above, the Turks in history first of all came to the fore with their 
distinguished ability of creating great civilizations, and, in such a way, contributing to the 
progress and emergence of modern civilization as being a sole creator of civilization. Of
the Turks as the origin o f all human civilization, the myth proclaimed to prove that the 
Turks, whose culture appropriated universal aspects, had been a civilized race from 
prehistoric times. The driving force behind the assertion that the Turks were not 
barbarous humankind since remote antiquity was the open rejection of being the Other of 
the West. According to the thesis, this characteristic made them a leader nation by 
rendering very great “services” to all human beings, such as, teaching other nations how 
to cultivate and how to work metals, and building big cities and founding strong states.
Throughout history this service enabled mankind to be civilized, cultured and
Sherril quoted from his talk with Mustafa Kemal on the history thesis. See 
Charles H. Sherril, A Year’s Embassy to Mustafa Kemal (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1934), 211.
Yusuf Akçura, “Birinci Türk,” 28. However, in the course of time, they 
gradually forgot their Turkishness and became Semitic. See Tarihi, 87-88.
263
progressed. This was the result of the Turks’ civilizing and ordering capabilities. Thus, 
from the beginning, Turkish history signified an ahistoricized way of life which was 
“materialized” with the modern codes and standards of Western civilization. No doubt, 
this tendency might be explicit if it is evaluated within the frame of the Kemalist concept 
of civilization for which modern/western civilization was the most developed human 
form; as discussed in Chapter III, at the center of this belief there was the idea of linear 
progress of world history. Thus, by applying universalized modern standards, the 
Kemalist historians did not hesitate to construct, exaggerate and judge past events 
without situating them in any historical context. The result was fabrication of the 
necessary myths, memories, values and symbols in place of that of the Ottoman-Islamic 
past and tradition. By such Turkification of world history, it was aimed to show that the 
Turkish nation had been part of a broader picture of the world civilization, that is, 
western civilization. To put it in other words, Turkification of the world history was one 
end product of its Westernization.
Secondly, in the Turkish History Thesis, in order to show Anatolia as a Turkish 
homeland since remote antiquity, greater efforts were spent. It was the result of two 
needs; the first, to refute Greek and Armenian nationalist claims according to which the
For the Turks’ services to mankind, see Afet İnan, Atatürk Hakkında, 202-203; 
Etienne Copeaux, 'H izmet A Key Word in The Turkish Historical Narrative.” New 
Perspectives On Turkey. 14 (1996), 100-101; Mehmet Saffet Engin, Kemalizm 
İnkılabının Prensipleri [The Principles of The Revolution of Kemalism], vol. I (İstanbul; 
Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938), 235. Türk Tarihinin Anahatlarına Medhal (Introduction to 
The Outline of Turkish History) was full of the claims of verifying the Turks’ services to 
mankind that had been deliberately ignored in European historiographies. See Türk 
Tarihinin Anahatlanna Medhal (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932). Even, it was implied 
that the Turks played a leading role in the development of the Islamic religion and 
civilization and produced the greatest philosophers of the Islamic world. Ibid., 69.
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Turks were newcomers and so did not have any rights on Anatolia. According to the 
thesis the assumption that the Turks came to Anatolia with the Seljuks or at the earliest a 
thousand years before, was a mistake that needed correction. In fact, the Turks had been 
the true inhabitants of Anatolia thousands of years before the coming of the Seljuks. 
The second was the urgent need to fill the gap in histoiy of Anatolia resulted from the 
rejection of the Islamic-Ottoman past. For these reasons, the Republican regime began to 
seek its past in ancient Anatolian civilizations.
Especially, for this purpose, the Hittites attracted particular attention of the 
Kemalist nationalist historians, the sole legislators of the t he s i s .Th e i r  discovery of the 
Hittites was a blessed opportunity for them to create a second past in Anatolia. In the 
thesis, the Hittites who, together with the Sumerians, were a Turkish people were shown 
as the original inhabitants of Anatolia. Their language resembled that of the Elamites and 
the Sumerians, which were neither Indo-European nor S e m i t i c . “They”, Webster 
writes, “were brachycephalic, like the Sumerians and the Elamites -unlike the European
101 Karal “Atatürk’ün,” 58.
This claim was elaborated on to some extent to show that the Greeks and 
Armenians living in Anatolia came from Turkish origin. It was for this reason that the 
Turks who came later to Anatolia accepted Islam, but the majority of those already 
settled had accepted the various forms of Christianity. See Lootfy Levonian, trans, and 
ed.. The Turkish Press, 1932-1936 (Beirut: The American Press, 1937), 64; Cumhuriyet, 
15 December 1932.
The Turkishness of the Hittite was extensively emphasized at the first congress 
by Reşit Galip. See Reşit Galip “Türk Irkı,” 131 and 155-156.
Until the early 1930s, it was unclear as to which linguistic family the language 
of the Hittites called “heiroglyph” belonged. Later, it became clear that it belonged to the 
Indo-European linguistic group. Yet, because the Sun Language Theory of 1936 proved
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Semites. At the time the Sumerians moved into Mesopotamia, the Hittites possessed an 
advanced stone-age culture, engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, and built 
houses and b o a t s . F o r  one of the Kemalist politician historians, the vestiges of the 
prehistory did therefore testify that the Hittites whose civilization was of the 
brachycephalic Turks founded a “high culture in Anatolia” hundreds of years before 
Judaic, ancient Aegean, and Christian civi l izat ions.This  was also true for other 
inhabitants of Anatolia and the Aegean Islands. In short, it is prevalent in the thesis 
that Anatolia began to be Turkicized from the end of the Paleolithic age and it reached its 
maximum point in the Chalcolithic age. The continuos invasions for thousands years until 
the end of the Selcuks (the mid-thirteenth century) made Anatolia one of the places, in its 
purest sense, belonging to Turkishness.
All in all, the pioneers of the Turkish History Thesis attempted to prove and 
establish Anatolia as a Turkish land and the center of their civilization since prehistoric 
times in a “scientific” way by ignoring its Islamic past. This was the act of remembrance, 
in which it is obvious that the result would be the rise of the Turks’ sense of belonging to 
their true homeland, Anatolia, and the justification for the Turkish presence in Anatolia. 
In general, the Kemalist return to “pristine” traditions, or a “forgotten” past, appeared as
that all tongues come from the Turkish language, this discovery was not so significant for 
the nationalist historians. See Copeaux, Türk Tarih, 32.
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Webster, The Turkey, 242.
See Saffet (Engin), “Anandolu’da,” 263, 265.
After the Hittites, other settlers of Anatolia, the Phrygians (becoming dominant 
after 1500 B. C.) and the Lydians (coming to Anatolia after 800 B. C.) were of Turkish 
origin. Moreover, the first settlers of the Aegean Islands came from Anatolia, who were
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a zeal to help fill the gap created by the rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past and to 
establish a solid basis for a new Turkish culture. In fact, the official historical doctrine 
targeted its ethnic and cultural differences and cosmopolitan values of the old and 
traditional life forms. This was a constituent part of the efforts of ahistoricizing Anatolia 
to transform its inhabitants into a oneness by forging a new identity.
5.3.2. Culture and History in the Kem alist Historiography
Parallel to a discursive strategy which required the use of the concept of culture 
interchangeably with that of civilization, towards the mid-1930s, much emphasis in all 
writings on Turkish history was placed on the Turks’ role in history as culture creators 
and transmitters since prehistoric times. Here, the term culture was used as a sub­
derivative of civilization, denoting a high standard of life forms. Putting forward the idea 
that the Turks had created and transmitted culture, the thesis came to reject the 
Eurocentric interpretation of the progress of civilization and culture according to which 
Europe was the native land of culture, and so Europeans undertook the task of bringing it 
to all of humanity. In this respect, Muzaffer (Goker) - General Secretary of the Society -  
claimed:
It is not true that culture was discovered in the West and brought to the East. 
Culture, from the Neolithic age to the last centuries, became apparent and 
widespread in the life of humanity for the first time when the Turks created and 
elevated its most deep-seated form in Central Asia. The Turks presented it to all 
human beings. For that reason, the first cultural nation of humanity is that of the
brachyphalic and therefore Turks. On Turkicizing Anatolia and the Aegean world, see
Tarih I.
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Turks creating a first human culture. This is about our history thesis (my 
emphasis).
The accentuation of the Turks as culture creators shed light on the relationship of culture 
with history in the thesis. This relation finds its best expression in the words of Afet 
İnan;
Turkish history had been in evident relationship to the cultural history of 
humankind; it was the cradle of all cultures. The Turks who were white, Aryan 
and brachycephalic were the descendants of those who were the oldest culture- 
creators. According to the testimony of the vestiges of culture, their homeland 
was Central Asia. Wherever they went with the torch of culture were the places 
where civilization prevailed... Culture of every age in Anatolia is familiar to that 
of the Turkish race. Since antiquity, Turkish race has existed in Anatolia with its 
culture, while there has been the hegemony of various political entities and the 
difference in its names throughout history.
For her, the Turkish History Society worked to confirm these facts in conformity with its 
founding principle, which was to write a general outline of Turkish history and place it in 
its worthy place in the world culture. Central Asia and Anatolia were, therefore, not only 
the homeland of the Turks, but also the oldest centers of culture.^*® In Hasan Cemil 
Çambel’s article written on the death of Atatürk we find the similar mode with greater 
stress on Atatürk’s role:
Muzaffer (Göker), “Türk Soyu ve Türk Tarihi” [Turkish Race and Turkish 
History]. Ülkü. (Birincikanun 1934), 253.
Afet İnan, “Türk Tarih,” 5-6. As a preliminary argument, she made a similar 
statement in 1931 at the First History Congress as to the way that both in prehistoric and 
historic times “Turkish race had achieved a high level of culture in its homeland while 
the peoples of Europe were still ignorant barbarians.” Afet İnan, “Tarihten,” 40.
110 See Günaltay, “Tarih Tezi,” 343.
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Atatürk was the first man who saw for the first time the line of the culture of 
humankind from prehistory up to now, its first roots in Central Asia from ten 
thousand years, and the creative and spreading role of the Turks in this trend... In 
history for the first time he saw and believed that all nations of the world come 
together under a unity o f culture, and so all human beings are relatives from the 
point of unity in culture. He called for all human communities to unite around this 
new ideal he found out from the reality of the old and new history... With his 
charisma, he stood before the world and cried: “Unite! because you are one and 
the children of same culture”.*^ *
This was for example evident in the case of the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a 
museum in 1932 by the order of Atatürk. Here, in parallel with the cultural policies of the 
Republic, the aim was to create the affinity of the people with “the past” of homeland. 
“This,” writes Kuban, “was also the recognition of the status of a great monument’s
99 1 1 2significance for universal culture.”
A similar account was also the dominant theme of the writings of the İnönü 
period. For example, Uluğ İğdemir began his article on the Third Turkish History 
Congress by highlighting that Atatürk strove to raise the Turkish nation to the cultural 
level of modern nations through making them “remember the honorable and bright 
past.”"^ That is to say, it had been “the Turkish nation that had transmitted the lights of
culture to nations all over the world.”114
Hasan Cemil Çambel, “Atatürk and Tarih” [Atatürk and History]. Belleten. 
III/IO (1939), 270-271. Şevket Aziz Kansu, in his article in the same volume, argues that 
the dynamics of Atatürk’s reforms was based upon the cultural atmosphere Atatürk 
wanted to create. Atatürk tried to shed lights on the place of the Turks in the genealogy of 
humankind as cultural bearers. Şevket Aziz Kansu, “Atatürk.” Belleten. III/IO (1939), 
275.
See Doğan Kuban, “Coservation of Historical Heritage during the Republican 
Era.” Turkish Review. 2/7 (1987), 65. For him this directly related to “the importance 
given to the study of Anatolian archaeology during his [Mustafa Kemal’s] time.”
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Consequently, what was implied in the above argument was that as cultural 
gardeners the Turks carried on the mission of establishing cultured and ordered society. 
In the process, this mission was interrupted with the Ottoman rule which was portrayed 
as a period of despotism, misrule and anarchy. In the view of the Kemalists, today, the 
Europeans, whose civilization and culture was the highest and most developed one, have 
maintained this task. They created this culture mostly by inspiring knowledge produced 
by the Turks. “Nowadays, it is not just to see the possession o f culture, which ought to be 
common, as belonging to one nation” (my emphasis).*'^ The historical role of the Turks 
in forming the first civilizations and cultures provided them with the right to regain the 
culture that was prevalent in the West. Cultivating land, applying metal-works, civilized 
life patterns (organized urban life, softened behavior, tolerance, pity, and so on) were in 
the Kemalist historiography among the most stressed aspects of culture the Turks created 
and flourished throughout history. Based on the idea of endless-progress in every sphere 
of life, this concept of culture signifies the “high” way of life compared with barbaric and 
primitive one. Therefore, finally, one might argue that the Kemalists’ interest in histoiy- 
writing was considered as the quest for a historical justification to the process of culture 
production.
To sum up, the Kemalist nationalist project, like all nationalist projects, was based on an 
imagination for the past as well as the future. It had to prove that history provided a
İğdemir, “HI. Türk,” 1. 
"" Karal, “Atatürk’ün,” 63.
1 1 5 Muzaffer, “Türk Soyu,” 253.
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legitimization for its causes. The Kemalist historiography seemed to validate a view of 
cultural history as simply the amoral pursuit of raison d’etat. Here the role of history was 
to re-write the past such as to prove that the nation was historically deep-rooted, and in 
this way to create historical continuity between the past and the present. The definition of 
“the past” was the main question the politician historians of the new regime dealt with. 
They were very selective in the construction of the past. Here history-writing was 
maintained through the denial of the other. As the main part of their discursive strategies, 
the Orient, including the Ottoman Empire and Islamic/Arabic worlds, was portrayed as 
established Others on the basis of myth and fantasy. Then especially emphasizing the pre­
historic times they attempted to construct a new “national history” by transforming all 
possible differences and pluralities in history into oneness. This quest for inherent 
oneness and continuity in history strove to be realized with an act of “forgetting” or the 
rejection of one thousand year past (Islam/Ottoman). It was in such a form of 
figuration* that myths and fantasies replaced realities.
Kemalist positivistic historicism was preoccupied with the idea that there was an 
endless march of progress toward the “better”, “rational”, and “comfortable”. 
Civilization, that of the West, had represented this line throughout history. Kemalist 
historicism implied the will of articulating into the genealogy of “civilization” and 
“culture.” According to it, the Turks had a right to belong to that civilization because they 
were its first initiators and carriers to the rest of the world. It was in this respect that
For such form of figuration, see John Pratt, “Norbert Elias and the Civilized 
Prison.” British Journal o f Sociology. 50/2 (June 1999), 275; Norbert Elias, The Germans 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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Kemalist historicism serves to legitimize the position of the Turks willing to uphold a 
high life constituted by the civilized nations, that is, Kemalist westernizing reforms.
In the Early Republican period, the state elite launched a widespread historical 
crusade through the school system and adult education centers (the People’s Houses and 
Rooms) to arouse consciousness of being firmly established in a secular genealogy or 
time-period in the hearts of the new Turks. This campaign tried to “remind” them that 
they had been part of a “great family”, the carrier of all “civilized” and “cultured” 
qualities throughout the centuries. So did they have the right to live as peoples of the 
“civilized” world did. At the same time, the Turkish History Thesis became extensively 
intrinsic to all aspects of the Kemalist Revolution. In addition to its usage in implanting 
new historical “facts” in Turkish minds by means of all educational and cultural 
institutions and organizations, as one of the Kemalist meta-narratives, it was stressed to 
provide a legitimate cause for political, social, economic, cultural and legal regulations. 
For example, coupled with the very control of the state on all economic affairs, two state- 
owned banks were named as Sümer Bank (The Bank of Sumer) and Eti Bank (The Hittite 




THE “LANGUAGE QUESTION” AS A CULTURAL DILEMMA AND 
THE TURKISH LANGUAGE SOCIETY
During Nevruz^ celebrations in 2000 some local newspapers wrote it as Newroz, 
upon which the official authorities brought suit against those newspapers that spelled the 
term Nevruz as Newroz? This act indeed resulted from the new official attitude to the 
term. When during the early 1990s it gradually came to be the symbol of revolting 
against the Turkish state, the official authorities tried to tame it and declared that Nevruz, 
not Newroz, was really a Turkish festival commemorated by the Turks through centuries. 
In this way they tried to turn it into part of official cultural ideology, written as Nevruz as 
opposed to local usage, Newroz. This case seems to be very illustrative to show the 
importance of the issue of language as a political and cultural dilemma in Turkish politics 
and society, and to what extent language has become politicized. In this way language 
has had a central place in determining the boundaries of the official notion of culture, 
and, at the same time, it has been used as a vehicle by forces from the center for different 
identification processes.
’ Neruz is a popular festive celebrated in the South East region of Turkey and 
some Turkic societies as the starting day of spring.
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The politicization of language in Turkey, closely tied with the state’s discourse of 
culture, is one significant end product of the official cultural policies of the Kemalist 
regime. Its seeds were found in the early Republican period when a process of language 
revolution was initiated, especially through the works and activities of the Turkish 
Language Society that was founded in 1932 as an official body. This quest was based on 
a purifying approach to eliminate all foreign grammatical rules and words from the 
Turkish language. In fact, together with the alphabet change in 1928, the foundation of 
the TLS was one of the critical turning points of the language revolution. It signified the 
goal to create oz Türkçe (pure Turkish) by ending the dominance of foreign lexical 
elements, mostly Arabic and Persian, in the Turkish language. And, in their place, the 
TLS strove to institute oz Türkçe words which were generally taken from dialects in and 
outside Turkey and old literary texts, and also invented some in accord with existing 
Turkish roots.
In this chapter, in order to trace the process of the creation of oz Türkçe, the 
discussions on the alphabet change and the works and activities of the Turkish Language 
Society will be analyzed. And, in doing so, it will be shown that new Turkish language 
with its new letters and words became one of the constituent parts of a new Turkish 
culture the modernizing rulers attempted to create from scratch.
6.1. The Revolution in Language and Its Background
2 Celal Başlangıç, “Bunu da mı W’apacaktmiz!”, Radikal (April 1, 2000), 19.
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Together with history, language was seen as an indispensable component for the 
Kemalist project of culture and society, foreseeing that it had to be reproduced as a new 
entity. It was based on the belief that, like all aspects of culture, language could be 
reformed in accordance with the politically designed plan and thus used as an effective 
tool to rename and reshape a new social and political order.^ This was the trend of 
revolutionizing the language with stress on its political role in the formation of culture 
and identity. Here language appears as an another “man-made” object. It was the link 
between language and power'* which made it easy for the Kemalist revolutionaries to 
rename the world according to their own aesthetic preferences. The revolution in 
language, as part of the Kemalist civilizing process from above, was initiated in general 
by the state elite, politicians and non-professionals rather than linguists. What was done 
from above was therefore at the first hand linguistic engineering, bound up with a 
political project of creating a new culture. Oz Türkçe as a new language would be an 
instrumental device “to spread culture among the people. It should be a language through 
which the flow of thought and idea from above is possible in order to publicize and 
inculcate cu l t u r e . I t  was “scientification of language”  ^ entirely inspired by Kemalist
3 This use of language was very common in the France of the Jacobins after the 
Revolution. See Robert Darnton, The Kiss o f Lamourtte (New York; Norton, 1990), 6-7. 
This was one result of the belief in the power of the human being to re-form and re­
construct reality. It was also evident in the American Revolution. See Cynthia S. Jordan, 
Second Stories: The Politics o f Language, Form, and Gender in Early American Fiction 
(Chaphel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 7, 10-11. This was one 
result of the belief in the power of human being to re-form and re-construct reality.
' •For the relation between language and power or authority and the usage of 
language as a device for “the act of renaming”, see Cynthia S. Jordan, Second Stories: 
The Politics o f Language, Form, and Gender in Early American Fiction (Chaphel Hill; 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 10-11.
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positivism. In fact, this was in parallel with the cultural tendency of the new regime that, 
as Heyd aptly puts it, engendered a “complete break with the Islamic past and the 
adoption of the secular values of modern civilization. The new outlook led, inter alia, to 
the introduction of the Latin script and the an urgent demand for the creation of a 
language capable of fully expressing the thoughts and feelings common to Occidental 
culture.”’ Based on this formula, the official discursive formation of language gradually 
took its shape through the process in which there were the two main steps; the first, the 
adoption of the Latin alphabet, the second, the creation of oz Türkçe by eliminating all 
foreign elements.
The discussions on alphabet change and purification attempts in Turkey did not, 
of course, suddenly spring up with the establishment of the Republic, but dated back to 
the Tanzimat reform movement. As mentioned in Chapter III, the transformation in the 
Ottoman vision of society resulted in the emergence of a new idea of people anymore 
composed of individuals who were seen as being educated and enlightened. This world­
view went hand in hand with the idea of “educating the people” that, toward the mid­
nineteenth century, was coupled with the need for a common language that ordinary 
people could easily understand. The new trend became very visible in the attempts of the 
Tanzimat elite to simplify the legal, administrative and educational language. In the
5 “Gazi Türkcesi” [Gazi Turkish], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 
1932), 114. Here the main expectation was that this new language would be “a genuine 
and vigorous language expressing a whole culture and civilization as well as other 
languages, [of the civilized world].” Ibid., 116.
 ^ The expression is of F. Rifki Atay. See Falih Rifki Atay, “Dil Kurultayı” 
[Language Congress], \n Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1936), 518.
’ Uriel Heyd, L an^aee  Reform in Modern Turkey (Jerusalem; The Israel Oriental 
Society, 1954), 20.
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second half of the nineteenth century, the rise of a new modern intellectual group and the 
spreading effect of newspapers accelerated the tendency of purification and 
simplification. For the modern-educated intellectuals, along with modern standards, 
Ottoman Turkish had to be corrected in a way by putting a strong emphasis on Turkish 
words and coining new terms from Arabic and Persian origin through changing their 
meaning and spelling.* The rapid spread of newspapers, using standard language, played 
a leading role in the process of forming a common language through simplification. This 
is indeed in a greater degree what Benedict Anderson refers to the “print capitalism” that 
brought about a common language, necessary for the persistence of nationalism and the 
possibility of a national imagined community.^ In the Ottoman Empire, as occurred in 
Europe, language began to emerge as being the main dimension for expressing new 
cultural affiliation which went beyond the particularistic one, and so served as a bond for 
the people seen as belonging to the same community.
The search for a standard, common language held the main place in the nationalist 
writings of the last three decades of the Empire. Seeing language as one of the 
constituting aspects of nation, the Turkish nationalists began to give importance to the 
Turkish part of the Ottoman language and regard the vernacular of the people as a 
reservoir of Turkish language needing help to become prevalent. This view began to gain 
support from the various sections of the intellectuals and rulers, especially during the rule
* Consequently, almost all literary works of Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Ali 
Suavi, Ahmet Mithat and others became nearer to spoken language, as opposite to the 
Ottoman literary tradition. For further details on the developments of the period, see 
Agah Sırrı Levend, Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri [Phases of Development 
and Purification in Turkish Language], 3'^ '* ed. (Ankara; TDK, 1972), 113-148.
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of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (1908-18) striving to create a linguistic 
unity among various layers of society. Newspaper and literary languages began to be 
simplified, especially stimulated by the activities of the Turkist movement.'® Among 
them, the most important one was the “new language movement” led by the prominent 
Turkists such as Ömer Seyfeddin and Ziya Gökalp." The basic aim of the movement was 
to create a Yeni Lisan (New Language) through standardizing the vernacular of the 
people, especially that of I s tanbul .The “new language”, during the reign of the CUP, 
received political support and gradually became the legal and administrative language as 
much as the newspaper and literary one.
In all discussions on the language reform from the beginning of Ottoman 
modernization, the alphabet, particularly letters, had become the hottest issue. During the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, language simplification attempts
 ^ See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread o f Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 37-82.
'® From the early 1910s, the activities of Türk Derneği (Turkish Association), 
journals -Türk Yurdu (Turkish Land), Halka Doğru (Toward the People), Türk Sözü 
(Turkish Speech)- and the literary movement known as Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) 
intensified the simplifying trend by placing a strong stress on a written version of the 
spoken language. See Levend, Türk Dilinde, 300, and, for further information, 300-347.
' '  It required the elimination of Arabic and Persian grammatical rules and some 
words for which there existed Turkish synonyms in the spoken language, and the coinage 
of technical terms from Arabic roots. In this sense. Ziya Gökalp’s language reform 
program was the main product of the movement. He strove to give birth to a language 
(one of the main components in his definition of culture) free from all foreign elements 
and understandable for everybody. For his program, see Ziya Gökalp, The Principles o f  
Tiirkism, translated by Robert Devereux (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 93-94.
'2  Yusuf Ziya Öksüz, Türkçenin Sadeleşme Tarihi Genç Kalemler ve Yeni 
LisanHareketi [History of Simplification of Turkish: Young Pens and New Language 
Movement] (Ankara: TDK, 1995), 170
'3 Heyd, Language, 18.
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came with some efforts for modifications in the alphabet.!^ In the CUP period, although 
the need for reforming the alphabet to express Turkish phonemes and syllables in a 
proper way was widely recognized, the main discussion on the issue of alphabet took 
place between the pro-western!st strand and moderate group including the Turkists and 
Islamists. The former, believing in a revolutionary turn, insisted on the necessity of a 
change in the alphabet, for, in their views, the Arabic letters were not suitable for writing 
and wording of Turkish well.*^ The moderates opposed any serious changes in the Arabic 
alphabet, while accepting some new arrangements to make the alphabet easily read and 
wri t ten.During the rule of the CUP, the views of the moderates became the official
As parallel with the attempts made to purify Turkish in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, some people began to state loudly that some modifications on the 
Arabic letters were essential for the writing of Turkish. For some proposals on 
modifications in the alphabet, see M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, Atatürk ve Harf Devrimi [Atatürk 
and Language Revolution] (Ankara: TDK, 1973), 17-20; Münif Paşa, “İmla Meselesi” 
[Problem of Orthography], in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Alfabe Tartışmaları [Discussions 
on Alphabet from the Tanzimat to the Republic], ed. Hüseyin Yorulmaz (Istanbul: 
Kitabevi, 1995) (original publication 1863), 25-28; Namık Kemal, “Kıraat ve Islah-ı 
Huruf Meselesi” [Reading and Alphabet Rreform], in ibid (original publication 1869), 
48-59; Ali Suavi, “Lisan ve Hatt-ı Türki” [Language and Writing in Turkish], in ibid 
(original publication 1870), 60-89. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the issue of 
alphabet was dealt with seriously as a public matter by Şemsettin Sami, who made some 
changes in the alphabet. He even prepared a new alphabet known as “the Istanbul 
Alphabet” in Latin characters which might be seen as antecedent to the Turkish Script 
Reform in 1928. See Frances Trix, “The Stamboul Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey: 
Precursor to Turkish Script Reform.” Int. J. o f Middle Eastern Studies. 31 (1999), 255- 
272.
>5 Among the westernists, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Abdullah Cevdet, Celal Nuri 
(İleri) and Kılıçzade Hakkı came to the fore as leading figures in drawing the need for 
alphabet change, proposing to form a new alphabet based on the Latin one. See Ülkütaşır, 
Atatürk, 29-33, 38-41; Bilal Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi [Turkish Alphabet Revolution] 
(Ankara: TDK, 1992), 47-52. As in most reforms of the Republic, the westernists’ call for 
change in the alphabet might be seen as forerunner of the 1928 alphabet revolution.
This was evident in all writings of the moderates of the period. See Şimşir, Türk 
Yazı, 44-45, 47-48.
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line.'’^ In general, the CUP’s efforts seemed to be part of the quest for forming a common 
vernacular, necessary for drawing the boundaries of the community composed of those 
who had similar feelings. In the 1920s, after the proclamation of the Republic, the 
alphabet as a most problematic side of language reform in Turkey kept appearing on the 
agenda as a contested issue.
6.2. The Alphabet Change as Part of the Republican Civilizing Process from Above
With the first attempts to build the institutions of a nation-state during the early 
years of the Republic, a common language was seen essential to make the masses 
conscious of being a cultural whole. The civilizing rulers of the new regime regarded 
language necessary for political and cultural identity and so the essential and unique way 
to become a nation.'^ For their goals, as opposite to Second Meşrutiyet reformers and 
intellectuals’ general tendency for simplification of the language without a direct
”  As an official body, in 1914, Islahat-i İlmiye Encümeni (The Committee for 
Scientific Terms), working on correcting and regulating the rules of letter and writing, 
was founded; among its members were Babanzade Naim, Ziya Gökalp, Rıza Tevfik 
(Bölükbaşı) and Ismail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu). Based on the fact that Arabic letters had to 
be written separately to be easily read and written, Enver Paşa in 1917 attempted to put in 
use in some official affairs a new alphabet, known as huruf-u munfasıla, hatt-i cedid or 
Enverpaşa yazısı. See G. L. Lewis, “Atatürk’s Language Reform as an Aspect of 
Modernization in the Republic of Turkey”, in Atatürk and Modernization o f Turkey, ed. 
Jacob M. Landau (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 196.
In the 1924 Constitution, Turkish was declared as the official language of the 
State (Part One, Article 3). Article 42 forbade the use of any language other than Turkish 
“taught as mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of training and education.” 
See “Constitution of the Republic of Turkey” quoted as Appendix D in Donald Everett 
Webster, The Turkey o f Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation 
(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political And Social Science, 1939), 297-236.
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intervention in its structure, the rulers aimed to create a pure Turkish, formulated to be 
realized in a revolutionary zeal.
The alphabet change in 1928 was the first phase in the state’s language revolution. 
In the period of 1923 to 1928, although there was wide consensus on the necessity of 
simplification in language, the main continuous discussion occurred on the letters and 
orthography. In this way the alphabet had become the subject of heated debate from the 
early days of the Republic. In the debate two leading groups came to the fore: the first 
was the supporters for change composed of those who were mostly followers of the 
western! St strand in the CUP period, and the second, the opponents who had been 
moderate in the matter of language, of the same period. The debate began with a motion 
made by İzmirli Nazmi with his two friends at the İzmir Economic Conference in 
February - March 1923, which was not taken into consideration by the chairman Kazım 
Karabekir because of the reason that “Latin letters being harmful for the unity of 
I slam” . 20 Immediately, after Kazım Karabekir’s views against the Latin letters published 
in the newspapers, a fervent discussion began to dominate the public. In the following 
days, in the Tanin and Resimli Gazete (İstanbul daily), Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and 
Kılıçzade Hakkı (Kılıçoğlu) who argued for the change published articles refuting Kazım
'9 For more information on the issue of language of the period, see Levend, Türk 
Dilinde, 389-391.
20 See Ülkütaşır, Atatürk, 44. In the following days, in a newspaper interview. 
Kazım Karabekir explained his views on the issue that the call for adopting the Latin 
letters was the satanic idea propagated by the enemies of Turkey, by which it was aimed 
to separate Turkey from the rest of the Islamic world, and the Arabic letters were not so 
difficult to write and read and ugly as was declared. For the text of the interview, see 
Levend, Türk Dilinde, 392-393; For his other statements published in newspapers, see 
Kazım Karabekir, “Latin Harflerini Kabul Edemeyiz” [We Can’t Accept Latin Letters], 
in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, 90-93.
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Karabekir’s views on the alphabet and mentioned the necessity of an alphabet reform to 
be freed from the burdens of ignorance.21 Both writers in company with Abdullah Cevdet 
and Celal Nuri (İleri), who had been the main carriers of the westernist models from the 
early years of the Second Meşrutiyet, had been the loyal defenders of the idea of a 
revolution in the alphabet. And also, on the issue as in most of the reforms, from early 
1910 on, they had implied the way commonly followed in later years by the rulers of the 
new regime. Even the debate was carried in the parliament; in 1924, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, 
during the session on the budget of the Ministry of National Education, put the blame on 
Arabic letters as a main cause of the ignorance and backwardness of Turkish people. 22 In 
1926, once again the issue of the Latin letters became a widely and heatedly discussed 
topic among the intellectual and political circles. Most of the linguists, historians and 
writers were against the proposed change in the alphabet.23 For them any change in letters
2’ Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) in his article (entitled “Latin Hurufli ile Türkçe Yazmak 
Mümkün müdür?” published in the Resimli Gazete (on 2 2  September 1923) whose 
editorial policy was opposed to the proposed change) promoted the idea that the existing 
Arabic letters were responsible for illiteracy and ignorance, and if replaced with that of 
Latin ones, would open a new horizon for young generations who would easily learn to 
read and write. For him there was not any religious obligation behind the use of the 
Arabic letters, but it was just a matter of choice. “Of course, there are many difficulties in 
passing to a new alphabet. But, why will the people who sacrifice their life for the sake of 
fatherland suffer this “cultural sacrifice” on behalf of eternal cause of fatherland?” 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Latin Hurufli ile Türkçe Yazı Yazmak Mümkün müdür?” [Is It 
Possible to Write in Turkish with Latin Letters?], in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, 94-97.
22 See Sami N. Özerdim, Yazı Devrimin Öyküsü [The Story of Alphabet 
Revolution] (Ankara: TDK, 1978), 20. And also, for the debate of the period, see Şimşir, 
Türk Yazı, 57-63.
23 From on 28 March 1926, \n Akşam (Istanbul daily), opponents of the proposed 
change, began an inquiry on whether to accept or reject the Latin letters among the 
leading writers and scholars. Among the respondents (15 writers and scholars) were just 
only three persons (Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, Refet Avni (Aras), Mustafa Hamit) who 
defeneded change. Among the opponents were Ali Ekrem (Bolayir), Muallim Cevdet
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would damage the continuity in intellectual and daily life of the nation. The debate 
between the proponents and the opponents of the proposed idea continued at the end of
1926.
At that point, in order to provide a background overview to the 1928 revolution 
and later purifying attempts of the early 1930s, it seems necessary to summarize both 
groups’ views. The main arguments of the supporters, who were among the leading 
figures of the westernists of the Second Meşrutiyet, were based on, first, the failure of the 
Arabic letters in expressing Turkish and the compatibility of the Latin one with Turkish, 
and second, the justification of new letters through the general westernizing and 
civilizing ideology of the new regime. '^* The first argument was mainly about the nature
(İnançalp), Necip Asım (Yazıksız), İbrahim Alaaddin (Gövsa), Avram Galanti, Halil 
Nimetullah (Öztürk), Veled Çelebi (İzbudak), Halit Ziya (Uşakhgil), İbrahim Necmi 
(Dilmen) and Gombotes Zoltan (Hungarian professor). For their detailed evaluations and 
judgements, see “Latin Harflerini Kabul Etmeli mi. Etmemeli mi?” [Should Latin Letters 
Be Accepted or Not?] (original publication, 1926), in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, 194- 
232. As prominent figures of the opponents, Avram Galanti and Fuat Köprülü came to 
the fore. For Galanti’s views on the issue, see Avram Galanti, Arabi Harfler Terakkimize 
Mani Değildir [Arabic Letters Do Not Hinder Our Progress], 2"^  ed. (Istanbul: Bedir 
Yay., 1996) (original publication 1925). Rejecting a revolutionary transformation in 
social and cultural life through a “rationally” modelled formula from above Fuat Köprülü 
evaluated all proposals for a change in the alphabet revolutionary in nature. See 
Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, “Harf Meselesi” [Question of Alphabet] (original 
publication 1926), in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, 233-35; idem, “Lisanımıza Dair” [On 
Our Language] (original publication 1927), in Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II  [Ideational 
Life of Atatürk Period], eds. Mehmet Kaplan et al (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 
1992), 33-37. Nevertheless, this stands in sharp contrast to his statements made 12 years 
later when he wished to become part of the official trend and became one of the 
champions of the new letters. For which see Köprülüzade Fuad, “Alfabe İnkilabı” 
[Alphabet Revolution]. Ülkü. 67 (1938), 1-2.
2“* For their claims, see Hüseyin Yorulmaz, “Islah-i Huruf tan Tebdil-i Hurufa” 
[From Reforming the Alphabet to Alphabet Change], in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, 8-9; 
Avni (Başman), “Latin Harfleri Meselesi” [Question of Latin Letters] (original 
publication 1926), in ibid., 244-245. For typical examples of the writings reflecting the 
proponents’ inclinations, see Falih Rifki (Atay), “Latin Harfleri” [Latin Letters], in
283
of Arabic letters which did not suit Turkish and so did cause a serious difficulty in 
Turkish orthography and Turkish spelling. Thus these letters had been responsible for 
widespread illiteracy and ignorance. Due to the fact that the Latin letters very easy 
compared to Arabic one, the new alphabet would be easy to write and read for 
everybody. Secondly, if Western civilization was wholly accepted, then it was necessary 
to imitate its writing and reading style and so adapt its Latin letters to the Turkish 
language; if otherwise, the Turkish revolution would be incomplete. In this respect, 
accordingly, the adoption of the Latin alphabet would be the redemption of the Turkish 
nation “chained in darkness” with the Arabic one seen responsible for the miserable 
condition of all Muslims.
On the other hand, the opponents who were mostly the Turkists and Islamists of 
the Second Meşrutiyet developed a moderate attitude to the issue of language. They 
essentially emphasized some practical reasons why there was no need for the Latin 
alphabet and the fear of a cultural and mental break with the heritage of the past.^^ In 
their views, although it was necessary to make some corrections in the alphabet and add 
some letters, Turkish had adjusted to the existing Arabic letters in its structure. Contrary 
to the views of the proponents, they argued that the ignorance and illiteracy among the
Hayatı II, 23-25; İzzet Ulvi, “Yeni Türk Harfleri Münasebetiyle” [On the Occasion of 
New Turkish Letters], ibid., 50-55; Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), “Latin Harfleri” [Latin 
Letters], in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete (original publication 1923), 94-98; Celal Nuri 
(İleri), “Latin Harfleri Meselesi” [Question of the Latin Letters], ibid (original 
publication 1928), 285-301.
25 For the opponents’ views, see ibid., 9-10; Avni (Başman), “Latin,” 245-46, 
Zeki Velidi criticized the proposed change in the alphabet, arguing that for the sake of 
participating in a new civilization and creating a new culture, adoption of Latin alphabet 
would cause “deep crisis and erase entirely national culture (milli hars) in the near
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people stemmed from economic backwardness and insufficiency of a true national 
education, but not necessarily the letters. So, in order to be an integral part of Western 
civilization, it was not necessary to adjust to its form of writing. The focal point of their 
argument was that the adoption of the Latin letters would bring about a loss of the ties 
with a vast religious and cultural literary tradition. In short, what this meant was that the 
basic discussion in terms of the proposed reform in letters occurred around determining 
the preferences of how to be westernized, that is, whether or not it was indispensable to 
make transformation in the alphabet to participate in Western civilization. After 1926, in 
accordance with the revolutionary zeal of the civilizing rulers the trend began gradually 
turning on behalf of those who supported the change.
Therefore, toward the end of 1926, the ongoing debate on the alphabet came to an 
end parallel with the RPP’s authoritarian orientation to silencing all opposition. After that 
time, there did not emerge any view that was in sharp conflict with the standards 
determined by the official authorities. On this secure ground, the move toward new letters 
became the official line. Moreover, according to the changing political climate, indeed, 
some writers who had been among the opponents began to change their approach to the 
problem, for it was not easy for them to be impartial when a sort of political 
authoritarianism dominated and set some strict orders on the issue of letters. In the 
following years, 1927 and 1928, the first preparations to realize the revolution in the 
alphabet were made in essence in a covert way; it was in this period that some writers of 
the official line such as Falih Rifki (Atay), Yunus Nadi (Abalioglu), Mithat Sadullah 
(Sander), Celal Nuri (İleri) and Ahmed Cevad (Emre), continued to write in favor of the
future.” Zeki Velidi (Togan), “Türklerde Hars Buhranı” [Crises of Culture among the 
Turks] (original publication 1926), in ibid., 243.
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Latin letters in newspapers. It seemed that to carry out the revolution in the alphabet was 
decided in 1927 as state policy, and from the beginning of 1928 the decision was put into
26use.
The government’s first step to change letters was to set up in May of 1928 the 
Language Committee engaged on the task of Latinizing the writing system and preparing 
a new grammar.2"^ As the first preparatory phase of the dressed change in alphabet, in 
May 1928 the Arabic numerals were substituted for with the Western one with a law that 
made them compulsory for all official bureaux as from June 1929, and for private 
businesses from June 1931. In the next two months, the committee prepared a report. 
Elifba R a p o r u and presented it to Mustafa Kemal on August 1, 1928. Immediately, on 
the basis of this report, in Istanbul, on 9 August 1928 Mustafa Kemal introduced the 
“new Turkish letters.”^^  In the following days, classes for higher officials and other staff.
On the decision for the revolution, see Özerdim, Yazı, 21.
2"^ Among the members of the Committee there were Falih Rifki (Atay), Fazıl 
Ahmet (Aykaç), Ruşen Eşref (Onaydın), Ragip Hulusi (Özdem), Ahmet Cevat (Emre), 
İbrahim Granti (Grantay), Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), Mehmet Emin (Erişirgil), 
Mehmet İhsan (Sungu), Ahmet Rasim, İbrahim Necmi (Dilmen), Celal Sahir (Erozan), 
Avni (Başman) and İsmail Hikmet (Ertaylan). See Ülkütaşır, Atatürk, 60-61. Most of 
them at the time of preparing alphabet believed the process of change in the alphabet 
would take at least ten years. Mustafa Kemal rejected this and wanted it to happen as 
soon as possible. To his close friend, Falih Rifki Atay, he said, “it will either happen in 
three months or it won’t happen at all”. See Falih Rifki Atay, Çankaya (Istanbul: Doğan 
Kardeş, 1969), 440.
The report was prepared by Ibrahim Grantay, writing at its introduction that 
“taking into account the speaking language of Istanbul on which today our common and 
literary language rely, we tried to create an alphabet theoretically and practically suitable 
to that language, ... which is originated from Latin letters used by European nations.” See 
Levend, Türk Dilinde, 401; Ibrahim Grantay, Elifba Raporu (Istanbul, 1928).
The way to name the new letters might be convenient to the political will 
behind the revolution. The committee held the meetings in Dolmabahçe palace in 25, 27,
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deputies, university professors, intellectuals, were held to teach them the new letters. In 
order to present the new letters to the masses, Mustafa Kemal went to some provinces 
where he gave public lectures on the new let ters.After  the presentation of the Latin 
script, the parliament passed a law on the alphabet change on 1 November 1928.^1 
Passing to the new alphabet would have to be realized, at most, in one year.^2 The rulers, 
at once, set to spread a nation-wide education campaign by passing education in the new 
letters for school children in the following semester and setting up Millet Mektepleri 
(nation schools) as a system of compulsory adult education.33
29 August, and there İsmet Paşa (İnönü) named new letters as truly “Turkish alphabet” 
{Türk alfabesi). The new one, for him, is the “most scientific and practicable formula”. 
Three items were determined as ultimate decisions of the committee: “1) in order to save 
the nation from ignorance only one way is to change the existing Arabic letters unfit for 
the Turkish language and to accept Turkish letters based on Latin origin; 2) the alphabet 
the committee proposed was truly a Turkish alphabet and this is definite; 3) the rules of 
use and orthography will evolve in parallel with reformation and progress of language 
and national taste.” Levend, Türk Dilinde, 403.
For further details on the tours, see Ülkütaşır, Atatürk, 90-128.
Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], “.....3 November 1928.
The law brought obligations for everybody to begin to use the new alphabet 
immediately, while government departments, periodicals and advertisements had to adapt 
to the new letters on 1 December 1928. See ibid; for the samples of the first writings in 
newspapers, see Yazı Devriminin 50. Yılı Sergisi [50'*’ Anniversary of Alphabet 
Revolution] (Ankara: TTK, 1979).
22 For Millet Mektepleri Talimatnamesi (Nation Schools Statute), see “Millet 
Mektepleri Talimatnamesi”, in Atatürk ve Türk Dili: Belgeler, ed. Zeynep Korkmaz 
(Ankara: TDK, 1992), 84-102. Millet Mektepleri as a wide system of adult education 
came to be the first well-organized adult education centres of the Republic. Every adult 
between the ages of sixteen and forty had to attend classes regularly held in primary 
schools. It was obligatory for them. The impressions of one foreign contemporary 
observer about the application of new law in Samsun might be illustrative: “My friends 
told me with considerable glee of enforcement measures taken by police who visited 
cafés and backgammon dens, removing to school any culprits who could not produce 
certificates of their reading and writing ability...The penalties were prescribed both for 
those who neglect to attend the schools and for those who attend but are lazy.” Henry
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There exist two basic themes in the discussions during the adoption of the Latin 
alphabet. The first one was about the destructive influences of the Arabic characters on 
Turkish culture from the early time of their adoption; the second, the importance of the 
Latin alphabet presented, from the beginning, as “new Turkish alphabet” and its possible 
effects. The first theme seemed to be related very much with the Kemalist understanding 
of modernization based on the civilization/archaism dichotomy. The Arabic letters, 
together with the sultanate, caliphate, sheria courts, mecelle (first constitution in modern 
sense), medresses, tekkes, clothes, serpuş (traditional male headgear), were seen as 
images belonging to the East imagined within the frame of barbarism as a mentality and 
way of life. They had imprisoned the Turks to live in a backward Eastern position. So, for 
the sake of progress in the path of civilization the Arabic letters had to be removed.
As a result, the Arabic alphabet was seen in the official discourse as having 
colonized the mind and mentality of Turks, that is, having tied the Turks to the East for 
ten centuries. On the question, the words of Mustafa Kemal, uttered on the night of 
introducing the new alphabet on 9 August in 1928, seems illustrative:
Fellow countrymen! In order to express our beautiful language we are adopting 
new Turkish letters... We have to emancipate ourselves from the 
incomprehensible signs that had placed our minds in an iron frame for centuries. 
We want to understand our language by all means. We shall understand it surely 
with these new letters in a near future... Today, one of our tasks is to learn 
quickly the new Turkish letters and teach them to the whole nation... If at least 
eighty percent of our nation is still illiterate, the fault is not ours. The fault lies
Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (original 
publication 1935), 125.
For a Kemalist perception of shortcomings of the Arabic alphabet, see Ahmed 
Cevad (Emre), “Muhtaç Olduğumuz Lisan İnkılabı” [The Language Revolution That We 
Need] (original publication 1928), in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, TIT, Celal Nuri, “A New 
Phase of the Turkish Revolution,” in The Turkish Press 1925-1932, trans, and ed. Lutfy 
Levonian (Athens: School of Religion, 1932) (original publication 1928), 90-91.
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with those who, not understanding the Turkish character, have chained our heads 
with iron bands. (Italics added)
The time had come to correct the faults of the past. In the correction, the Arabic alphabet 
had to be removed, for it had been insufficient in expressing Turkish in general and 
modern scientific and technical terms in particular; yet, the new one was introduced as 
easily adapted to the writing of Turkish. This was regarded urgent, and so some 
objections, which focused on the discontinuity in history, were rejected. As Mustafa 
§ekip (one of the pro-reformists in language) stated, “[W]e have no time to listen to such 
objections which insistently point out to us the risk which our culture and traditions may 
run. The foremost thing in our minds is the present and the future. Let those who are fond  
o f the past, remain in the past” (my emphasis). Thus, to establish a new ftiture and 
create new generations, it was at first necessary to free youths from the destructive 
influences of the books and all writings full of “superstitious and scholastic” 
kn ow le dg e .T o  put it in a more clear way, free from the sensation of the old
35 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri [Atatürk’s Speeches and Statements], vol. II 
(Ankara: İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1989), 274; for English translation, see 
“Mustafa Kemal Pasha’ Address on Launching the New Characters,” 'm The Turkish 
Press 1925-1932 (original publication 1928), 86-87. Through all stages of the revolution, 
Mustafa Kemal came to the fore as a main leading figure in initiating the reform in 
language. His role is soundly stressed in Tarih IV  on the section of “History of the 
Revolution”. Tarih IV  (Istanbul: Maarif Vekaleti Yay., 1931), 252.
See “Some Extracts from the Address of Mustafa Şekip Bey, Professor of 
Psychology in the University of Constantinople,” in The Turkish Press 1925-1932 
(original publication 1928), 87.
3·^  For such a revolutionary evaluation in an official line, see İzet Ulvi (Akyurt), 
“Yeni Türk Harfleri Münasebetiyle” [On the Occasion of New Turkish Letters], in 
Atatürk Devri, 53. “These books belonging to the pre-modem, archaic ages were”, writes 
Celal Nuri, “insufficient to meet today’s cultural needs, and even these outmoded 
volumes got us into a dilemma we face today.” Celal Nuri, “Latin,” 298.
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generations, as one of the Kemalists expressed, “new generations will escape from the 
effect of what was written and then come under that of what is being written and will be 
written. ”38
Consequently, in the discourse of the civilizing rulers the Arabic letters with their 
form and writing style and with their Arabic-Islamic and Ottoman overtones were not 
capable of fitting modern ways. No longer concerned with the association with the past 
and other Islamic societies, they stressed the need for an alphabet in common with the 
West. It was for this reason that, in the views of Mustafa Kemal:
So long as Turkish was written from right to left, it could never properly diffuse 
the ideals of European civilization. The picturesque involutions and intricacies of 
Arabic script afforded a psychological background to Oriental mentality which 
stood as the real enemy of the Republic” (my emphasis). 3^
That is to say that the Turkish nation with a new language in its new dress (new alphabet) 
would gain a new mentality and take a place in the family of '‘alem-i medeniyef' (the 
civilized wor ld ) .He re  the emancipatory aspects of the Latin letters that were of the 
civilized nations of the world were emphasized as a panacea for correcting the 
shortcomings and deficiencies common to Oriental mentality. That was why the new
38 Burhan Asaf (Beige), Türk Yurdu, 39/233 (March 1931), 46-60.
39 Quoted in H. E. Wortham, Kemal o f Turkey (New York; William
Edwin Rudge, 1930), 188-89.
'*0 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol. II, 272. The expectation, as one of the 
leading pro-reformist journalists (Yunus Nadi) claimed, was that, being the beginning 
and base-line of Western civilization, “the adoption of the Latin letters will make us more 
closer to that civilization from the point of gaining its educational and instructional 
tools.” Yunus Nadi, “Yeni Yazı” [New Alphabet], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2: Atatürk 
Devri Yazarlarının Türk Dili Hakkındaki Görüşleri [Atatürk and Turkish Language 2:
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letters, as Mustafa Şekip fittingly said, “not only solve our educational problem but also 
emancipate our minds and hearts from the influence of Ottoman t r a d i t i o n s . In  short, 
what was needed was a revolution in language, the change in alphabet was its first step. 
As argued above, in the search for identifying the reasons for being backward, the blame 
was placed, as one of the causes, on the alphabet in use for ten centuries. The solution 
was a new creation, the Latin letters, that could give way for progress and development 
of the Turkish language and overcome illiteracy. Beside these positive effects, perhaps 
more importantly, the other expectation was that it would end the backward position of 
the Turks in life and science by eliminating the domination of Arabic and Persian rules 
and lexicons.
Why was the Latin alphabet adopted as the “new Turkish alphabet”? For Celal 
Nuri, there were two reasons for the acceptance. The first was its international character; 
secondly, it was suitable for use not only in European languages, but also in languages 
with Ural-Altaic origins such as Finnish and Hungarian.'*^ For our purpose, the emphasis 
on its international character is significant, because the substitution for the Kemalists was 
something signifying to participate wholy in Western civilization which was seen as 
universal. To put it in other words, it would make it easy for the Turkish nation to possess 
the omnipresent and universalized standards of civilization.
In short, the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with that of the Latin in the 
writing of Turkish appeared as a most critical symbolic turn in socio-political and cultural
The Atatürk Period’s Writers’ Views on Turkish Language], ed. Zeynep Korkmaz 
(Ankara: TDK, 1997) (original publication 1928), 7.
“Some Extracts,” 8 8 .
42 See Celal Nuri, “Latin,” 285-301.
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life of Turkey. It is critical because it led to a radical cultural break with the tradition and 
heritage of the shamed past by creating a state o f illiteracy. This was indeed a starting 
point for a “language without history which was ready to be filled with a new cultural 
content. ”''3 In other words, what was aimed with the alphabet change was to end 
historical continuity and to create the new language for a new beginning and future 
generations. Thus, evidently, as an act of “forgetting”, it was political will to cut new 
generations off from the influences of the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage and to make 
them closer to modern civilization by means of a newly manufactured culture.'*'* 
Thereupon, by the change the state gained a chance to control the whole process of 
publications including new ones and transcriptions.'*^ Printing was, therefore, so 
important on the part of the ruling elite to spread the idea of the new “imagined 
community” as in what we find in Benedict Anderson’s analysis.'*^
During the heated discussions on the possible alphabet change, as mentioned 
before, the opponents rejected it, as expected, on behalf of a strong desire to preserve the
'*3 See Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “Devletin Kültüre Düşen Gölgesi” [Shadow of the State 
on Culture]. Dergah. 28 (1992), 12.
'*'* Taking into account literary continuity, Victoria Holbrook sees the change as 
one of “nationalist” and “chauvinist” political endeavours to make Ottoman literature 
unattainable to the new Turks. It led to the emergence of the “ new mode of literacy” to 
which, according to their position at the moment of change, some have advantage in 
access. See Victoria Rowe Holbrook, The Unreadible Shores o f Love: Turkish Modernity 
and Mystic Romance (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 2, 20.
'*^ This was very clear in the position of some newspapers with opposing 
tendency. After the change, facing the loss of their readers, newspapers and other 
periodicals took financial support from the government. Some newspapers, which 
criticised the change and other reforms, were deprived of the critical subsidy. See Allen, 
The Turkish, 126. The last opposition groups were thus eliminated and what was 
contemplated was a new literature including no views contrary to the official line.
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tradition and the living culture. On the other hand, portraying the living one as archaic, 
the proponents put forward a revolutionary zeal judging the change as a necessary stage 
to create a new generation and a new life ordered in an “endless” progressive manner. 
The change was therefore in general justified and inaugurated with the concept of 
civilization that was the name of a “world order” covering everything in socio-economic, 
political and cultural realms. Only in this sense did the concept of culture totally 
differentiate from that of the opponents taking place in the discourse of the reformists. 
For example, for one of the pioneers for the change, Ahmed Cevad (Emre), each nation 
had to adopt at least scientific and cultural terminology and letters of universal and 
dominant civilization to gain a civilized mentality in language. The alphabet change was 
the first step in the nationalization of “culture and technique of universal civilization”, 
which was necessary for being civilized and progressed.'*'  ^Celal Nuri put it in more clear 
words, claiming that “the substitution of the Latin alphabet with that of Arabic will fulfill 
our need at the first instance, and then, enable the Turks to enter into the international 
culture'' (my emphasis).'*^ Despite these general remarks on universalized culture, there 
was an ambiguous attitude among the Kemalists towards culture and its relation with 
language and alphabet, which mostly stemmed from the harsh criticism of those placing 
strong emphasis on local and “authentic” culture. The main justification was their stress 
on the new and civilized way of life, to be created on the basis of universalized values of
'*6 See Anderson, Imagined, 44-45.
'*7 Cevad (Emre), “Muhtaç,” 273 and 279.
'** Celal Nuri, “Latin,” 291. He continues, “after the adoption of the new alphabet, 
in the near future, the Turkish nation will catch up with the civilized nations which are 
the forerunners of civilization, and take part in their culture”, 298.
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civilization. However, after mid-1929, there emerged a new trend when the issue of the 
alphabet was directly perceived within the context when the Revolution was mentioned in 
connection with the term culture. In this context, the basic theme was that, with the help 
of new alphabet being easily read and written, a new culture would be created as a 
requirement of the modern age. The abolishing of the old alphabet meant to be free from 
the “old culture” and also the emergence of new literature which would produce a “new 
one.”'*^ Here culture, beside its nationalized form, was often used to refer to all aspects of 
life developed in the West; that is to say, the most stressed view in the discussion on the 
change was that following the change a great abundance of culture would begin to flow 
into Turkey.
After 1930, it is evident that this attitude began to take place in official texts and 
discourse. For example, in Tarih IV  prepared in 1931 to be taught in high schools, the 
change was portrayed as a turning point in the struggle for the “cultural independence of 
Turkishness”.^ “ On the tenth anniversary of the change, in 1938, this was obvious in the 
words of the leading elite of the Republic. Then Atatürk described it as a “base for the 
progress of the Turkish capability in the sphere of culture.” '^ Indeed, after the adoption.
'’9 This was the very tone of the claims of Yunus Nadi as he stated all that was 
done after the adoption of new alphabet in one year as an essence of creating new 
national culture. See Yunus Nadi, “Yazı İnkilabı” [Alphabet Revolution], in Atatürk ve 
Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1929), 11-13. In his views, the substitution of the Arabic 
letters was indispensable because it caused the Turkish language and culture to be 
dominated by alien elements, that of Arabic and Persian. With the revolution in alphabet 
the Turkish language was freed from the bad influences of “alien and Eastern culture”. 
Yunus Nadi, “Dilimiz Hakkında” [On Our Language], in ibid., (original publication 
1929), 16.
50 Tarih IV, 252.
5* Nimet Arsan, ed., Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri [Atatürk’s 
Circulars, Telegraphs and Declarations] (Ankara; T. İ. T. Enstitüsü Yay., 1964), 594;
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the search for a purified and simplified language went hand in hand with the creation of a 
unified national culture. That is to say, the main efforts of the state agents, especially the 
TLS, were directed to make “new” language of “new” culture, which was purified from 
all “archaic” and “eastern” elements.
6.3. The TLS and Language Planning: the Process of the Creation of Öz Türkçe
As argued above, the first step in revolutionizing the language was the change in 
the alphabet and the second was, as an inevitable result of the first, the movement of 
purifying the Turkish language. So, in connection with the revolutionary cultural program 
of the Republic, both had to be conceived on familiar terms.^^ xhis was the movement of 
“fully freeing Turkish from the chaos of the old taste” Arabic and Persian phrases 
fostered. It was in this sense that the ruling elite tried to purify the language from
Atatürk ve Türk Dili, Belgeler, 50. In the same line, M. Fuad Köprülü, though he had 
harshly criticized proposals for a change in the alphabet in the mid 1920s, saw the 
alphabet change as passing from the circle of old culture into that of new one, meaning 
that “the abolishing of the Arabic letters meant escaping from the Eastern culture of 
Middle Ages and being a part of Western culture" (my emphasis). See Köprülü, 
“Alfabe,” 1.
52 This was among the pro-reformist elite a common view which was deliberately 
and soundly expressed in the newspapers of the period. In an editorial comment in 
Milliyet (1  Mart 1929), the old writings were stressed as being full of Arabic and Persian 
origins because “they were most fitting to Arabic letters, and also Arabic and Persian way 
of thought and feeling were in fashion in the Ottoman time.” The change of alphabet 
from Arabic to Latin gave a chance to the rulers to replace Arabic and Persian words with 
that of “ÖZ Türkçe that will take its shape in our mind with new alphabet.” See “Yeni 
Türkçe Sözler” [New Turkish Words], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2, 70. This was the 
movement of “fully freeing Turkish from the chaos of the old taste” Arabic and Persian 
Phrases fostered.
53 M. Nermi, “Nermi Bey Diyor ki: “Öz ve Ulu Yol Tutulmuştur!”” [Nermi Bey 
Says: “True and Great Way was Held!”], Cumhuriyet, 1 August 1930, 3.
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“foreign” words, mostly Arabic and Persian derivations, through the works of the TLS^ "* 
which was one of the basic cultural institutions, founded on 12 July 1932, with the task of 
forming and reproducing national culture.
In fact, the search for gaining a “scientific” and “civilized” language^^ went back 
to the mid-1920s, but gained momentum with the alphabet change in 1928. It was a 
widespread purification movement with fervent official support. The movement finds its 
true mode in Mustafa Kemal’s words, in his Introduction to Sadri Maksudi’s Türk Dili 
İçin (For the Turkish Language) .After  mentioning the strong link between national 
sentiment and language, he continued:
[A] rich national language has great influence on the development of national 
feeling. The Turkish tongue is one of the richest of all; it only needs to be 
intelligently cultivated. The Turkish nation, which knows how to establish its 
government and its sublime independence, must free its language too from the 
yoke of foreign words. '^^
To this end, after the alphabet change, a commission called DU Encümeni (The Language 
Commission) was set up in Ankara, assigned to provide “the new Turkish Standard 
Dictionary.” *^ The dictionary was aimed to put öz Türkçe words in place of Arabic and
Its first name was the Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (the Turkish Language 
Research Society). In 1936 it purified its own title as the Türk DU Kurumu.
The expression belongs to Balhasanoğlu Necip Asım (Yazıksız). See 
Balhasanoglu Necip Asım, “Dil Heyeti” [The Language Committee], in Atatürk Devri 
Fikir Hayatı II  {ongxndX publication 1926), 32.
Türk Dili İçin was one of the studies worth mentioning directing the 
purification movement in the firs half of 1930. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), Türk Dili İçin 
(Ankara; Türk Ocakları İlim ve Sanat Heyeti Yay., 1930).
57 Ibid.
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Persian origins (seen incomprehensible for the people). This trend also found its echoes 
in other spheres; for example, to free the schoolboy from the influence of Arabic and 
Persian words, both were deleted from the Use curriculum on 1 September 1929. In 1931 
the activity of the committee was ended. Immediately after the first Turkish History 
Congress, on 1 2  July 1932, the TLS was officially founded with a direct encouragement 
and initiation of Mustafa K e m a l . He himself decided two main branches in its working 
areas: the first, philology and linguistics, and the second, the Turkish language (studying 
and determining Turkish language from the point of dictionary-technical term, grammar- 
syntax, etymology).^® Mustafa Kemal appointed Samih Rifat as the first president of the 
TLS, and Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydm) as its first general secretary. Yakup Kadri 
(Karaosmanoğlu) and Celal Sahir became its first members. These four founding- 
members, charged with a political program of forming the new Turkish, were politicians
See “ismet Pasha’s Address,” in The Turkish Press, 1926-1932 (original 
publication 1929), 147. For İsmet Paşa, the Dictionary “will not only collect the words 
which a civilized nation uses. It must satisfy all the needs of culture.” Thus the task of the 
Committee was “to find the way to transfer into Turkish all the words and terms” of a 
developed language. Ibid, 148. In June 1930, the commission announced that it had just 
completed the letter^. See Allen, The Turkish, 127.
After the first congress of the Turkish History Society, as noted by Ruşen Eşref 
Ünaydm, Mustafa Kemal said, “if so, let a language society be found, called the Turkish 
Language Research Society, working in a similar fashion to the Turkish History Society.” 
See Ruşen Eşref Ünaydm, Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti ’nin Kuruluşundan ilk Kurultaya 
kadar Hatıralar [Memoirs from the Foundation of the Turkish Language research 
Society to the first Congress], 2 "** ed. (original publication in 1933) (Ankara; TDK, 
1943), 10.
Mustafa Kemal drew a schema of working areas of the Society with his 
handwriting. For that, see ibid. The role and cult of Mustafa Kemal in its foundation finds 
its clear expression in the words of Ruşen Eşref Ünaydm: “As occurred in every reform, 
the Society was born out of the mind of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal.” Ibid, 11.
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rather than linguists or social scientists.^* Setting the modes to all discussions and policies 
about language until the end of the Single Party Period, this political, or something like a 
bureaucratic, mission had a central place in inventing new oz Türkçe free from all 
“destructive” and “unenlightened” influences of the “old” one. It would be the new 
Turkish language conceived as more deserving to the new Turkish society. This quest 
finds its clear expression in the words of Hasan Ali (Yücel): “We have to create a 
language convenient to our new life and new ideal, and, within its setting, create a 
national culture.
Coupled with the motivation of a desire to build up a high culture, its founding 
principle implied at first a deliberate cultivation of the language to rename and redefine 
what was incorrect in the past. Thus, the principal aim of the Society was to purify the 
Turkish language, elevate it to the level of the modern languages or a language of 
civilization and science, and close the gap between the written language and that of the 
people; for which it would seek words of vocabulary in Turkish of the people -whose 
language was thought to be less distorted-, its dialects, old texts and other Turkic 
languages. All were clear in Article 3 and Article 4 of the TLS’s statues. In Article 4 the 
procedure to realize its aims were given as follows: a) to organize scientific meetings, b) 
to determine and codify the Turkish language in accordance with its roots, evolution and 
needs, c) to obtain all materials useful to study the Turkish language and to collect new 
words from old books and dialects of people from various places of the country, d)
All were members of the parliament and the RPP. Ünaydm, Hatıralar, 13.
See Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler Müzakere Zabıtları [The First Turkish 
Language Congress; Theses, Discussion Minutes] (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933), 213.
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publish the products of the activities of the Turkish Language Research So c i e ty .B y  
reporting and publicizing all, founding the TLS was aimed to present and propagate öz 
Türkçe words to replace “foreign” ones in the (written and spoken) language.
6.3.1. The First Turkish Language Congress
In order to further and discuss ideas on the Turkish language and determine an 
elementary program for the TLS, as its first main activity, the first Turkish Language 
Congress {Birinci Türk DU Kurultayı) convened in Istanbul on 26 September 1932. '^  ^The 
Congress aimed to solve the question of language with a directive and order from above; 
and in this way, as Burhan Asaf (Beige) declared, it:
[WJill determine a set of rules and principles, and will order to write and speak 
Turkish according to these rules and principles. The journalists and intellectuals 
who up to now have defended an evolutionary approach to language and so not 
made any progress in the affairs of language, will obey this order... The last task 
of the Congress is to set language control comprising the world of the press.
For the statue of the Society, see ibid, 420-55; Onaydın, Hatıralar, 13-15.
Five language congresses were convened during the period I examine: 1932, 
1934, 1936, 1942 and 1945. 1932 and 1934 congresses were almost on similar account, 
and so in this study the main stress was placed on the first one. Similarly, there did not 
exist any thematic difference between 1942 and 1945 congresses where the second wave 
of the puristic effort was prevelant.
Burhan Asaf (Beige), “Kurultay” [Congress], Hakimiyet-i Milliye, September 
26, 1932, 2 . Indeed, language control, one of the first steps to reach a common language, 
may be seen in connection with cultural control which, as discussed in the first chapter, is 
necessary for creating a homogenous structure through creating one linguistic, historical 
and artistic tradition.
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Mustafa Kemal wished to take a different way in the congress from that of the first 
Turkish History Congress that was convened after the history thesis previously 
determined was put at the disposal of writers, authors, and academicians.^^ This stemmed 
from his fear of facing once again a similar dilemma resulting from discussions on the 
accuracy of the official historical thesis at the Turkish History Congress. The 
participation of Mustafa Kemal and the far-reaching interest of the press and radio made 
the congress a grand national convention.
Mustafa Kemal and his co-workers expected that in the Congress their program 
would be wholeheartedly welcomed. Nevertheless, there was a heated debate on whether 
the reform would be in an evolutionary or revolutionary way. Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), the 
former editor of Tanin and who was one of the pro-reformists on the issue of the alphabet 
in the 1920s, severely criticized the official purist tendency to throw away some
According to his program, the first step was to organize a congress, introduce 
the thesis there and take the interpretations of experts, poets, men of letters, journalists 
and teachers. The second step was to make people interested in the affairs of its own 
language, to conduct the statue of the Society at the congress. Ünaydın, Hatıralar, 2 1 . 
Mustafa Kemal wanted the thesis to be prepared at least a week before the congress. For 
this purpose, he ordered the formation of a committee made up of individuals who 
introduced and defended the thesis. According to the program prepared by the committee, 
the proposed language thesis had to be framed in company with the history thesis, and so 
the roots of the Turkish language would be studied either in its oldness or its relation to 
Indo-European languages and other Asian and European languages. Mustafa Kemal 
himself read and made some corrections to the program. He ordered to announce that 
congress would be held in 26 September 1932. See ibid, 29 and 33. For the program, see 
ibid, 33-35.
Especially Mustafa Kemal’s presence was especially exposed in the words of 
Ruşen Eşref “Mustafa Kemal in the hall of the Congress positioned something like a 
monitoring eye filtering everybody from head to foot and correcting their faults and 
defects... He was a leader who himself, for the first time, made the Turkish nation think 
in its own language”. See ibid, 55 and 64. He mythicized Mustafa Kemal’s entrance into 
the hall as a sun, seeing everything and every action. Ibid., 63. It was the “shining sun 
symbolism” associated with Mustafa Kemal.
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commonly used words of foreign origin and, instead, create new ones.^^ For him in the 
last fifteen years the language had been simplified to a sufficient level. So there was a 
slight exaggeration on stressing the hegemony of foreign words in the Turkish language. 
While believing in the necessity of some regulations, he argued that language was not 
something that could be deconstructed and reproduced with “a deliberate action”; it was 
just a natural organism taking its shape in an evolutionary way. Against the general 
official line, he proclaimed, “the written language has never in any place been identical 
with the spoken language, and it cannot be i d en t i c a l .A lm os t  all speakers, main 
representatives of the official line, fervently condemned his views. They believed that 
language can and should be consciously cultivated and reproduced, which was necessary 
as in other reformist acts, for they were “revolutionists, not evolutionists.”'^  ^ Their stand, 
signifying a radical purist stream, in turn became the official line, supported by Mustafa
In his view, words from foreign languages were only adopted by a nation 
through assimilating them to its national language, which can not distort its grammatical 
and syntactic structure. See Birinci, 274.
Ibid., 276; Frank Tachau, “Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform”, 
Review o f Politics, 26/2 (1964), 196. In this regard, he gave an example, “To make high 
art and literature -certainly products of culture- possessed by everybody is not to bring 
them down to the level of everybody, but to broaden the sphere of culture as comprising 
everybody.” Ibid., 278.
Hasan Ali, Ali Canip, Fazıl Ahmet, Dr. Mustafa Şükrü, Sadri Ethem and 
Namdar Rahmi denounced his claims, arguing for the will to create a new moral base in a 
revolutionary zeal. See ibid., 280-310. Ali Canip declared, as in the revolutions like the 
hat and the alphabet, the revolutionary cadre of the Republic would transform the Turkish 
language in a new mode. Ibid., 285-290. Sadri Ethem criticized Hüseyin Cahit’s wish for 
continuation with the past: “The past having its own economic, legal and artistic entity 
can not be fitting today’s understanding. This difference can only be overcome with a 
revolution, not evolution. Today we have a new society with new tastes and morality" 
(my emphasis). Ibid., 300.
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Kemal7 ' They emphasized the significance of total elimination of all words of foreign 
origin, to create a culture unrestrained by the nostalgic preferences of the older 
generation, which had been nourished with Arabic and Persian (Oriental) mentality.
In the Congress in connection with the official history thesis, a comparison 
between the most ancient Turkish languages (including Hittite and Sumerian) on the one 
hand, and the Indo-European and Semitic languages on the other hand was authorized. 
This nationalist tone of voice was at the heart of most of the presentations in the 
Congress.'^ 2 In these presentations, the general framework of the language thesis was 
outlined by drawing parallelism with the official history thesis. The core of the thesis was 
that Turkish was the mother of all tongues in the world.'^  ^ On the thesis, Ruşen Eşref, in
As in the case of the works on history, in the Congress and later, any view 
against the official line was condemned as a reactionary urged by the enemies of the 
Republic. See Jacob M. Landau, “The First Turkish Language Congress”, in The Earliest 
Stage o f Language Planning: The ‘First Congress’ Phenomenon, ed. Joshua A. Fishman 
(Berlin: Mouton: De Gruyter, 1993).
”^ 2 See Birinci, 71-185. In his presentation entitled “Türk Filolojisi-Türk Dili Bir 
Hint-Avrupa Dilidir” [Turkish Philology-Turkish Language is an Indo-European 
Language], Saim Ali tried to show that the Turkish language had been of the family of 
the Indo-European languages. Ibid., 75. Ahmet Cevat (Emre) compared the Sumerian 
language with the Turkish one and found out many similarities. Ibid., 81-94. Similarly, 
Agop Martayan strove to attract attention on commonalties between Turkish on the one 
hand and Sumerian, Indo-European and Armenian languages on the other. Ibid., 94-104. 
Artin Cebeli went one step further and claimed that “the Turkish language was of a 
similar family with the “Turco-European languages” and the languages of all white 
races... Also the mother of all languages, as it is thought, is not Sanskrit, but Turkish.” 
Ibid., 129). What was common in their argument was that Turkish was the oldest of 
living languages all over the world.
Samih Rifat, by making an analogy in terms of words about history, society, 
nature, law, art, foods and clothes, reached a conclusion that there were a lot of 
commonalties between Turkish on the one hand, and the Indo-European (he called Art) 
and the Semitic languages on the other. See ibid., 455-456. On Turkish’s relationship to 
Semitic and Ari languages he had mentioned his views in the First Turkish History 
Congress. See Samih Rifat, “Türkçe ile Diğer Lisanlar Arasında İrtibatlar” [The
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his closing speech of the Congress, depicted the Turkish as a language of culture-
creators:
In the program of the Congress it was proven that the Turkish language had 
spread from Central Asia to the shores of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans 
and of Finnish gulf... It was very likely to estimate that it was the language of the 
Sumerians and Hittites ... Turkish was the language of the first and oldest culture. 
It was at the roots of Sanskrit, Greek and Latin, which make up the basis of 
modern linguistics. Turkish was, therefore, the language of those who have 
founded big cities and states and of those who have cultivated land and 
enlightened human kind (my emphasis).'^''
Nevertheless, the thesis, implicitly anticipating that, like all Semitic and Indo-European 
languages, Arabic and Persian in their origin could be based on Turkish, became 
senseless with the hegemony of the radical purists in the mainstream official line. And 
thus it was not stressed so much until 1935 when a new, more moderate route was 
decided in language reform.'^^ It was in 1935 that Mustafa Kemal, convinced of the 
unnecessity to change every word of foreign origin, came to cease this radical purist line, 
which found its evident exposition in the Sun Language Theory, that will be elaborated in 
latter parts. What were solidified in the First Congress, and later in the Second Congress,
Relationship of Turkish with Other Languages], Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi (Ankara: T. 
C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933), 60-61, 66-67.
See Birinci, 470; Onaydın, Hatıralar, 76-77.
Although in the daily press of 1932 on the relations of the Turkish language 
with others there were a lot of commentaries and articles emphasizing the oldness of the 
Turkish language and it as the source of the languages all over the world, in the period 
between 1932 and 1935 there were very few. In 1935, in harmony with the new official 
line, a number of writings began to appear in the newspapers. See Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2, 
623-680. A similar case, to some extent in comparing with the First and Third 
Congresses, may be observed in the lectures delivered at the Second Turkish Language 
Congress in 1934. See “İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı” [The Second Turkish Language 
Congress], Türk Dili, no; 8 , 9, 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 13, 14.
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were the imagination of Osmanlica as a significant “Other” of öz Türkçe and the 
hegemony of the radical purism.
6.3.2. The Imagination o f  Osmanlica (Ottoman Turkish) as an Other o f  Öz Türkçe
As mentioned above, the official language reform movement was primarily based 
on the idea to save young generations from the old language. Here the old was 
Osmanlica. In the discourse of all writings and speeches on the language revolution 
remarkably after 1928, the passing from Osmanlica to öz Türkçe appeared to be a most 
emphasized issue. Especially in the period between 1928 and 1936, the civilizing rulers 
and intellectuals had regarded Osmanlica as a significant Other of the newly constructed 
ÖZ Türkçe. The First Turkish Language Congress was an official scene of once again 
displaying the “old” language, that is, Osmanlica?^ In the established plan of the 
language engineers, all efforts were made to downgrade Osmanlica in status. Their main 
assumption was that culture could not be formed on the basis of a language made up of 
two foreign languages [Arabic and Persian], Osmanlica.”'^ '^  Osmanlica, far from being a 
language of the new Turks, was the “language of the Sultanate and religion.”'^ * So they
One of the Kemalist purists, Ahmet Şükrü, with a nationalist and myticized 
tone, described the Congress as a main step in the “revolution of passing from Osmanlica 
to Turkish”. It was the declaration of ending the hegemony of Osmanlica and of the 
independence of Turkish language, leading to the “emergence of the Turkish nation that 
wanted anymore to speak and write Turkish.” See Ahmet Şükrü, “Osmanlicadan 
Türkçeye Geçiş İnkılabı” [The Revolution of Passing from Osmanlica to Turkish], in 
Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1932), 97-98.
Falih Rifki Atay, “Büyük Dile Doğru” [Toward Great Language], Atatürk ve 
Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1935), 259.
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first of all devalued Osmanlica and the Ottoman Empire through stressing its non-Turkish 
character. In its broad terms, the effort may be summarized as follows:
Before coming under the influence of Islam, Turkish, though it borrowed some 
words from various languages, had preserved its true essence. When the Turks met Islam, 
Arabic and Persian began to have a strong influence over Turkish; the former was in 
administrative and legal areas, and the latter, in literature. This trend reached its peak 
point in the Ottoman time when the sense of national belonging and consciousness did 
not prevail. It was the era that Turkishness was mentioned mostly with pejorative terms.·^  ^
So Turkish became distorted, loosing its functional power and its vocabulary and 
grammar structure. The result was a language that was a mix of three languages -Arabic, 
Persian and Turkish-, known as Osmanlica. This language in time also became dominant 
as a spoken language among the circles of the upper stratum as well as a written one. 
Under the burdensome effect of Arabic especially, it took the shape of a language full of 
foreign affections and taste that were unsuitable to the Turkish state of mind. Unnatural 
and obscurantist in comparison to modern taste, it developed naturally out of Ottoman 
culture that was equally “hybrid” and “entirely aristocratic”. A s  a language of
Ismail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), “Dil” [Language], \n Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 
(original publication 1933), 149.
Thus, in the Ottoman Empire, Turkishness was submerged under a constructed 
Ottoman identity. For a typical characterization, see Samih Rifat’s opening speech, 
Birinci, 4-5.
The phrase belongs to Yunus Nadi. See Yunus Nadi, “Dil İnkılabına Dair Bir 
İki Deyiş” [One or Two Words on Language Revolution], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 
(original publication 1933), 135. This characteristic, for him, made it not having “any 
links with the rest of the people. It was for this reason that the basic goal of the alphabet 
change and language reform was to create a culture lending itself to the whole Turkish 
nation.” Ibid. In his speech at the First Congress, Reşit Galip, Ministry of Education,
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administration and high culture developed at the center, it completely alienated itself 
from the people’s language. At the end, there emerged two different languages: the 
written (and spoken) language of the ruling class called Osmanlica and the Turkish of 
ordinary people called öz Türkçe}^ It was seen as a significant sign of duality between 
the rulers and ruled, or a sign of social status between the two groups.Thus,  alongside 
Osmanlica, with its pureness and cleanliness Turkish had lived among the people without 
any of the corruption that was evident in the language of the Ottoman ruling stratum. On 
the other hand, Osmanlica was full of Arabic and Persian terms having lived as “foreign 
and frozen cliché". To be a national and civilized community, the Turks had to remove
stressed that, as a cosmopolitan language of the rulers, Osmanlica had been 
incomprehensible for the rest of the people. Birinci, 469.
Seeing Osmanlica as a foreign language for the Turks might expose its best 
signs in the words of Mustafa Kemal; “When you translate something from Osmanlica or 
another language, first look at the meaning and try to express it in Turkish.” Quoted in 
Ahmet Cevat (Emre), “Dilimizi Öz Benliğine Kavuşturmaya Başlarken” [Beginning to 
Discover the True essence of Our Language], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original 
publication 1932), 1 2 2 . For a similar tone in translation from Osmanlica to öz Türkçe, see 
“Osmanlicadan Türkçeye Geçerken Düşünülecek Bir İş: Osmanlı Sözlerini Olduğu Gibi 
Türkçeye Çevirmekten Çekinelim” [One Thing during Passing from Osmanlica to 
Turkish: Avoiding to Translate Ottoman Words in Turkish as They Are], in Atatürk ve 
Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1932), 117-119. Regarding Osmanlica as an artificial 
language, Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) in his book (1930) tried to show its difference from 
Turkish with texts written in both languages. He argued that it could “not be suitable for 
spreading education and civilization and prevents the advance of national sentiment.” See 
Sadri Maksudi, Türk Dili İçin, 248-261.
In the writings on this duality, two hugely separated life-style and world view 
each group held were usually stressed. In the First Congress, against Hüseyin Cahit 
(Yalçın)’s arguments that it is not easy to remove the difference between the written and 
spoken languages, Hasan Ali (Yücel) deemed Osmanlica responsible for the deep chasm 
between the intellectuals and the rest of the people. The language revolution was aimed at 
abolishing this chasm and “making a civilized language by understanding the people’s 
language and making it academic”. See Birinci, 284. Also, on this duality and the hybrid 
characteristics of Osmanlica and Ottoman culture, see Ahmet Ağaoğlu, “Yeni Nesil 
Arasında Dil Meselesi” [Language Issue among the New Generation], Atatürk ve Türk
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all which up to now had inculcated on the people “scholastic meanings”. I n  other 
words, it had to be cut off because of the “fact” that ''Osmanlica came to be regarded, as 
a result of the need to express a state of mind or point of view belonging to another 
realm. On the other hand, today we have our own realm and thus we dislike old phrases 
signifying foreign taste” (my emphasis).®'’ What was needed was to reshape the Turkish
Dili 2 (original publication 1933), 131-134; also see Yunus Nadi, “Türk Dili Türkçeye 
Doğru” [Toward Turkish, Language of the Turks] (original publication 1933), 145.
®3 See Samih Rifat’s speech. Birinci, 481-82. In his comment on the Congress, 
Avni Ali (Çandar), stressing “Ottoman cosmopolitan literature” with non-Turkish 
characteristics, depicted scientific and literary understanding of the old regime closely 
tied with a “scholastic” language and knowledge. Osmanlica, not having been the 
People’s language, had to be abolished like the Sultanate and all of its institutions. See 
Avni Ali (Çandar), “Dil Kurultayından Sonra”, in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original 
publication 1932), 495-497. In the Ottoman time the duality between 'Disani Osm anf 
(Ottoman Language) and folk Turkish was not a mere linguistic one, but a sharp 
difference among “understandings” or “state of mind”. Ottoman understanding and all its 
institutions was the child of the knowledge of the Middle Ages or “medrese”, swam of 
scholasticism. Ottoman understanding created by Osmanlica was in its true terms a mind 
of Middle Age... By the language revolution we do not only pass from one language to 
another, but also pass from one understanding -that of Middle Ages- to a “Turkish 
understanding” -that of the civilized world.” Halil Nimetullah, “Osmanlica Anlayıştan 
Türkçe Anlayışa” [From the Ottoman Understanding to the Turkish One], Cumhuriyet, 
27 March 1933, 3. M. Fuad Köprülü went one step further, saying that “[I]t was the logic 
of the Middle Ages which has hindered our development until now. Ottoman language 
and culture of the Middle Ages it belongs to has distorted our taste, our spirit and good 
judgement and so has made the Turks alienated from themselves. Thanks to the language 
revolution, in particular, and cultural revolution, in general, with which the language one 
is closely tied, future generations will create new art and new literature signifying the 
Turkish spirit, Turkish character and Turkish ability.” Köprülü, “Dil İnkılabı Hakkında 
Bazı Düşünceler II” [Some Thoughts on the Language Revolution II], in Atatürk ve Türk 
Dili 2 (original publication 1933), 142.
®'‘ M. Nermi, “Nermi Bey Diyor”, 3. For him the new realm had to be free from 
the bondage of old writing and its literature: “Writing full of old expressions could not be 
a model for new generations growing up in a new civilized realm” (my emphasis). Ibid. 
Moreover, about the relationship between Osmanlica and the old mentality, Falih Rifki 
(Atay) said, “a new language would bring forth a new Turkish mentality and Turkish 
culture easily taking a secure place in modern civilization... By imitating western-style 
music while abolishing the oriental one, the goal is to create a Turkish music in the world 
of western civilization.” Falih Rifki (Atay), “Yazı, Dil, Kafa” [Alphabet, Language,
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language in terms of nationalist and populist principles. In nationalizing language, in the 
first place, one had to take into consideration scientific and technical ability and 
civilizational progress, which would bring about a close link between the national 
language and people’s language.^^
This imagination brings us to the official understanding that Osmanlica with its 
artificiality and foreign sense of feeling could not set a model for a more civilized domain 
of the Turkish nation portrayed as a community of equals, because it had been of a 
“foreign” world. It was for this reason that on behalf of the civilizing elite Osmanlica, the 
language of “high culture”, was unbecoming to the new regime’s principle of populism 
aiming at abolishing class differences and privileges. What was needed was a new 
Turkish purified from all foreign affections nourished by alien elements in the language. 
This would bring about the end of the cultural gap between the Turkish of popular 
language and that of the upper classes. A purified and simple Turkish easily 
understandable by everybody, was preferred as a language shared by all strata in the 
society, regardless of class, religious and ethnic differences.*  ^ In this respect, one might
Mind], Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1932), 103-104). For one of the 
Kemalist politician purists, Şeref (Aykut) (deputy of Edirne), the Turks had to take into 
account the fact that Turkish way of thinking and Osmanlica way of thinking are totally 
different. In sofar as the Turks get away from all suffocating domination of Osmanlica, 
they can think, speak and write in Turkish. See Şeref, “Türk Dilidir Osmanlica Değil” [It 
Is the Turkish Language, not Osmanlica], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 
1934), 186-187.
*5 This was the very tone of Samih Rifat’s opening speech. See Birinci, 4-6.
This can be clearly observed in Yunus Nadi’s statements in his article on the 
Statute of the TLS according to which every Turkish citizen, whether woman or man, 
was accepted as its member. For Yunus Nadi, this meant, “the idiom of “every citizen” in 
the Statute comprises citizens with non-Turkish origin in Turkey. It was necessary that 
the people of a homeland come together with a common language... For this reason, the
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argue that öz Türkçe was invented as a common language that would be of the 
community of “civilized” equals.
6.3.3. Radicals and M oderates in the Language Reform
After the adoption of Latin letters, the creation of new Turkish, öz Türkçe, became 
the dominant idea among the ruling circles. On the formation of öz Türkçe, there began to 
appear two main groups representing two dominant views on the language issue. The first 
group argued for the total elimination of all foreign words and words of foreign origin in 
the written and spoken Turkish language. They also believed that all these words would 
be replaced by öz Türkçe words and terms coined and created from the people’s dialects 
in Anatolia and other Turkic dialects and languages. It included the “so-called” radical 
purists. The second group, while promoting the elimination of the Arabic and Persian 
rules and words in general, and the simplification of the written language as far as 
possible, rejected the view of getting rid of all words of foreign origin widely used even 
in popular language. Mainly they did not believe in the need for a harsh revolutionary 
break in linguistic affairs. This group was called the “moderate purists”.A h m e t  Cevat
Statute, regardless of their ethnic, racial and religious difference, assumed all non- 
Turkish and -Muslim citizens as collaborative in view of both rights and duties in the 
affairs of language that is the best expression for citizenship. The TLS thus saw all 
citizens as its natural members.” Yunus Nadi, “Türk Dili İçin İlk Kurultay” [The First 
Congress for Turkish Language], Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1932), 
467,
For a detailed account of the two trends, see Ali Ekrem Bey “Turkish Language 
Changing Rapidly”, in The Turkish Press, 1926-1932 (original publication 1931), 150. 
Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), İ. Necmi (Dilmen), Celal Sahir and Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydm) were 
the leading radicals. On the other hand, among the famous moderates were Hüseyin Cahit 
(Yalçın), Ahmet Cevat (Emre), Falih Rifki (Atay) and Yunus Nadi (Abalioglu).
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(Emre) firstly elaborated moderate purism in his book entitled Yeni Bir Gramer Metodu 
Hakkında Layiha (1931).**^  The book emphasized in the first instance the impossibility of 
revolution in language, for it was a living thing in the mind first based on 
“understanding.” And so it strongly excluded newly created words that did not have any 
connotation in the people’s language.
The radical purism as a revolutionary project firstly appeared in Sadri Maksudi 
(Arsal)’s book entitled Türk Dili İçin, published in 1930 with an Introduction written by 
Mustafa Kemal. With a highly secularized nationalist passion, he emphasized that the 
Turkish race all over the world was losing their national character, which was due mainly 
to the gradual weakening of its language. For the survival of the Turkish race, in his 
view, the first and most important task was to create a written and spoken language that 
would be ÖZ Türkçe, a language of civ ilization.T he main idea of the book is that, like 
the modern nations developing their language through a deliberate renewal, Turkish had a 
strong need to be redressed in such a way, called the language revolution. This included a 
“collection of words circulated among the people, setting them up in type and using them
*** Ahmet Cevat (Emre), Yeni Bir Gramer Metodu Hakkında Layiha [Text on A 
New Grammar Method] (İstanbul, 1931).
Ibid., 17, 44. For him, in reforming the language, orta Türkçe (common 
Turkish), used by most of the people in their daily languages, had to be taken into 
consideration to create a common language. It could include some words of foreign 
origin, which had been already Turkicized. See Ahmet Cevat, “Dilimizi,” 122-23.
90 Why was this very important? The answer lay in his definition of culture. For 
him, culture as one of powers necessary for the survival of a nation was the “set of 
national ideas and feelings expressed in a definite language.” Its strength was based on a 
cultivated language and a literature (covering strong and sincere feelings and advanced 
ideas expressed in that language). Such a language would bring about the civilizational 
and cultural progress of the Turks. For further details, see Sadri Maksudi, Türk Dili, 12-
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in scientific and literary works, coining new words in accordance with the language’s 
grammatical and syntactic rules, substituting words of foreign origin with them.”^^  In 
order to achieve such an end, he argued that all words of foreign origin including Arabic, 
Persian and Latin terms should be eliminated and a new terminology should be recreated 
from Turkish origin.
The struggle between the radical and moderate purists put its stamp on all 
discussions of the language reform until the end of the single party period. During the 
early years of 1930s radical purism became the official line especially when Mustafa 
Kemal sided with it. So it became a sole influential factor in policing language until 1935 
when, in the First Turkish Language Congress, it came to be the official language policy.
The Congress was closed on 5 October 1932 with a full language planning. It was 
the starting point of the period 1932-1935. The Congress elected a Central Committee to 
direct the works and activities of the Society, and enacted a program to speed the 
language reform. The program included the following items: A comparison between the 
ancient and modern Turkish on the one hand, and the Indo-European and Semitic 
languages on the other, the preparation of a Turkish grammar, the collection of all 
Turkish words in five dictionaries, analysis of foreign works dealing with the Turkish 
language, the publication of the research in a periodical, and reservation of space for the
20; for some comments on the book, see Ragip Hulusi (Özden), “Düşünceler”, Öz 
Dilimize Doğru, 4-15 Ağustos 1932, 56.
Ibid., 18.
92 For his views on terminology, see ibid., 375. Ahmet Cevat Emre, criticizing 
Sadri Maksudi who with more fervent nationalist orientation tried to create a common 
Turkish language shared by all Turkic groups in the world, argued for a common 
terminology with the West, necessary to engage in its scientific and cultural atmosphere.
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discussion of linguistic problems in the newspapers.^^ Upon that, first of all, the 
Committee began to initiate two main projects. The first was the collection of words from 
the vocabulary of the people, old texts of ancient Turkish vocabularies and other Turkic 
languages. The second was the search for Turkish equivalents of foreign origin words.
6.3.4. The Radical Purists ’ Language Policing
To accomplish this task the government supported the TLS with its full authority. 
It was in this language planning that, by a kind of national mobilization, several agencies 
were involved in the process of creating oz Türkçe\ government agencies, schools, 
universities, newspapers, and even individuals. A decree issued in November 1932 
provided the cooperation of all administrative organs throughout the country in the 
collection of Turkish words that existed in the everyday speech of the people, but not 
used in written language.^"* In every province and every district a language committee 
was established, comprising leading officials and the RPP’s leaders of the region. Mostly 
teachers and other educated people maintained the collection. They filled in a separate 
form for each word by registering its meaning, synonyms and antonyms, how and where 
it was used. In such a way, it was aimed to process completely every single form. Within 
eight months, the Society collected 129,792 f o r m s .A t  the same time, together with the
See Ahmet Cevat Emre, Atatürk'ün İnkılap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi [Atatürk’s Goal of 
Revolution and History Thesis] (İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1956), 29-31.
3^ Birinci, 456.
9'* See Heyd, Language, 26; Söz Derleme Dergisi, I (İstanbul, 1939), 13-16.
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vocabulary of the living dialects, more than 159 old literary texts and dictionaries, mostly 
of Turkish dialects, were systematically investigated to discover Turkish words. Parallel 
to the project of collecting words from the spoken language, was the other project, a 
language survey among the literate to find öz Türkçe equivalents in place of 1400 words 
of Arabic and Persian origin. '^" Although the survey aroused a lively public interest by the 
active participation of the newspapers, the radio, the RPP and the People’s Houses, the 
responses were very insufficient for providing relevant equivalents. Therefore, the 
language engineers turned to the approximately 130,000 items previously collected.
These items as well as other words collected from the old texts and dictionaries 
were examined. Then the popular, ancient and Turkic material in the summer of 1934 
was put into a dictionary form entitled Osmanlicadan Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları Tarama 
Dergisi (a Collection of Turkish Equivalents for Osmanlıca Words). It suggested about 
30,000 ÖZ Türkçe words as possible substitutes to over 7,000 Arabic and Persian loans. 
Meanwhile the grammatical elements, suffixes in particular, were gathered, analyzed and
“İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı.” Türk Dili. 8 (September 1934), 24. By September 
1933, or in nine months, this was over 130,000. See Ahmet Şükrü, “Dil Bayramı” 
[Language Festive], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1933), 162. The 
collection had been maintained until the mid-1940s, and the number reached more than 
200,000 by 1942. Dördüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı [The Fourth Turkish Language Congress] 
(Ankara; TDK, 1943), 73.
For further details, see Ahmet Şükrü, “Tarama Derneği,” Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 
(original publication 1934), 500; “İkinci,” 24-28. For the survey, see “Dil Anketi 
Başlıyor; Osmanlıca Kelimelerin Tam Karşılığı Bulunacak” [The Language Survey 
Begins; Accurate Equivalents of Ottoman Words Will Be Found], Cumhuriyet, 10 March 
1933, 1 and 6.
See “İkinci,” 28. In this thick book of 1300 pages, Osmanlıca words were put in 
an alphabetic order and on the opposite side, their öz Türkçe equivalents were placed.
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classified, and all scientific terms, in French, English or German, were collected in a pair 
of lists, and distributed to specialists and asked them for their equivalents in Turkish.^^
The intention of collecting and coining new words, as mentioned above, was to 
create a new meaning world for future generations. This was the most emphasized idea 
by the radical language engineers. As one of them, Halil Nimetullah, wrote, “new words 
collected and coined by the TLS express a new meaning world totally different from the 
“old”, Osmanlica. They are signs of making the Turkish nation closer to civilization and 
further from primitiveness.”^^  The new Turkish, constituting a new meaning world, had 
to have its own accent free from that of I s t a n b u l . I n  the process of the invention of öz 
Türkçe, as Heyd aptly puts it:
[EJvery word of Arabic or Persian origin was considered outlawed and 
condemned to suppression as soon as a Turkish equivalent was found... This 
attitude was clearly reflected in the lists of the ‘inquiry’, which mainly contained 
Arabic and Persian words used in the everyday language, many of them even in 
the vernacular of the uneducated and rural population.
98 Ibid.
99 Halil Nimetullah, “Osmanhca,” 3. For him it was because that “a nation’s level 
of civilization is judged in the first place in accordance with the meaning of words used 
in its language. Thus Osmanhca full of foreign words could not express the taste o f ... the 
Turks.” Ibid., 153.
See i. Necmi (Dilmen), chairman of the TLS, put the reason in the following 
way: “Because of collecting a lot of words from people’s accents, each has its own 
pronunciation. All have to be transformed into a common accent. In this sense, the dialect 
of Istanbul will not be sufficient, for it does not include the voicing of newly collected 
and coined words. We have to form a common one comprising and expressing every 
voicing.” Ibrahim Necmi (Dilmen), “Şive işi için iki Söz” [Two Words About the Issue 
of Accent], \n Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1932), 30.
Heyd, Language, 31.
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It was attempted to replace foreign orinin words with words provided in Tarama Dergisi, 
the inquiry and with some new creations from Turkish roots.
This attitude of replacing all words of Arabic and Persian origin reached its peak 
point during the years 1933-1935. In those years, various measures, such as massive 
publicity, encouragement, reshaping of habits in the use of language and coercion 
through legislation, began to be actively employed to achieve everyone’s acceptance or 
compliance with the new policy. For example, after February 1933, the newspapers 
began to use the new substitutes, due to the last item of the program approved by the first 
Congress, requiring the newspapers to save some space for the language issue. 
Thereupon, at least two articles appeared, translated into new Turkish with a glossary 
explaining the new words published at the end.'°^ By a decree issued in November 1934, 
Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of the Press) ordered the press to 
publish its editorial in öz Türkçe in the front pages in full text.^ ®'* In addition to the above
However, many borrowings from European languages (especially technical 
terms) were welcomed and some new ones were even used to replace those that were 
excluded. See Metin And, Culture, Performance and Communication in Turkey (Tokyo: 
ILCAA, 1987), 174.
For one of the first examples, see Yunus Nadi, “Niçin Dilimizi Düzeltmeye 
Çalışıyoruz?” [Why Do We Try to Correct Our Language?], Cumhuriyet, 3 March 1933, 
1. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) published a guideline of how the writers use öz Türkçe in all 
their writings. For him, they had to write in öz Türkçe, because using new language was 
their national duty. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), “Dil Düzeltme İşinde Yazıcılann Borçları.” 
Öz Dilimize Doğru. 19(19 June 1934), 12.
Ahmet Şükrü, “Dil Değişiminde MilliyeC [Milliyet in Language Change], 
Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1934), 50. In the newspapers, especially in 
the semi-official daily -Hakimiyeti Milliye-, there were commentary parts publishing new 
words and showing how to use them in a sentence. For an example, see M. Nermi, “Dil 
Bayramı Yaklaşıyor” [Language Festive Coming], Hakimiyeti Milliye, 23 September 
1934, 1-2. Even in the same newspaper, M. N. published the list of new words used by 
the President of the TLS in his speech delivered on account of Dil Bayramı (Language
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legislative actions and incentives on the press, some measures were taken to force the 
people to change their speech-habits. This can be illustrated by a decision of the İzmir 
municipality approved in March 1933. According to the decision, the use of the language 
and words other than Turkish were prohibited in the public realm. It particularly 
restricted street-venders who usually used the words of the “old” and other languages 
while performing their profession. Indeed, this act had been voiced throughout the 
single party period by the campaign of Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş! (Citizen! Speak 
Turkish!). Here, what was required was that the true Turkish citizens who had to free 
from, as Ahmet Emin Yalman put it, the “cosmopolitan, mosaic” structure had to speak 
Turkish. Those who did not do so would be excluded;
Let those who did not want to be Turkish citizens by means of their languages and 
deeds, those who did not want to adopt the “umumi hayat” (the public life) of the 
country, be visible and exclude themselves from the whole something like an 
ecnebi (foreign) element.
At this juncture the role of the People’s Houses was emphasized in educating and 
diffusing ÖZ Türkçe within their locality. It was in this regard that two main tasks were 
attributed to the Houses: the first was to “transform the Turkish of the native speakers 
into the dialect of the centre”; the second, perhaps more importantly, to “be engaged
Festivity) one day before. See M. Nermi, “Dil Bayramı Yarın” [Tommorrow Language 
Festive], Hakimiyeti Milliye, 25 September 1934, 1 and 4.
See “Güzel Bir Emir” [A Good News], Cumhuriyet, 7 March 1933, 3. In 
addition, in the same news, it was stressed that Istanbul municipality where in its various 
districts the street-venders were still using languages other than Turkish had to take this 
implementation as model. “Though being free whatever languages minority groups use in 
their private life, in public places like streets and gazinos Turkish should be the dominant 
language.” Ibid.
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continuously and more closely with those whose mother tongue is not Turkish or who do 
speak one another language among their families even if speaking Turkish.” The 
campaign targeted mainly the non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims to make them 
speak the new Turkish. It was obvious that the aim was to form a homogenous national- 
cultural community with a common language. Moreover, the usage of the new Turkish 
was to be advanced through the propagation of the officials over the country to use the 
new language. In that Mustafa Kemal set himself with this task by making his speeches 
and writing letters in the new language.
The process of the constant, radical modification in the Turkish vocabulary also 
gave way to changes in many names and titles. The act of renaming appeared first in the 
names of some cities, places and geographical names, containing some reference to the 
ancien regime and particular ethnic and traditional structures. Also, this trend paved the 
way for a fashion of changing names from Arabic to Turkish. For instance, Hüseyin 
Kazım, one of the radical purists, argued for the necessity of calling children by such 
names as Alp and Bozkurt in preference to Arabic and Persian names like Ali and
Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe” [Turkish in Public Places], 
Tan, 4 March 1937, in Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme'Politikaları, 122-124.
Yaşar Nabi, “Halkevleri’nin Dil, Tarih, Edebiyat Yolundaki Çalışmaları” 
[Language, History, Literature Works of the People’s Houses]. Ülkü (March 1939), 45-
46.
‘0* For a typical example of his speech in öz Türkçe, see Atatürk’ün Söylev ve 
Demeçleri, vol. II, 320-321. This, delivered in honour of the crown prince of Sweden on 
3 October 1934, was impossible to understand for those who were unfamiliar with the 
new language. As H. Reşit Tankut says, it was first written in Ottoman with Arabic words 
and then replaced with neologisms. See Lewis, “Atatürk’s,” 206; H. Reşit Tankut, 
“Atatürk’ün Dil Çalışmaları” [Atatürk’s Language Studies], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 
(Ankara, 1963), 125.
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Mehmet. This alteration of Islamic names was later turned into the Law of Surnames 
{Soy Adi Kanunu) issued in June 1934 which required that everyone had to take a 
surname within two year s .Ar t i c l e  3 of the Law prohibited taking as surnames names 
denoting rank and officials, aşiret and other nations, and uncivil manners; and so, all new 
surnames had to be öz T ü r k ç e At the same time, a law issued on 26 November 1934, 
prohibited the further use of titles such as paşa, gazi, efendi and bey, as well as names 
indicating noble lineage. Following the western style, it anticipated that putting before 
names, a man would addressed merely as Bay (“Mr.”) and a woman, as Bayan (“Ms.”).^ *^  
In conjunction with this decree, Mustafa Kemal dropped the title Gazi, of Arabic origin.
Following Mustafa Kemal’s endeavor to Turkicize many people’s names, he 
listed new names in his article. He even declared that he dropped unofficially his name, 
Hüseyin Kazım, and wanted from his friends to call him Yılmaz. See Hüseyin Kazım 
(Duru), “Her Türk’ün Adı Türkçe Olmalıdır!” [Name of Every Turk Has to Be Turkish!]. 
Öz Dilimize Doğru. 17 (12 March 1934), 11.
Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], “Soyadı Kanunu” [Law of Surname], no. 
2741, (Ankara; Prime Ministry, July 2, 1934), 506.
During the sessions on the Law, Şükrü Kaya, Minister of Interior Affairs, 
emphasized that establishing Turkish surnames instead of those reflecting any traditional, 
ethnic, religious attachments would be necessary for national unity. For him, words such 
Çerkeş, Laz, Kızılbaş, Haydaranli [an diŞiret name], and so on, belonged to the Middle 
Ages, and gave way an “imagined” division among the people. Thus words preferred as 
surnames had to be free from all particularisms and also they had to be öz Türkçe. For his 
statements, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. IV, C. 23, 21-6-1934, 246-249. In particular 
within this vein, uncivilized names were seen unacceptable to be used in Turkish society, 
for “nobody”, said Şükrü Kaya, “has a right to be foolish and disgusting in the Turkish 
society.” Ibid, 247.
"2 Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], “Efendi, Bey, Paşa Gibi Lakap ve Unvanların 
Kaldırılmasına Dair Kanun” [The Law about the Abolishment of Nicknames and Titles 
like Efendi, Bey, Paşa'], n. 2867 (Ankara: Prime Ministry, November 29, 1934), 6.
In the Army the old ranks of müşir and liva were substituted with that of 
European ones; mareşal and general. For Ahmet Cevat Emre, “the adoption of “bay”, 
“bayan” and surnames Europeanized our language.” See Emre, Atatürk’ün, 46-47.
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24 November 1934, the parliament bestowed on him a surname, that of Atatürk, “Father 
Turk” and another law issued on 7 December 1934 prohibited the use of Atatürk, or its 
any modification, by anyone else. Then he considered substituting Kemal with an old 
Turkish word that has a very similar sound to the name Kemal. It was “Kamal”, meaning 
the “strong”, the “armed.” He was now called Kamal and upon that his political system as 
Kamalism}'^^ In this regard the similar act of renaming was evident in post-revolutionary 
France. The Jacobins renamed themselves and urged others to name children in 
accordance with the new system, as well as changing the names of places and streets 
reminding of the past.^^  ^ The Kemalist efforts to abolish all titles belonging to the “old” 
and the setting up of new names seemed to be due mainly to the trend of equalizing and 
civilizing everyone thought in the boundaries of a modern way of life, which was at the 
heart of the Kemalist notion of culture.
Moreover, the period of radical purism coincided with another phase of the 
Kemalist secularizing efforts. Among those efforts were the ban of wearing religious 
clothes outside the places of worship, the conversion of the Aya Sofya (Hagi Sophia) 
mosque into a museum, and the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday, the 
closing of Theological Faculty of the Istanbul University, the removing of religious
Rıza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım [My Life and My Mémoires], vol. IV (İstanbul; 
Altındağ Yay., 1968), 1785-1786. Finally he decided on Kemal, but usually signed his 
name as K. Atatürk. However, after 1935, Kamalism gained a widespread usage among 
the Kemalists. See Mehmet Saffet Engin’s book entitled Kamalism and La Turquie 
Kamaliste (an official journal) which was published under this name until 1950.
See Darnton, The Kiss, 6-7. This was, as Hunt calls it, “revolutionary 
language” which “did not simply reflect the realities of revolutionary changes and 
conflicts, but rather was itself transformed into an instrument of political and social 
change. .. The language itself helped shape the perception of interests and hence the
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instruction from the school curriculum. It was attempted for the purpose to eliminate 
all remainders and remnants of the past together with its language.
6.3.5. The Phase o f  M oderate Purism and the Sun-Language Theory
The Tarama Dergisi, providing a large alternative of possible substitutes, created 
great chaos in using new words in place of those that were dropped. By the loss of words 
accumulated throughout centuries, which formed the crucial component of the 
vocabulary of spoken Turkish, most of the people were faced with a severe handicap to 
find the proper designation and so to express themselves.**'^ This situation was a 
“linguistic anarchy”.*** Mustafa Kemal described it as follows: “We have brought the 
language to a deadlock.. .we will also save it from this deadlock.”**^  In the end, it brought 
about a change in the Society’s attitude. The tendency was now toward a more moderate 
position. Due to the linguistic anarchy, during the mid-193 5 the voice of the moderates 
began to find echo in the official line. The critique of the moderate purists may be
development of ideologies.” Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution (Berkley, CA: California University Press, 1984), 24.
**^  Heyd, Language, 30.
**”^ One contemporary observer reported that “[DJuring 1935 the metropolitan 
press passed through a period of trying to use nothing but the pure Turkish words. Even 
the best educated men and women could not learn the daily, news without looking up 
several words per paragraph in their pocket glossaries.” The result was for the 
newspapers to suffer a “tremendous drop in circulation.” See Webster, The Turlcey, 244.
*** Hundreds of borrowings from Arabic and Persian, integral part of the everyday 
speech, could not be removed before “Turkish substitutes had been accepted by the 
people.” Heyd, Language, 32. Also see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern 
Turkey (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), 428.
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illustrated with the views of Yaşar Nabi. He saw the efforts of the radical purists as 
making “Turkish far too barren and insufficient by eliminating all words of foreign 
origin, many of them taking roots in the people’s tongue”; the result was a “few öz 
Türkçe words with which it is impossible to make any progress in science and technique 
and even create the most primitive form of l i t e r a t u r e . B y  the autumn of 1935, the TLS 
dropped its policy of extreme purism. With Atatürk’s encouragement, a new dictionary 
commission was founded with the task to make a comparative study on words in the 
Tarama Dergisi and discover the best Turkish equivalents that would be published in a 
dictionary form. 121 In September 1935, its product came as Osmanlicadan Türkçeye Cep 
Klamzu (An Ottoman-Turkish Pocket Dictionary) and its associate publication, 
Türkçeden Osmanlicaya Cep Klavuzu (A Turkish-Ottoman Pocket Dictionary). 122 Now
115 Atay, Çankaya, A ll.
'20 Yaşar Nabi, “Dil Devriminde Ülkü Söz Kıtlığı Değildir” [The Ideal in the 
Language Revolution Is Not The Scarcity of Words], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original 
publication 1935), 261. But a rich language as in the West included many words as much 
as possible. So, while he believed in the necessity of “replacing some Arabic and Persian 
origins with that of öz Türkçe words existing in popular usage”, Turkicized words of 
foreign origin had to remain. Also, like other moderates, he rejected the radical purist 
idea of making the language of the elite and the people very close to each other. See ibid.
*21 As Falih Rifki Atay recounts, at the beginning the committee consisted of only 
the moderates. Then, upon the demand of Atatürk, some purists entered into the 
committee. He tells us that “We [the moderates] preferred for a lot of words to remain in 
the language, although others [the radical purists] wanted to create a pure language 
having no relevancy in the world. In Turkish we leave as many words through proving 
that they are Turkish.” Atay, Çankaya, 475-479. See Ibrahim Necmi Dilmen, “Türk Dili 
Tetkik Cemiyeti Nasıl Çalışıyor?” [How The Turkish Language Research Society 
Works?], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 1935), 506, for the members of 
the Committee. The Commission examined a number of books by taking into account 
French and German equivalents of Arabic words, and then making a comparison with 
Arabic and Persian. For a list of the books the Committee studied, see Saffet Arikan, 
“Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumunun Bildiriği” [The Turkish Language Research Society’s 
Decleration], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (Ulus, 26 March 1935), 508-509.
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the main stress was no longer placed on finding Turkish equivalents for all words of 
foreign o r i g i n . S o  it included many assimilated Arabic-Persian words previously put 
into the list of condemned words. Although the Klavuz made it unnecessary to 
eliminate all words of foreign origin used in Turkish to some extent, for Atatürk it was 
far from his expectation to lessen the ongoing chaos in the language issue. He seemed 
convinced of the need for using foreign origins going deep down in both the written and 
spoken languages. The use of these words in any way would not be contrary to the 
language reform.
During late 1935 and early 1936, the Society’s moderate attitude became a new 
official line in the language policy. The new policy was justified with a theory the “so- 
called” Sun Language Theory {Güneş DU Teorisi)}'^^ After almost ten months of work.
'22 For the Kılavuz, see Ibrahim Necmi Dilmen, “Dil Kurumunun Çalışmaları” 
[The Works of the Language Society], in Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (original publication 
1935), 514-515.
'23 In a statement issued on the incident of its publication, the goal was put 
forward “to provide genuine Turkish substitutes for words which are considered foreign 
because they are used (only) in our written language and are not found in the spoken 
language of the people”, and also to “establish a written language which every literate 
person can understand.” Quoted in Heyd, Language, 32.
'24 In the Society’s journal, Türk Dili, it was rationalized in a way that 
etymological research had proved that “a number of words... formerly thought to be of 
foreign languages had originally passed from Turkish into those languages.” Türk Dili, 16 
(April 1936), 22; Heyd, Language, 33.
'25 In late 1935, on the eve of giving up the extreme purist tendency, while he was 
at a dinner in Çankaya with his close friends, he said: “Friends! "Kitap”, “katip”, 
“mektup” are ours; “yetübü”, “lemyektüp” are of the Arabs.” See M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, 
“Dil Üzerine Atatürk’ten Üç Hatıra” [Three Mémoires on Language from Atatürk], in 
Türk Dili İçin [For the Turkish Language], vol.l (Ankara: T. Kültürü Araş. Enst., 1966), 
212.
'26 It was first mentioned to some degree in Ulus (2 November 1935), running a 
column devoted to the theory. Also it was stated in the foreword to XhQ Klavuz that “In the
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the Theory became publicized and crystallized in the Third Turkish Language Congress 
{Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı). It convened on August 1936, as İ. Necmi Dilmen clarified, 
“to introduce the Turkish Language Thesis to the whole world” by showing that Turkish 
was the “basic source of all cultural languages including the Ural-Altai, the Indo- 
European and the Semitic ones” (my emphasis). ^ 27 xh^t is, the Theory revealed that 
Turkish was the mother of all languages. It was in the first instance in harmony with the 
Turkish History Thesis which showed that the Turks in history had been culture-creators, 
and their homelands (Central Asia and Anatolia) were the cradle of human civilization 
(or “high culture”), it was proved by the “TLS’s serious philosophical, scientific and
dictionary we have accepted that all words that appear to have passed from a Turkish root 
to foreign languages and then later returned to our tongue in inferior form. It is our 
unshakable conviction... that the main source of the so-called Indo-European and Semitic 
languages. . . lies hidden in the depths of Turkish.” Quoted in Tachau, “Language,” 199; 
Türk Dili, 16 (1936), 9 and 15. Atatiirk’s venture again came to the fore in the formation 
of the theory. In the formation he seemed to be mostly inspired from an unpublished 
paper by Hermann F. Kivergic sent to him in mid-1935. In its general term, it was on the 
connection between the emergence of first thought and language. Mustafa Kemal wanted 
his colleaques to work on and transmute it into a theory for the Turkish language. For a 
detailed account, see Atay, Çankaya, 475-479; Emre, Atatürk’ün, 46-50. For the role of 
Atatürk in the initiation of the Theory, see Lewis, “Atatürk’s,” 206-7. For more details on 
the Sun Language Theory from various perspectives, see Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı [The 
Third Turkish Language Congress] (Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937), 37-284; Şemsettin 
Günaltay and H. Reşit Tankut, Dil ve Tarih Tezlerimiz Üzerine Gerekli Bazı İzahatlar 
[Some Explanations on Our Language and History Theses] (Istanbul; Devlet Basımevi, 
1938), 27-69.
'27 See Üçüncü, 4. It is obvious that by cultural language he meant a language 
with highly developed, artistic, scientific capability (like the Western languages, 
specifically French, German and English). In this Congress, and then on, it was used 
interchangeably with the phrase “culture language” which seemed adopted as equivalent 
to that of “civilized language” put to use in previous official discourse of language.
'28 That is why, in this regard, “the language works had to examine closely the 
presence of a primitive Turkish culture language which had taken root everywhere 
through Turkish migrations... The New Turkish Language Thesis anticipates that at the 
foundation of all languages, there has been the language of our ancestors who carried 
culture to the four corners of the world.” Üçüncü, 9-11. This nation took “the names of
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linguistic works for ten months” supported with several publications including articles, 
booklets and books. Coupled with the desire of presenting this “scientific” discovery to 
the whole world of science, a number of foreign scientists were invited. Î. Necmi Dilmen 
saw their participation as “making it possible to go hand in hand with the world of 
science.”* 29 Their presence was clearly to serve the linguistic engineers’ search for a 
justification of their theory.
The Sun Language Theory had a far reaching effect; if all existing languages were 
of Turkish origin, it was no longer necessary to eliminate words previously thought to be 
of foreign origin.*^® The Theory opened a new epoch since everybody could “write and 
speak as you did without any hesitation because all are in Turkish.”*^* At the same time, 
Atatürk himself set the tone by reestablishing some words of Arabic origin such as millet
their cultural creations and systems of thought related to these creations to Asia, Europe 
and America... and thought them to other nations.” Günaltay and Tankut, Dil ve Tarih, 
28. It was attempted to discover the justification of the Thesis in the unknown parts in 
modern literature on the roots of some languages (like French, English, German) and that 
of Latin and Ancient Greek. “For it, the unknown words in these languages can be easily 
explained with Turkish.” Üçüncü, 10. With the Theory, the sun took its distinguished 
place among the symbols of the Kemalist regime: “Our ancestors who founded the first 
culture in Anatolia used the sun as a symbol... The sun takes its place in history as a 
symbol of Turkish thought and art.” As Afet İnan recorded, this expression was made by 
Mustafa Kemal himself See Üçüncü, 7.
*29 Üçüncü, 4-5. Mustafa Kemal, in his opening speech delivered at the Grand 
National Assembly (1 November 1936), stressed chiefly the participation of the European 
scholars as legitimating the official thesis. See Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçler, vol. 1, 
406.
*20 Ibid., 13-14. For example, almost 16 % of the substitutes suggested in the 
Klavuz were “words (or derivations of words) which until recently had been thought to be 
of Arabic, Persian and other foreign origin, but which have [now]...been proved to be 
derived from Turkish roots.” Ibid., 14; Heyd, Language, 33. Especially at the first hand 
those who wrote for the people, like writers and journalists, had to take into consideration 
the new discovery when they wrote. Ibid., 13.
*2* Atay, “Dil Kurultayı,” 517-518; idem, Çankaya, 473.
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“nation” in his speeches from late 1935 onwards in place of the purist replacement ulus. 
In a similar fashion, in the following years, several words of Arabic and Persian origin 
were re-welcomed as well as that of European languages which began to take place more 
than previous times.
It is generally accepted that the reason for the Sun Language Theory was to end 
the radical purist trend which caused a great chaos in finding satisfactory substitutes to 
the dismissed words. Thus in later times it was not so much emphasized in the official 
discourse.However ,  this did not mean the abandonment of reform in language. The 
goal remained the same that to some degree Turkish should be purified and simplified 
and free from foreign yoke. Now the TLS maintained its work primarily concentrated on 
technical and scientific terminology. In general, in determining the terms, it was settled 
that some foreign roots were tolerated when a proper Turkish equivalent could not be 
found. If it was necessary, new terms should be re-invented from Turkish roots by means 
of Turkish word formation. ^ 33 it was the name of a new trend to exchange Arabic terms
’32 After Atatürk’s death, it was completely dropped out of the official discourse. 
Even then İ. Necmi Dilmen cancelled his lectures on the Theory, which were made 
obligatory in 1936 at the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography of the Ankara 
University. See Lewis, “Atatürk’s,” 208; Nihat Sami Banarli, Türkçenin Sırları [Secrets 
of Turkish] (Istanbul, 1972), 317.
’33 In the Third Congress, 1936, the following items concerning the formation of 
terms were proposed for the Language Theory. 1) In the curriculum of primary and 
secondary schools, a) “the terms, of Turkish origin and common in the world of culture 
(elektrik, dinamo, metre, gram, etc.) should be applied as they are”, and b) “others should 
be coined from Turkish roots”. 2) “The terms of professional and higher education should 
be directly adopted from the terms belonging to the world of culture, which have been of 
Turkish origin.” Üçüncü, 22. In this text, a working report of the TLS, the term culture 
seemed to be used to express what all the previous definition of civilization comprised. It 
is so obvious that the world of culture was the world of civilization.
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for European ones, especially French, and directly apply some of them if they di not exist 
in Turkish.’3'*
With the death of Atatürk (November 1938), the direction of the language reform 
went to the opposite angle for a short period of time. A number of old names previously 
Turkicized was re-instituted. *35 And the TLS maintained its moderate position regarding 
purism. This attitude may be understandable when one takes into account the vulnerable 
political context resulting from the change in the ruling cadre. After the new cadre 
consolidated its power, a new tide of purism was put forward by the successor of Mustafa 
Kemal, İsmet İnönü.
6.3.7. The Second Wave o f  Purism
'34 Some of them were benzin, makina, fizik, psikoloji, kimya, telefon, elektrik, 
radyo, gazete, kongre, parti, demokrasi, and so on. See Webster, The Turkey, 242. 
Coupled with this trend, in 1936, the Republican People’s Party changed its name from 
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası to Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Here chose the French parti to the 
Arabic fırka, while the other two words in the title were of Arabic origin.
'35 Heyd writes that “On 1®* January, 1939 the İstanbul newspaper Vakit (Arabic 
loanword for “time”) resumed its old name, which in Nowember, 1934 had been changed 
to (Turkish) Kurun. A short time later the Ministry of Education replaced its new name 
Kültür Bakanlığı with the previous... one. Maarif Vekaleti, and the Ministry of the 
Interior reintroduced vilayet ‘province’ and kaza ‘district’ in place of the Turkish terms il 
and ilçe. When, at its 1939 Congress, the RPP adopted its new programme and statutes, 
many Arabic terms previously eliminated were reinstated.” Heyd, l^anguage, 36.
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The new step in the renewed purism under İnönü’s patronage was taken in the 
early years of 1940. Coupled with an extremely puristic approach, language was again 
seen as the effective vehicle of the Republican ideals. In this trend, as Atatürk had, İnönü 
played a decisive role through directing the literate to apply more purified Turkish and 
setting an example by delivering the speech in the new language. Now the emphasis 
was placed not chiefly on the formation of new words and terms, but to provide the wider 
usage of the words and loanwords previously advanced. Under this circumstance, the 
TLS started a campaign to Turkify the written and spoken language. And so it began its 
work to recover words invented in the first half of the 1930s and impose them on the 
public, the press and the people, Most importantly, in March of 1942, it published the 
list of philosophical, sociological, grammatical and pedagogical terms as new substitutes
'36 For this task, on 26 September 1942, he called for the intellectuals and whole 
public to make efforts for the betterment of the language reform. See Dördüncü, 4. It was 
the renewed attempt to close the assumed gap between the written language and spoken 
one in favour of “Turkish” and continued to Turkify the language of the state and science. 
See ibid; Beşinci Türk DU Kurultayı, 1945 [The Fifth Turkish Language Congress, 1945] 
(Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Basımevi, 1946), 23.
'37 In the Fourth Congress, Hasan Ali Yücel, Minister of Education and President 
of the TLS, focused on this new trend as the government’s sole task, claiming that “We 
are now at the stage of settling the new, completing the missing... and maturing our 
[language] revolution.” Ibid., 6. He also claimed, it was the task of “making the national 
language of Turkish a language of science and technique in eight or ten years.” Ibid., 150. 
For the works of the TLS on the second wave of the revolution, see ibid., 17-19.
'38 The representatives of the mass media were especially urged to share this 
campaign. By the late 1941 and early 1942, the editorial of Ulus, semi-official daily, and 
Anadolu Ajansı, semi-official news agency, began to use new substitutes, while most of 
these substitutes were being promoted and proposed in the language section of Ulus. 
Thereupon, in January of 1942, the Turkish Press Association published a booklet, for 
their members, including the list of new substitutes applied by Ulus and Anadolu Ajansı 
and a small guideline for how to use new words. See DU Kolu Tarafından Birlik Üyeleri 
İçin Çıkarılan Aylık Broşür [Monthly Brochure Published by the Language Section for 
the Members of the Unity] (Ankara: Türk Basin Birliği, 1942).
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to existing ones in a book form.*^  ^ In that, almost all terms of foreign origin were 
replaced with that of new creations incomprehensible for both the literate and the people. 
In the Fourth Congress, the issue of terminology took a considerable place among other 
topics. In the commission for terminology there emerged a heated debate on whether the 
terminology would be based on newly created terms or that of Europe. The dominant
political will in the Congress sided with the attempt of purifying existing terminology.
However, this time the Kemalist linguists of the Society faced considerable 
criticism mainly from university professors and other literates whose everyday 
vocabulary was intended to be a bo l i sh ed .Th ey  rejected the TLS’s orientation to 
change technical and scientific terms (most of them of foreign origin) with that of newly 
invented öz Türkçe. In fact their stance was questioning the position of the Society as a 
sole dictator in language issue. Unlike the previous events, the debate did not end with a 
complete victory of the radical purists. Ignoring such an ongoing debate, the TLS 
continued its work to publish the Türkçe Sözlük (Turkish-Turkish Dictionary) and 
“translate” the Turkish Constitution into the new language. The former indeed was the 
last of all searches for a complete dictionary, which included the living Turkish
See Felsefe ve Gramer Terimleri [Terms of Philosophy and Grammar] 
(Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1942).
For the discussions, see Dördüncü, 224-239. Even the textbooks had been 
written in new terms for the last two years. As claimed in the report of General Secretary 
of the TLS, it was necessary for creating “enlightened” and “civilized” future 
generations. Ibid., 20.
141 Especially university professors refused the new attempt that would distort the 
meaning of the existing scientific terms, for they were willing to have common 
terminology with a world of “science”. For their claims and the counter-claims of the 
linguistic engineers taking place in the discussions in the Terms Committee, see ibid; 
Beşinci, 241-267.
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vocabulary of modern Turkey, and the newly coined words (expected to be used in the 
near future) and technical terms. With a more puristic approach it was aimed to eliminate 
all words of foreign origin, which would “save” the younger generation from the 
suffocating effects of the “old” language.
The purism of the pe r i od reached  its zenith with the translation of the Turkish 
Constitution into a more pure form, which later became one of the aspects of the hottest 
political debate in the multi-party period. The translation was regarded urgent and 
inevitable because it was a principal political text with direct influence on all matters 
related to the public institutions and the whole public. Thus, as a political text, the 
Constitution had to reflect the new political discourse of the Republic. The work began in 
1942 together with the efforts to create neologisms. After some drafts prepared at the 
initial stages of the work, the final version was adopted by the Parliament in January 
1945 144 Yyie Constitution was now called Anayasa replacing Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu,
'^^ 2 In the preface to the Dictionary, it was implied that “The Society did not intend 
to grant (the foreign words) a living right in the language... It considers it its duty to seek 
Turkish substitutes for all those foreign words for which substitutes have not yet been 
found, and it hopes that in future editions of this Dictionary it will be fortunate to replace 
many more foreign words by genuine Turkish equivalents.” Quoted in Heyd, Language, 
41. In the Dictionary, as stressed by the language engineers, priority was given to the 
Turkish origins. Beşinci, 12.
As in the first purist one of the 1930s, this period witnessed an effort to 
maintain the secularizing reforms. These included that the criminal Law passed in June of 
1941 multiplied the penalties of the Hat and Alphabet Laws, and the call to prayer {ezan) 
in Arabic (was replaced with its Turkish translation in 1932) was made punishable with 
jailing for up to three months. Heyd, Language, 37.
The Constitution with its new dress was hugely differentiated from that of 
1924, including a lot of new words and terms in place of Arabic and Persian origins. For 
the new version, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 7, C. 15, S. Sayısı; 39, 22-31. For 
example. Article 26 of the new version contained 37 Turkish words, which were a few in 
the same article of the 1924 Constitution. Ibid., 24; Tahsin Banguoglu, “Devlet Dili
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the name of the 1924 Constitution. Following that, in April of 1945, the Dahilli 
Nizamname (Standing Order) of the Parliament translated as İçtüzük was also 
Turkicized.''*^ Some foreign words which had historical connotations for the Republic 
remained, though the new language of the Constitution included many öz Türkçe words 
and terms, some religious and popular.
“Turkicization of the Constitution” was seen in relation to the nationalization of 
the state language. Herein lies a separation between the state language on the one hand 
and literary and scientific one on the other. In the official discourse, it was implied that, 
although since 1932 literary and scientific language had been turkicized to a greater 
extent, the state language signified with the language of the Constitution and Law was 
still under the hegemony of Osmanlica. Tahsin Banguoğlu claimed that this hegemony 
was ended with the adoption of new Constitution by the Parliament in 1945 and the State 
Language became Turkish. It is obvious that its translators’ attitude toward language
Türkçe” [The State Language Is Turkish], Beşinci Türk Dil Kurultayı, 59. For the new 
words, terms and phrases used in the new version, see ibid., 3-21 and 32-33.
For a Turkicized version of TBMM İçtüzüğü, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 7, 
C. 16, S. Sayısı: 68, 3-27.
E. g., can (soul), mal (property), din (religion), vicdan (conscience), aile 
(family), cumhuriyet (republic), hürriyet (freedom), vatan (homeland), devlet (state), and 
so on. Banguoğlu, “Devlet,” 64. The intention of the TLS was announced that they would 
be purged from the Turkish language in the course of time.
Ibid., 65. In fact the change in the State Language came to being first with new 
terminology created from Turkish roots and then with the Anayasa and İç Tüzük, which 
constituted the basis of the Law language. For a more detailed account, see ibid., 58-59. 
For Saim Ali Dilemre, this effort had to be treated within the desire to create a common 
language comprising people, science and state languages. To gain a common language 
would be only possible with a revolutionary attempt that had been taken as a principle in 
the Turkish language reform. Ibid., 78-79. For a more chauvinist view on the issue, see İ. 
Hakkı Baltacıoğlu’s speech, ibid., 125-126; Besim Atalay’s speech, ibid., 147-148.
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was highly politicized, while the intended aim was declared to make it understandable to 
the people.
The period after 1945 was the escalation of considerable criticism on the grounds 
that it was leading to the corruption of the language. By raising the criticism coupled with 
political opposition, the government turned toward a more moderate position with regard 
to language reform. The TLS, with its highly politicized stand, became the issue of the 
ongoing political battlefield between the ruling party and its opposition, the Democrat 
Party (DP). The DP, after coming to power in 1950, in the first instance questioned the 
position of the TLS and its role on the issue of the language reform, and weakened it by 
withdrawing from government support. In addition, in 1952, it canceled the 1945 version 
of the Constitution and re-instituted that of 1924, changing several names previously 
turkicized.
As a conclusion, there were two principal steps in the language revolution during the 
formative decades of the Republic: The first was the formation of the new Turkish, called 
ÖZ Türkçe, to provide a break with the past. The second was the standardization and 
generalization of that language to assimilate local dialects and local/ethnic languages. In 
other words, the alphabet change and later purification and standardization attempts were 
based on a political impetus associated with the multiple task of breaking with the past 
and interpreting the present and the future through renaming or redefining.
In fact, this process manifested to some extent what other “national” languages 
undergoing the process. Thus newly formulated Turkish language should be taken as a 
“cultural artifact” of the Kemalist nation-building project rather than “the basis of
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national c o ns c i ou sn es s .T he  goal of the project was to “liberate” Turkish from “ten 
thousand years of subordination” and “restore” it to its rightful place among the civilized 
and cultured nations. This was to be realized through elevating the status and advancing 
the use of öz Türkçe. In this respect öz Türkçe had to assume its proper role of projecting 
a civilized and cultured Turkish personality. As a sole valid language in the public realm, 
it came to acquire a superior status, such that even speakers of other languages and 
dialects among the Kemalist elite group developed negative attitudes to their possessions.
The official language policies began to spawn a group of elite, which continued to 
benefit from its monopoly of mastery of the official language. In this determined status, 
the use of language as a symbol had outmost importance. It seemed to be a symbol of a 
high, cultured and civilized life. That was why access to it meant at the first sight to have 
the right to take part in that life. It came to be the language which was, in the words of 
Eugene Weber, “about status and access and success and, sometimes, revenge.” Taking 
into account in nation-building process, it was also a tool and symbol for forming and 
strengthening within the borders of the homeland a collective sentiment of belonging. It 
was part and parcel of the main official line disregarding all particularities which were 
seen as dangerous for the healthy formation of a high life under the concept of culture. In 
short, ÖZ Türkçe appeared to be judged symbolizing the Turkish nation as having its own 
culture.
The Kemalist quest for building up a new future, inspired from Jacobin 
utopianism, came with the creation of öz Türkçe which was aimed to be entirely value-
For the process, see Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1879 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 111.
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free. What was common with this aim was that it would be ready to be filled with the 
new meaning world of secularized moral discourse of Kemalism, and in such a way, the 
people’s view of themselves would be re-shaped. Here language was subject to the 
process of the production of meaning which would in fact provide for the Kemalists to 
interpret and re-construct the interests and “ethos of future generations” of the Turkish 
nation. This act came with “scienticization” of language that was inherently 
politicization, or ideologization, of language. In this way the Kemalist language engineers 
viewed Arabic and Persian -o r even literacy in the Arabic script- as a political statement.
It is in this sense that the Kemalists’ evaluation of language as an another “man­
made” object seemed to be largely differentiated from that of Romanticism, which saw 
language as the sole constitutive aspect of culture, a tool for expressing all belonging to 
living traditions and manners. For example, in Herder’s formulation, language as a basic 
aspect of culture was the product and expression of the collective experience of the group 
having its own unique way. So it could not be invented in anyway by a group of 
individual through coining new words.*^^ This difference stemmed from the historicist 
view constituting the Kemalist conception of language; it was a progressive and futurist 
idea.
There emerged the zigzag in the process of revolutionizing language. This might 
be seen as a political control which ended in periodic acts of renaming. This made 
language one of the most contested issues during the early Republican era and the multi-
Eugene Weber, “What Rough Beast?” Critical Review. 10/2 (1996), 296.
'50 Jordan, Second Stories, 14.
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party period. In fact it was inherent to the process itself in which language came to be 
contested and historically contingent.
151 See Robert Reinhold Ergang, Herder and The Foundations o f German 




The early Republican period in Turkey shows a process of nation-building accompanying 
the processes of society-making and order-making. Throughout this dissertation, I have 
highlighted this process and demonstrated that of culture production through focusing on 
the new literature on politics of culture, nationalism, politics of identity and state. This 
analysis has been maintained on the bases of a new conceptual framework emerging as a 
result of the crisis of modernity and a new socio-political reality led by the rising tide of 
identity politics during the last two decades in Turkey. In this regard, I have argued that 
culture came to be the end-product of a modernist political project, and has, in turn, 
became one of the most debated issues in the political arena throughout the history of the 
Republic. Culture-making, initiated by the state in the early Republican era, reflected the 
processes that paved the way for a civilizing pressure on the people from above. These 
occurred around a specific political project initiated in a specific society, the “Turkish 
society” of the second quarter of the twentieth century, of which the state came to be the 
sole legitimate designer and actor. The official discourse on culture as a vision of the 
“new society” constituted the backbone of the Kemalist project of modernization. The 
product was the politicization, or the ideologization, of all aspects of “culture”, and so 
through the state mechanisms, these aspects ranging from fine arts to language were used
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as “agents of civilizing discipline”.* This was in fact one of the radical “modernist” 
programs of culture launched in a non-Western context.
Two Projects o f Modernity
In the West, the history of “the modernist program of culture” went back to the 
late eighteenth century, coupled with the emergence of a modern political will, or new 
state formation, to re-construct society. Nowadays, almost all analyses concentrating on 
the relation of culture to the state and politics have taken into account this specific 
historical process. It has been possible only through embedding power and history in the 
analyses of culture or grounding culture in unequal power relations; such an effort for 
historicizing or contextualizing came out to expand the scope of the concept of culture. In 
this way I have tried to highlight the historico-political development of the concept of 
culture in one way or another appearing with the idea of civilization. It is in this respect 
that the notion of culture as an idea and a process is a modern invention. At that point, it 
came to be a vision of the formation of “cultivated” and “ordered” society and “civilized” 
individuals on the basis of new standards and certainties. The modern state, personified, 
symbolized and imagined, from the beginning has been closely associated with such an 
order-making notion of culture used as an effective vehicle for both legitimating and 
cultivating. That is to say, the modern system of legitimization and the efforts for 
cultivation revolved on the part of the rulers of a nation-state especially around the 
construction, dissemination, and imposition of a form of cultural identity on which the
' This is Toby Miller’s expression. See Toby Miller, The Well-Tempered Self: 
Citizenship, Culture, and the Postmodern Subject (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), 21.
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political belonging or membership is based. Only to a greater extent has this occurred by 
means of its monopolization of “legitimate use of culture”. In this regard, nationalism as 
an ideology of “culture” has been inherent in the process of culture production directed 
by the state’s apparatuses. Thus the formulation of nationalism gains utmost importance. 
Only by going beyond the civic/ethnic dichotomy, the place of “culture” in the nationalist 
formulations of the modern state becomes clear. Employing Tilly’s conception, 
nationalism is classified as top-down and bottom-up formats. Both seem more 
explanatory to understand the role and dynamics of culture in nationalist projects, 
because they do not try to prove whether nationalism is culture-embedded or politics- 
oriented, but in its general sense they tell us the direction of processes of culture 
production. Put simply, the top-down form reflects the political will to construct a new 
nation by targeting and transforming all ways of life, whereas the bottom-up form is 
concerned more with state-building and coincidentally with “rejuvenation” and 
improvement of “submerged” cultural values. In fact, both are related to the formation of 
culture in a given time and space.
Throughout the dissertation, I have shown that these two modern projects 
accompanied the development of two dominant notions of culture. The first one was the 
hierarchical-assimilative, Enligthenist-Jacobin notion of culture signifying a modernist 
program for the construction of a new order and new society. From the beginning, culture 
was here associated with the idea of civilization. Flourishing from the Enlightenment 
philosophy, both concepts reflected an ontological and epistemological rupture and the 
leaning to construct a new symbolic universe based on the new secular “Truth” and new 
patterns in which the “enlightened” and “civilized” rulers came to be the unique culture-
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builders. At the heart of this quest there was the idea of the construction of an “ordered” 
society and “civilized” citizens. This understanding turned into an extensive political 
project under the rule of the Jacobins in the post-revolutionary period in France. For the 
sake of the project, all forms of life became the objects of cultural crusade maintained 
from above by the “civilizing” rulers. Here, the “new way of life” determining all aspects 
of the modern public sphere were extended to the private one through assaulting 
particular attachments, family relations, artistic and musical taste, and so forth. The state 
and its actors with a determined “civilizing” mission played a decisive role in this attack 
revolved around the Republican quest for equalizing everybody. In short, culture that was 
produced in a nationalist endeavor as top-down format was disseminated and imposed on 
the people seen at the bottom of hierarchical structuration. This notion of culture was 
therefore assimilationist coexisting with both inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies.
The second was the organic, unique notion of culture, led by Romanticism. It was, 
first of all, based on a clear distinction between kultur (culture) and zivilisation 
(civilization). The former denoted the system of values shared by all the members of a 
definite community, here the community of Germans; that is, it manifested a collective 
and organic whole. It was, therefore, the main source for the development of personality 
and the very identity of everybody in that community. However, civilization represented 
the secondary aspects of life and continued foreign elements (often associated with the 
French way) seen harmful to the harmonious structure of culture. In Germany, the 
organic, differentialist notion of culture became the cornerstone of nationalistic ideas 
during the nineteenth century. That is to say, the idea of nationalism, developing from the 
bottom upward, came with the state-seeking endeavor of the intellectuals and later the
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state elite to establish a political structure for “German” culture. In turn, through the state 
agents and intellectual/artistic works in the hands of nationalist intellectuals it was 
attempted to be revitalized and improved. Then it became the name of the defined 
community signifying the collective personality of all citizens. This differentialist nature 
made it difficult for the outsiders with “different” cultures to access membership, or 
citizenship of the German state. In this sense, it is exclusionary and non-assimilative.
The above-mentioned models have had a determining effect on almost all 
modernist/nationalist projects in non-Western societies. The Turkish case was one, and 
the most unique, of the first projects of the non-Western world. The Republican regime, 
during its formative decades, initiated a modernist project to civilize the society, on the 
basis of a sort of state-led, or top-down, nationalism, akin to the French type. Two 
concepts, culture and civilization, constituted the baseline of the project, coming as a 
vision of “human-self cultivation” and “ordered society”. Here, the cultural institutions of 
the Republic, which symbolized and manifested the monopolization of the legitimate use 
of culture, came to the fore as producers, carriers, and disseminators of the state discourse 
on culture. These institutions were planned as the basic agents for promoting and 
imposing “the modern way of life” to cultivate and order the society, to create future- 
generations and tame the masses. The rationale for culture production was the will of the 
Kemalists to find out their ideal image in the future, but not mainly the past and the 
present, as with Jacobin revolutionary utopianism. It seemed to be that the construction of 
culture was inherent to the projection of the planned future-life. The ideological and 
institutional roots of the Kemalist will to construct a new way of life may be related to 
the development of the idea of “society-making” in the Ottoman reformist movement
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with its civilizing mission. By its nature and revolutionary characteristic, the civilizing 
mission in the hands of the Republicans turned into a wholesale cultural crusade to create 
a new society.
The ruling group of the Kemalist regime attempted to attribute high, civilized life 
forms and a “cultivated” state of mind to the concept of culture. In this regard, culture, 
claiming universal validity for itself, became their self-image, or a way of their 
identification. The civilizing elite detached themselves from the rest of the people with 
particularistic and traditional affiliations, with their distinct language, historicity, dress- 
style, taste of art and music, education, way of thinking, notion of honor, and so on. In 
this way, their “elitist categorization of culture”  ^ denoted at the first glance a social and 
cultural status, based on various qualities and patterns, ranging from artistic taste to 
training, from dress to manner of eating, which reflected the inner structure of the 
Kemalist perception of “the modern way of life”. This culture was on the part of the 
civilizing rulers and intellectuals the entire source of all-good values. Truth, and identity. 
This was also true for the Romantic notion of culture, but the difference was that, unlike 
the Romantic-German definition, the Kemalists did not regard “living culture” as a 
spiritual, organic entity giving true essence to human beings. Also, setting up a strict 
hierarchy between life forms, it anticipated revolutionizing every sphere of life 
considered to belong to the “old”, that is, primitive, archaic. In this sense, the Kemalist 
notion of culture was different from Gokalp’s formulation that stressed the inevitability 
of “living” and “local” values for the definition of culture. It does, however, seem to be 
very close to the Westernists’ proposal to re-construct new forms of life for “enlightened”
 ^ Jack David Eller, “Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism”, American Anthropologist, 99/2 
(1997), 249.
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and “civilized” future-generations. In the Kemalist formulation, the standards of the 
“civilized” world, by which the knowing elite judged all existing aspects of life, were set 
for the society.^ These standards became obviously uncontested subject matters of the 
Kemalist political project of cultural, political and social transformation, coming to terms 
as a process of culturalization. In the process, then, instead of the “old”, a new system of 
politics and education were instituted, new forms of public and private life were set in 
motion, and new family types and gender roles were introduced. The Turkish state came 
to be the sole protector of “the new way of life”. The life woven around culture also 
demonstrated political life, that is, expressed political convictions as well as social and 
cultural ones. In this discourse, politics and all forms of life could not be separated; here, 
culture emerged as a whole surrounding politics. The result was the politicization of all 
aspects of life: language, education, art, literature, history, and so on. In short, culture 
was the outcome of the constant process of cultural production, and so became the 
vehicle of projecting a vision of “the modern way of life”, a good life, promoted by the 
cultural doctrine of the rulers.
The Public Sphere
In this respect, I have argued that the ruling group formed a public sphere, the 
public which was surrounded by the political and the cultural. Thus, it became a milieu
 ^ These standards, establishing mainly the base line of the new Turks’ 
identification, were, as Kadıoğlu argues, especially symbolized through “modern images” 
rather than philosophic-historical and ethical underpinnings. See Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 
Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi [The Will of Republic, the Judgement of 
Democracy] (Istanbul; Metis, 1999), 22, 31, 129. In this regard, the prescriptions for how 
to talk and listen, how to dress, how to eat, and so on, all were necessary for being 
publicly visible.
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where the Kemalists’ concepts of art, politics and pleasure were displayed. The way of 
access to the culture that determined all belonging to the public realm passed only 
through assimilating into it, that is, it was only open for those who held and internalized 
these manners, or those who became “culturally” matured. In this way, it was a unifying 
force forming an imagined community of “cultured” equals; here, making equal means 
making similar, and distancing from non-equals mentally and spatially. As the Jacobins 
had done in France, the Kemalist mission of inclusion attributed to transform all that 
belonged to the private realm, a realm of particularities and tradition. It seemed to be a 
cultural crusade. This was attempted to be realized through expanding the public into the 
private. Any resistance to that mission had to be silenced.'* In this regard those who reject 
internalizing new manners and behavioral norms were excluded. Exclusion here means to 
be deprived of gaining a new public identity, that is, of benefiting from the advantages of 
the state and participating in the public sphere. This position has defined who belongs 
and who does not to culture. Membership to the Turkish culture meant the internalization 
of a set of manners manufactured by the official cultural institutions. For example, the 
People’s Houses came to the fore being places where the practices of patterns of new 
style and taste were introduced to the ordinary people; the Houses were therefore the 
agents for taming them through creating a proper network of practicing new modes of 
behavior. In such a way, in general, the institutions provided the technologies of the 
formation of citizenry; that is, the modern Turkish citizen signifies the status of a subject
On this mission, Giesen writes, “every act of resistance on the part of outsiders 
not only puts the inclusion of an individual at risk but also challenges the entire mission 
of inclusion. Outsiders cannot resist inclusion, neither by right nor by reason. Whoever 
questions the mission has to be overwhelmed and destroyed.” Bernhard Giesen, 
“Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Kommiics.Deadalus. 127/3 (1999), 247.
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matured in the discourse formation during the early Republican period. To put it briefly, 
this dissertation identifies that the Kemalist “society-making” notion of culture based on 
the logic of assimilation is inclusionary and exclusionary at the same time.
All these mean to establish the rigid boundaries between insiders and outsiders. In 
the official discourse those who were not able to assimilate into the culture were deemed 
as “internal” outsiders (insisting on the norms and manners belonging to the Ottomans, 
Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians, Jews, Armenians, a^irets, etc.). The result was the process 
of internal exclusion. In fact, this was a homogenizing account of how the new culture de- 
legitimized and marginalized those outsiders and assigned their values to the past as 
“past” or made them “prehistoric” as only “folkloric” and “mythic” objects of museums. 
Here, the main stress was placed on the supposition of “artificiality” and “backwardness” 
of the old life forms. This was based on a model reflecting a set of relations between the 
civilized and the savage, the modern and the traditional, the West and the East.
Herein lies the Kemalist perception of authenticity. Contrary to the Romantic 
formulation, it did not include the patterned aspects of life evolved especially around 
Islam and tradition over the centuries. In the official discourse, those aspects were 
regarded “artificial”, “imitated”, “archaic”, which had overwhelmed the true essence of 
the Turkish nation, while newly constructed culture was presented as “true” and 
“authentic”. Her true essence could only be discovered in the endless-progressive march 
of modern civilization. It was for this reason that traditional dress form and music, the 
Arabic alphabet, “old” words, rituals in gender relations and family, traditional public 
rites, ceremonies and festivities, were not seen as aspects of the Kemalist notion of
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“authenticity”. Regarding their artificial, imitated and archaic nature, the civilizing rulers 
excluded these aspects from the new past of the Republic.
Throughout the dissertation, I highlighted that this “fact” stemmed from the 
official history and language theses, which were developed as the most significant 
cultural products through the works of the THS and the TLS. Both provided suitable 
ground for “authenticity” of the new Turkish culture with a relative distinct historical 
experience and language form; that is, they helped to maintain a “unique” Turkish 
identity. Nevertheless, in accordance with the cultural goals of the new regime, the above 
two theses traced the genealogy of the West representing the most developed form all 
over the world. Correspondingly, Turkish history began to be rewritten from the point of 
historicism of Jacobenist and positivist understanding, preaching a linear and progressive 
view of history. The Turkish language, developed through this history, had to be purified 
from all elements of languages, of old and archaic life forms. In this way, both made it 
possible, on the behalf of the civilizing elite, to claim Turkish culture as one of the 
authentic cultures belonging to the universalized modem civilization, but not that of non- 
Western ones. However, it does not imply a substantial difference with that of languages 
and histories of the West in the sense that Kemalist historicism tried to demonstrate the 
history of the Turks having been part of the genealogy of Western civilization and culture 
from the beginning, and the Turkish language, being also at the roots of the Indo- 
European languages (of Western civilization), would be a language of a modern life and 
science.
As part of the official project of detraditiomlizing the past, in the Kemalist 
hi story-writing, history was “politicized”, “ideologized”. The invention of a new history.
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which did not have any connotations with living dominant traditions, only justified a 
historical perspective tightly bound up with the political authority. Here the aim was to 
rediscover the civilized and cultured essence, the talent of the Turks, and to tie the new 
culture to their pre-historic past by following the traces of “Western civilization and 
culture”. In that, history was preoccupied primarily with discovering and formulating the 
affinity between Turkish history and the history of Western civilization through which 
the role of the Turks was emphasized as culture-creator, civilization-creator. This was 
almost an imaginary and romantic quest in nature, but the lost world that the Kemalist 
politician historians strove to re-invent in this way was not similar to the Romantic 
historians’ yearning to authentic and unique pastoral world in combat with modern 
civilization.^ On the contrary, the effort to bring the past into the present reflected the will 
to participate in this civilization. This included mostly “forgetting” or negating through 
the invention and selection of some specific moments in history. One might argue that the 
result was a weak historicity constituting one significant part of the process which made 
the Kemalist notion of culture contested throughout the history of the Republic.
In a similar vein, the Kemalist language policy had a central place in determining 
the boundaries of this culture. Language, with its new alphabet and vocabulary, attributed 
a different world of meaning to the patterns of the new style and taste and so came to be 
the main vehicle to decipher new signs and images. At that point, education in the new 
language, which was essentially limited to those who accepted to be assimilated, would
 ^ The Romantics promoted a “counter-model of European Antiquity based on 
culture” rather than the abstract, political model of the Enlightenment thinkers and 
Republicans. See John Rundell and Stephen Mennell, “Introduction; Civilization, Culture 
and the Human Self-Image”, in Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization, eds. J. 
Rundell and S. Mennell (London: Routledge, 1998), 14.
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make “cultured” citizens of the Republic taking part in and managing the new public 
discourse. The most viable means of codifying and implementing language policies was 
mainly through legislation including constitutional provisions, laws, decrees, ordinances, 
regulations, and guidelines regarding language subsidy or language use. This was the act 
of re-naming, which had occurred periodically. Nevertheless throughout the Single-Party 
period the issue of language was not settled. Every step in the language revolution 
became subject to the hottest debate both among politicians and between politician 
linguists and academicians. The principal opposition was, in particular, part of the 
Kemalist elite; the basic reason for that was the fact that language change was felt 
strongly in every sphere of life. Consequently, during this period and the following years, 
language as a political tool in the hands of the political and intellectual elite seemed to 
become one of the most contested issues in the public realm and of dividing aspects in 
ideological proliferation in the political arena.
The dispute over the history and language theses and policies exemplified to what 
extent culture had been a contested issue in the period from 1923-1945. Nevertheless, by 
passing to the multi-party period after 1945, it became more and more subject to harsh 
political debate. The reason behind the debate was that the degree of success or failure of 
cultural policies engineered from above had a direct relationship to the country’s social 
and political structure. As Keating argues, if a nation-building project is tied to only one 
social group or a single party imposing monolithic cultures by their notion of nationalist 
ideology, it will undermine the support base for its constructed values.^ This was true for
Michael Keating, Nations against the State (London: MacMillan Press, 1996),
62.
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the post-war period in Turkey. In order to mobilize voters and citizens, the opposition 
party, the DP, carried the official definition of (national) culture as a chief objective of 
political debate by stressing the significance of local-Islamic traditions and continuities 
with the near past (the Ottomans). Discussion went on around the definition of culture: 
whether it was originary/authentic or derivative/foreign. The result was cultural wars 
waged by the strongholders or interpreters of Kemalism: it has also been a war 
dominating Turkish political life up till now, which caused to some extent four military 
interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) in politics. Consequently, (Turkish) culture 
projected through a modernist program has come to be a process, and so it has been 
constantly formed and re-formed, contested and struggled for in accordance with the 
changing political and social situations.
In this dissertation I have attempted to conceptualize the official notion of culture 
prevalent during the early Republican regime from a political science perspective; thus 
concentrated on the institutional bases of the discursive formation of the Kemalist 
cultural understanding for which the state agents and institutions pursued a set of policies. 
1 have showed that the state and its civilizing agents played the active role in the process 
of culture production, formed and spread new life forms, and also that it was the nature 
of this process which made culture the most contested issue. Nevertheless, resistance (in 
general intellectual rather than popular) to the policies is to some extent elaborated 
throughout this dissertation. Such an attempt, in fact, makes it difficult to understand the 
needs, premises, hopes, aspirations and interests of ordinary people, which in the last 
instance seem to be the determining factor in the policies of a modern state. That is why it 
seems essential for future-research to focus on the activities of the People’s Houses and
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Rooms and the Village Institutes and Schools especially at the local level, the 
relationships between these agents and the ordinary people, and the dynamics of popular 
resistance to the state cultural policies. Such analyses will provide to grasp the clues as to 
how the ordinary people imagined themselves via the forged identity. In addition to this, 
in order to trace the line of the contested nature of the official discourse on culture and to 
make a comparison between its formative years and its later reformulation, it appears to 
be necessary to examine the politics of culture initiated during the DP period. Such 
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APPENDIX A
m e d e n iy e t  n e  d e m e k t ir ?
Medeniyetin ne olduğunu başka başka tarif edenler vardır. Bence 
medeniyeti harstan ayırmak güçtür ve lüzumsuzdur. Bu nokta-I 
nazarımı izah için hars ne demektir tarif edeyim:
a. Bir insan cemiyetinin devlet hayatında; b. Fikir hayatında, yani 
ilimde, içtimaiyatta ve güzel sanatlarda; c. İktisadi hayattta yani ziraatte, 
zanatta, ticarette, kara, deniz ve hava münakalatcılığında yapabildiği 
şeylerin hulasasıdır.
Bir milletin medeniyeti dendiği zaman hars namı altında 
saydığımız üç nevi faaliyet muhassalasmdan hariç ve başka bir şey 
olamıyacağmı zannederim. Şüphesiz her insan cemiyetinin hars, yani 
medeniyet derecesi bir olmaz. Bu farklar devlet, fikir ve iktisadi 
hayatların her birinde ayrı atrı göze çarptığı gibi bu fark üçünün 
muhassalası üzerinde de görülür. Mühim olan muhassalalar üzerindeki 
farktır. Yüksek bir hars, onun sahibi olan millette kalmaz diğer 
milletlerde de tesirini gösterir. Büyük kıtalara şamil olur. Belki bu 
itibarla olacak, bazı milletler yüksek ve şamil harsa, medeniyet diyorlar. 
Avrupa medeniyeti, asrı hazır medeniyeti gibi.
Hars mefhumunda milletlerin geç ve güç değişen bazı ırki, fıtri 
hasletlerine, karakterlerine hasrederler ve buna çok kıymet ve ehemmiyet 
verirler. Mesela, İstanbul’un zaptı hadisesini mütala ederken, diyenler 
vardır ki: BizanslIlar Türklerden daha medeni idiler, fakat Türk’lerin 
harsı kuvveti olduğu için galip ve muvaffak oldular. Bu telakki ve izah 
doğru değildir. Hakikatte Türk’ler Bizans’lılardan hem daha medeni 
idiler, hem de ırki karakterleri onlardan yüksekti. Medeniyet dediğimiz 
harsın, üç mühim unsurunu göz önünde tutarak hadiseyi mütalaa 
edersek, fikrimiz kolaylıkla izah edilmiş olur:
İstanbul’u zapteden Türk’ler devlet hayatında elbette Bizans 
İmparatotluğundan çok yüksekti. Türk’lerin İstanbul fethinde inşa ve 
icadettikleri gemiler, toplar ve her nevi vasıtalar, gösterdikleri yüksek fen 
iktidarı, bilhassa koca bir donanmayı Dolmabahçe’den Haliç’e kadar 
karadan nakletmek dehası, daha evvel boğaziçinde inşa ettikleri kaleler, 
aldıkları tedbirler Bizans’ı zapteden Türk’lerin fikir ve fen aleminde ne 
kadar ileri olduklarının şahitleridirler. Bizans Prenslerinin Türk 
ordugahlarında staj yaptıkları, her hususta ders aldıklarını da 
hatırlatmak isterim. Daha Atilla zamanındaki şarki Roma 
İmparatorluğunun Türk’lerin haraçgüzarı olacak kadar siyasette ve
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askerlikte dun mertebede bulunduğu malumdur. Bizansı zapteden 
Türklerin iktisadi hayatta BizanslIların çok ilerisinde olduğunu izaha bile 
hacet görmüyorum. Hülasa medeniyet harstan başka birşey değildir. 
Hars medlulünü seciye diyebileceğimiz karakter mefhumuna 
indirmemelidir. Bu arz ettiğim telakki birbirinden ayırt edilmesi güç olan, 
medeniyet ve harsın tarif, izah ve anlaşılmasında kolaylığı da mucip olur.
Mustafa Kemal (1930).
KÜLTÜR NE DEMEKTİR?
Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin temeli kültürdür. Bu sözü burada ayrıca 
izaha lüzum görmüyorum. Çünkü bu, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin 
okullarında birçok vesilelerle eser halinde tespit edilmiştir.
Kültür, okumak, anlamak, görebilmek, görebildiğinden mana 
çıkarmak, intibah almak, düşünmek, zekayı terbiye etmektir.
Yine insan, enerjisiyle ve fakat tabiatın ona iltifat edildikçe 
tükenmez yardımıyle, yükselen, genişleyen insan zekası, hudursuz 
kavrayış anlamında “insanım” diyen bir vasf-ı mahsusu olur.
İnsan hareket ve faaliyetin, yani dinamizmin ifadesidir. Bu böyle 
olunca kültür, yukarıda işaret ettiğimiz, insanlık vasfında insan 
olabilmek için bir esasi unsurdur.
Bunu kısaca izah edelim. Kültür, tabiatın yüksek feyizleriyle mesut 
olmaktır. Bu ifade içinde çok şey mündemiçtir. Temizlik, saflık, yükseklik 
insanlık vb... bunların hepsi insanlık vasıflarmdandır. İşte kültür 
kelimesini mastar şekline soktuğumuz zaman, tabiatın insanlara verdiği 
yüksek vasıfları kendi çocuklarına, hafidlerine ve atisine vermesi 
demektir.
Buraya kadar anlatmak istediğimiz, bugünkü Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
çocukları , kültürel insanlardır. Yani hem hem kendileri kültür 
sahibidirler, hem de bu hassayı muhitlerine ve bütün Türk milletine 
yaymakta olduklarına kanidirler.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1936) 
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Padişah namzetleri
SA R A Y L A R I N  d ö r t  d u v a r ı  i ç i n d e  h a l a y ı k l a r  v e  h a r e m a ğ a l a r ı  a r a s ı n d a  y e t i ş e n  n a z l ı  
e f e n d i l e r  k u ş  b e y i n l i  k a l r n a g ^ a  m a h -  
k umdular.
B u n l a r  d a h a  b e ş i k t e  i k e n  r ü t b e  v e  n i ş a n  
s a h i b i  o l u r l a r  v e  s ü n n e t  d ü ğ ü n l e r i n d e  p o r t a ­
k a l  o p f I u n u n  h ü n e r l e r i n e  g ü l e r k e n  m ü ş ü r  k ı ­
l ı ç l a r ı  k u ş a m r l a ı ·  v e  m u r a s s a  n i ş a n l a r l a  b e z e -  
n i r l e r d i .  B ı y ı k l a r ı  t e r l e m e j . T e  b a ş l a y ı n c a  d a  
h a y a t ı n  m a n a s ı n ı  o d a l ı k l a r ,  h a l a y ı k l a r ,  s a r a y l ı ­






İ n k ı l â p  T ü r k i y e s i n d e  b e ş i k t e n  m e z a r a  k a d a r  m i l l e t  d a v a s ı  u g ^ u n ı n a  d ö g ^ ü ş e r e k  e h l i y e t i n i  
i s p a t  e t m e k  g e r e k t i r .  A n a d a n  d o g m a  h a k l a r  y o k t u r .  A n a d a n  d o g m a  v a z i f e l e r  v a r d ı r .
Her Türk çocuku yarının Cümhurreisi olabilir.
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Orümcekü ka fa !
O r ü m c e k ü  k a f a ,  O s m a n h  v a t a n d a ş ı n ı n  k a f a s ı d ı r .  
B u  k a f a n ı n  i ç i n d e  i k i  k o c a m a n  ö r ü m c e k  o t u r u r d u .  
U la m  ta a s s u b u  v e  f^arp h a yra n l ı i i ı :
Pelua Örnekleri:
M e s e l e  —  fTlüslüm müsün öenilöit t^e zekerini göste­
ren kimseye ne lâzımgelir?
E i c e v a p  —  Eğer sünnetli iöüğü için öyle etti ise küfrüne 
hükmolunmaz.
ümmet
M e s e l e  —  Zeyt, muallim yahuâiler müslümanlarûan 
hayırlıöır, çünkü çocuklarının muallim hak­
larını uerirler âese ne lâzımgelir?
E t e e v a p  —  Küfürâür.
M e s e i e  — Kızılbaş taifesinin şer’an kıtali halâl olup, 
katleden gazi ue kızılbaş taifesinin ellerinden 
maktul olanlar şehit olurlar mı?
E lc eva p  —  Olurlar, gazoyl ekber ue şehaöetl azimeölr.
Mesele — Zeyâi müslüm kâfir ölllnce zaruretslz tekel­
lüm eylese nikâhına zarar olur mu?
E l c e v a p  — Zararı mahzâır. Küfrüne hükmolunup aureti 
tefrik olunmaz. Taziri şeâlt ue zecrolunur.
M e s e l e  —  fDusauuer aynanın beyü şirasınâan olan 
kisb, halâl olur mu ?
E l c e v a p  —  Halâl ue tayyip âeğllöir.
M e s e l e  —  Deua İçin birkaç kaâeh hamr içmek halâlâir 
öeyene ne lâzımgelir?
E l c e v a p  —  Tecâiâi İman lâzımdır.
M e s e l e  —  Zeyt, bigayri zaruretin başına yahudi şap­
kasını giyse şer’an zeyde ne lâzımgelir? 
E l c e v a p  —  Küfür lâzımgelir.
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TAASSUP örümceğinin ördüğü ağ­lar, milleti daima ahırete bağlar­
dı. Türk cemiyeti şeriatin, me­
cellenin ve fetvanın taşlaşmış kalıpları 
içinde hapsolunurdu.
Bu teokratik nizam kendini devam 
ettirmek ve insanlarını kendi ihtiyaç­
larına göre yetiştirebilmek için bütün 
müesseselerini de kurmuştu.
Meselâ, kabinede dünya işlerini temsil 
eden sadrazamın yanıbaşında daima 
ahıret işlerini temsil eden kellifelli bir 
şeyhülislâm yer alırdı.
V \
Osmanh cemiytttnin ahıret işleri sadrjzım ;
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I ş ı k l ı
İ n k ı l â p  T ü r k i y e s i n i n  i n s a n ı ,  i i ? ıkl ı  b i r  k a f a  
t a ş ı  r.
lUı  k a f a d a  h i ç b i r  y a b a n c ı  h a y a t ı  t e l â k k i  
t a r z ı n a  y e r  y o k t u r .
H u  k a f a y ı  i m l e t e n  m o t o r ,  i n k ı l â b ı n  y ü k s e k  
m e n f a a t l e r i d i r .
H u  k a f a ,  m ü s t a k i l  b i r  k a f a d ı r .  H e r  h â d i s e ­
y i  i n k ı l â b ı n  z a r u r e t l e r i n e  g ö r e  t a h l i l  v e  t e r ­
k i p  e d e r  v e  h e r  k a r a r a  i n k ı l â b ı n  p r e n s i p l e r i ­
n e  g ö r e  v a r ı r .
l â i k l i k  d e ğ i l d i r .  T ü r k  l â i k l i ğ i  h a y a t ı n ,  y a n i  
m i l l e t i n  m e n f a a t l e r i n i  v e  d i r l i ğ i n i  h e r  ş e y e  
h â k i m  k ı l a n  a k t i f  b i r  t e l â k k i s i d i r .
İ n k ı l â p  h ü k ü m e t l e r i n d e  b a ş v e k i l ,  m i l l e ­
t i n  y ü k s e k  h a y a t i  m e n f a a t l e r i  n a m ı n a  o l a n  
i k t i d a r ı ,  h i ç b i r  a h ı r e t  v e  u k b a  m ü m e s s i l i  i l e  
p a y l a ş m a z .
M İ L L E T  D İ R L İ Ğ İ
Cümhuriyet Türkiyesinde vatandaşın hayatı 
milletin istiklâline, milletin menfaatlerine, 
milletin dirliğine bağlanmıştır.
Cümhuriyet Türkiyesinin cemiyeti lâik bir 
cemiyettir.
Fakat bu lâiklik sadece din ve dünya iş­
leri arasında Fransada olduğu gibi, bir müta­
reke manasını ifade etmez. Yani passif bir
** Tarihimizi okuyunuz, görürsünüz ki milleti 
m ahveden, esir eden harap  eden fenalıklar, 
hep din kisvesi alhndaki küfür ve m ela’net- 
ten  gelmiştir.,«
G azi
**Köhne zihniyetlerle, m aziperstlikle m uha­
faza! m evcudiyet mümkün değildir.,.
G a zi
Yeni rejimde karşılığı ıjokiur !
“ D i n  l e l â k l d s i  v i c d a n î  o l d u ğ u n d a n ,  F ı r k a ,  d i n  
f i k i r l e r i n i  d e v l e i  v e  d ü n y a  i ş l e r i n d e n  v e  s i y a s e t -  
t e n  a y r ı  t u t m a y ı ,  n ı i l l c t i m i z i n  m u a s ı r  t e r a k k i d e  
b a ş l ı c a  m u v a f f a k i y e t  a m i l i  t » o r ü r . , ,
Cünılnıriıjel H alk hırkam  program ından
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Ü m m et M aarifi
OS M A N L I  1 mparatorluijuruın içtimai l)uMvt.-şin· deki ikilik ve tezallılık (şark ve vrarpl m aa­rifinde de yaşıyordu.
OsmanlI İmparalorluL'unun maarifi hır taranan 
teokrasinin isteklerine cevap vermek lü /nm unn (.lıı- 
yarken, dij^er taraftan sadece takat ı-tıut-k.
yani ^zarp ilmini olduğu ^ibi ithal eylemekle mille­
ti terakkiye KÖtüıecc^ini sanıyordu.
OsmanlI 1 mparatorluı!:unda iki tip mektep vardı:
D i n  m e k t e p l e r i  v e  d ü n y a  m e k t e p l e r i .
F a k a t  d ü n y a  m e k t e p l e r i n d e k i  t e d r i s a t l a  d a  t e o k ­
r a t i k  t e r b i y e  e s a s t ı .
B u  t e r b i y e ,  T ü r k  c e m i y e t i n e  r u h  v e  f i k i r  b a k ı ­
m ı n d a n  i k i y e  b ö l ü n m ü ş  i n s a n l a r  v e r i y o r d u .
M e s e l â ,  b i r  i d a d i  t a l e b e s i  b i r  t a r a f t a n  h i k m e t ,  k i m ­
y a .  j e o l o j y a  K i b i  m ü s p e t  t a b i a t  i l i m l e r i l e  k â i n a t ı n  
o l u ş u n u  v e  s e y r i n i  ö j ^ r e n i r k e n ,  d i ğ e r  t a r a f t a n  a y n i  
m e k t e p t e  v e  a y n i  s ı n ı f t a  t a b i a t ı n  1 3 0 0  s e n e  e v v e l k i  
b i r  u k b a  g ö r ü ş ü n e  g ö r e  i z a h ı n a  i n a n m a k  m e c b u r i ­
y e t i n d e  b ı r a k ı l ı r d ı .
OsmanlI maarifinde mektep, çocuğun kafpsına bir­
takım basmakalıp nazariyeler dolduran bir mües­
sese idi.
Ç o c u k t a  m ü s t a k i l  a r a ş t ı r m a ,  t a h l i l  v e  t e r k i p  y a p m a  
k a b i l i y e t l e r i  b ü y ü k  b i r  m e h a r e t l e  ö l d ü r ü l ü r d ü .  
M e k t e p t e  e n  m u v a f f a k  o l a n  ç o c u k ,  h a f ı z a s ı  e n  k u v ­
v e t l i  o l a n  b i r  e z b e r  m a k i n e s i d i .
Mektep mij?
E S K İ  M E K T E P :
Hir hapisanvdfn fa rk ı var mı /
Türk, anasını böyle i
bırakabilir m i:
Çocuk kümesi m i?
O s m a n l I  I m p a r o t o r l n g u n d a  k a d ı n ,  k ü m e s  h a y v a n ı  t e l â k k i  o l u n u r d u .  P e ç e n i n  v e  k a f e s i n  a r k a s ı n d a  
h a p s e d i l i r  v e  A l l a h ı n  h u z u r u n a  h i l e  ( c a m i l e r d e )  a n c a k  k a v ı t  v e  ş a r t l a  ç ı k a b i l i r d i .
C e m i y e t t e  o n u n  y e r i  d a i m a  e r k c i v i n k i ı ı d e n  a y r ı l m ı ş t ı .
M a h a l le b ic i  d ü k k â n ı n d a ,  tra m v a y d a ,  t iyatroda, h u lâ sa  hayatta o. tecrit e d i l m i ş  ve e m si  ih t i lâ ç ­
la r ına  tesliiTi o lm u ş  bir  m a h lû k tu .
B u  z i h n i y e t ,  o n u  m e k t e p t e  d e  b u l m u ş t u .
E s a s e n  k a d ı n ı n  t a h s i l  g ö r m e s i  l i ı / u m s u z  v e  h a t t a  z a r a r l ı  s a y ı l ı r d ı .
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M illet M aarifi
MÜH terbiye ile inkişaf ve ilâ edilmek istenilen genç dim ağları 
bil taraftan  da paslandırıcı, uyuşturucu, hayalî zevaitle doldur­
m aktan dikkatle içtinap etm ek lâzımdır.
Qnz't
Görerek ve anlıyarak öğrenmek
İN K I L Â P  T ü r k i y e s i n i n  i ç t i m a i  b ü n ­y e s i n d e k i  b i r l i k  v e  t e z a i s ı z l ı k  m a ­
a r i f  s i y a s e t i n d e  d e  h â k i m d i r .  
T e o k r a t i k  n i z a m ı ,  d e v l e t  t e l â k k i s i ­
n i n  d ı ş ı n a  a t a n  C ü m h u r i y e t  r e j i m i  
k e n d i s i n e  h a s  m a a r i f  s i s t e m i n i  d e  y a ­
r a t t ı .  T e v h i d i  t e d r i s a t  p r e n s i p i n i n  k a -  
b u l i l e  T ü r k  c e m i y e t i n i n  l â i k  e s a s ı  m a ­
a r i f t e  d e  i f a d e s i n i  b u l d u .
B ö y l e l i k l e  v a h d e t l i  b i r  t e r b i y e  v e r ­
m e k  v e  T ü r k  i n s a n ı n ı n  r u h u n u  
v e  k a f a s ı n ı  i k i y e  b ö l ü n m e k t e n  k u r ­
t a r m a k  i m k â n ı  d o ğ d u .
İ n k ı l â p  T ü r k i y e s i ,  v a t a n d a ş l a r ı  
c i n s l e r i n e  g ö r e  k ı y m e t l e n d i r m e k  g i b i  
p a t a l o j i k  b i r  i l l e t l e  m a l û l  d e ğ i l d i r .
C ü m h u r i y e t  T ü r k i y e s i n d e  k a d ı n  
v a t a n d a ş ,  h a y a t ı n  b ü t ü n  c e p h e l e r i n ­
d e  e r k e k  v a t a n d a ş ı n  y o l d a ş ı  t a n ı n ­
m ı ş t ı r .
Avrupanın daha birçok memle­
ketlerinde tatbik edilemiyen muhte­
lit tedrisat usulü, Türk inkılâbının 
daha ilk anında tahakkuk ettirdiğ:! 
fütuhattan biridir.
Tevhidi T edrisat K anunundan:
1 — T ürk iye dahilindeki bütün müessesatı ilmiye 
ve tedrisiye M aarif Vekâletine m erbuttur.
2 — Şer’iye, Evkaf Vekâleti veya hususi vakıflar 
tarafından idare olunan bilcümle medrese ve m ek­




ö d etm ek ..
İ n k ı l â p  m a a r i f i n d e  m e k t e p ,  ç o c u ğ a  b ü t ü n  h a y a t  v e  m e s l e k  b i l g i l e r i n d e  l â z ı m  o l a n  
t e c r ü b e l e r i ,  ö l ç ü l e r i  v e  m e t o t l a r ı  v e r e n  b i r  m ü e s s e s e d i r .  O n d a  g a y e  t u f e y l i  e z b e r c i ­
l e r ,  u k a l â  n a z a r i y e c i l e r  y e t i ş t i r m e k  d e ğ i l ,  c e m i y e t  i ç i n  f a y d a l ı ,  f a a l  v e  y a r a t ı c ı  u n s u r ­
l a r ı  ç o ğ a l t m a k t ı r .  T e d r i s a t t a  i ş  p r e n s i p i ,  m a a r i f i m i z i n  a n a  v a s ı t a l a r ı n d a n  b i r i d i r .
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T e o k r a s i  h a y a t ı n  y a l m z  m a n a l a r ı n ı n  d e ğ i l ,  ş e k i l l e r i ­n i n  d e  a r d ı n d a  k a l m ı ş t ı .  O n u n  i ç i n  h e r h a n g i  b i r  y e n i  
m a n a y a  g e ç m e k  k a d a r ,  y e n i  b i r  ş e k l i  k a b u l  e t m e k  t e  
k ü f ü r l e  b i r d i .
M e s e l â  : N a m a h r e m  o l a n  k a d ı n ı  h e r h a n ı ^ i  b i r  a r k a d a ş ı ­
n a  g ö s t e r e n  b i r  i n s a n  b ü y ü k  g ü n a h  i ş l e m i ş  s a y ı l ı r d ı .  
G u s ü l  m a k b u l  o l m a d ı ğ ı  i ç i n  d i ş  d o l d u r a n  k e z a .  R a m a z a n ­
d a  o r u ç  b o z a n  k e z a .
D i ş i n i  d i ş  f ı r ç a s i l e  t e m i z l i y e n  k e z a .
V e  b u n u n  g i b i .  E e s i n  n e r e d e n  g e l d i ğ i n i  b i l m e d i ğ i  h a l d e  f e s  
v e  s a r ı k t a n  g a y r ı  b i r  b a ş l ı ğ ı  b i r  k ü f ü r  a l â m e t i  s a y a r d ı .  
M e v l e v i n i n  s i k k e s i  b i l e  s o f u  m ü s l ü m a n ı n  g ö z ü n d e  b i r  n e ­
v i  z ı n d ı k l ı k  a l â m e t i  i d i .
B u  i ğ r e n ç  v e  k ö t ü r ü m  z i h n i y e t ,  T ü r k  c e m i y e t i n i n  z a h i r î  
m a n z a r a s ı n ı  d a  m ü z e l i k  b i r  h a l e  s o k m u ş t u .
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•İN K I L Â P  T ü r k i y e s i ,  T ü r k  c e m i ­y e t i n i  i ç i n d e n  o l d u g ^ u  g i b i ,  
d ı ş ı n d a n  d a  h a y a t  a k ı ş ı n ı n  
c n  i l e r i  i c a p l a r ı n a  u y d u r d u .  
B u n u n l a  b e r a b e r  f e s i n  y e r i n e  
ş a p k a n ı n  g e t i r i l i ş i ,  T a n z i m a t  D e v ­
r i n d e  o l d u ğ u  g i b i  b i r  k ı y a f e t  m e ­
r a k ı n d a n  i l e r i g e l m e m i ş t i r .
B a z ı  m ü t e r e d d i t  a ğ ı z l a r  ş a p k a  
m e s e l e s i n i  ( m e d e n î  s e r p u ş )  t e ­
k e r l e m e s i  s a y e s i n d e  h o ş  g ö s ­
t e r m e ğ e  ç a l ı ş ı r k e n .  G a z i  K a s t a -  
m o n u y a  g i d e r e k  o r a d a k i  h a l k ı n  
k a r ş ı s ı n d a  ş a p k a s ı n ı  b a ş ı n a  g i y ­
m i ş  v e  d e m i ş t i r  k i :
“Buna medenî serpuş Jilûn demezler. Bunun adı şapkadır, l't* bu, işte, hüt/leee giydir.  
Çünkü ^uyet rahattır.,,
G a z i ,  b u  s ö z l e r i l e  f e s i n  y e r i n e  k o n a n  ş a p k a n ı n ,  k a f a  k ı y a f e t i n i n  d e ğ i ş t i ğ i n e  
d e ğ i l  ; e s k i  k a f a n ı n  i ç i n d e  b ü t ü n  b i r  z i h n i y e t i n  y ı k ı l d ı ğ ı n a  d e l â l e t  e t t i ğ i n i  
a n l a t m ı ş t ı r .





OsmanlI C('miyeli iki soila VflişiıiMİi
Miri, i i^erialvı soila, di '^cri. Avrupacı solladır.
Hunlarm ikisinde de millelin ^ahsiyi‘1 ve .ı.-siilelini kuruma ve oınm namma «^alısiyelli 
ve asliyelli bir Îikir ve küllür yaralına lıa>sası yoklar. IkiM de yalmııcı âlemlerin esiridirler. 
Mu esnroli bir şeref ve millelin beııliumi ve o7.lu*^ Minii yadır^iamayı da bir meziyel 
sayarlardı.
Yukarda teşrih masasına yalırdıj;ımız lenkrası malısulıi olan şeriattı softayı bir kenara 
bırakırsak, Avrupacı softanın ayırt edici vasıflarım şdylece sıralıyabiliriz;
Hiçbir millet, âiğer bir 
milletin yaptığı usulleri 




Bin yarım adam  bir tam 
adam  değild ir; 
Siyasette ve idarede 
en m uzır şey, m ille t­
ler ve cem iyetler için 
te lâfisi en zor olan 
felâket, yarım  bilgili 
adam ların salâhiyet s a ­
hibi o lm asıd ır.
ismet Paşa
Avrupa hayranlığı:
Her iyi, her doğru, her güzel AvrupalI olandır.
Ve t)unlar irişilnıez birer mazhariyettir.
OsmanlI münevverinin indinde Türk milleti en kabili­
yetsiz bir ekalliyetten de aşağılık bir kalabalıktır.
Taklitçilik: Hangi diyardan olursa olsun, yeter ki AvrupalI olsun.
Sathilik;
İlmin ve ihtisasın kaynaklarına giderek derinleşmeğe 
lüzum yoktur. Altında Avrupa damgası olmak şartile 
OsmanlI ülkesinde her iddia ilmin kendisi gibi geçer. 




O s m a n l I  m ü n e v v e r i  İ s t a n b u l  s a k s ı s ı n d a  y e t i ş e n  b i r  
k o / . m o p o l i u i r .
O n u n  i ç i n  ' r i i r k i y o .  u ç s u z  b u c a k s ı z  v e  h i ç  c a z i p  o l m a ­
y a n  b i r  m e ç h u l d i i r .
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Mu v.ı ı^il.ırl.ı Irhrlcnmiş bir Osın.-ırılı münevverinin kemli millelile 
vı· keieli mcmlekclilc jiubek Iuilm ke.'iilmiş ve koksu/.leşnıiş olması 
iMİııilır.
Mu ilılmrİM o. nıillel ve memlekel hesabına yabancıya karşı her 




İnkılâp'’ 'rilrkiyosindc hor miinovvor ¡vin asıl ulan, kondi nıillolino vo kondi ım*mlok»*litu* 
inanmak vo kondi talihini hnniann talihiıio hau'lanıaklır.
Inkılâ|)vı 'rürk miinevvori ivin modoniyol taklit ulanacak hir şey delildir.
.Medeniyet. yiTİnde yapılan, yerinde yaratılan liir cemiyet e.'Jeridir.
.\vriipa medeniyetine iltihak veya intibak diye hir şey yoktur.
Ilaıii:i devirde luılunıırsa hulunsun o devrin medeniyetine has olan ileri kıyml-tleri ve 
1)11 kıymetleri yaratan ileri metotları idrak edip kendi medeniyetini yaratmak vardır, 
'raklit edilecek hir örnek yahut ithal olunacak birtakım müesseseler yoktur.
İdrak edilip alınacak ve kondi ihtiyaç ve zaruretlerimize ^oire tatbik sahasına ı^eçirilecek 
metotlar vardır.
İnkılâpçı 'I'iırk münevverinin ayırt edici vasıilunnı şöylece sıralıyabiliriz:
Bilelim ki, milit benlisini bil- 
miyen milletler, başka millet- 
l e r İD  şikArıdır. Gazi
•
Mizim halkımız çok temiz 
kalpli, çok aall ruhlu, terak­kiye çok kabiliyetli bir kalk­
tır. Bu halk, e^ er bir defa 
muhatapiaıının aamimiyetle 
kendilerine bAdIm olduklarına 
kani olursa her tOria hareke­
ti derhal kabule amadedir. 
Bunun için gençlerin, her şey­
den evvel millete emniyet 
bahşetmesi lâzımdır. Gazi
BûyOk şeyleri, yalnız bflyflk 
milletler yapar.
Millete inanmak:
iyi, doğru ve güzel, Türk dehasının da bir ifadesidir. 
İnkılâpçı Türk münevveri, milletine sevgi ve inanla 
doludur.
Yaratıcılık: Türk medeniyetinin yaratıcısı, yalnız Türk kafasıdır.
Derinlik: Yaratıcı oimpnın şartı, bilgi ve ihtisasta derine gitmektir.
Memleketçilik:
İnkılâpçı Türk münevverinin indinde memleketin her 
parçası mukaddestir. Ve tanınmaya, anlaşılmaya ve 
sevilmeğe değer bir kıymettir.
Memleketi yeniden kurmak işi, onu ancak çok yakın­
dan ve çok derinden tanımakla kabildir.
lUı vasıllarla bezenmiş hir inkılâpçı münevverin memleket vc 
millet sevgisi sadece coşfîun bir duvfiu işi dejiil. ayni zamanda 
hesaplı ve bili i^li bir şuur hâdisesidir.
IUj itibarla o. memleketin ve milletin üstüne titrer vc hu u|5;urda 





OSM AN  l. ednti, kelin
Türkçe k e n d i 
otele sıjîmmiî? bk_^
Ar:ıp ve Acem e\ itıi yninı/ kelime­
leri ile de^il. k a i d e re H iLj,^ ç^a s m ı >! n r 
lidyle bir ijVreii dill<S^^^i^iı va/ıbtrm
6;^vveılefinin dili ynim/ fiiller ve 
^ımiş bir sürü Arap ve Acem 
retti.
evinden kovulmuş ve ı^ b^iydi.
OsmanlI münevveri zü 
ması mııkaLİderdi.
OsmanlI cemivetinin 
kendisi >^ibi sun’i ve ij r^eti 
ve Acem tesirleri altında Div 
hırında otladıktan sonra, Tanzir 
sini ^îarbın fikir ve ^törüş boyu
ku. i^:r
kal-
lîdebiyatta da. bıitün öteki saha  ^
p:ayet sathi bir taklitçilik alıp yürün' 





SfDİn sesin gibi bir  ak l ina:  ı r u h n ü v az  
Bir in 'ikâst niyaz 
G ecen in  sinei ı ı lâ l ın den
Süzülüp, dağlara , ■ahabclere te ranele r  serper.
O  d e m  ki bü lb ü lü  jeyda  sanevberan ı  te r in  
Şu mavi gölgelerin 
Şebi am akt  p ü rh ay a l in d en  
G û (ü  r u h u  leyali b ihabere
ne^idele« söyler. 
Hüseyin  Suat
an'.İt b.ıvatı da 








T a t l ı ,  h a f i f  b i r  t e b e s s ü m  i n c e  d u d a k l a r ı m  
a ç t ı ,  ş u  h a n d e i  m e l e k â n e y i  d e r i n c e  b i r  n e f e s  
t a k i p  e t t i .  \ ' e d i  k u d r e t i n  e n  m ü k e m m e l  b i r  
n ü m u n e i  s a n ’a t i  o l a n  b a ş ı m  b i r  t a c ı  / . e n i n  ^ i b i  
t e / y i n  e d e t ı  s a ç l a r ı n d a  s e r i  s c y y a l â t ı  i h t i z a z  
c e r e y a n  e t t i ;  ş i i r  i l e  u l v i y e t t e n  m ü r e k k e p  b i r  
â l e m i  r u h a n i y e  n a z ı r  o l a n  g ö z l e r i n i  s e t r e d e n  
p e r d e l e r  k e m a l i  b a t a e t l e  k a l k a r a k  b i r  ç i f t  ı t ı a v i  
^ ü z  a r z e t t i .  H u  g ö z l e r ,  p i ş i ^ â h m d a  ba}!>[teteii 
a ç ı l a n  â l e m i  h a k i k a t t e n  t a h a ş i  i l e  m ü m t e z i ç  
t a a c c ü p  a l â i m i  i z h a r  e d i y o r d u :  g e n ç  k ı z  u y a n d ı . .
l'^itkizuıL' Hıtliı Ziya
ey semayı şita tuâe tuâeöir.
cenahı hebuter, şahabı ter... 
^cwreuanı tabiat gunubeâir;- 
büstüne safî şükûfeler.
i - ne bir yaprak ne bir çiçek* 
ehrengü naümit
burma burma çek 
ir sütrei sefit.
C cnaf) Ş ahabetttn
Osmanlılığın herbiri bir nümunei fazaili ahlâki sayılmağa 
is|)atı kemali istihkak etmiş olan askerimizin askerliğe ait me- 
ziyatı meşhuresi muharcbci ahirede uyunu nlerniyane daha 
şaşaalı, daha vazıh bir suretle tecelli.saz. olduğundan dünyanın 
clsinei takdiri, aklamı sitayişi bu mcz.iyalı âliyeden lüzumu 
kadar bahsettiler ki, tekrarı malûmu ilâm kabüıııden ve binaen- 
ah'yh abes olur.
KiTCtiıcdiir .\f.ıhm ı«r I:Lrctn
İktisat ı l i j ^ ^ ^ f c i V t n ü r u r u  zaman ve te tabüü  te c rübe
ve ez man ile sabite ve düs tu ra i ı  sah ih aya  is tinaden
tertibü tedvin  o I № m u f tu r .
Esası, cemiyet i b e y e r i y e n i ^ ^ ^ n a f i i  maddîyesin i idare eden  
k av a n in i  tabiiyeyî t a h l ^ ^ S H ^ ^ Û W a y e t i  b e ıer in  istihsali ha- 
vayiç em r in d ek i  m e s a ^ ^ l J ^ p z ı ^ d e  sem eredar  eden  ta r ik i 
marifet i irae ile husu lü  re^m ıi  sa ^ f Ş p e  delâlet etmek t ir .
Biliriz ki beni âd em  m a z h ^ t  bir vü cu d u  zikuv>
vettir,  fakat  bu sahai gabraya  t j v 'e m  gelir.
Hiktnrc^ * Azaıından)
T ü r k ^
y a b a â \ ^




İnkılâp, Türk dili nin de, Türk milletinin olduğu gibi, 
kayıtsız ve şartsız istiklâlini ilân etmiştir.
Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son yıllarında Türk dilinin 
kurtuluşu namına düşünülmüş çare, sadece kaideleri 
Tülkçeleştirmekten ibaretti.
Gazinin yüksek  reisliği altında toplanan D il  K u ­
rultayı dax>aı/ı ileniş bir d i l  inkılâbı halinde ortaya  
atmıştır .
Artık Türk dili davası bir Türk rönesans an'anelerinden 
biri olmuştur. Şimdi Türk dili kelimelerilc, sarf ve nahvi, 
kısaca bütün bünyesile yeniden inşa olunan İçtimaî bir 
müessesedir.
Bu büyük davanın olgunlaşmasına millet içinde bir 
seferberlik manzarası veren yeni dil hareketi. Gazinin 
kendi elile idare ettiği bütün davalar gibi, milletin en 
derin kaynaklarında kuvvetler ve hamleler uyandıran bir 
inkılâp manası taşımaktadır.
Bu arlık bir dil reformu değildir. Bu, bir dil inkılâbıdır.
Bu hareket yemişlerini şimdiden vermeğe başladı. ‘
İnkılâp Türkiyesinin edebiyatı, milletin İçtimaî örgü­
sünü aksettirmeğe ve köklerini memlekete bağlamağa 
doğru giden canlı bir harekettir.
Cihan edebiyatına orijinal bir Türk edebiyatı katmak 
şerefi inkılâp san'atkârına nasip olacaktır.
Tjiliçe огоеИег:
T e k  m e k t e p  d o k u z  y a ş ı n d a d ı r .
A r a p  h a r f i  b i l m i y e n  o k u m u ş  ç o c u k l a r ı n  s a y ı s ı  
4 0 0 , 0 0 0  - i g e ç t i .
D o l a b a  a t t ı ğ ı m ı z  s o n  f e s l e r i n  k ı r m ı z ı  ç u h a l a r ı  
v e  k a r a  p ü s k ü l l e r i  ç ü r ü d ü .
T e c v i t  v e  ş e d d e ,  A c e m  t e r k i p l e r i  v e  A r a p ,  
b a p l a r ı ,  e s k i  ş a r k  i ş l e m e l e r i n e  d ö n d ü .
S o n  m e d r e s e l i n i n  s a ç ı  a ğ a r d ı .
B i z i m  b ü t ü n  g e n ç l i g i m i z c e  s ü r e n  k a v g a n ı n  
a d ı ,  e s k i - y e n i  k a v g a s ı  o l d u .  B u  a d  y a n l ı ş  k o n ­
m u ş t u r .  B u  k a v g a n ı n  a s ı l  d o ğ r u  a d ı  e s k i  v e  
y e n i  d e ğ i l ,  i k i  m e d e n i y e t ,  i k i  k ü l t ü r ,  i k i  ç a g  
k a v g a s ı d ı r .  B i z i m  i s m i m i z  g â v u r ,  k a r ş ı m ı z d a -  
k i l e r i n  i s m i  m ü r t e c i  i d i :  H a ç  v e  h i l â l  g i b i
ç a r p ı ş ı y o r d u k .  F a tih  R ı f k ı .
Türkiye nasıl zenginleşir ?
Bu suale cevap vermek için düşünüyorum: gö­
zümün önüne zenginleşecek güzel yurdum geliyor. 
Cennet gibi ovalar, şen, mes’ut yuvalar, parlak 
mavi gökünü fabrika dumanlarından bulutlar kap­
lamış şehirler, şen şarkılarla çalkanan güzel evli 
köyler..
Bu hayali hakikat yapmak yoluna büyük öncü­
müzün işaretile girdik. İkinci hedef: İktisat. Şu 
saydıklarımı hepimiz yapacağız. Yurdumuzun mal­
larını, milli mallarımızı kullanacağız. vHam madde 
yetşitiren memleketimiz sanayi yuvası olacak, 
çiftçinin eline para girecek, işsizlik, sefalet kalka­
cak. Ziraat yeni aletlerle daha geniş yapılacak. 
Kasabalarda, yerine göre dokuma tezgâhları, iş 
yuvalan, konserve fabrikaları kurulacak.
Behire
Ankara Ticaret Liteti lolebeti
“ Aşk,, diye ne bir Tanrı adına varacağa 
Ne gözleri yeşil bir kadına varacağa. 
Ergenliğin düşünü gören genç adam gibi  ^
Toprağı altetmenin tadına varacağız. ■
Behçet Kemal.
**Yaban„ da n  :
Geçen gün bir cephanenin cepheye nasıl taşındı­
ğını gördüm . Uzun bir kağnı kafilesi, ah, ne hazindi, 
bu kağnı kafilesi... Gıcır, gıcır... Ve sıska m andaların 
kalça kemikleri o kadar sivrilmisti ki, yer yer derile­
rini delmişti. B u deliklerin üstünde sineklerin yüzü 
kalkıp yüzü oturuyor. Kafileyi sevkeden insanlar ise 
bu sineklerin azmanı gibidir. Ne sakilleri insan sek­
line, ne yürüyüşleri insan yürüyüşüne, ne sesleri insan 
sesine benzer. Bu iki direk iki tekerlekten ibaret 
arabalar sanki onların gövdelerinin bir ekidir. B un­
ların içinde yatarlar. Yatakları, yorganları, yiyecek ve 
içecekleri bunların içindedir. Kaplum bağanın kabuğu 
belki kaplum bağadan ayrılabilir, fakat, bu arabaları 
bu adam lardan ayırm anın im kânı yoktur.
Y akup  KadrL
G ö z l e r i m d e  p a r ı l t ı s ı  b a k ı r  b i r  t a s ı n  
K u l ı ı k l a r ı ı ı ı  k o m ş u l a r ı n  a y a k  s e s in d e .
V a r s ın  b u n a  b i r  y u d u m  s u  v e r e n  o l m a s ı n  
Biiç u c u ı ı ı d u n  b i r i  b a n a  su  y o k  d e s i n  d c .





k Of I d I rd i k!
D i l i  y a b n n c ı  v e  i b r e l i  o l a n  O s m a n l ı  
c e m i y e t i n i n  l ı a r i l e r i  d e  d i l i m i z i n  b ü n ­
y e s i n e  v e  a l ı e n ^ i n e  b i r  t ü r l ü  k e n d i ­
s i n i  u y d u r a m a m ı ş  o l a n  A r a p  h a r f l e r i d i .  
B u  h a r f l e r :
A  —  t i k  t a h s i l i  s o n  d e r e c e  g ü r l e ş t i r i ­
y o r d u .
B — Bizi acayip, pahalı ve ters bir 
matbaa tekniğine bağlıyordu.
C -- Bizi teokrasinin külliyatına ve 
fikir yeraltlarına doğru sürüklüyordu.
D — Yabancıların dilimizi öğrenm e­
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“Vatandaşları yani Türk harflerini çabnk fifreniniz! Bütün mllletCı kfiylüye, çobana, hamala, eandelcıya, fifrctiniz. Bunu vatanperverlik ve milliyetperverlik vazifesi biliniz. Bu vazifeyi yaparken, düşününüz ki bir milietin, bir içtimai hcyetkı yüzde eekeeni okuma yazma bilmez, bu ayıptır. “Bundan İnsan olanlar utanmak lâzımdır. Bu millet utan· mak için yaratılmış bir millet defildir. İftihar etmek İçin yaratılmış ve İftiharla tarihini doldurmuş bir millettir. Milletin yüzde sekseni okuma yazma bilmiyorsa, bata biz- lerde defildir. Hata onlardadır ki, Türk seciyesini anlamı- yarak birtakım zincirlerle knfalurmsızı sarmışlardır. Mazi· nin hatalarını kfikOnden temizlemek zamanındayız. Hata­ları tashih edeceğiz.» Gazi
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VENI TÜRK HARFLERİ.
'V/"ENI Türk harfleri dilimizin bünyesine ve 
ahengine tamamile uygundur.
Bu harfler;
A. — Ümmilik mücadelesinde en kuvvetli si­
lâhımız ve çocuğa okuyup yazmayı kolayca 
öğretmek için güzel bir vasıtadır.
B. — Bize modern matbaa tekniğinden arıza­
sız istifade yollarını açmıştır.
C. — Bizi teokratik külliyatından ve fikir ye- 
raltlanndan bir darbede ayırmıştır. Geriye 
doğru uzanan köprüyü dinamitleyip atmıştır.
D. — Yabancıların dilimizi kolayca öğrenme­
lerini ve ekalliyetlerin millet bünyemize gir­
melerini kolaylaştırmıştır.
Kar^ııcıkhчr^¡acıí: Ih irflrnnı
bir türlii iokcrnı-ı/rn halk, ş nu/i gül· 





O S M A N L I N I N  tarih te lâ k k is i  üçe bölü n- müijtür.
(')smanlı  tarihi.
İs lâ m  tarihi.
L l m u m i  tarih ( A b d ü l l ı a m i d in  son d e v ir le r in d e  
m ekteplerde o k u t u lm a s ı  y asa k  ed ilm işt i) .
O s rn a n l ıM a r ih i ,  O s r n a n o g u l la r m m  bir  aile  m a ­
s a l ın d a n  ibaretti. T ü r k  m il le t in in  v . ı r l ı ^ m j ı n  
O s m a n  ü ^ u l la r m ın  tarih sa h n e s in e  ç ık m a s ı  
t lo la y ıs i le  haber v e r i ld i .
Türk m i l le t in in  v a r l ığ ı ,  O s m a n l ı  t a r ih in in  baş­
la n g ıc ın a  ar ız i  o larak k a r ışt ığ ı  g ib i ,  bu tar ih in  
b ü tün se y r i  m ü d d e t in ce  de a r ız î  o lm a ktan  k u r ­
tu lm a m ış t ır .
Türklük bu tarih telâkkisi indinde gizlenmesi, 
unutulup bir kenara bırakılması icap eden bir 
mefhumdu. Ve bunun üzerinde durmak O s­
manlılık için adeta bir tehlike sayılırdı.
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İslâm tarihi, Osmanlı cemiyetinin teokarasiye 
verdiği mevki dolayısile mühim sayılırdı. Baş­
tan aşağı araplara ve Araplığa ait olan bu tari­
hin mukaddemesi ise “ Kısası Embiya,,  idi. O 
*‘ Kısası Embiya,, ki, Yahudi peygamberlerinin 
masallarından başka bir şey değildir.
Umumî tarih, insanlık tarihinin ancak bir fas­
lıdır. Ondan evvelki kısımlara Avrupalılar 
“ Tarih ötesi „ adını vermişlerdir. Buna se­
bep te tarihin AvrupalIlara göre telâkkisinde, 
ona, AvrupalIların ırkî faikıyetlerine göre bir 
hareket noktası ve Avrupanın tahakküm siya­
setine göre bir mihver verilmesidir.
O s m a n l ı  c e m i y e t i n i n  “ U m u m î  t a r i h , ,  a d ı  a l t ı n d a  
o k u t t u ğ u  ş e y l e r ,  g e r e k  h a r e k e t  n o k t a s ı ,  g e r e k s e  
v e r d i ğ i  h ü k ü m l e r  b a k ı m ı n d a n  t a m a m i l e  g a y r i  
i l m i  v e  k e y f î  o l.a n  b i r  “ A v r u p a l ı l ı k , ,  t a r i h i d i r .  
G ö r ü l ü y o r  k i ,  O s m a n l ı l ı ğ ı n  t a r i h  t e l â k k i s i  h e m  
b ö l ü m  p ö r ç ü k  h e m  d e  g a y r i i l m î  i d i  v e  T ü r k l ü k  
i l e  h i ç l ü r  a l â k a s ı  y o k t u .
. £. 1 *m. i?.!.· il »l
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in k ılâ p çı T ürkün  
Tarih T elâkkisi:
İNKILAP Türkiyesinin tarih telâkkisi, hare- 
 ^ ket noktası olarak Türk milletinin tarih 
sahnesine çıkışını, mihver ve varış noktası 
olarak ta büyük milletin insanlık tarihinde 
oynadığı ve oynamakta olduğu medeniyet 
rolünü almıştır.
Yeni tarih telâkkimiz, bizi milletimizin öz 
kaynaklarına götüren ve onun cihan içinde­
ki seyrini anlatan ışıklı bir kavrayıştır.
Bize, Türk tarihile insanlık tarihinin biribir- 
lerile olan karşılıklı ve içli dışlı münasebetle­
rini bir bütünlük halinde verir.
Osmanlı tarihi, İslâm tarihi, araplılık tarihi 
v. s., V. s. Türk tarihinin içine ancak dolayı- 
sile alınmış birtakım fasıllardır.
Yeni Türk tarihi, bizi bize Avrupalıların 
istedikleri ve işlerine geldiği gibi değil, tari­
hî hakikatin gösterdiği gibi anlatmaktadır. 
Yani Türk tarihinin en büyük vasfı herşeyden 
önce “İlmî,, oluşutur.
Bu Yeni telâkki, Türk milletinin başta ge­
len mevkiini geriye doğru olduğu gibi ileriye 
doğru da gösteren bir esastır.
Yeni telâkkiye göre, Türk milleti on binlerce 
senelik bir medeniyet ve tarih devresi­
nin mirasçısı oluyor. Ve bütün bu devir için­
de göstermiş ve insanlık tarihine hediye et­
miş olduğu eserleri tevsik için büyük bir tarihî 
tetkik davasının karşısına getirilmiş oluyor. 
Büyük Gazinin eseri olan yeni tarih telâk­
kisi, tıpkı dil davası gibi, manen ve maddeten 
milletçe bir seferbirliğin manzarasını almış 
ve ardı gelmiyen arkeoloji ve tarih tetkika- 
tının anahtarı olmuştur.
Bu davanın bir güzel tarafı da, kendisine 
muvazi olarak ilerliyen dil işine doğrudan 
doğruya bağlı olması ve Türk milletinin tarih 
içinde yeniden uyanışını ve kendi benliğine 
kavuşmasını müjdelemesidir.
Bir Türk arkeolojisile, bir Türk filolojisinin 
bu kadar özlü ve köklü bir surette ortaya 
konuşu, bu iki harekete yeni bir Türk röne- 
sansmın kıymet ve şümulünü vermiştir.
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OS M A N L I  c e m i y e t i n d e  k a d ı n ,  s a d e c e  b i r  d i ş i  i d i .
K a d ı n a  y a l n ı z  f i / i y o l o j i k  b i r  r o l  
v e r i l d i ğ i  i ^ i n ,  o t u m  c e m i y e t  i vg i nde  
b a ş k a  t i ı r l ü  k ı y m e t l e r  e d i n m e s i n e  
c e v a z  y o k l u .
K a r a  b i r  t a a s s u p ,  o n u  e \ ' i n i n  i ^ i n e j  
t ı k a m ı ş t ı .
V e  k a d ı n ı n  c a h i l ,  g ö r g ü s ü z  k a l ­
m a s ı ,  i s k â n ı  a h l â k ı n ı n  t u t u n a b i l m e s i  ; 
i ğ i n  ş a r t l ı .
• H a s i l  b i r  ( ; a d ı r  v e  ç ö l  h a y a t ı n ı n  
i n s a n l a r ı n  a h l â k ı n ı  g e m a l t m d a  t u ­
t a b i l m e k  i ç i n  l ü z u m l u  y ^ ö r d ü p f ü  
İ ç t i m a î  t e d b i r l e r ,  s a r s ı l m a z  n a s l a r  
h a l i n d e  i n k ı l â b a  k a d a r  s ü r ü p  j ^ e h n i ş l  
v e  c e m i y e t i  k a d ı n d a n  a y ı r a r a k  k u v ­
v e t i n i  y a r ı  y a r ı y a  d ü ş ü r m ü ş t ü .
O sm anlI cemiyetinin ahlâk mefhu­
mu, bizzat ahlâka karşı itimatsız­
lıktan başka bir şey^degildi.
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İN K I L A P  T ü r k i y o s i n d e  k a d ı n  e r k e ğ i n  d e n g i  t a n ı n m ı ş ·  t a m  h u k u k l u  b i r  i n s a n d ı r .
H i / . i m  k a d ı n l ı l <  d a v a m ı z ,  A v r u p a d a k i  f e m i n i z m i n  
s e m t i n e  b i l e  u ğ r a m a m ı ş t ı r .  B a z ı  e n  m e d e n î  A v r u p a  
m e m l e k e t l e r i n d e  b i l e  h â l â  t a h a k k u k u  i ^ i ı ı  u ğ r a ş ı l a n  
k a d ı n  h a k l a r ı n ı .  I ' ü r k  k a d ı n ı  t o p t a n  e l d e  e t m i ş t i r .  
B i z d e k i  k a d ı n l ı k  d a v a s ı ,  A v r u p a  f e m i n i z m i n d e n  ş u  
i t i b a r l a  d a h a  d e r i n  v e  ş ü m u l l ü d ü r  k i ,  o r a d a k i  k a d ı n  b i r ­
t a k ı m  s i y a s i  f ı r k a l a r ı n  i n t i h a b a t  d a l a v e r e l e r i n e  a l e t  t e ­
l â k k i  o l u n m u ş ,  b i z d e  i s e  k a d ı n ı n  k u r t u l u ş u  b i r  i n s a n ­
l ı k  v e  b i r  m i l l e t  d a v a s ı  o l a r a k  t a h a k k u k  e t t i r i l m i ş t i r .  
İ s l â m  c e m i y e t i n d e ,  c i n s î  a h l â k ,  p e ç e ,  ç a r ş a f ,  k a f e s ,  
h a r e m ,  s e l â m l ı k  g i b i  b i r t a k ı m  i h t i y a t  t e d b i r l e r i n e  h a ­
v a l e  e d i l m i ş k e n .  Y e n i  T ü r k  C e m i y e t i n d e  k a d ı n l ?  e r k e ­
ğ i n  ş u u r l a r ı n d a n  g e l e n  f a z i l e t l e r i n e  b ı r a k ı l m ı ş t ı r .
B u  i t i b a r l a  b i z d e  k a d ı n ı n  a z a t l ı ğ ı  d o ğ r u d a n  d o ğ r u y a  
a h l â k  m e f h u m u n u n  a z a t l ı g ı m  i f a d e  e d e r .
‘'Anaların bugOnkü evlAtla- rina vereceği terbiye eaki de­virlerdeki gibi baait delildir. BujpflnGn anaları için cvaafı lA- zlmeyl haiz'evlAt yetiytirınek, evlAtlarını bugünkü bayat İçin faal b r uzuv haline koymak pek çok уйкяек ^ evsafın hAmlIl olmaca mulevakkıftır. Binaen­aleyh kadınlarımızı hatta er­keklerimizden çuk münevver, daha çok feyizli, d.«ha fazla bil­gili olmağa mecburdurlar | eğer hakikaten milletin anası olmak İstiyorlarsa...„ Gazi
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K U L T U R  İ N K I L Â B I M I Z
M EH M ET S A F FE T
‘^EĞ ER  bir vatandaş yalnız birini yap­
saydı nam ına m illet hafızasında onu 
ebediyen yaşatacak tunçtan bir hey­
kel dikmeğe değerdi.
Ya bir vatandaş bunlarm  hepsini 
yaparsa ona ne yapmalı? Onun en 
büyük m ükâfatı bütün m illetin nesil- 
o’pr.sn. ebedî b ir sülrran ve 
muhabbet duygusunu kazanmış olma­
sıdır.,,
Evet onlardır, onun en büyük 
m ükâfatı budur. Fakat daha fazlası, 
onun ıbu büyük işleri h.cr tü rlü  mü­
kâfattan  tmüstagni olarak yapmış cî- 
Liiak büyüklüğünü haiz olmasıdır. 
B unları sadece yapmış ohnasm ın bir 
milleti .kurtarıp yükseltmenin, manevî 
zevki onun yüksek vicdamnı tatm ine 
kâfidir. Kaldı ki büyük bir m illet 
ve onun bütün m üstakbel nesilleri ve 
hatta beşeriyet onu daima derin  bir 
muhabbet, sonsuz bir şükran ve min­
netle yadedecektir.
Yapıcısını bu yüksek m azhariye­
te nail eden bütün  bu inkılâplar için­
de hiç şüphesiz en büyüğü k ü ltü r in- 
kılâbımızdrr.
K ültür ne dem ektir?
K ültür b ir m illetin  ruhudur, ha- 
yatmın. iksiridir, kurtuluş ve yükse­
lişin en büyük bir âmilidir. Ruhsuz 
bir vücu t nasıl yaşıyamazsa kü ltü rü  
akim kalmış b ir m illet de payidar o- 
lamaz. K ültür yaşıyan ve yaşatan bir
ruhtur. B ir m illetin  maneviyatıdır.
Daha açık bir ifade ile, kültür, 
bir m illeti meydana getiren uzuvla­
rın düşünüş, duyuş ve gidişinde bi­
linmesi icap eden en iyi şeyleri bil­
mesi, en iy i duygulara m alik olması 
ve en iyi bir tarzda hareket etmesi 
demektir. B.u bilgilerin, duyguların 
ve hareketlerin  m illî bir "‘bünyesi mil­
lî ve İçtimaî b ir kaynağı,, vardır. Bu 
bünye m illetin bütün mazisiyle olan 
varlığı, bu kaynak bütün  istikbaliyle 
beslenen m efkûreleridir.
Bizim mazimizle olan varlığımız 
bütün beşeriyet tarih in in  yekta bir 
simasını arzettiğ i, tarih in  en büyük 
dehasmm sezişinin bir işaretiyle a- 
raştırılarak m eydana çıkm ıştır. Kül­
tü r inkılâbım ızın en başında işte bu 
bü)rük hakikatin  keşfini görüyoruz. 
Muhayyilemiz önündeki bütün o ge­
niş beşerî faaliyet sahalarm da T ür­
kün büyük ruhunu, yüksek zekâ ve 
kabiliyetini görüyoruz. E n eski za­
manlardan beri beşeriyetin talim  ve 
terbiyesini deruhte etmiş olan bir mil­
letin  evlâtları olmak, bunu hakika­
ten şuurla idrak etmek ne büyük bir 
kültür bünyesine m alik olmak, ne mu­
azzam (bir manevî inkılâp vücuda ge­
tirmek demektir. Bu büyük millet 
böylece kendi kendisinin azametini 
anlamış oluyor, başkalannm  kendi­
sine harika diye izafe ettiği işleri
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O bu idrak sayesinde pek tabiî bulu­
yor. Eğer bu m illet dahî ve büyük 
adam yetiştirmezse başka hiçbir m il­
let yetiştiremez. Bunu tarih  inkılâ­
bımızla anladık.
K ültür inkılâbım ızın bünyesine 
taallûk eden ikinci büyük safhası dü­
şünüşümüzün, duygum uzun ve ha­
reketlerim izin ifadesi olan dilim izin 
zenginliğini ve büyüklüğünü anlamış 
olmaık inkılâbıdır. Dilimiz de ta rih i­
miz gibi dünyaya hâkim olmuş bütün 
kavimlere en esaslı bir m edeniyet un­
suru vermiştir. Zaten büyük medenî 
bir m illetin başka tü rlü  bir dili ola- ‘ 
mazdı. Bu hakikati de öğrendik ve 
bir zühul eseri olarak bir zamanlar 
kullandığımız Osmanlıcadan dilimizi 
tasfiye etmeğe büyük zengin T ürk  
diline dönmeğe cehtettik. Bu da ge­
ne Onun sezişinin, Onun iradesinin 
mahsulüdür. Ve onun için tahakkuk 
etmemesine, akim kalmasına hiçbir 
imkân olmadığını düşünmek, ruh­
larımıza büyük b ir sevinç membaı o- 
luyor. Çok geçmeden bütün münev­
verler, bütün irfan  hayatım ız büyük 
ana diline hakikî T ürk  anasm ın d ili­
ne kavuşacaktır.
Gerek tarih, gerek dilce bu benli­
ğimize doğru gidiş bizim m illî şahsi­
yetimizi tamamiryacak, bizi geniş ay- 
dm lık ufuklara doğru yürütecektir. 
Kendi kendisini öğrenen bir insan 
nasıl haysiyet ve şuurunun icabı ola­
rak yükselirse kendi benliğini en yük­
sek bir hakikat olarak öğrenen bir 
m illet de bu inkişafa behemehal maz- 
har olur.
‘T arlad a  çapası üzerine eğilmiş du­
ran yorgun argın T ürk  köylüsü! Sa­
kıt, mütehammil, asıl T ü rk  köylüsü..
Şimdi sana dönüyoruz. Ancak se­
nin kucağında, kollarında senin d i­
linde en yüksek, asîl duygu lan  bul­
mak mümkün olabilir. Seni asırlar­
ca ilimal ettiler. Fakat bu şaşkm ev­
lâtların  senin en büyük evlâdının ir-  
şadiyle şimdi huzurunda eğiliyorlar. 
H er şey şendedir, her şey şenindir!,,. 
Çapası üzerine eğilmiş yorgun arg ın  
T ürk  köylüsünün bu manzarasına, de­
rin m analı bakışlarındaki suale nasıl 
cevap vereceğiz? T ek bir cevap v ar: 
Onun hizmetine, onun yükselişine 
koşmak...
K ültür inkılâbım ızın bünyesi on­
da, onun ' bü tün  .çci'S-fl: mazii^inde 
m ündem içtir. Bu maziye baktığım ız 
zaman muhayyilemiz önünde ne şe­
refli ve geniş bir “m illî hayat,, “İnsa­
nî hayat,, manzarası canlanıyor.
•: K ültür inkılâbım ızm  “kaynağı- . 
na„ gelince — bu istikbale ait parlak 
m efkurelerimizde m ündem içtir. Bu 
m efkûreleri b ir ana m efkûreye itrca 
edersek onu şöyle ifade edebiliriz: 
“M uasır m edeniyetin en ileri safında 
lâyık olduğumuz mevkii almak.,. B u­
nun iç in  tek  ve aynı zamanda zevkli 
b ir çare v a r : M üspet ve çok çalışmak. 
İnsan için hayatta en zevkli şey ne­
dir? Sualine en büyük m ütefekkir­
ler, filesoflar, peygamberler “çalış­
ma vardır,, cevabını verm işlerdir. 
Çalışmayı zevksiz addeden bir insan 
saadeti dünyanın neresinde hangi va­
sıtada arasa katiyen bulamaz. “Saa­
det, yüksek İçtimaî bir m efkûre uğ­
runda çalışmaktır.,, Avrupanm en bü­
yük filesof şairi olan Göte Faostunda 
İnsanî saadeti böyle bulduğunu büyük 
bir hakikat olarak anlatm ıyor mu? 
Ciddî çalışmak bizim mefkûrem izdir.
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M efkuremiz .içini çalışmak m efkûre- 
mizdir. K ültür inkılâbım ızda bu saf­
ha idrak edilm iştir. Çok uzun sür- 
miyecek bir zamanda bunun azametli 
neticesini, T ü rk  m illetinin şanlı is­
tikbalini m edeniyetin ta  ön safında 
göreceklerdir.
N için çalışıyoruz? M illetim izi 
her safhada yükseltm ek için değil mi? 
îlim , irfan, sanat ve alelıtlak  yaşa­
yış seviyesinde yükseltm ek için çalı­
şıyoruz.
O halde, büyüklerim izin bunlar 
üzerinde ne ham leler hazırladıklarını 
bir görelim. B unları düşünürken bu 
m illî yükselişim izin aydınlanan fec­
rini görmemek ve karşım ızda doğan 
yeni günün ışıklarını seyretm ekten 
derin hazlar dujnnamak mümkün de­
ğildir.
İsm et Paşa H azretlerin in  yüksek 
tarihî şahsiyetlerinin reisliği altında 
çabşan liyakatli kabinede irfan  inkı­
lâbını eline almış olan idealist yük­
sek karakterli M aarif Vekilimiz Dr. 
Reşit Galip Bey, geniş ve şaşmaz iha- 
tasiyle bu işi katî bir surette halle ка­
гат verm iştir. Ne lâzım dır? Dedik 
ki ilim, irfan ve sanatte kültürüm üz 
yükseltilecektir. İlk  iş ilim  kaynağı 
olan ve inkılâbım ızm  ölçüsiyle m üte­
nasip olan bir darü lfünun kurm aktır. 
Bunun bütün hazırlıkları ikmal edil­
miş yeni ve liyakatli b ir inkılâp darül­
fünunu kurulmak üzeredir. Bu darül­
fünun T ürk  ilmini yapacak, T ürk  
âlim lerini yetiştirecek evsaf ve m ahi­
yeti haizdir. O kadar güzel ve o ka­
dar etraflı düşünülmüş b ir müessese­
dir.
Bundan sonra umumiyetle her­
kesin irfanına hadim olacak büyük
millî kütüpanemiz kurulacaktır. Bu 
millî kütüpane T ürk  m illetinin en 
büyük bir irfan  hâzinesi olacaktır. 
Bilgimizi yükseltmek, muhitimizde 
kuvvetli b ir manevî hava yaşatacak 
bütün eski ve yeni eserler orada her­
kesin istifadesine açık bulundurula­
caktır.
M illî müzeye gelince — bu, her 
türlü  şuabatiyle başlı başına b ir san­
at hâzinesi olmakla kalmıyarak aynı 
zamanda darülfünun derecesinde ve 
hatta ondan daha müessir b ir bilgi 
müessesesi olacaktır. Amerikan â- 
lim lerinden Gilman müzeleri, bu söz­
lerimizi teyit edecek mahiyette, da­
rülfünunun blic Ic.v kilidi;: illüşahlias
bir terbiye müessesesi addetm ektedir. 
Oraları ilham membaıdırla·:. İnsani­
yetin iptidaî devirlerinde,içinde vahşî 
kasrrgal'Jir esen koyu ormanlar arasın­
da hir hayat hamlesi halinde fışkırıp  
yükselen sanat n:ıhu bize o yeşil, gü­
zel tabiatin  ilham larını verir. İlim  
müzeleri ve sanat müzeleri iki ayrı 
ayrı müessese olmakla beraber eşya­
larını teşhir vasıtasiyle terbiye ver­
mek hususımda m üşterektirler. Ve 
onun için her ikisine de müze ünvanı 
verilm iştir. İlim  müzesi bilgi verir, 
bilgi iştiyakları uyandırır. Sanat 
müzesi zevk ilhamları verir, zevki in­
celtir. H ayatın manasmı daha derin­
den anlamağı ve yaşamağı öğretir. 
İçimizde en ta tlı hisleri uyandıran, 
insanın hayvandan farklı olarak en 
büyük m eziyeti olan, muhayyilesini 
besi iyen ve büyüten müessese sanat 
müzesidir.
İşte  cemiyet içinde böyle yüksek 
bir kü ltür e fu le si olan büyük mil-
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lî müzemiz de m illetim izin şerefiyle 
mütenasip bir şekilde pek yakında 
Ankarada kurulacak ve k ü ltü r inkılâ­
bımızın mühim bir boşluğunu yapa­
cağı hizmetlerle dolduracaktır.
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Bunların hepsinin fevkinde bir 
de ilim ve irfan  süzgeci olan m illî 
akademimiz kuruluyor. Akademiler 
her sahada büyük millî ve İnsanî hiz­
metler yapan, eserler meydana geti­
ren simaları şerefli sakafı altında 
toplıyan bir müessesedir. H er yeni 
bilgi, her büyük iş o kanaldan geçe­
rek, onun tasvibine iktiran ederek em- 
..niyç,tle.>milletin huzuruna çıkacak ve 
sahibi böyle bir şerefe liyakat kesbe- 
decektir. Görülüyor ki akademiler 
bir m illetin ilim ve irfanını, ibda- 
larm ı kontrol ve teşvik eden en yük­
sek ve lüzumlu bir salâhiyet makamı­
dır.
' İşte  kü ltü r inkılâbım ızm  bu ye­
ni, esaslı ve mühim hamlelerinin ha­
zırlandığını serin rüzgârlı tepelerden 
fevkalbeşer denecek hayatî bir hamle 
ile yeni T ürk  medeniyeti ışıklarının 
yükseldiği bu aydınlık güzel Anado­
lu yaylasına meçlûp olammak müm­
kün m üdür? Bu hamleleri, bunu âşk, 
zekâ ve kabiliyetle geceli gündüzlü 
çalışarak hazırlıyanı ve yapacak olanı 
düşününce makalemizıin başındaki 
cümleye tekrar dönmek arzusuna 
mukavemet edilemez.
'B ir vatandaş bunlardan yalnız 
birini yapsaydı m illetin en büyük ma- 
arifçisi diye m illet hafızasında ebedi­
yen yaşatmak üzere namına bir hey­
kel dikmeğe değerdi. E ğer bir va­
tandaş bunların hepsini yaparsa ir ­
fan ve kü ltü r hayatım ızdaki kazanç 
namına onun m ükâfatı ne olacaktır? 
Onun en büyük m ükâfatı nesilden 
nesle m illetin bütün irfan  m üntesip- 
lerinin, bütün münevver evlâtları­
nın derin muhabbet ve şükranm ı ka­
zanmış olmaktır. H atta bundan da 
fazla onun en büyük m ükâfatı m ille­
tine yaptığı hizm etlerin, yüksek vic­
danına verdiği payansız tatm inkârlık- 
tır. Büyük adamlar her tü rlü  mükâ­
fattan m üstağni olarak m illî rollerini 
yaparlar.
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